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Abstract 
Evolutionary theory has been employed to explain psychological and social 
phenomena for over a hundred years. However, despite various claims that 
evolutionary theory should be considered the dominant theoretical framework for 
psychology, mainstream psychologists have resisted the widespread use of 
evolutionary explanations in their domain. This thesis aims to clarify the role of 
evolutionary explanations in psychology. In particular, I demonstrate that a clearer 
understanding of the role of evolutionary explanations in psy~hology is obtained by 
drawing on some recent literature in the philosophy of science. Evolutionary theory, I 
argue offers a coherent, unifying, explanatory framework for psychology, and 
evolutionary explanations should have a more prominent role in psychological science 
than they have had in the past. However, mainstream psychological theory will not be 
entirely replaced by theories drawn from the evolutionary research programme. The 
relationship between evolutionary explanations and other sorts of explanations in 
psychology is clarified, and some suggestions as to what evolutionary theory offers 
the future of psychology are forwarded. 
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Introduction 
Humans are the product of evolution. Our opposable thumb, bipedal stance, and 
colour vision are all the result of millions of years of selection under ecological 
conditions where these characteristics proved favorable in fulfilling reproductive 
goals. The anatomical and physiological features of our bodies are clearly explicable 
in tenns of evolutionary theory. Evolution by natural selection can explain why we 
possess a grasping hand with an opposable thumb, why we walk upright, and why we 
see the world in colour. In all motile organisms certain ways of behaving, but not 
others, are also likely to prove beneficial in tenns of increasing reproductive success. 
Ultimately behaviour is regulated by brain processes. In organisms with complex 
nervous systems, brain processes can be conceptualised as the physiological 
instantiations of psychological mechanisms.' Certain ways of perceiving and thinking 
about the world, of making decisions, and of integrating behaviour are likely to prove 
more reproductively successful than are others. It follows that evolutionary theory 
should be able to explain why humans think and behave in the way that they do. The 
logical conclusion is that evolutionary theory should be able to provide satisfactory 
explanations of human psychological and behavioral phenomena. Psychology should 
be considered as a branch of biology. 
The sort of argument outlined above has been forwarded by numerous biologists, 
philosophers, anthropologists and psychologists since the publication of Darwin's The 
Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection. Darwin himself clearly viewed 
the emotional, behavioural, and psychological characteristics of humans as specific 
instances of evolution by natural selection at work. Evolutionary theory for Darwin, 
Huxley, Romanes, and others provided a means of explaining the nature and 
organization of the human mind just as it provided explanations for physiological, 
anatomical and behavioural phenomena in humans and other animals. 
About a hundred years later, the development of sociobiology, to the consternation of 
many social scientists, offered a way of explaining the patterns of social behaviour in 
humans and other animals by reference to evolutionary theory. For E. O. Wilson, as 
with Darwin, psychology could be clearly conceptualised as a biological science. Just 
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over a decade later, and in the wake of a voluminous raft of criticism directed at 
sociobiology, evolutionary psychologists were beginning to make similar claims. For 
evolutionary psychologists, however, the mind was seen as the level to which 
evolutionary explanations should be directed. The seemingly diverse behaviour 
manifest in humans was explained as the product of innate psychological 
mechanisms, explicable ultimately in terms of evolutionary forces. As with Darwin 
and Wilson, psychology was, and is, viewed by evolutionary psychologists as part of 
biological science. Evolutionary theory is, or should be, the unifying theoretical 
paradigm in the psychological sciences. 
Mainstream psychologists, however, have been, and remain, unconvinced. Humans 
may be the product of evolution it is conceded, but that does not necessarily mean that 
the rich and diverse characteristics that humans possess are explicable in evolutionary 
terms. There is more to human life, it is suggested, than can be gleaned from an 
evolutionary point of view. The phenomena that psychologists study are necessarily 
imbued with meaning. Therefore, psychological phenomena are best understood in 
terms of specific developmental trajectories through richly structured cultural space. 
The role of evolutionary explanations, it is suggested, is extremely limited and 
psychology should not be conceived of as merely a branch of biology. 
How are we to reconcile these two, seemingly contradictory perspectives on the role 
of evolutionary explanations in psychology? The fact of human evolution suggests 
some place for evolutionary explanations in psychology, but this by itself says little 
about just what that place might be. In this thesis I suggest that understanding the role 
of evolutionary explanations in psychology pivots on some central issues of more 
general concern in the philosophy of science. More specifically, the role of 
evolutionary explanations in psychology can be clarified by a consideration of the 
nature of theories and theory appraisal, the nature of explanation and how progress is 
achieved in science. If we are to understand what part evolutionary theory will play in 
a future psychology, we need to clarify just how evolutionary theory is structured, 
what its relationship is to other theories in psychology, and just what sort of 
explanations it offers for psychological science. 
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Philip Kitcher (1985) in his book Vaulting Ambition provided a detailed discussion of 
the nature and adequacy of sociobiology as an approach to human behaviour from a 
philosophy of science perspective. More recently, article length discussions of 
evolutionary explanations in psychology offered by philosophers of science include 
Stereleny (1992) Sober (1993a) and Kitcher (1990). Given the renewed interest in 
evolutionary approaches to psychology, I believe the time is ripe for a more detailed 
discussion of some of the crucial issues relevant to our understanding of the role of 
evolutionary explanations in psychology. Moreover, whereas past discussions have 
focused primarily on the adequacy of evolutionary explanations of psychological 
phenomena in methodological or epistemological terms, I believe is necessary to 
extend this analysis to a more in-depth treatment of issues of more global concern. To 
this end the aim of this thesis is to provide an evaluation of evolutionary explanations 
in psychology in terms of a more general conception of the nature of science. My 
primary goal is to provide a clarification of the role that evolutionary explanations 
play in psychology ahd the role that they should play in our attempts to further our 
understanding of psychological phenomena. 
In the first chapter I provide a detailed discussion of the important conceptual issues 
relevant to evaluating the role of evolutionary explanations in psychology. My 
approach in this chapter, however, is more general in nature. I begin by providing a 
sketch of a realist approach to science. Although realism is rarely explicitly called 
upon in the rest of the thesis, it is an important perspective from which to develop a 
stable and coherent philosophy of science, and to locate psychology clearly as part of 
a more a more general attempt by science to understand the nature of the world. 
Following this discussion of realism, I outline some contemporary approaches to 
understanding the nature of theories and theory appraisal. I draw heavily here on a 
model of theory appraisal recently forwarded by the cognitive scientist Paul Thagard 
(1992). Thagard's approach to theory appraisal provides a fruitful and illuminating 
way of understanding how we should characterise the relations between alternative 
theories and on what basis we should prefer one theory to another. In science, the unit 
of epistemic significance is rarely located at the level of single theories, but instead 
can be found in large scale or global theoretical constructions. At this point I offer a 
model of such large scale theoretical structures, which I call global research 
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programmes. Global research programmes are shown to have important features that 
provide a means of understanding both the internal and external dynamics of science. 
Clarifying the nature of theories and theory appraisal is important if we are to 
understand just what evolutionary theory offers for psychology. Questions regarding 
the nature of explanation are similarly relevant. Just when is something adequately 
explained, and what sort of explanations should we be seeking in science? I provide a 
discussion of these issues and present an approach to explanation that will prove 
useful in clarifying the kinds of explanatory resources that the evolutionary 
programme offers psychology. Finally in the first chapter, I present a discussion of the 
nature of conceptual change and progress in science. If we are to understand what 
evolutionary theory offers for the future of psychology it is important to clarify in 
what ways progress can be achieved and under what conditions we might say that a 
conceptual revolution in science has occurred. 
In chapter two I discuss the nature of psychology. My aim is to suggest that 
psychology should be conceived as a science continuous with the biological and 
physical sciences. Psychology's subject matter indicates that it can only be considered 
as a semi-autonomous science, one with important connections to both biology and 
sociology. The subject matter of psychology also suggests that it will not be a science 
like physics with a primary focus on experimentation, prediction, and the construction 
of scientific laws, but should instead model itself on biology, with an emphasis on 
historical or narrative style explanations. The lack of cumulative progress 111 
psychology, it is suggested, is partly a consequence of the acceptance of an 
inappropriate empiricist philosophy of science. The fragmented conceptual nature of 
psychology is also noted, and it is suggested that theoretical unification in psychology 
can be considered a virtue. However, unification is unlikely to be achieved through 
reduction and we must simultaneously pursue a practice of promoting theoretical 
pluralism. This discussion of psychology provides some conceptual background to an 
evaluation of the claims made by some in the evolutionary programme that 
evolutionary theory offers the appropriate unifying theoretical framework for 
psychology. 
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The history and structure of the evolutionary research programme is elaborated in 
chapter three. It is useful, I believe, to locate current attempts to employ evolutionary 
explanations in psychology in an historical perspective. Importantly, we need to 
understand why evolutionary theory has failed to gain widespread acceptance in 
psychology despite various attempts by philosophers and scientists over the last one-
hundred years or so to explain psychological phenomena from an evolutionary 
perspective. The structure of the general evolutionary research programme is also 
discussed and disciplines such as sociobiology, behavioural ecology and evolutionary 
psychology are presented as clearly being part of the general evolutionary 
programme. There is considerable debate by evolutionary minded anthropologists and 
psychologists about how best to apply evolutionary theory to psychological, 
behavioural and social phenomena. I discuss some of the important issues in this 
context and promote an approach which encourages _ theoretical pluralism while 
drawing on the full resources of the evolutionary research programme in an attempt to 
establish the most explanatorily coherent way of explaining psychological phenomena 
from an evolutionary perspective. 
In chapters four to nine I review the various criticisms which have been directed 
towards the evolutionary research programme in psychology. These criticisms are 
conceptualised in chapter four as being primarily concerned with the overall 
explanatory coherence of the programme. The various sorts of criticisms include 
questions regarding the moral acceptability of the evolutionary research programme 
( chapter five), the adequacy of comparative explanations in psychology (chapter six), 
the use of adaptation explanations (chapter seven) and role of learning and culture in 
explaining human phenomena (chapter eight). 
In chapter nine I present a detailed discussion of the nature of jealousy and the various 
sorts of explanations that have been developed to explain jealousy-related 
phenomena. This chapter serves as a case study of the way I believe we should 
understand evolutionary explanations more generally in psychology. My focus, 
therefore, is on comparing evolutionary explanations of jealousy with alternative 
theoretical approaches in terms of some of the general criteria of theory appraisal 
outlined in chapter one. I also consider how evolutionary explanations of jealousy are 
related to other sorts of theoretical approaches. My conclusion is that evolutionary 
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explanations have a prominent, but not exclusive role, to play in furthering our 
understanding of the nature of jealousy and the various phenomena that are associated 
with it. 
The conclusions reached in chapter nine are adopted more generally in my overview 
of the role of evolutionary explanations in psychology in the final chapter. I present 
reasons to suggest that· the evolutionary programme does not offer either a new or 
revolutionary paradigm for psychological science. However, I indicate that 
evolutionary theory needs to play a more prominent role in the construction of 
psychological theory and in developing explanations of psychological phenomena. I 
conclude by considering some of the ways that the evolutionary research programme 
might increase our understanding of psychological phenomena and provide a means 
of furthering progress in the psychological sciences. My conclusions may be more 
modest and circumspect than some in the evolutionary programme would like. 
Psychology will not be just a branch of biology. However, the conclusions are also 
more bold and expansive than many in mainstream psychology would allow. 
Psychology cannot ignore evolutionary theory. In developing a richer and more 
detailed understanding of humans and the world that we live in, it is important to 
make explicit just how, and to what extent, the evolutionary forces that have led to 
our existence provide satisfactory explanations of the phenomena which constitute the 
science of psychology. 
Chapter One 
Explanation, theory appraisal, and the growth of science: A 
realist perspective 
7 
In evaluating the role that evolutionary explanations have to play in psychology, it is 
important to provide a clear understanding of the nature of science itself. This is no easy 
task, for science has been characterised in a large variety of different, often mutually 
incompatible, ways. My aim in this chapter is to offer a coherent realist view of science. 
In particular, the focus of this chapter is directed towards an elucidation of the way 
science can be said to further our understanding of the nature of the world. 
Firstly, I provide a discussion of the aims of science. Following Maxwell (1984), I 
suggest that science should be directed towards furnishing us with valuable knowledge of 
the world and our place in it. This, I suggest, is most fruitfully achieved given a realist 
philosophy of science. Realism, although the mainstream philosophical position, is 
currently under attack from a variety of sources. I suggest that realism can weather these 
criticisms and remains our best way of understanding the nature of science. A realist 
approach to science suggests that science advances our understanding of the world over 
time by providing increasingly better theoretical explanations of nature. 
Following an overview of realism, I discuss the nature of theories and the way that they 
are organised into more large-scale conceptual structures. I offer at this point a model of 
global research programmes in science, which provides a means of understanding the way 
that scientific theories are organised, and the relations that obtain between academic 
disciplines and between science and society. An overview of the nature of theory 
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appraisal in science is then presented. I suggest here that a model of theory comparison 
developed by Thagard (1992) provides a fruitful way of understanding the relative value 
of theories and the various kinds of relationships that obtain between them. 
The idea that science provides us with an understanding of the world via the development 
of theory is tied closely to the notion of explanation. I discuss the different ways that 
scientific explanation can be conceived and forward a dual perspective on explanation 
championed by Kitcher (1985, 1989) and Salmon (1989). This approach to explanation 
provides us with a way of realising how science furnishes us with a means of increasing 
our understanding of the world. Finally, I discuss the nature of progress and conceptual 
change in science. The discussion here pivots on the way that science can be said to 
provide us with progressively richer and more detailed accounts of the way the world is. 
The aims of science 
One plausible way of characterising science and demarcating it from other forms of 
intellectual inquiry is with respect to its aims. However, just as science itself can be 
viewed as a highly heterogeneous collection of activities, so too can its aims be variously 
construed. Generally speaking empiricists conceive the goal of science to be the 
prediction and control of observable data. Successful theories are to be judged solely with 
respect to their empirical adequacy (van Fraassen, 1977). On this instrumentalist 
construal of theories the aim of science can be viewed as the production of ever more 
powerful descriptions and orderings of empirical results. 
For Laudan (1977) the aim of science is the solving of empirical and conceptual 
problems. Progress in science can be judged to the extent that empirical problems are 
solved and anomalies and conceptual problems are minimised. Kuhn (1962) also sees 
science ('normal science' at least) as essentially a 'puzzle-solving' activity. Science on 
this view may progress in some sense, but it doesn't progress towards anything, such as 
truth. 
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In contrast to this perspective, realists, in general, characterise the goal of science as the 
discovery of explanatory truths about the world (Newton-Smith, 1981; Boyd, 1984). 
Realists claim that science seeks to provide an increase in understanding about the nature 
of the world. The instrumentalist's goal of increasing the empirical content of scientific 
theories is subordinate to this broader aim. Given the inherent fallibility of theories and 
their modification over the history of science, it is unlikely that at any point in time we 
can claim that we have a true theory. Progress in science, therefore, is often conceived of 
as the increase in approximations to the truth, or the increase in the 'verisimilitude' of 
theories (Popper, 1963).1 
Both the instrumentalist and orthodox realist perspectives on the aim of science capture 
something of the nature of actual scientific practice and provide a rationale for scientific 
inquiry. However, I think they both do some injustice to the nature of science as an 
essentially human activity, and to the way science should, indeed needs to, develop in the 
21 st century. 
An evolutionary approach to science (e.g., Hooker, 1987; Dunbar, 1995) suggests that 
science is essentially a species strategy for coming to understand the nature of the world 
and our place in it. Like all organisms, humans subsist on information, we are 
'informavores'. The desire for ever better representations of ourselves and the world we 
live in is a fundamental feature of our evolved biology. When this 'epistemic hunger' 
(common to all organisms not entirely pre-wired) is coupled with human reflexivity and 
language then we have the essential preconditions for the distinctively cumulative and 
progressive nature of science. Information about ourselves and the world we inhabit, 
however, is from an evolutionary point of view, never neutral: we are not seekers of truth 
per se, but of valuable truth. Ultimately what is of value to us is open to question and 
revision, but the best place to begin an understanding of value is with evolution: the 
1 Such a notion is not without its problems (see Newton-Smith, 1981; Laudan, 1984), however, I defend 
something like a 'horizon' concept of truth in my discussion of realism below. Although truth is never 
ultimately obtained, theories can be said to have this aim in their 'sights'. 
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ultimate source for an explanation of what is good or bad for organisms of our type in the 
kind of world we inhabit.2 
A construal of science which does justice to the importance of valuable truth (although 
without the overt evolutionary overtones) is the fundamentalist approach articulated by 
Nicholas Maxwell (1980, 1984). Maxwell argues that the goals of science as typically 
conceived: prediction, control, explanatory truth and so on, although important in their 
own right, need to be subordinate to still more fundamental aims. 
Ideally intellectual inquiry ought to help us to tackle rationally those problems of 
living which we encounter in seeking to discover and achieve that which is of 
value in life. Intellectual inquiry ought, in other words, to devote reason to the 
enhancement of wisdom. (Maxwell, 1980 pI9). 
Maxwell's fundamentalism suggests that all of intellectual inquiry should ultimately be 
directed to answering four basic questions: 
(1) What kind of world is this? 
(II) How do we fit into the world and how did we corne to be? 
(III) What is of most value in life and how is it to be achieved? 
(N) How can we develop a better human world?3 
Just how best to answer these questions and how to achieve the ultimate mm of 
developing what is of most value in existence is of course open to discussion, revision 
and change. However, we will never answer our fundamental questions of existence 
unless all of scientific inquiry is aimed ultimately at these four basic questions outlined 
above. 
2 I am not arguing here that this is the only source for an understanding of value, for there will always be 
conflicts between what is reproductively good for us and what we as individuals value. Moreover, values 
may be relatively idiosyncratic to local features of culture at a level too fme-grained to make evolutionary 
explanations particularly useful. 
3 Maxwell is somewhat anthropocentric here. This fourth fundamental question should I believe be directed 
at developing a better world for humans and all other life forms on the planet. 
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Maxwell contrasts this fundamentalist approach with the specialism typically encountered 
in science. Science in its twentieth century guise consists of a large number of highly 
specialised disciplines and sub-disciplines all concerned with answering highly specific 
and technical questions within their domain. Specialised inquiry is not a bad thing in 
itself, indeed it is necessary to answer question one above; however, this kind of problem 
solving should not be divorced from a consideration of more fundamental assumptions 
and problems. It is important to note that Maxwell is not endorsing some kind of simple 
pragmatism here. Intellectual inquiry is also to be pursued for its own sake. 'Pure' 
intellectual inquiry is a part of what is of value in living. Born in to the world in a state of 
ignorance,4 our fundamental problems centre around our developing an understanding of 
what we are and how we relate to the physical, cognitive and social worlds around us. 
Ultimately, however, the way specialised inquiry is conceived in contemporary academic 
institutions needs to be radically restructured along non-specialised lines. 
Maxwell suggests that disciplines can no longer remain isolated from one another in their 
pursuit of highly specialised knowledge of the world. Moreover, they must openly 
acknowledge their multiple dynamic relations to other areas of inquiry, to institutions, to 
society and more globally, to the planet itself. There needs to be reciprocal lines of 
discourse between experts and non-experts; between institutions and scientists; and more 
generally between society and science. I shall suggest, below, that one way of achieving 
these desiderata is through the development of global research programmes which, among 
other things, specify ways in which sub-disciplines are related to one another and which 
provide means of relating the accounts of science to specifically social and moral issues. 
The aim of achieving valuable knowledge, moreover, is best realised given a realist 
construal of science. 
4 Well, comparative ignorance at least. We do, from birth, have some understanding of some basic features 
of the world we inhabit (e.g., see Spelke, 1991; Shepard, 1984). And of course just how we come to learn 
about the world is to some (as yet unspecifiable degree)framed. (see the contributions to Carey & Gelman, 
1991). 
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A Realist perspective 
Both lay-people and working scientists tend to be realists (in some respects at least). 
Realism is also the majority position in the philosophy of sdence. However, it is currently 
under attack from both relativists and empiricists, although for somewhat different 
reasons. In this section I outline, and defend, a realist approach to science from various 
anti-realist moves. In particular, I highlight the role that super-empirical values play in 
theory appraisal and in the growth of science. I argue that our best understanding of 
theory evaluation and progress in science is most coherently understood from a realist 
perspective. 
Realism, as the title of a recent book by Rom Harre (1986) suggests, comes in a variety of 
forms.50ntological realists believe that the physical world has an existence independently 
of our perception and thoughts about it. This is perhaps the central idea of realism, and is 
one embraced by lay-folk and most philosophers and scientists alike. However, the idea 
that reality exists independently of knowing has been denied by some. Most notably by 
Berkeley, but also by some post-modernist philosophers.6 
Ontological realism with respect to theoretical entities is the idea that the non-observable 
entities described by scientific theories have an existence in the same sense that 
observable objects do. Most working scientists, as Hacking (1984) notes, clearly are 
realists in this sense. Experimental physicists design equipment and experiments which 
can manipulate unobservable entities in such a way as to produce new phenomena. The 
manipUlation of entities in this manner assumes that they actually exist. Some 
sociologists of science, however, (e.g., Latour & Woolgar, 1986) deny the reality of 
entities in these cases. Rather than scientists discovering entities such as electrons in the 
5 My outline of the central ideas of realism is drawn variously from the overviews provided by Hooker 
(1987); Boyd (1984); Leplin (1984); and Greenwood (1987). 
6 For example, Woolgar (1988) and Gergen (1985), who deny that reality can, in any meaningful sense, be 
said to exist prior to and independent from, a suitably constructed knower. 
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world, such entities are conceived of as being constructed through a social process of 
negotiation and persuasion. 
Although there are some questions with regard to the status of ontological realism, it is 
with respect to epistemological and semantic realism that most objections have been 
directed. It is here also that many realists (who share similar ontological commitments) 
part company. Epistemological realism is the thesis that we can have knowledge, albeit 
highly conjectural and fallible knowledge, about the nature of theoretical entities. Our 
best theories therefore are also our best guides to reality. Moreover, because theories refer 
to non-observable entities, it is the global excellence of a theory, not merely its empirical 
adequacy which provides the basis for its acceptance or rejection. Most empiricists 
(notably in recent years, van Fraassen, 1977, 1984) reject this approach to theoretical 
entities. For them, empirical adequacy is to be our primary, if not exclusive, guide to the 
acceptance or rejection of theories. We can have no knowledge ofunobservables. 
The third major realist thesis, semantic realism, claims that our theoretical terms 
embodied in language are genuinely referential in nature. Truth, therefore, consists in an 
appropriate correspondence relation between language and the world. Theories are true, 
or approximately true, by virtue of the way the world is.7 
This point leads to another central claim of realists: the progressiveness of science in 
terms of the increasing truthfulness of theories. Typically speaking, it is claimed, 
scientific change is progressive in nature. Successive theories in the history of science are 
successful to the extent that they provide, generally speaking, a better account of the 
nature of the world, in both its observable and non-observable features. fudeed, as many 
have argued (e.g., Hooker, 1987; McMullin, 1984), the success of science in purely 
pragmatic terms, is only explicable given a realist construal of science. That is, scientific 
7 It is here that one realist at least (Harre, 1986) parts company. For Harre, questions of truth are not 
questions about the relations between language and the world, but are questions abut the moral nature 
of scientific communities. . 
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theories must be at least approximately true. Progress in science then consists in the 
convergence of scientific theories on the true nature of the world. 
In what follows below I defend a strong form of realism, which endorses the ontological, 
epistemological and semantic aspects of realism outlined above, from various anti-realist 
criticisms. 
Anti-Realism 
Challenges to realism come in a variety of guises, manifested as rej ections of the 
ontological, epistemological and semantic aspects of realism outlined above. These 
challenges can be either local or global in nature. The ontological challenge to realism, in 
its global form, represents a rejection of the idea that the world exists independently of a 
suitably constructed knower. Local anti-realists, in contrast, question the existence of 
parts of the world assumed to exist in realist doctrines; those parts which are 
unobservable to unaided humans senses. The epistemic challenge to realism questions our 
ability to know the truth or falsity of theories, either globally, or as they refer to specific 
hidden entities. Doubts about whether terms in theories can be said to refer to theoretical 
entities represents the semantic challenge to realism. 
These doubts about the adequacy of scientific realism are probably best understood in 
terms of the critiques developed by alternative scientific methodologies. For convenience, 
I group these challenges roughly into two alternatives: empiricism and relativism, while 
appreciating that there is a diversity of positions represented by these two approaches. 
However, despite differences in the details of different versions of empiricism and 
relativism, the anti-realist critiques of these approaches can be fairly clearly articulated. 
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The challenge from empiricism 
The anti-realist in the empiricist tradition provides a local challenge to the 
epistemological and semantic theses of most realist doctrines. Empiricists question the 
realist claim that we can have knowledge of unobservable entities, and that our theories 
can be licitly said to refer to those entities. Typically -speaking, empiricists do not 
question the existence of non-observable entities, however, they argue that knowledge of 
these entities is not possible. 
In recent years, this perspective has been most forcibly championed by van Fraassen 
(1977, 1980, 1984), with an approach he labels constructive empiricism. For van 
Fraassen, the acceptance or rejection of a scientific theory should be made solely on the 
basis of its empirical adequacy. Reference to non-observable entities and to virtues above 
and beyond empirical adequacy have no role to play in theory appraisal and the growth of 
science. Theories which include non-observable entities in their ontology will always be 
radically underdetermined by their empirical adequacy, as many theories which may be 
logically incompatible will be empirically equivalent. Van Fraassen claims that no 
scientific evidence can bear on the adequacy of theoretical claims about non-observable 
entities, therefore, the ontology of our theories should be purged from all such claims. 
There remains of course the question of just what should count as being observable. For 
van Fraassen the distinction should be drawn relative to us. Claims about what is 
observable should be made in reference to the normal unaided perceptual capacities of 
humans. Van Fraassen justifies this anthropocentric distinction by noting that it is our 
attitudes towards theories which determine their accepttmce or rejection. Scientific 
activity is best conceived of as construction rather than discovery; the construction of 
theories which are adequate to the data. 
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The challenge from relativism 
Anti-realism in the relativist tradition, despite the variety of positions adopted, pivots on 
two principle arguments: the underdetermination of theories by evidence and the theory-
ladenness of observation (Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983). The Duhem-Quine thesis states 
that because theories are never tested in isolation, but are always conjoined with auxiliary 
hypotheses, and based on methodological assumptions, evidential equivalence between 
theories can always be maintained through modifications or replacement to some aspect 
of the theory matrix. Theory choice, therefore, can not be based on empirical adequacy 
alone; other factors must be involved. 
For sociologists of science, these other factors are often, but not always, social factors: 
Factors that lie outside the rational choice of theories as best representing the true nature 
of the world (Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983; Mulkay, 1979). Such social factors may 
include the motivation and ambition of individual scientists, the social allegiances of 
scientists to class systems, and the political climate in which such decisions are made. 
The acceptance of Lamarckian theory in soviet biology is the classic example of the 
overriding force of political factors in theory acceptance.8 However on a smaller scale, in 
the everyday practice of science, a variety of external factors are said to playa role in the 
epistemic attitudes that scientists adopt towards their theories. 
From this perspective, the realist's claim that theories in some sense map an external 
reality, and that successive theories in the history of science represent increasingly better 
representations of the world, is called into question. If factors other than the epistemic 
virtues of theories playa major role in theory acceptance and rejection, then the so-called 
progress of science better reflects changing socio-political circumstances than it does the 
increasing truthfulness of theories. 
8 Bloor (1981) argues that the invocation of social factors to explain belief acceptance, however, is not just 
restricted to cases of bad science. 
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The possibility of a central role for social factors in the process of theory appraisal also 
follows, so relativists claim, from the theory-Iadelmess of observation. Observations, the 
argument goes, are never theory neutral; they always presuppose some prior ontological 
commitments. Although this point was made explicit by Popper (1959) in his critique of 
logical positivism, it is with Kulm (1962)9 and Feyerabend (1975) that the theory 
dependence of observation has been deployed as an argument against the rational and 
progressive nature of scientific inquiry. 
If scientific theories provide an intellectual structure which serves to orgamse and 
interpret observations, then there can be no theory-independent observations on which 
choices can be made between rival theories. Theories are said to be incommensurable, 
and scientists, in Kulm's (1962) vivid metaphor, are said to exist in different worlds. 
Facts are not out there in the world as such, but are constructed through a social process 
mediated inevitably by theory. From this perspective, theory is viewed as permeating 
science's observational base. 
Relativists see the theory dependence of observation as providing a fundamental 
challenge to the epistemological core of realist doctrine. Theories cannot be meaningfully 
thought of as representations of an independently knowable reality, if the reality that 
scientists measure is to large extent an artefact of prior theoretical commitments 
(Woolgar, 1988). This challenge to the epistemological base of realism has been extended 
to embrace realism's ontological commitments. Woolgar (1988 p. 60) argues that the 
natural world is constructed through, rather than revealed by, its discovery. ". .. the fact 
of an object is the temporarily stable upshot ofa complex social process. Moreover, this 
process continues long after an initial discovery claim, 'the object' has and will continue 
to change." 
9 Kuhn's position regarding the rationality of theory change has changed somewhat since the first edition of 
scientific revolutions. In later works Kuhn (1977) defends the rationality of theory appraisal in terms of 
some enduring epistemic aims. 
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The character of an object, Woolgar argues, changes with different stages of research. 
The 'discovery' of quasars, for example, was not a case of revealing some hitherto 
unknown aspect about the world, but of constructing it through a social process of 
negotiation. At various stages of the research the 'object' was labelled as: an unusual 
trace; possible interference; unusual interference; communications from another 
civilisation; and some new kind of pulsating radio source. In this, and other situations, so 
it is claimed, the social network constitutes the object which does not exist antecedently 
and independently of the construction process. 
This brief review does not do justice to the various kinds of positions adopted by 
relativist critiques of realism. However, although the strength and significance of the 
theory dependence of observation and the under determination of theories varies, as a 
challenge to realism, all relativists question the notion explicit in realist doctrine, that 
science in some sense can be said to be providing us with increasingly better (more 
truthful) representations of reality. 
The challenge from the history of science 
Realists are typically sanguine about the history of science. Successive theories over 
times are seen as providing us with increasingly better representations of reality. Science 
is converging on the truth. This optimistic induction on the history of science has been 
challenged by Larry Laudan (1984). Laudan argues that many successful theories in the 
history of science have been non-referring. The pragmatic success of a theory therefore, 
can not be indicative of its truth status. Moreover, genuinely referential theories are not 
always successful at the empirical level. Wegener's theory of continental drift is a notable 
example of just such a theory. Although it is genuinely referential in nature, it remained 
unsuccessful for over thirty years. A truly referential theory may also, Laudan argues, 
make false claims .about the nature of the world. In sum then, the referential status of 
theoretical terms do not provide us with any kind of guide as to the acceptance and 
rejection of theories as realists claim. 
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Laudan also questions the notion of approximate truth. What exactly does it mean for a 
theory to be approximately true? If a clear notion of truth cannot be explicated, then it is 
difficult to see how the truthfulness of a theory can explain its success. The notion of 
approximate truth is also problematic when considering the progress of science. Laudan 
claims that successive theories in science do not typically retain the key mechanisms and 
theoretical entities of prior theories. If this is the case, the idea of cumulative progress 
towards the truth is difficult to sustain. In what sense can we say that our present theories 
are truer than those that have gone before? Realism, it is argued, simply cannot provide 
an adequate explanation of why science works. 
Realism defended 
The status of non-observables 
The local anti-realism espoused by van Fraassen, suggests that we should limit the 
domain in which we can reliably generate true beliefs to what is observable. But on just 
what basis can this selective scepticism be maintained? As Churchland (1989) points out, 
given the theory dependence of observation, the epistemological status of observable 
entities is rendered just as dubious as that of non-observables. Why should our cognitive 
limitations extend only to those entities which are not immediately perceptually 
accessible to us? There also seems no reason why the data generated via perceptual 
prostheses (such as telescopes and microscopes) should be significantly less reliable than 
those generated by our unaided senses. Both the eye and the telescope provide us with 
information about the world, which in some sense is dependent on, and mediated by, 
theory of some kind. 
The absolute distinction between observables and non-observables is also difficult to 
maintain. As Churchland (1989) argues, van Fraassen cannot make a principled 
distinction between things that are possibly observable by humans (with unaided senses), 
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and things that can not be in principle be observed by humans. Our epistemic attitude to 
dinosaurs, electrons, continental drift and the oort cloud should, therefore, be the same, 
despite their different observational status. It follows that even the empirical adequacy of 
a theory is something that is radically underdetermined by the evidence. A theory cannot 
say anything about all observable entities in space and in time. 
More broadly speaking, the realist's confidence about unobservables is based on the 
considerable success of theories in the history of science that refer to hidden entities. 
Reference to genes, electrons, thoughts, dinosaurs and the like, provide the best 
explanation of phenomena that scientists seek to explain. Moreover, our ability to 
manipUlate those entities, such as genes and electrons, so as to produce new phenomena, 
provides us with further reason to accept their equivalent epistemic standing with more 
manifestly observable entities (Hacking, 1984; Giere, 1988). 
The role of super-empirical values 
Both empiricists and relativists use the Duhem-Quine thesis of underdetermination to 
support their anti-realist claims. Empiricists argue that reference to non-observables 
creates an unacceptable proliferation of ontologically diverse, but empirically equivalent 
theories. Relativists, on the other hand, argue that underdetermination of theories by their 
evidential base, strongly implicates the role of external (i.e. social and political) factors in 
theory appraisal. 
The realist's response to these claims is to suggest that the fact of underdetermination 
neither necessitates a rejection of hidden entities, or an invocation of social factors in 
theory choice. Instead, the underdetermination of theories by evidence, suggests the vital 
role that super-empirical values play in theory choice (McMullin, 1993; Churchland, 
1989). Such super-empirical values include simplicity, explanatory breadth, consistency, 
and fertility. It is the global excellence of a theory, not merely its empirical adequacy, 
which provides a measure of that theory's success. I shall have more to say on the role of 
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super-empirical values in my discussion of theory appraisal below, but analyses of the 
history of science (e.g., Thagard, 1992; Giere, 1988) strongly implicate values beyond 
those of empirical adequacy as being crucial in the acceptance and rejection of theories. 
These same studies, although not denying the role of social factors in science, suggest that 
it is the epistemic values internal to science which do most, if not all, of the explanatory 
work in accounting for theory change in science. 
For both Laudan (1977, 1981) and Lakatos (1970), sociological factors can only be 
employed to explain the content of bad science; there is no need to invoke social factors 
in an explanation of adequate science. The acceptance of a Lamarckian theory of 
inheritance by soviet biologists then, requires an explanation in terms of socio-political 
climate of the time. Most theory choice in science, however, can be adequately explained 
by those values which are said to be internal to scientific inquiry. 
Even Kuhn (1977), who is often cited as invoking social factors in theory choice, argues 
that it is typically those internal virtues of a theory that provide the basis for theory 
acceptance and rejection. However, just how those criteria are employed, may vary from 
scientist to scientist, depending on the social context and other external factors. Recourse 
to individual biography to explain theory choice, argues Kuhn, does not mean these 
choices are subjective, at least not in the sense that they cannot be discussed as something 
over and above matters of mere taste. 
Ultimately, the role that social or external factors play in theory choice is an open 
question; one that needs to be analysed on a case by case basis. However, the history of 
science does provide some support for the idea that it is typically those values internal to 
science, such as explanatory breadth and simplicity which play the major determining role 
in scientist's epistemic attitude towards theories. That is not to deny that some external 
factors may play an important role in theory appraisal. However, there is no suggestion 
that factors considered external to science (ambition, political allegiance and so on) 
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typically overwhelm values internal to science, when scientists make decisions about 
theory acceptance or rejection. 
A closer look at the theory dependence of observation 
The theory-dependence of observation has been used widely by sociologists of science as 
a critique of the assumption that there is some neutral observation base on which theory 
choice can be made. Following Kuhn (1962), it is suggested that the theory or paradigm 
adopted determines the nature and content of the observations made. It follows that 
comparisons between theories in terms of the claims they make about the world cannot be 
fruitfully made. 
Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing 
paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life. 
Because it has that character, the choice is not and cannot be determined merely 
by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for those depend in 
part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue. 
(Kuhn, 1970, p. 94). 
If this is truly the case, then of course it is difficult to uphold the realist's claim that 
science progresses through theories which provide increasingly better representations of 
the world. After all, not only are theories said to be incompatible, but they determine the 
kind of world in which observations are to be made. 
One possible way of defending realism from such a challenge is to question the claim that 
observations really are theory laden. One defence of the autonomy of observation from 
theory is provided by Jerry Fodor (1984). Fodor argues that our early perceptual 
processing capacities are insulated from those higher order systems, so that our concepts 
do not penetrate our perceptual systems. Fodor points out that many illusions maintain 
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their illusory status, from a perceptual perspective, even if we know that our sense are 
being fooled. 
However, as Churchland (1989) has persuasively argued, such a defence will simply not 
work. For a start, it is highly questionable that our perceptual systems really are 
independent of higher order processes. Many illusions do change their character given the 
requisite knowledge. Moreover, the role of conceptual knowledge in the interpretation of 
observations through telescopes, microscopes, and of x-rays, is well documented (e.g., 
Chalmers, 1982). 
Churchland (1989) points out, furthermore, that even if there was considerable rigidity at 
the perceptual level, there still might be considerable conceptual plasticity in terms of 
how those sense data are ultimately processed. The number of possible mappings from 
percepts to concepts leaves plenty of elbowroom for multiple interpretations of reality. It 
seems that to some extent perception is theory laden. Indeed, given the idiosyncrasy of 
our evolutionary history, this thesis is almost trivially true. What is observable to us, is 
dependent on the complex collection of theories which explains the functional capacities 
of our perceptual-cognitive system. 
There is no need for the realist to reject the idea that observations are to some extent 
theory-laden. What is truly problematic for a realist ontology, is the idea that observations 
are determined by a process which is idiosyncratic to the social context (including the 
theoretical framework) of the scientists concerned. This is what lies behind the claim of 
some sociologists of science (e.g. Latour and Woolgar, 1986) that facts are, to all extents 
and purposes, socially constructed. 
Talk of facts being socially constructed, however, fails to make an adequate distinction 
between phenomena and data. Data is variable and represents the outcome of various 
experimental interactions with reality. Phenomena, on the other hand, are stable, 
repeatable, aspects of the world (Bogen & Woodward, 1988). That data changes over 
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time, as in the discovery of quasars, is not surprising. However, it is not the character of 
the object that changes per se. What we see in the process of scientific discovery is 
different interpretations of multiple patterns of data. The upshot of this process is the 
discovery of a new phenomenon: quasars. Sociologists of science such as Woolgar (1988) 
are therefore making the illicit move from the theory dependence of observations to the 
theory dependence of nature (Kitcher, 1993). 
That knowledge of the world is socially constructed, is to some respects trivially true. 
Scientists are social beings operating in an institutional environment embedded in a 
culture. Theories are, prima facie, social constructs; they are constructed partly through 
the enactment of social processes. That such knowledge is arbitrary and idiosyncratic to a 
particular social milieu, that is, that the world can be so variously interpreted as to make 
theories only analysable from a socio-cultural perspective, is however, to be rejected. The 
importance of taking into account the social dimensions of science does not necessarily 
entail a rej ection of realism and its acceptance of an independent reality, which is to some 
extent knowable. Between the two extremes of a world fixed by its empirical content, and 
one multiply constructed by communities of scientists, there is ample room for a realist 
portrayal of science which does justice to both. 
As Kitcher (1993) notes, there is a vast unexplored middle ground between the extremes 
of an approach which denies the role of social factors, and one which views nature as 
virtually impotent in determining the nature of theories. The strong version of the role of 
social factors in science is surely false. Scientists with the same social background differ 
in their beliefs due to different encounters with the world. Moreover, scientists do find 
out things quite contrary to their expectations. What we believe does not necessarily 
dictate what we perceive (Kitcher, 1993). 
Furthermore, the history of science suggests that even scientists with quite different 
theoretical commitments can agree about what is to count as significant observations. For 
example, despite significant differences in the ontology of the phlogiston theory 
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compared to its oxygen counterpart, both Lavoisier and Priestly could communicate 
easily enough about the results of their experiments, and agreed on what would count as 
significant results (Thagard, 1992). 
What needs to be examined in more detail is the nature and extent to which theories 
permeate observations both in science and in everyday life. This is ultimately an 
empirical question, and one of interest to psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, and 
historians alike. However this preliminary analysis suggests that the world is robust 
enough to provide the primary means whereby scientists can make rational choices about 
theories. 
Rescuing truth: an optimistic reappraisal of the history of science 
Laudan (1984) provides us with a pessimistic induction on the history of science. There 
may be progress through time, but that progress cannot be conceived of as progress 
towards truth. Laudan' s analysis rests on the claim that the referential status of theoretical 
terms plays little part in the acceptance or rejection of theories, and fails to be retained in 
successive theories. More broadly speaking, the history of science suggests that all 
theories in the past have been false, and there is nothing to suggest that the epistemic 
status of our current theories is any different. 
Although the possibility of achieving absolute truth is to rejected, realists typically still 
hold onto the notion of a convergence on truth. Our current theories may be false, but 
they are less false, or more truthful, than those they have replaced. As Kitcher (1993) 
notes, it is not enough to demonstrate the falsity of all past theories, the anti-realist also 
needs to demonstrate that the history of theoretical entities has been erratic in nature. 
The history of science does not reveal to us that we are fallible in some 
undifferentiated way. Some kinds of claims endure, other kinds are likely to be 
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discarded as inaccurate. Furthermore this is exactly what we would have expected 
given our conception of the relationship between human cognitive systems and 
nature. 
(Kitcher, 1993 p. 138). 
One of the goals of a realist approach to science, is to uncover just those aspects about 
reality which we can be more or less sure about. In many ways our abilities to generate 
true theories may be domain-specific. Blanket claims of pessimism (or indeed optimism) 
regarding the truth status of theories are simply not warranted. 
The history of science, contra Laudan, does provide some evidence for the idea that 
successful theories or parts of theories are those in which the central terms truly refer 
(McMullin, 1984). When we consider theories at a more fine-grained level, we see that 
some parts are more successful than others, and that these parts of theories are often the 
ones that are genuinely referential in nature. Moreover, these successful aspects of 
theories are maintained across time. For example, early twentieth century geology was 
successful in many areas in which the acceptance of a false stabilist position had no great 
impact. Less success was met with when geological theory had to work within false 
stabilist constraints (Kitcher, 1993). 
Certainly science does not, and probably never will, give us the whole true picture. 
However, a more modest realism provides us with some encouragement for the idea that 
we are obtaining better representations of the world. As long as we accept the idea that 
our ability to choose between theories, or parts of theories, is predicated on methods that 
are to some extent reliable (in terms of producing verisimiliar representations of the 
world), then realists claims for convergence can be maintained. 
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Theory appraisal and the role of global research programmes in science 
All our knowledge of the world is obtained via theory. Theories are the vehicle whereby 
we arrive at an understanding of the nature of reality. A realist approach to science views 
theories as explanatory in nature. In contrast to the descriptive role of theories in 
empiricist philosophies of science, realists argue that science advances through the 
articulation and development of deep-structured or postulational theories; that is, theories 
which refer to latent entities and provide us with explanations of phenomena. 
Realists typically adhere to a correspondence approach to truth. Our theories, in some 
respects, and to some degrees, r;orrespond to aspects of the real world. This 
correspondence is best considered as a mapping rather than a mirroring relation (Hooker, 
1987). From an evolutionary perspective, the ability to develop maps or representations of 
the world is a natural capacity of information processing systems like humans and other 
animals. To further the goals of survival and reproduction many organisms have evolved 
abilities which transcend mere hard-wired responses to local contingencies in the 
environment. 10 The ability to plan sequences of action, in even the most rudimentary 
sense, requires some knowledge of the world. This knowledge is acquired via the 
dynamic process of gene-environment interaction during the ontogeny of the organism's 
nervous system. The notion of correspondence then, is not between sentences and the 
world - theories are not fundamentally linguistic entities - but between internal maps or 
models, and an external reality. 
The idea of theories as models, or populations of models, has received considerable 
support from a variety of realists (e.g., Churchland, 1989; Giere, 1988). Given that it is 
unlikely that sentences form the basis for most of our, and all of other organisms' 
cognitive activities, it seems more plausible to suggest that theories are in some sense 
10 Whether or not animals possess representations of the world is currently a matter of some debate. 
However, the burgeoning literature in animal cognition (e.g., Ristau, 1992; GriffIn, 1984) provides 
considerable support for the continuity or correspondence of many animal species with humans in this 
respect. 
27 
28 
models of the world that enable organisms to interact with external reality in order to 
further their evolutionary goals. 
Models as candidates for truth, then, can be accepted or rej ected on the basis of the extent 
to which they are similar to external reality. Similarity here can be specified in terms of 
various respects and degrees (Giere, 1988). Models, or better populations of models, can 
be similar to the world in some respects but not in others. Moreover, although our 
theories are likely to be false, this falseness is not an all or nothing affair, but instead 
comes in degrees. Often our first initial probings of an aspect of reality are widely 
accepted to be way off the mark, while still providing a useful first approximation as to 
how that aspect of the world is structured. The evolution of climate models is instructive 
in this respect. Initial models provided crude global averaged estimations of changes in 
temperature based on a few, reasonably well-known parameters, such as concentration of 
atmospheric gases, cloud reflectivity and solar energy. Later models, the so-called general 
circulation models, have been able to provide detailed local predictions by including an 
increasing variety of relevant parameters: including life-climate feedback systems, ocean 
currents and more detailed analyses of cloud effects. Although the initial models were 
ultimately false representations of the world, they provided some measure of similarity: 
temperature in the real world is affected by levels of atmospheric gases and solar 
radiation. Later models, while still false, furnish us with greater degrees of similarity 
between our representations and the world by taking into account a wider variety of 
systems which affect climate in the real world. 
The notion of theories as models also provides a further means of rebutting some of the 
anti-realist arguments outlined earlier. The advancement of science can be seen in terms 
of increasingly better models of the world. Where better refers to some increasing 
similarity between the model and nature. So it follows that even rejected theories are not 
entirely false, but. simply lack strong similarity, or the right kind of similarity in 
comparison to proffered alternatives. 
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One way science advances is by discovering new aspects of the world, that is, new 
respects in which our models might resemble the world. Science also advances by 
discovering some respects in which similarities between model and the world are 
not as commonly thought. 
(Giere, 1988, p.l07.) 
In at least one important respect the history of science is analogous to the ontogeny of 
human cognition. Through the developmental trajectory of both runs increasingly richer 
and more complex sets of models which provide better maps with reality. These maps 
provide, for both scientists and developing children, increased understanding of the world 
of which they are a part. 
Scientific research programmes 
On the realist account of science I am presenting here, theories can be fruitfully 
considered as modelling aspects of the external world. However, in science theories 
rarely, if ever, occur in isolation. Instead, they are typically conjoined with other, 
auxiliary theories, methodological assumptions, scientific laws, and so forth. It follows 
that in evaluating theories, the unit of epistemic significance is rarely the individual 
theory itself, but rather is the whole network of assumptions in which it is embedded. 
These larger networks of assumptions has been variously termed 'paradigms' (Kuhn, 
1970), 'scientific research programmes' (Lakatos, 1970), 'research traditions' (Laudan, 
1977), and 'global theories' (Hooker, 1975). Although in many respects similar, these 
different approaches also provide some interesting points of departure that are worth 
elaborating on. 
Kuhn's (1970) notion of paradigm has been widely influential among philosophers and 
scientists. However, as commentators on Kuhn have noted, his use of paradigm in the 
structure of scientific revolutions is highly variable. Masterman (1970), for example, 
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enumerated twenty-one different usage's of paradigm employed by Kuhn. Kuhn (1977) 
himself is aware of this variable usage and distinguishes between two main meanings for 
paradigms. The first construal of paradigm is global in nature and refers to the shared 
commitments of a particular scientific community. These commitments include shared 
goals, epistemic values and so forth and are typically underpinned by a common 
educational background. Paradigm, in the second main sense intended by Kuhn, refers to 
more specific kinds of commitments shared by scientists. These sorts of commitments 
include various cognitive components such as models, symbolic generalisations and 
exemplary instances of scientific work. Kuhn also uses the term 'disciplinary matrix' to 
refer to this shared collection of cognitive values. It is this second usage of paradigm 
which captures most of what we mean by the Newtonian paradigm, or the Darwinian 
paradigm in science. 
In his earlier work, Kuhn also makes a distinction between paradigms and schools. The 
pre-paradigm phase of science is characterised by collections of poorly articulated and 
generally limited theories which are pursued by different schools. In later work, Kuhn 
(1970, 1977) abandoned any hard distinction between schools and paradigms, 
appreciating that schools are most fruitfully thought of as poorly articulated and limited 
paradigms. 
Paradigms for Kuhn provide, very generally speaking, a way of organising and observing 
the world. What is considered as observable and how observations are interpreted, is 
going to be partly a consequence of the paradigm adopted by the scientist. Paradigms 
then, loosely characterised, are overarching frameworks from within which scientists can 
carry out the practice, of what Kuhn terms 'normal science': the pursuance and solving of 
empirical and conceptual puzzles. Paradigms are overthrown or replaced during times of 
scientific revolution, when a competing paradigm becomes accepted by a significant 
portion of the scientific community. It is here that Kuhn's account of science has been 
charged as irrational. Certainly in his early work Kuhn has characterised this process of 
scientific change as one of conversion or of gestalt switching. However, as he has made 
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clear in later works (e.g., Kuhn, 1977), the acceptance of a new paradigm is nonnally due 
to its greater worth in tenns of satisfying a set of fairly stable epistemic values, such as 
simplicity, explanatory breadth and fertility. It follows that the influence of a paradigm is 
not so all embracing that followers of competing paradigms cannot communicate 
intelligently with one anotherYIt is also clear that observations can, in some sense, 
provide a theory neutral basis from which comparisons can be made. 
Lakatos's (1970) notion of scientific research programmes captures many of the aspects 
of Kuhn's paradigms. Like Kuhn, Lakatos emphasises the importance of appraising 
larger-scale theory clusters rather than isolated theories. As such, Lakatos's methodology 
of scientific research programmes is intended as an extension of Popper's 
falsificationism. It is research programmes however, not individual theories, which are 
candidates for falsification. 
A Lakatosian research programme has two methodological prescriptions. The negative 
heuristic outlines what paths a scientist can avoid in their investigations. In particular, the 
hard core of a research programme is considered as immune from falsification, and is not 
directly under test. The hard core of a research programme contains those central 
assertions (often embodied in laws) which provide the basis for understanding the rich 
array of theory and phenomena which embody the research programme and its domain of 
inquiry. The hard core of the Darwinian research programme, for example, is the idea of 
natural selection coupled with the laws of descent. Empirical results which may seem to 
falsify the hard-core assumptions should be accommodated by the research programme by 
modifying the 'protective belt' - the collection of auxiliary assumptions, methodological 
rules and so forth, ancillary to the central claims of the programme. These changes to the 
auxiliary assumptions of a research programme should be content increasing and not ad 
11 Kuhn draws the analogy here between speakers of differel)t languages. Although it is possible to translate 
from one language to another, this translation inevitably involves some leakage of meaning. The adequacy 
of a translation is typically determined by tlte degree to which the individual has immersed themselves in 
the culture in which the language is a part. To adequately understand the nature of some alternative 
paradigm then, one must step outside one's own paradigm and become part of the alternative paradigm's 
culture. 
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hoc in nature. The anomalous phenomenon of altruism for example in biology, rather than 
spelling doom for the Darwinian research programme, was accommodated by the 
development of the theories of kin and reciprocal altruism. These theories greatly 
expanded the range of biological phenomena which could be satisfactorily explained by 
the evolutionary programme. 
Lakatos's second methodological rule, the positive heuristic, states what paths to pursue. 
That is, it outlines the future progress of the research programme, in terms of problems to 
be solved and areas to be investigated. Lakatos, like Popper, places emphasis here on 
novel predictions. Indeed, a successful research programme should at some time in its 
history provide us with a prediction of some previously unexpected pattern of findings. 
The success of Einstein's special theory of relativity, for example, was greatly enhanced 
(in the eyes of fellow scientists, if not Einstein himself) by the successful prediction of a 
gravitational red shift and the deflection of light 1.7 seconds of arc for rays of starlight 
grazing the sun. 
For Lakatos, research programmes are never to be entirely rejected; instead they can be 
either progressive or degenerating. Moreover, a research programme can progress 
conceptually without necessarily making empirical progress. Commentators on Lakatos 
have noted that the distinction between progressive and degenerating research 
programmes is entirely a historical question and provides little help in evaluating 
currently competing research programmes. After all, one can never be sure just when a 
previously degenerating programme might afford us with some outstanding new 
prediction. The notion of an inviolable hard-core has also received some criticism. 
Laudan (1977) for one notes that the hard-core of a research programme is also 
modifiable over time. Furthermore, it can be hard to say just when these modifications are 
such as to suggest that the research programme has changed. 
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Despite these criticisms, I think that we can hold on to the general framework that 
Lakatos provides. The hard core of a research programme can be treated as virtually 
sacrosanct, in that attempts to account for anomalous phenomena should be made initially 
in other parts of the research programme. At times there may be modifications to the 
hard-core; however, this can be viewed more generally as part of the evolutionary 
progression of a research programme, rather than as a signal of an old programme's 
demise and the emergence of a new one. 
Comparisons do need to be made between competing research programmes in our own 
lifetime and I think this can be done by employing the criteria for theory evaluation that I 
will outline below. These criteria provide us with a guide about what research programme 
it is best to pursue at any given point in time. However, that does not mean that it is 
irrational to pursue less acceptable research programmes, given that they provide some 
hope for future development. 
Similar in many ways to Kuhn's paradigms and Lakatos's research programmes, Hooker 
(1975) provides us with another characterisation oflarge scale theoretical entities, which 
he simply calls global theories or theoretical world views. However, Hooker's global 
theories are more broad in their scope than Lakatosian research programmes and more 
approximate the global usage of paradigm employed by Kuhn . 
. .. the fundamental intellectual entity in science is the theoretical-world-view; 
this is something like a tightly interconnected ('coherent') set of conceptual 
categories for grasping the world, finding expression at the most general level 
as a systematic metaphysics (systematic ontology) then a more particular 
application as a fundamental theory (standard sense), next as a forging link 
to other important theoretical areas as necessary ... 
(Hooker, 1975 p. 155). 
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Hooker's notion of global theory, therefore, has both an internal and external character. 
The internal globalness of a theory is represented by a coherent collection of conceptual 
categories, methodological rules, measuring instruments and so forth. The external 
globalness of a theory refers to its connections with other theories and aspects of life. At 
no level of analysis can theories be viewed in isolation. The theoretical world view that 
science affords us should be coherent both within and between the boundary divisions 
that are typically employed. Our best theories of sub-atomic phenomena should be 
compatible with our best theories of atomic, chemical, and neural phenomena. Our best 
theories of the distribution and evolution of species, should be coherent with our theories 
of geological and atmospheric change, and so forth. In evaluating global theories this 
inter-disciplinary coherence must be taken into account. 
The two factors of large-scale theory collections that emerge in all three accounts 
presented here, are that it is these global theories that should be the fundamental unit of 
cognitive significance and that theoretical pluralism at all levels of theory analysis is 
fundamental to the growth of science. The history of science counsels us that progress is 
obtained through the development of multiple scientific research programmes or global 
theories. Certainly pluralism at this level is crucial for scientific progress. However, 
typically speaking, pluralism is most readily manifest within scientific research 
programmes. It is the proliferation of theories here that provides a research programme 
with its progressive character. As new theories are proposed, accepted, and rejected, a 
research programme increases its explanatory power in providing us with a better 
population of models that represent the world. 
The terminology that I will employ throughout this thesis is that of Lakatos's research 
programmes, and I will accept the basic framework of his approach. However, I think that 
it is important to place research programmes in a wider context, one that includes 
relations to other research programmes, technology and society. So in evaluating research 
programmes we must take into account not only their internal coherence, but also their 
relation to other areas of science and to society in general. What follows is a brief 
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characterisation of the way that I shall deploy the notion of research programmes in this 
thesis. My model of research programmes, which I dub 'Global research programmes' 
(GRP's) is essentially a hybrid of Lakatos's and Hooker's models of large-scale 
theoretical entities. Figure one describes in schematic form the general features of GRP's. 
Features o/Global Research Programmes (GRPs) in science. 
Internal characteristics 
1. The hard core 
This part of the global research programme (GRP) contains the central theories and laws 
which describe, predict, and explain, in conjunction with auxiliary theories, the relevant 
phenomena in the domain of inquiry. The hard core is virtually immune from 
falsification; although it can be revised over time, its fundamental features cannot be 
radically changed without altering the character of the research programme. 
2. The protective belt 
The protective belt of the research programme is comprised of auxiliary theories, 
methodologies, and experimental technologies. If there are specific anomalies confronting 
a research programme, modifications will be initially sought in the protective belt before 
the central hard core assumptions are questioned. These modifications, however, should 
~ 
be content increasing and coherent with other features of the research programme. 
2.1 Auxiliary theories 
The auxiliary theories m a research programme provide a means to extend the 
explanatory scope and precision of the theories and laws outlined in the hard core. They 
are often formulated in response to specific anomalies or problems encountered by the 
research programme, and are typically couched in less general terms than those theories in 
the hard core. The auxiliary theories of a research programme should cohere both with 
other auxiliary theories and with the central assumptions of the hard core. 
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Figure One. The structure of global research 
programmes in science. 
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2.2 Methodologies 
Typically speaking, a scientific research programme will have an array of various 
methodologies. Some of these might be specific to the programme in question, while 
others will be shared with other programmes. Problems in the development of a research 
programme may, in part, be the result of inadequate or inappropriate methodologies. 
Likewise, the success of a research programme is in part a consequence of the kind of 
methodology employed. It is important that the methodologies used are adequate to the 
task of identifying phenomena, and constructing and evaluating the relevant theories, 
including the theoretical underpinnings of the methodologies themselves. 
2.3 Experimental technologies 
In their interactions with the world, scientists will employ a variety of procedures which 
depend on the appropriate use of technology. Like the methodologies employed, this 
equipment may be specific to the research programme in question, or a shared part of the 
wider scientific community. The development and use of technology is reciprocally 
related to the identification of phenomena, and the construction of theory. Advances in 
theory will enable commensurate development of technology which may lead to the 
identification of new phenomena and new means of evaluating theory. 
3. Domains of intellectual inquiry 
Most research programmes in science will embrace a wide variety of domains at different 
levels of structural organisation. However, scientific research programmes, as they have 
been developed so far in the history of science, have a circumscribed range of inquiry. For 
example, although the evolutionary research programme explains a wide range of 
phenomena, from the functional properties of cells to the dynamics of ecosystems, it is 
uninformative on the micro-properties of matter or the structure of planetary systems. An 
important goal of research programmes is the identification of phenomena, in the sense of 
robust, replicable empirical findings. This elucidation of phenomena evolves in tandem 
with theory, method and technology as suggested above. 
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4. Social features 
4.1 The scientific community 
An important part of any GRP is the scientific community which operates within the 
programme's intellectual framework. This community, in tandem with written sources, 
contains the living embodiment of the knowledge structures of the programme in 
question. The nature of the social relations between individuals and the way cognitive 
resources are divided and deployed can play an important part in the degree and nature of 
a programme's progress. Ideally there should be a free and open exchange of infoffilation 
regarding all aspects of a GRP. Individuals should be aware of developments not only in 
their own field of specialisation, but also of more global issues relating to theory, 
methodology, technology and the programme's multiple interfaces with the rest of 
science, and more generally speaking, with society. 
4.2 Institutional features 
The role of institutions in scientific inquiry has often been neglected. However, I consider 
the institutional features typical of a GRP playa potentially important part in the success 
or failure of a programme. The way resources are allocated, work reviewed, pUblications 
assessed, and rewards allocated, among other things, may substantially influence the kind 
of inquiry carried out. The structure of academic institutions, of course, does not comply 
neatly with the boundaries of GRP's. Often members of competing programmes may be 
working in the same department, or adherents of the same programme may be distributed 
across different departments. The institutional features of a GRP then, are more likely to 
be a consequence of general institutional aspects of academic life, although there may 
also be specific institutional characteristics specific to the programme itself. 
4.3 Education 
The way scientists are educated also plays an important role in the development and 
progress of GRP's. Both the style and content of education can influence the emerging 
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community of scientists. Ideally the education of scientists should be concerned with the 
key features of the GRP itself. This will involve not only the acquiring of the relevant 
methodologies and facts in the programme's domain, but also should involve a 
consideration of theoretical issues at various levels of specificity. A familiarisation with 
the history of the GRP should be an important part of this process. Although the 
attainment of expertise in narrow domains is a necessary feature of contemporary science 
education, this fact should not preclude the importance of understanding the relationships 
between various sub-domains of inquiry and of considering the broader social 
ramifications of the GRP in general. 
External characteristics 
1. Relations to other research programmes 
As Hooker (1975) has emphasised, it is important that the theories, methodologies and so 
forth, in a given GRP be compatible with those of other GRP's. Furthermore, it will often 
be the case that the domain of interest will overlap with various different GRP's. The 
development of appropriate connections between GRP's of various degrees of globalness, 
therefore, is an important consideration when conducting research and articulating theory. 
Moreover, progress may be achieved in a research programme by the relevant 
combination of theories, technologies and the like, developed in different programmes. 
2. Technological applications 
The progress of theory in science and the elucidation of phenomena can not be insulated 
form the various technological applications that may be employed as a consequence of 
theory development. Although some scientists may be engaged in 'pure' research, 
typically speaking scientific research will have some implications for the way humans 
intervene in the world to further their various goals. This relationship between science 
and technology isa reciprocal one. The articulation of theory and the construction of 
scientific explanation play an important role in guiding technology, while technology 
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opens up new ways of interacting with the world so as to provide increasingly richer 
descriptions of reality. 
3. Ethical and political implications 
Because the goal of science can be characterised as the production of valuable knowledge 
(Maxwell, 1984) and because the products of science and the pronouncement of scientists 
wield considerable impact for the development of society, it is important to recognise the 
moral implications of GRP's. Science, therefore, cannot be insulated from valuational 
considerations, and more particularly, from ethical questions relating to the impact of 
science on society. This relationship between science and society, as with technology and 
society, is reciprocal in nature. The development and promulgation of scientific ideas can 
exert a profound impact on social policy, while political considerations may, to a certain 
extent, direct research and the way that it is subsequently reported. It follows that one way 
in which a GRP might be evaluated is with respect to the potential social consequences 
that it implies. 
Progress in a research programme can occur in any aspect of the overall structure, be it 
theoretical, methodological, empirical, institutional, ethical or whatever. Moreover, some 
research programmes might progress through the forging of appropriate links to other 
areas of science, or in ways of explaining new intellectual domains. Ultimately, the 
evaluation of a research programme is made in terms of its overall coherence in relation 
to alternative programmes. A central aspect of this evaluation will be in terms of the 
global excellence of theory displayed by the programme in question. 
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Theory appraisal in science 
The account of science that I have presented thus far, suggests that progress is achieved 
through the succession of increasingly better research programmes over time. However, 
on what basis should we accept that one theory or research programme is better than 
another? That this task is even possible at all has been questioned by some, especially 
those of relativist persuasion. However, the realist account of science that I have defended 
above suggests that fruitful comparisons can be make between alternative research 
programmes, and decisions can be made regarding their comparative worth. 
The evaluation of competing hypotheses is not only an integral part of science, but is also 
., 
ubiquitous in many other domains, such as legal reasoning and the reasoning processes of 
lay individuals (Josephson & Josephson, 1994). This kind of reasoning is based on 
abductive processes. On the discovery of some interesting pattern of data in the world, 
there is a natural press for an explanation of this data pattern. Typically, a range of 
plausible candidates are suggested. At a later stage, these various candidate hypotheses 
are evaluated with respect to their overall acceptability. This second stage, whereby more 
mature theories are evaluated, has been termed 'inference to the best explanation' 
(Harman, 1964).12 The important point to note here is that abduction and inference to the 
best explanation are ampliative and explanatory in nature. They go beyond the data to 
suggest typically, but not always, hidden processes that serve as explanations of the 
patterns observed. 
12 There is some debate in the literature as to whether abduction and inference to the best explanation can be 
considered as separate processes. Josephson and Josephson (1994) retain this distinction, however Thagard 
(1988) argues that it can not be sustained. Certainly the initial development of plausible explanatory 
hypotheses must involve some kind of evaluation to avoid a combinatorial explosion of possibilities. 
However, I think the distinction can still, albeit.more fuzzily, be drawn. Abduction can be said to refer to an 
initial proliferation of plausible alternatives, typically articulated by an individual or a number of 
individuals, whereas inference to the best explanation is reserved to refer to the evaluation of relatively well 
developed and coherent hypotheses in a more explicitly social and institutional context. 
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Typically speaking, most theorists have posited a range of criteria from which to judge 
the adequacy of competing theories. Kuhn (1977) for example, suggests that a good 
theory should have five major attributes: 
(1) It should be accurate. That is, it should fit with the data. 
(2) It should be consistent, both internally and with other accepted theories in related 
aspects of nature. 
(3) It should have broad scope. 
(4) It should be simple, in terms of bringing order to phenomena. 
(5) It should be fruitful. It should lead to the discovery of new phenomena or previously 
unknown relationships between phenomena. 
Just how these criteria are to be weighed against one another is an area for further debate. 
McMullin (1993) argues that predictive accuracy and explanatory power are to considered 
primary virtues in guiding theory choice, with the other epistemic values as means to 
these ends. Others (e.g., Lakatos, 1970; Chalmers, 1990) have emphasised the importance 
of fertility. A good research programme is a progressive one. It is one that leads to the 
prediction of new results and novel phenomena. 
Despite the differences in accounts of theory choice, one theme that seems to emerge as 
central to theory appraisal is that of explanatory scope or breadth in tandem with 
simplicity of theory. All other things being equal, a theory or research programme will be 
considered superior to its rivals if it furnishes us with an explanation of a wide range of 
phenomena using a minimal number of explanation types or argument patterns 
(Friedman, 1974; Kitcher, 1981). " Science increases our understanding of the world by 
reducing the total number of independent phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate, 
or given." (Friedman, 1974 p. 15). 
In both the Newtonian and Darwinian programmes, for example, a small number of 
explanatory patterns can be used to unify a large number of (apparently) diverse 
phenomena. Thus, the process of natural selection coupled with the laws of descent can 
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be used to explain a multiplicity of biological phenomena. We can explain social 
grooming among vervet monkeys, the diversity of beaks on Darwin's finches and the 
distribution of Southern beech trees, by instantiating these few argument patterns. 
Evolutionary theory has obvious virtues over three separate kinds of theories used to 
explain these biological phenomena. 
From a realist perspective, focus on unification as central to theory appraisal, suggests 
that over time theories that fasten on to local or accidental features of a portion of the 
world are gradually weaned out in favour of approaches which carve reality at its 
joints. 13Science, from this perspective, is a search for invariances, which furnish us with 
increased understanding of the nature of reality. 
In terms of theory appraisal, the idea of explanation as unification has many affinities 
with the model of explanatory coherence developed in some depth by Paul Thagard 
(1978, 1989 ,1992). Thagard's (1992) model contains seven principles, which serve to 
provide a means by which to evaluate the epistemic worth of competing hypotheses. 
Research programmes or systems of explanations are to be evaluated in terms of their 
overall explanatory coherence. 
The first principle, symmetry, asserts that the coherence of two propositions in an 
explanatory system is symmetrical. If propositions P and Q cohere then so do 
propositions Q and P. The second, and most important principle, is that of explanation. 
The principle of explanation comes in three parts. The first part asserts that if a 
hypothesis P explains some patterns of data then P and the data cohere. It follows here 
that the more a proposition explains the more coherent it is. Thus explanatory breadth, or 
unification, is an integral part of Thagard's model. The second aspect of explanation 
states that if a hypothesis P is explained by another hypothesis Z, then P and Z cohere. 
Scientific research programmes are, of course, rich collections of such internally coherent 
13 Of course it is entirely possible that such a carving is beyond the scope of our or anyone's competence. 
However, despite the inherent messiness of our blade work, the notion of the increasing unification of 
theories provides some hope that we are getting closer to true explanations of the world. 
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explanatory networks. The last aspect of the principle of explanation asserts that the 
degree of coherence of some explanatory system is inversely proportional to the number 
of propositions that it contains. This claim embodies the notion of simplicity as it is 
typically deployed. We should be wary of explanatory schemes which contain too many 
special assumptions. 
The third principle presented by Thagard is that of analogy. If a proposition P explains 
some phenomenon Q, and another proposition PI which is analogous to P explains a 
phenomenon QI, then P and PI and Q and QI cohere. The role of analogy in theory 
development and appraisal, as Thagard (1992) notes, in clearly illustrated in the case of 
evolutionary theory. Darwin explicitly drew on the evidence from artificial selection to 
support the validity of his proposed mechanism for evolution, natural selection. 
The fourth principle is that of data priority. Propositions that describe patterns of data 
have some degree of acceptability on their own. Principle five, contradiction, asserts 
simply enough, that propositions which contradict one another incohere. This principle 
reflects the importance of consistency in any explanatory scheme. If two propositions 
which are not explanatorily connected both explain a certain class of phenomena they are 
said to incohere. Thus competition, Thagard's sixth principle, is seen as an important part 
of theory appraisal. Often, but not always, alternative explanatory schemes will compete 
with one another as the best explanation for a given range of phenomena. 
The final principle, acceptability, has two parts. The first part states that the acceptability 
of any proposition in an explanatory scheme depends on its degree of coherence with 
other propositions in that system. The second part asserts that the. acceptability of a 
proposition is mitigated by the number of unexplained relevant phenomena. A 
proposition which successfully accounts for a few relevant phenomena, while not 
explaining many others, will be deemed as less acceptable. 
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These principles developed by Thagard seem to incorporate many of the criteria 
suggested by other theorists as integral to theory appraisal. The acceptability of Thagard's 
model, however, is itself dependent on the explanatory coherence of his approach in 
relation to alternatives. To evaluate his model Thagard has implemented the seven 
principles of explanatory coherence in a connectionist network, ECHO, and more recently 
ECH02. These are computer programmes which serve to model cases of theory choice 
between competing scientific research programmes. If the theory of explanatory 
coherence provides a good explanation of theory choice in science then the results of 
running ECHO on important historical episodes in science should conform to actual 
changes in dominant research programmes. 
The results of the simulations run by Thagard (1992) provide considerable support for 
the theory of explanatory coherence. The replacement of phlogiston theory by oxygen 
theory, the acceptance of Darwinian theory, and the revolutions in physics and geology, 
are all explained in terms of the greater explanatory coherence of the successful research 
programmes over their competitors. 
The theory of evolution, for example, uses three main hypotheses: Organic beings are in a 
struggle for existence, organic beings undergo natural selection, and species of organic 
beings have evolved, to explain a wide variety of natural phenomena. Darwinian theory 
explains the complexity of animal behaviour and physiology, species extinction, the 
geographical distribution of species, the similarities in morphology and development 
between species and so on, by employing these small number of principal hypotheses. 
Evolutionary theory evinces both greater explanatory breadth and simplicity than does its 
main competitor, creationism. Darwin's theory also draws support from the analogy with 
artificial selection. If animals can be modified over time through selective breeding, then 
modification can also occur through natural selection. In running ECHO on the 
comparative worth. of Darwinism and Creationism, Darwinian theory clearly emerges as 
the more explanatorily coherent theory. 
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The analysis of science afforded by Thagard's theory of explanatory coherence suggests 
that the kinds of epistemic values used to evaluate research programmes remain, broadly 
speaking, invariant across the history of science. I say broadly speaking, because an 
analysis of individual scientists or even some specific scientific episodes, may reveal 
considerably more variability. As Kuhn (1977) argues, the fixity of epistemic values does 
not preclude a considerable flexibility in terms of how they are deployed in any given 
context. 
A naturalistic approach to science emphasises the nature of science as a human activity. 
Scientists are decision makers (Giere, 1988), employing some combination of the 
principles delineated by Thagard, in service of their goals, both as scientists and more 
generally as human beings. Individual scientists will vary in many respects. For a start, 
they will have different relationships with the various relevant bodies of evidence. Their 
education, although probably similar, will also vary in temis of emphasis and direction. 
As Kitcher (1993) points out, in thinking of evolutionary problems some of the great 
biologists have been considerably influenced by their own experiences and predilections. 
Darwin himself was guided by his experiences on the Beagle, his interest in artificial 
breeding and his reading of Malthus. The framing of evolutionary questions for E. O. 
Wilson, on the other hand, has been strongly influenced by his passion for ants, and more 
latterly by his interest in conservation. 
The intellectual profile of scientists will also reveal differences in terms of fundamental 
cognitive strategies (Kitcher, 1993). In the language of Gardner's (1983) theory of 
multiple intelligences, some scientists will be more richly endowed with visuo-spatial or 
logical-mathematical intelligence and will approach problems and frame solutions in 
different terms than those who are more linguistically orientated. Scientists will also 
differ with respect to their social and political allegiances. However, despite these 
differences, Thagard (1992) has argued that social and political factors rarely playa direct 
role in the acceptance and rejection of theories. The case studies presented by Thagard 
provide no indication that extra-scientific motivational factors play an important part in 
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major episodes of scientific change, although undoubtedly these factors can exert some 
influence on individual decision-making processes. Indeed, as Thagard (1992) notes, any 
individual socio-political predilections tend to be mitigated by the socio-institutional 
processes of organised science. 
Because of an institutional commitment of science to experimental evidence and 
explanatory argument, science as a whole is able to transcend the personal goals 
of its fully human practitioners who acquire the motivations to do good 
experiments and defend them by rational argument. 
(Thagard, 1992 p.l13). 
This is not to deny the potential importance of other, external factors, in the acceptability 
ofa theory or research programme. Consistent with the model of GRP's outlined earlier, 
the social implications of a theory will also play some role in its acceptance or rejection. 
For example, if a theory has potentially important politiCal or social ramifications our 
standards for theory evaluation may be higher. Conversely, if a particular theory suggests 
important and socially relevant courses of action we may be more ready to accept it as a 
reasonable theory. Haig (1989) for example, has persuasively argued that questions of 
risk ought to play an important role in the appraisal of scientific theories. In assessing the 
adequacy of nuclear winter theory, for example, we should not only employ those values 
typically conceived of as legitimate, such as simplicity, explanatory breadth and so on, 
but we should also consider the costs of being wrong. In the case of nuclear winter theory 
the risk in downplaying the effects of a thermo-nuclear war, that is, in rejecting nuclear 
winter theory, are potentially disastrous. In contrast, by accepting the theory (although it 
hasn't been 'proven'), we encourage the down-scaling of nuclear weapons below a 
critical threshold level and hence reduce the possibility of a nuclear winter occurring with 
its globally catastrophic effects. As Haig makes clear, we can no longer accept the 
empirical orthodoxy that the aim of science is the pursuit of near-certain value-free 
knowledge. If we are to do justice to the goals of discovering and realising what is of 
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value in existence then we must accept the role that external factors have to play in the 
development of science. 
The heterogeneity of socio-cognitive profiles revealed by individual scientists will be 
reflected in the way questions of explanatory coherence are to be evaluated in specific 
cases. For example, Giere (1988) has suggested that one of the reasons why Wegener's 
theory of continental drift was originally rejected was due to the overwhelming majority 
of influential Northern Hemisphere scientists in evaluating Wegener's theory. The 
evidence for continental drift is strongest in the Southern Hemisphere, where comparative 
analyses of floral and faunal profiles provide strong evidence for the connection of the 
various Southern Hemisphere landmasses in one super-continent, at some time in history. 
At the time that Wegener proposed continental drift, stabilism may well have been the 
most explanatory coherent theory. However, if the evidence from the Southern 
Hemisphere studies had been more salient, or more visible to the major geologists of the 
time, mobilism may have provided the most explanatory coherent alternative. 
At all times, of course, scientists can only choose the best theory which is available to 
them. Even if that theory is fundamentally wrong, it is rational to pursue it in the absence 
of better alternatives. Like the movement of a species across an adaptive landscape, 
scientists can only explore the local optima of theory available to them, although there 
may be much better alternatives inaccessible at other locations. 
In providing a rich and informative account of theory appraisal, Thagard's theory of 
explanatory coherence needs to be understood at both the relatively more coarse-grained 
level of major changes in the history of science and also in terms of the individual 
decision-making processes of scientists. Thagard's theory also provides, more generally 
speaking, an understanding of decision-making processes in non-scientific arenas. An 
evolutionary approach to theory appraisal focuses on the adaptive value of theory-choice 
across different domains and in different species. 
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Relationships between theories 
If, as many have suggested, theoretical pluralism is essential for the growth of science, 
then pair-wise evaluations of theories or research programmes is, or should be, an 
ongoing activity in science. However, research programmes are not necessarily in direct 
conflict with one another, even if they purport to provide explanations of the same range 
of phenomena. The cognitive relationships between theories can vary in terms of the 
epistemic conflict or threat that one theory poses for another. 
Two useful schemes for evaluating the conceptual relationships between theories have 
been presented by Laudan (1977) and Thagard (1992). If a new theory Tl completely 
absorbs or entails a previous theory T2, then Tl can be said to incorporate T2 (Thagard, 
1992), or be considered to be in a relationship of entailment (Laudan, 1977). If Tl only 
partially incorporates or provides a rationale for T2, while rejecting parts of the theory, 
then Tl can be said to sublate (Thagard, 1992) or reinforce (Laudan, 1977) T2. If, 
however, Tl invokes the near total rejection of T2, then Tl can be said to supplant T2 
(Thagard, 1992). This context is similar to Laudan's conditions of implausibility and 
inconsistency where Tl either entails that T2 is unlikely or entails the negation of (most 
of) T2. If a new theory simply ignores an older theory, then for Thagard (1992) they can 
be said to disregard one another. This may occur for any number of reasons. Theories 
may also be compatible ifTl entails nothing at all about T2 (Laudan, 1977). 
This conceptual scheme for evaluating the relationships between theories can help to 
clear up many problems encountered in arguments regarding the comparative worth of 
theories. In some cases proponents for a particular approach vigorously debate the merits 
of an alternative perspective without considering how the two approaches may be related. 
Some scientists who actively oppose evolutionary explanations in the social sciences, for 
example, often wrongly suggest that evolutionary and social explanations are inconsistent 
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or implausibly related to one another. The conceptual error here is twofold. First of all, a 
scientific research programme, evolutionism, is being contrasted with a domain of 
inquiry, social behaviour; there is no straight forward pair-wise evaluation of theory. 
Secondly, it is assumed that evolutionists envisage the relationship as one of 
supplantation, when it is, I believe, better conceived of as sublation. Evolutionary theory 
incorporates (partly) rather than rejects social theory. 
The nature of scientific explanations 
One important function of global research programmes in general and theories more 
particularly, is to provide explanations. We say that the core assumptions of the 
evolutionary research programme, plus the relevant auxiliary theories, furnish us with 
explanations of biological phenomena. But what does it mean to say that something has 
been explained? A popular answer to this question is to suggest that explanations provide 
us with an increased understanding of the world (Frieillnan, 1974; Kitcher, 1981; 
Salmon, 1989). Science tells us not only that, but also why. That is, science provides us 
not only with descriptive knowledge of the way the world is, but also explanatory 
knowledge; it tells us why the world is the way that it is. But just how do explanations 
serve this goal of furthering our understanding of the world? 
The received view 
Although there is a general consensus regarding its inadequacy, or at least 
incompleteness, as a theory of explanation (see Kitcher~ & Salmon, 1989), the most 
important and influential account of scientific explanation was that provided by the 
philosopher Carl Hempel (e.g. 1966). For Hempel, to explain something was to provide 
an argument to the effect that the thing to be explained was to be expected given certain 
antecedent conditions, coupled (usually) with some laws of nature. A central form of 
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scientific explanation for Hempel comprised the so-called deductive-nomological 
explanations. These kinds of explanations, as their name implies, are deductive in nature 
with the conclusion or explanandum sentence being derived from the premises or 
explanans sentences, in which there must figure at least one scientific law. Schematically: 
L I, L2, ... , Lp } Explanans (laws) 
Cl, C2, . .. ,Ck } sentences (initial conditions) 
E Explanandum sentence 
For example, Leverrier explained the irregularities in the motion of Uranus (the 
explanandum) by invoking Newton's law of gravitation and postulating an, as yet 
unknown, planet of a particular size, position, and mass (the explanans) (Hempel, 1966). 
Hempel also provided an account of probabilistic explanations. In some cases the 
explanandum will not follow with deductive certainty from the premises, but only with a 
high degree of probability. The pattern of the argument, however, is similar to that of 
deductive-nomological explanations. 14 For example: 
The probability for persons exposed to the measles to catch the disease is high. 
Jim was exposed to the measles. 
----------------------------------------------------- [Makes highly probable that] 
Jim caught the measles. 
Kitcher (1989, p 410/411) summanses the key features of Hempel's account of 
explanation as: (1) The idea that explanations are arguments; (2) The conclusion of an 
argument is a sentence describing the phenomenon; and (3) That the premises of an 
explanation must contain at least one law. 
14 Hempel (1966) also provided an account of inductive-statistical explanations, however, this figures less 
prominently in his overall model of scientific explanation. 
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Problems with the received view 
Although widely influential and seemingly capable of providing an adequate account of 
many explanations in science, Hempel's model of explanation has accumulated over the 
years a considerable body of criticism from a diversity of sources. These criticisms are 
summarised by Kitcher (1989) and Salmon (1989). 
Firstly, there are many accounts in science which appear to be explanatory in nature, but 
do not fit the deductive-nomological model. For example, the narrative style of 
explanation found in history and sciences such as evolutionary biology and palaeontology 
appear to provide us with satisfactory explanations of phenomena, but do not typically 
invoke laws, and do not conform to the pattern of deductive arguments. 
Conversely, there are also arguments which fit the pattern of the deductive-nomological 
model but do not provide us with adequate explanations. To use the standard example: 
A) The shadow of a flagpole. 
coupled with B) The elevation ofthe sun and the laws of the propagation oflight. 
does not 
explain C) The length of the flagpole. 
If we exchange C for A in the example above, however, we have provided a reasonable 
explanation. The problem here is one of causation. It is the height of the flagpole coupled 
with the relevant laws and initial conditions which causes, and hence explains, the length 
of the shadow; not the shadow which causes (and therefore explains) the length of the 
flagpole (Salmon, 1989). The co-occurrence of sharp drops in barometer readings and the 
commencement of storms provide a similar counter example. Whenever barometric 
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pressure drops sharply a stonn will occur. However, the drop in the reading does not 
cause, and hence fails to explain, the presence of the stonn. The barometer reading and 
the stonn are the effects of a common cause: atmospheric conditions of a certain kind. So 
although the explanation of the stonn on the basis of barometric readings confonns to the 
deductive-nomological model, it is not truly explanatory in nature. 
Another problem for Hempel's conception of scientific explanation is that of explanatory 
relevance. The problem is illustrated with the example of the hexed salt. A magician 
waves his wand over a sample of salt which has been placed in water. The salt 
subsequently dissolves. What explains this fact? An explanation which confonns to the 
deductive-nomological model could be constructed whereby the dissolved salt is 
explained by reference to the law that 'all hexed salt dissolves in water' and that this salt 
was so hexed. Clearly the invocation of hexing is non-explanatory in this context. 
Similarly, we do not explain Bob's failure to conceive a child by reference to the fact he 
consumes on a regular basis his wife's birth-control pills, even though it is true that all 
males that ingest female contraceptives fail to become pregnant (Salmon, 1989). The 
problem here is that arguments that confonn to the deductive-nomological model of 
explanation do not necessarily pick out the relevant features from the irrelevant ones in 
furnishing us with explanations of phenomena. 
Finally, Hempel's account of explanation has difficulty in providing an understanding of 
very rare events, even though they may be furnished with adequate explanations. The 
favourite example here is the case of the mayor's contraction of paresis. We can explain 
this fact by reference to the mayor's previous bout of syphilis, and noting that 
occasionally syphilitics contract paresis. The previous incidence of syphilis explains the 
subsequent contraction of paresis even though the probability of this occurrence is 
extremely low. What is important in this and similar cases, Salmon (1989) emphasises, is 
not high probability but statistical relevance. It is important that the facts cited make a 
difference. 
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This brief tour of Hempel's account of explanation and some of the problems that have 
been directed against it fails to do full justice to the complexity of the issues involved. 
However, my aim here has been to highlight those aspects of explanation that any fully 
realised approach to explanation must take into account. It is important in this context, I 
believe, that our account of explanation be global in nature. That is, the best theory of 
explanation should be one that not only makes sense of explanations in physics or the 
physical sciences, but also in biology, psychology, and the social sciences. The account of 
scientific explanation that I favour here follows from a brief, but lucid and influential 
article, by Kitcher (1985), in which two forms of (essentially compatible) explanation are 
forwarded. The first, causal-mechanistic approach, championed by Salmon (1984, 1989) 
among others, views explanation as an elucidation of causal mechanisms. The second 
approach, as developed by Friedman (1974) and advanced by Kitcher (1981, 1989), 
conceives explanation as unification: the derivation of a wide range of phenomena from a 
small set of underlying argument types. I shall also argue that there are important 
pragmatic considerations which must be taken into account in any model of scientific 
explanation. 
The causal-mechanistic approach to explanation. 
Part of the problem with the deductive-nomological model of explanation, as highlighted 
by the examples above, is that it fails to adequately address the role of causation in 
explanation. The subsumption under laws is not enough, we also need an understanding 
of the causal relationships that obtain between explanandum and explananda. Only then 
can we make sense of the idea that the height of a flagpole explains the length of the 
shadow and not vice versa. This ontic conception of explanation has been rigorously 
formulated and championed by Salmon (1984, 1985, 1989) among others (e.g., Raiiton, 
1981; Bunge, 1996). From this perspective, to explain something is to show how it fits 
into the causal structure of the world. "Explanatory knowledge opens up the black boxes 
of nature to reveal their inner working. It exhibits the ways in which the things we want to 
explain come about" (Salmon, 1989, p.l82). 
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The causal-mechanistic approach to explanation focuses on the way explanations tell us 
how the world works. This typically requires details of the mechanisms which underlie 
and give rise to empirical regularities. It is only through a detailing of such mechanisms 
that understanding is achieved (Bunge, 1996). The causal-mechanistic approach to 
explanation is wedded (although not inevitably) to a realist view of nature. Because much 
of the interesting furniture of the world is inaccessible to us, explanations often need to 
advert to unobservables; to the hidden mechanisms which reside in nature. A distinction 
can be made here between descriptive and explanatory knowledge. Descriptive 
knowledge is knowledge of appearances. Explanatory knowledge, by contrast, provides 
an understanding of the underlying mechanisms which produce the phenomena of interest 
(Salmon, 1989). 
From the causal-mechanistic concept of explanation we can explain why Bob did not get 
pregnant and the mayor contracted paresis by an examination of the relevant mechanistic 
processes. Human males simply do not possess the necessary physiological mechanisms 
to enable pregnancy, while the mayor's paresis can be shown to follow from the action of 
certain causal processes at the biochemical and physiological level of description. 
Science progresses, on the causal-mechanistic view of explanation, as more detailed 
mechanistic hypotheses are elaborated which reach deeper levels of reality (Bunge, 1996). 
An important and useful distinction in this context is that made by Railton (1981) 
between ideal explanatory texts and explanatory information. The ideal explanatory text 
is an account of all those relationships that obtain, causal or otherwise, over various levels 
of analysis, which give rise to the phenomenon of interest. Explanatory information, by 
contrast, refers to specific portions of the ideal explanatory text which are being 
examined. Given the extraordinary complexity of the world and the myriad kinds of 
causal relationships that can obtain between phenomena, the ideal explanatory text may 
be an unobtainable ideal. However, this is not important, for science can be seen to 
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advance by seeking out explanatory information which fills out parts of the ideal 
explanatory text. 
A focus on underlying causes can also serve more practical ends. By teasing out the 
causal relationships which exist in the world we are in a position to intervene in nature so 
as to bring about desirable results (Salmon, 1989). As Bunge (1996, p. 422) notes: 
" There is nothing like the disclosure of mechanisms to destroy myths and to empower us 
to control natural and social processes." 
In summary, the causal-mechanistic approach to explanation suggests that our 
understanding of the world is advanced by knowing the detailed mechanisms (causal or 
otherwise) which are responsible for the phenomena that we wish to explain. Reference 
will often be made, in the filling out of the ideal explanatory text, to processes, entities 
and relations which are non-observable in nature. Such an approach not only captures 
what it means to explain why the mayor contracted paresis or why Bob did not get 
pregnant, but also provides a way of intervening in the world to obtain more pragmatic 
ends. 
Explanation as unification 
A somewhat different approach to explanation suggests that explanation can be conceived 
of as unification (Friedman, 1974; Kitcher, 1981, 1989). Science can be viewed as 
advancing our understanding of the world, from this perspective, by positing unifying 
schemes which explain a diversity of phenomena. In this manner we reduce the total 
number of independent phenomena that we have to accept as given (Friedman, 1974). 
This approach is what Salmon (1989) terms the epistemic conception of explanation. 
According to Kitcher (1981, 1989) the sciences draw on a limited set of arguments - the 
explanatory store - which provide a means of explaining a wide range of phenomena. A 
theory unifies our beliefs to the extent that it can provide a few general patterns of 
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arguments which can be deployed to explain a large number of facts about the world. 
Kitcher (1989, p. 432) clearly summarises this perspective on explanation: 
Science advances our understanding of nature by showing us how to derive 
descriptions of many phenomena, using the same patterns of derivation again and 
again, and, in demonstrating this, it teaches us how to reduce the number of types 
of facts we have to accept as ultimate (or brute). 
This perspective on explanation fits in neatly with some of the ideas outlined earlier on 
theory appraisal. Two important criteria for appraisi~g theories are explanatory breadth 
and simplicity (parts one and three of Thagard's second principle of explanatory 
coherence, explanation). Ceteris paribus, we should prefer theories which explain a wide 
rarige of phenomena without invoking a large number of special assumptions. As Kitcher 
(1981, 1989) notes, many theories in science are accepted because of their explanatory 
promise. This promise is tied closely with notion of unification. For example, Darwin's 
theory of evolution was widely accepted prior to its detailed confirmation, because it 
promised to explain a wide range of biological facts, using a few simple argument 
patterns. Darwin offered explanatory sketches in place of detailed evolutionary stories. He 
demonstrated how phenomena could be explained by implementing certain argument 
patterns which he had demonstrated in explaining other biological facts (Kitcher, 1989). 
The notion of explanation as unification deals effectively with the problems of 
irrelevance and accidental generalisation. We resist the claim that it was the magician's 
hexing which explained the salt dissolving in water by appealing to the fact that an 
alternative theory (one grounded in chemical theory referring to the molecular 
composition of salt etc.), can explain why both hexed and non-hexed salt dissolves in 
water. That is, the chemical theory better unifies the facts that we know about the world. 
Appeals to hexing on the other hand, only fasten onto restricted portions of the world and 
hence is limited in scope. 
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The notion of explanation as unification provides a global means of ordering the world. It 
furnishes us with a way of understanding the regularities in nature. It also allows us to 
make sense of developments in the history of science which demonstrate the preference 
for theories which can order and systematise a wide range of diverse phenomena in a 
relatively simple manner. 
How does this notion of explanation as unification fit in with the idea presented earlier 
that explanation is concerned with un-covering the causal structure of the world? 
Importantly, as both Kitcher (1985, 1989) and Salmon (1985, 1989) emphasise, these two 
approaches to explanation are essentially compatible with one another. They provide a 
complementary means of comprehending how scientific understanding of the world is 
obtained. 
The notion of explanation as unification is a 'top-down' approach (Kitcher, 1985). Its 
goal is to construct a coherent world picture, viewing particular facts as instances of more 
general regularities. By contrast, the causal-mechanistic concept of explanation is a 
'bottom-up' approach (Kitcher, 1985); it is more concerned with explaining how 
individual event came about. Clearly both forms of explanations are necessary to advance 
our scientific understanding of the world. In our attempts to decipher the ideal 
explanatory text, we need to draw on whatever global theories are on offer and 
demonstrate how they further our understanding of specific mechanisms which are in 
operation in the world, and which give rise to the phenomenon of interest. 
For example, we may want of explain why some frogs, so paradigmatically amphibious, 
happen to exist in some extremely arid regions such as the Colorado desert and the Gran 
Chaco of Paraguay (see McClanahan, Ruibal, & Shoemaker, 1994). One kind of 
explanation, informed by the top-down approach, would be to draw on evolutionary 
theory and demonstrate how frogs with certain characteristics under certain 
environmental conditions out reproduce other frogs. We explain the frog's existence by 
invoking the notion of biological function and by adverting to the theory of natural 
59 
60 
selection. However, we also want to explain just how the frogs, seemingly suited to life 
near water, manage to exist under the arid conditions. To do so, we note a number of 
behavioural and physiological mechanisms which the frogs possess which allow them to 
conserve water and stay cool. For example, we note that that certain species of frogs and 
toads stop producing urine when water is not available, and allow wastes to accumulate in 
body fluids. Dehydrated frogs are also capable of absorbing water much more readily 
through the skin in a response mediated by a posterior pituitary hormone, arginine 
vasoticin. In other words, we explain the frogs' presence in the desert by elaborating the 
detailed mechanisms which enable them to survive under extremely arid conditions; we 
take a bottom-up approach. 
Clearly, both these kinds of explanation are valid and true (as far as they go), and are 
necessary to advance a complete understanding of the phenomenon of arid dwelling 
anurans. Just which kind of explanation we may prefer at any given time may be, partly 
at least, a matter of personal interest. Evolutionary biologists may be more interested in 
the functional explanation as an instance of natural selection at work and concern 
themselves with relevant phylogenetic and genetic details of the case, while animal 
physiologists and behavioural ecologists may be more concerned with the specific details 
of the behavioural and physiological mechanisms in operation. It is here that the 
pragmatic features of explanation playa role in determining the kind of explanation that 
is deemed relevant in different situations. 
The pragmatics of explanation 
In recent years, the most articulate defender of the pragmatic conception of explanation 
has been Bas van Fraassen (1977, 1985). For van Fraassen an explanation is an answer to 
a why question. The appropriate answer to the question asked can only be determined by 
contextual features, such as the background knowledge of the questioner. Explanation is 
conceived as providing a bit of relevant missing information. Any information can play 
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this role depending on the nature of the question. "Which factors are explanatory is 
decided not by features of the scientific theory but from concepts brought from outside." 
(van Fraassen, 1985, p. 324). For example, in answering the question: 'Why did Rebecca 
drink the glass of beer?', we can provide multiple answers depending on context. For 
instance, 'Because she was thirsty', or 'because her husband has just left her and she 
wants to drown her sonows', or 'because her husband has left her and she wants to 
celebrate' . 
Van Fraassen's notion of explanation places emphasis on the idea of contrast classes. We 
need to explain why one state of affairs arose rather than another. How an explanation-
seeking why question is answered will be determined, in part, by the relevant emphasised 
contrast class. For example, the question Why did Rebecca drink the glass of beer? asks 
us to provide information which explains why Rebecca and not someone else consumed 
the beer. Whereas the question, why did Rebecca drink the glass of beer? promotes an 
answer in terms of why Rebecca drank the beer rather than throw it away or pour it over 
somebody's head. 
While it seems clear that pragmatic considerations do play an important role in what we 
deem as an acceptable explanation, I follow Kitcher (1989) and Salmon (1989) in 
rejecting the idea that pragmatics is all there is to explanation. The important point of 
departure here is van Fraassen's commitment to a form of empiricism, in contrast to a 
realist to a realist construal of science favoured by both Kitcher (1989) and Salmon 
(1989). Explanations, as Kitcher (1981) notes, are not just accepted for their predictive 
power or empirical adequacy, but are often selected for their explanatory promise in 
unifying disparate collections of phenomena. It is hard to see how advancement in science 
could be achieved without reference to unobservable entities and processes, ones which 
underlie more manifestly pragmatic considerations. Moreover, explanation is not always 
just a matter of answering why questions; there are also explanation-seeking how-possibly 
questions. How actually did mammals get to New Zealand is not the same question as 
why they got there (Salmon, 1989). 
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One way of reconciling the pragmatic with the ontic and epistemic conceptions of 
scientific explanation is to deploy Railton's (1981) distinction between explanatory 
information and the ideal explanatory text (Salmon, 1989). The ideal explanatory text 
contains all the objective aspects of explanation; it contains all the relevant 
considerations. What part of the ideal explanatory text that we want illuminated invokes 
pragmatic considerations. 
The ideal explanatory text determines what constitutes explanatory information 
and distinguishes it from explanatory misinformation. Relevance is a matter of 
objective fact; salience is a matter of personal or social interest. (Salmon, 1989, 
p.16l). 
Salmon (1989, p. 135) provides a useful summary to the three forms of explanation 
outlined above and how they increase our understanding of the world. 
Our understanding is increased (1) when we obtain knowledge of the hidden 
mechanisms, causal or other, that produce the phenomena we seek to explain, (2) 
when our knowledge of the world is so organised that we can comprehend what 
we know under a smaller number of assumptions than previously, and (3) when 
we supply missing bits of descriptive knowledge that answer why-questions and 
remove us from particular sorts of intellectual predicaments. 
These three forms of essentially compatible explanation will provide a fruitful means of 
understanding the role that evolutionary explanations play in psychology as I will detail 
in chapters five and seven below. 
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The role of global research programmes in scientific explanation 
In the present context it is worth additionally noting the important role that GRP's play 
in developing satisfactory explanations of relevant phenomena. Firstly, and most 
importantly, GRP's provide a source of explanatory unification. That is, the hard core of 
the programme typically provides some very general means of explaining a wide range of 
diverse phenomena within the domain of the programme. Explanations for specific 
phenomena draw on the hard core accompanied by the relevant auxiliary theories. 
Secondly, as the auxiliary theories become increasingly more fine-grained they begin to 
conform to specific causal-mechanistic explanations of the facts under consideration. 
Essentially the mechanistic details which give rise to the phenomenon under 
considerations can be conceived of as instantiations of the general argument patterns 
embodied in the hard core of the programme. Thirdly, given that GRP's contain important 
social relations, both internal and external in nature, it is reasonable to suggest that 
pragmatic considerations will also play an important role in the kind of explanatory 
information that is specifically sought. 
For example, in explaining the digestive processes of cows, we can refer simultaneously 
to the function of bovine digestion and the theory of natural selection, as well as to the 
more or less specific theories of the physiology and biochemistry of digestive 
mechanisms. Moreover, just what aspect of bovine digestion that we are interested in may 
be directed in important ways by our specific needs, be they framers wanting to trial new 
feed types, or environmentalists concerned about the release of methane gas as a by-
product of bovine gut activity. 
As I see it, GRP's play an important role in specifying the relevant problems and 
directing research in such a way as to integrate and inform these different ways of 
understanding scientific explanation. In the filling out of parts of the ideal explanatory 
text, GRP's specify the general forms of argument which are likely to prove fruitful in 
illuminating specific mechanisms which give rise to the phenomena that we wish to 
63 
64 
explain. Because science has important responsibilities to society, just what portions of 
the ideal text that are elucidated will be directed, to some extent, by purely pragmatic 
considerations. Ultimately, our goal of understanding the world can be conceived as a 
striving for the whole truth where partial and valuable truth are of considerable epistemic 
and moral worth. 
Progress in science 
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of change, or from a realist's perspective, progress, 
in science. Firstly, there is progress that is achieved form within a global theory or 
research programme. Progress here is achieved mainly through accumulation. There is an 
increase in the number of stable reports of phenomena and explanatory extensions to the 
scope of the research programme (Kitcher, 1993). Kuhn (1970) characterises this kind of 
progress in 'normal' science as puzzle-solving. Scientists working within a paradigm or 
research programme provide increasingly better solutions to conceptual and empirical 
problems throughout time, while the number of anomalies are gradually reduced. 
The second kind of progress, and the one that has received the greatest attention is change 
across research programmes. Typically speaking, one research programme is rejected or 
supplanted by another, better, conceptual scheme. Change in this instance is more 
dramatic in nature, and in Kuhnian terms represents nothing less than a scientific 
revolution. The acceptance of Copernican and the rejection of Ptolomeic astronomy, and 
the widespread acceptance of Wegener's continental drift theory, are two examples of 
revolutions in science. The depth of change that occurs in episodes of scientific 
revolution, however, varies in different cases. 
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Figure Two. Degrees of conceptual change (Thagard, 1992 p. 35) 
1. Adding a new instance, for example that the blob in the distance is a whale. 
2. Adding a new weak rule, for example that whales can be found in the Arctic ocean. 
3. Adding a new strong rule that plays a frequent role in problem solving and 
explanation, for example that whales eat sardines. 
4. Adding a new part-relation, for example that whales have spleens. 
5. Adding a new kind-relation, for example that a dolphin is a kind of whale. 
6. Adding a new concept, for example narwhal. 
7. Collapsing part of a kind-hierarchy, abandoning a previous distinction. 
8. Reorganizing hierarchies by branch jumping, that is, shifting a concepts from one 
branch of a hierarchical tree to another. 
9. Tree switching, that is, changing the organising principle of a hierarchical tree. 
Thagard (1992) provides a useful characterisation of the various degrees of conceptual 
change that may occur (see figure two). Relatively undramatic and frequent changes in a 
conceptual scheme occur when new instances of a concept or new rules relating to 
concepts are added to the conceptual repertoire of a research programme. Over the last 
one hundred years or so, biologists have provided us with a number of such instances, as 
new species were discovered and aspects of their physiology and behaviour were 
elaborated. These kinds of changes, typically speaking, do not threaten the conceptual 
integrity of a research programme. 
More dramatic changes occur when previous distinctions between kinds are collapsed or 
a concept is shifted from one branch of a hierarchical tree to another. For example, 
Darwin collapsed the distinction between species and varieties (important to creationist 
accounts) and recategorised humans as a kind of animal rather than a completely different 
kind of creature. This kind of branch-jumping is a hallmark of all major scientific 
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revolutions (Thagard, 1992). The most dramatic kind of conceptual change is that of tree 
switching, where the whole basis for hierarchical organisation is altered. Dalwin for 
example, altered the classification of species from one based of similarity to one tied to 
historical descent (Thagard, 1992).15 
These changes in conceptual schemes are accepted because of the increase in explanatory 
coherence that they afford us. Conceptual progress, therefore, both within and especially 
across research programmes can be characterised, from a realist perspective, as 
adjustments to our explanatory and categorisation schemes which better represent the true 
nature of the world. The history of science can be conceived in terms of increasingly 
more realistic orderings of nature. 
Other kinds of progress in science also occur, which are variously connected to 
conceptual progress. Explanatory progress, for example, " consists in improving our view 
of the dependencies of phenomena" (Kitcher, 1993 p.105). Often the scope of a research 
programme will be expanded on over time to include new phenomena, while the 
explanations of previously isolated phenomena will be refined and elaborated. The 
Darwinian research programme for example, has over time, furnished us with more 
satisfactory (explal}atory coherent) explanations of phenomena, such as altruism, while 
extending its scope to incorporate newly discovered phenomena such as the structure of 
DNA and the social framework of primate societies. Explanatory progress, as in these 
Darwinian examples, is often the result of changes to the theoretical structure of the 
research programme. The focus on the gene as the level of selection (Williams, 1966) and 
subsequent refinements to the theory of kin altruism (Hamilton, 1964a, 1964b), provided 
better explanations of the seemingly altruistic behaviour of many animals, in particular 
the eusocial insects. 
15 The implications of some of these changes are yet to be fully realised. In ethics, for example, typically 
humans still appear to occupy a unique position apart from other animals. Even in taxonomy, recent 
fmdings from molecular dating techniques (Sibley & Ahlquist, 1984; Hasegawa, Kishino & Yano, 1989) 
indicate that humans, chimpanzee and (possibly) gorillas, should, historically speaking, be considered as 
one genus. 
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Organisational progress occurs in a research programme when there are improvements in 
the relations between different areas of science (Kitcher, 1993). Change in science often 
occurs through the merging or blending of different scientific fields. These sorts of 
changes can be seen as improving both the internal and external coherence of a scientific 
research programme. 
Progress can also be achieved in instrumental terms (Kitcher, 1993). New techniques and 
experimental methods contribute to the progressiveness of a research programme by 
providing access to previously unexplored portions of the world (and therefore revealing 
new phenomena), and by refining methods of confirmation and disconfirmation. In purely 
pragmatic terms, a greater explanatory understanding of the world also provides new 
means of intervening in reality to provide (theoretically at least) material benefits to 
humans and other animals. 
Summary 
If the goal of science is to provide us with significant or valuable knowledge about the 
world, then a realist construal of theory and theory appraisal provides us with a means of 
evaluating the instantiation of this goal. Wherever possible we should pursue research 
programmes which provide us with an increased understanding of the rich and complex 
dependencies of nature in both its observable and non-observable manifestations. In other 
words we should seek conceptual schemes which have greater explanatory coherence than 
the relevant alternatives. This increase in understanding provides us, not only with 
epistemic food for our explanatory hunger, but also with a richer understanding of the 
ways we can interact with nature to promote that which is of most value in existence. 
Many of the themes presented in this chapter will be used in my analysis of the role of 
evolutionary explanations in psychology in subsequent chapters. In particular, I focus on 
the relations between evolutionary theory and other research programmes in psychology 
and on the relative degree of explanatory coherence that they offer. In the next chapter I 
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look at some of the more general issues regarding the role of theory in psychology and the 
place of psychology in science, generally speaking. 
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Chapter two 
The nature of psychology 
Much confusion has been engendered over the disciplinary status of psychology. Should 
psychology be considered a proto-science, a fully-fledged science, a radically different 
kind of science, or not a science at all? What sort of explanations should we be seeking in 
psychology and what sort of strategies do we need to employ to further our understanding 
of psychological phenomena? The lack of a clear answer to these questions is due, I shall 
maintain, to widespread disagreement over both the nature of science and of psychology. 
In this chapter I will argue that psychology should be considered a science. Moreover, 
although psychology, like all areas of academic inquiry, has unique characteristics, there 
is no radical discontinuity between psychology and the natural and social sciences. As 
such, psychology as a science can be understood, from a naturalist-realist perspective, as 
part of a diverse but coherent collection of activities that have as their goal the production 
of valuable knowledge. In this chapter I examine claims regarding the unique status of 
psychology as a science. I argue that there are no special features of psychology which 
clearly demarcate it from other forms of scientific inquiry. This point is illustrated in 
terms of the wide overlap between psychology and other sciences such as biology, 
anthropology and sociology. As such, psychology can only be conceived as a quasi-
autonomous discipline; however, one that can neither be eliminated by or reduced to 
other scientific disciplines. Explanations in psychology, I will further argue, are best 
represented over a distal-proximate dimension. Ideally, explanations over different 
temporal scales should be developed in conjunction with one another to provide coherent 
causal pictures. This idea is linked to the two notions of explanation presented in the 
previous chapter. That is, explanations should be sought in psychology which provide a 
means of unifying diverse phenomena as well as elucidating the specific causal 
mechanisms which bring about phenomena. Finally, although psychology is reasonably 
characterized as conceptually fragmented, I will argue that where possible, psychologists 
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should be pursumg globally integrated systems of theory which provide coherent 
explanations of psychological phenomena at different levels of analysis and over varying 
" 
temporal frames. 
Is psychology a science? 
Questions about the disciplinary status of psychology have come from a variety of 
sources. Philosophers of science, such as Kuhn, Lakatos, and Popper have all, either 
explicitly or implicitly, questioned whether psychology deserves to be considered a 
science in the same sense that either physics or biology is. From within psychology itself 
there have been many claims (especially from humanist and hermeneutic perspectives) 
that either psychology should not be considered a science at all, or if so, a radically 
different kind of science. 
The main concern of Popper (1959, 1963) with the scientific status of psychology is with 
respect to its supposed lack of falsifiability. This criticism, although primarily directed 
against psychoanalytic theory, has also been aimed more generally at psychology as a 
whole. According to Popper, theories in psychology can always be rescued by illicit ad 
hoc moves. If theories cannot specify the conditions in which they may be refuted, then 
from Popper's perspective, they necessarily fall outside of the purview of science. 
This criticism of psychology as a science is wrong-headed in two important ways. Firstly, 
theories in psychology, even in psychoanalytic psychology, (Grunbaum, 1986) are 
falsifiable. Falsifications may lead to modifications in the theory in question, but those 
modifications are then subject to further tests. Secondly, falsifiability as a demarcation 
criterion, is an inappropriate way to demarcate science from non-science. Importantly, as 
Lakatos (1978) has made clear, theories are never tested in isolation but are always 
conjoined with other theories, auxiliary hypotheses, and observational techniques and 
equipment. If empirical findings fail to support the theory, the scientist can always blame 
one of the auxiliary hypotheses or some aspect of the experimental set-up. Theories are 
always under-determined by the data that they purport to explain. Typically speaking, 
70 
71 
scientists will be working within the framework of a global research programme, where 
disconfirmations rather than spelling doom for the program are simply viewed as 
anomalies that await explanation. More generally speaking, it is unclear that there is any 
criterion or set of criteria which could be said to adequately demarcate science form non-
science. Laudan (1983), for example, believes that science is a far too heterogeneous 
collection of activities to allow for any demarcating criteria. Certainly it is implausible to 
suggest that there will be necessary and sufficient conditions for what is to count as 
science, although it may be possible to take a prototype approach to the issue of 
demarcation, or to characterize science in some more abstract sense as a certain kind of 
relationship between organisms and the world (e.g., see Dunbar, 1995). 
The lack of global theories in psychology have prompted both Kuhn (1962) and Lakatos 
(1978) to question the disciplinary status of psychology. The lack of any unifying 
paradigm for Kuhn is suggestive of pre-science rather than science, where various loosely 
articulated schools of thought vie for adherents. The lack of any theoretical unity is also 
considered a problem by Lakatos, who in addition has been especially scathing regarding 
the lack of methodological sophistication often displayed by psychologists. 
I think that it is undoubtedly true that psychology lacks any kind of unifying theoretical 
framework, although it does have its share of genuinely global research programmes. 
However, this in itself is not an adequate demarcation criterion, nor does it necessarily 
indicate that psychology is a very different kind of science than say physics or biology. 
This is especially true if we consider that all theories are more or less global in nature 
(Hooker, 1975) and that even in psychology limited unification has been attained. The 
methodological naivete of many psychologists is certainly an area of concern, as noted by 
psychologists themselves (Meehl, 1967, 1978; Lykken, 1991). However, this is surely a 
consequence of bad science or the adoption of an inappropriate philosophy of science, 
rather than a problem inherent to psychology per se. 
The disciplinary status of psychology, as well as occupying the thoughts of various 
philosophers, has also been a perennial concern for psychologists themselves. Ever since 
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psychology split from its institutional and intellectual affiliations with philosophy there 
have been numerous attempts to characterize just what the nature of psychology is. It 
would be fair to say, that despite a considerable degree of intellectual labour directed 
towards this task, there has emerged no consensus of opinion about whether or not 
psychology is, or should be, considered a science. As Giorgi (1992, p. 46) notes, 
"Throughout its history, psychology has been described as a natural science, a human 
science, two or more sciences, as intrinsically non-scientific - and other things too 
numerous to mention." 
One of the main reasons for this divergence of opinion regarding the status of psychology 
is the extreme diversity of psychology's subj ect matter and forms of inquiry which have 
been at different times labeled as psychological. This 'intellectual zoo' (Miller, 1992, p. 
40) provides a means of characterizing psychology as scientific or non-scientific 
depending on just which species of psychology one chooses to consider. Two important 
divisions that emerge when considering the scientific status of psychology are the ones 
drawn between academic and professional psychology and between psychology as a 
science and psychology as an art. 
The schism between academic and professional psychology has been highlighted recently 
by Corballis (1990), who argues for a division, institutionally at least, on this basis. 
Whether or not professional psychology might be considered a science remains an open 
question here, although Corballis notes the gradual decline in the scientist-practitioner 
model and the increasing distance that is being established between professional and 
academic psychologists. 
The most frequently aired source of disagreement over the status of psychology is 
whether or not the subject matter that psychologists investigate lends itself to a form of 
scientific inquiry or whether the domain of psychology is more conducive to the sort of 
inquiry engaged by those in the humanities. That is, there is a division drawn between 
psychology as a human science and psychology as a natural science. There is a long 
tradition, epitomised in humanist and hermeneutic approaches, which conceptualises 
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psychological investigation as a primarily interpretative enterprise. Those of post-
modernist persuasion such as Gergen (1985, 1992) have vigorously pursued this view of 
psychology. Because meaning is central in human life, psychology should be concerned 
with the way social roles are realised in cultural contexts, and how the agents concerned 
interpret these roles. Psychology and the other social 'sciences', from this perspective, 
are more akin to literary interpretation than the kind of inquiry pursued in the natural 
sciences (Gergen, 1985, 1992). 
One way of resolving this conflict between the science and the art of psychology would 
be to admit that some psychological phenomena fall clearly within the scope of natural 
scientific methods, while other psychological phenomena lie outside the purview of what 
might be considered science. William Wundt, remembered mainly as the founding father 
of experimental psychology, was one prominent proponent of this kind of division 
(Toulmin and Leary, 1992). For Wundt, only certain aspects of psychology, such as basic 
sensory and perceptual processes, were considered to be amenable to empirical 
investigation using the methods of the natural sciences. Other areas of psychology such 
as language, custom, social structure, were viewed as more appropriately investigated 
using other methods such as those employed by anthropologists. Psychology on the view 
presented above would cleave into two separate disciplines: one, a science concerned 
with basic physiological, perceptual and cognitive processes, and the other, a humanity 
engaged in the elucidation of personal and social meaning. 
If our conception of science is modeled on Newtonian physics (as is not infrequently the 
case in the history of psychology), and formalised in the empiricist (specifically logical 
positivist) tradition, then it is clear that many if not most branches of psychology fall 
outside the scope of scientific inquiry. The beliefs, desires and other intentional attitudes 
of humans are widely (e.g., Manicas & Secord, 1983, Secord, 1990, Robinson, 1985, 
Margolis, 1990), although not universally (e.g:, P. M, Churchland, 1989), considered to 
be an ineliminable part of many psychological explanations. However, it is extremely 
unlikely that we will discover any laws of human action in the way that we have laws of 
say gravitation (Manicas & Secord, 1983). Human action is "spatially, temporally, and 
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socially situated" (Secord, 1990, p. 79), therefore explanation as subsumption under the 
covering law model will be inappropriate for psychology. Furthermore, because of the 
variability of psychological phenomena, psychology will never achieve any measure of 
predictive power. It is highly unlikely that we will be able to say, with anything like 
deductive certainty, that certain states of affairs will be obtained regarding human 
thought or action given certain initial conditions and any putative psychological laws. 
The open nature of psychological systems also poses problems for the role of experiment 
in psychology (Margolis, 1990). The closure demanded by experimental procedure 
radically alters the behaviour of the subject and hence the object of inquiry. This problem 
is exacerbated by the double hermeneutic: people are both the subject of inquiry and the 
inquiring subjects. For many psychological phenomena, especially of a social nature, the 
role of experiment in psychology is likely to be strictly limited and alternative methods of 
investigation will have to be employed. l As Manicas and Secord (1983, p. 410) express 
it: "If our aim is to explain behaviour as it occurs in ordinary life there is no escaping the 
ordinary description of behaviour and experience." 
Clearly if psychology is to be considered a science it will be a very different one from 
that of experimental physics and will not conform to a model of science informed by 
most versions of empiricism. Many of the conceptual problems regarding the disciplinary 
status of psychology might, however, be resolved on alternative philosophies of science. 
Giorgi (1992, p. 47) presents a clear statement of this view: 
Were a theory of science which is compatible with the diversity and complexity 
of human reality to be attained, the problems of psychology's unity, of the 
scientist professional dichotomy, and of the meaning of psychological science 
could, in principle, be resolved. 
I Although Greenwood (1982) has argued that causal inquiry based upon closed experiments is possible, 
even in social psychology. Greenwood suggests that although there are many barriers in practice to 
developing a viable experimental social psychology there is nothing in principle to suggest that 
experiments cannot make an important contribution to an understanding of social behaviour. 
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In the first chapter of this thesis I have articulated a realist approach to science which I 
think can do adequate justice to the nature of psychological inquiry and which can 
resolve, or at least provide a means of resolving, some of the perennial problems 
regarding the disciplinary status of psychology. It will become clear that although 
psychology is not a science like physics, it is nonetheless a legitimate form of intellectual 
inquiry, more in line with the sciences of biology or geology in terms of the kinds of 
explanations that it seeks. Moreover, I will argue that although psychology's subject 
matter is in some respects unique, nonetheless it can be coherently understood as part of a 
larger enterprise, continuous with that of both the natural and social sciences. In 
developing this view of psychology it will be useful first to consider in more detail the 
domain of psychological inquiry. 
The domain of psychology 
One of the reasons for the widely differing attitudes regarding the scientific character of 
psychology is the sheer diversity of psychology's subject matter. Psychologists study a 
tremendous range of different kinds of phenomena which exist at different levels of 
structural organisation and which can be understood at different levels of analysis. 
The structural organisation of nature, as traditionally understood in SCIence, can be 
conceived as a series of part-whole relations. Cells are parts of organs, which are parts of 
organisms, which are parts of ecosystems and so on. The subject matter of psychology 
embraces a wide cross-section of this physical stratification, from the chemical properties 
of nerve cells through to the ecological relations of humans and society. 
Whereas levels of organisation are concerned with the part-whole relations of the 
physical world, levels of analysis refer to a conceptual distinction in terms of the kinds of 
questions that can be asked of the world. Although our best scientific picture of nature is 
a thorough going physicalist one, there are also various emergent properties of this 
physical world which are best understood at different levels of conceptual analysis. Much 
of psychology is concerned with a portion of these emergent properties: mental 
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phenomena, intentional behaviour, and the social relations between individuals. Other 
disciplines such as anthropology and sociology are concerned with emergent properties at 
more inclusive levels such as social structure and cultural traditions. 
One popular approach to explaining psychological phenomena is to draw the distinction 
between three different levels of analysis: ecological, computational and 
implementational (e.g., Marr, 1982; Stereleny, 1990). The ecologicallevel2 specifies the 
functional attributes of the system; the computational level explains how the system 
operates algorithmically while the implementational level explains how the 
computational level is realised in a physical system. It is important to note that all these 
levels should be considered widely, that is, in reference to the appropriate environments 
(Stercleny, 1990).3 
I will adopt a similar division in my conceptual partitioning of psychological phenomena, 
although with some clarifications. I will conceive psychology as being concerned with 
four levels of analysis: functional, physiological, psychological, and social. The 
functional level, as in the ecological level, specifies the purpose of the system in 
question. It is here that we ask the question: 'What is it for'? Where for is a short hand for 
'what are the adaptive advantages of the system in question in the environment in which 
it was selected for?' Functional questions can be asked about each of the three other 
levels of analysis. We can licitly inquire about the function of a brain system, a cognitive 
system, or certain kinds of social arrangement. This level is a crucial one, for questions of 
function help us to demarcate real phenomena from noise. Moreover, knowing what 
something was designed to do can provide us with important information about how the 
system is likely to carry out these functions. 
2 I adopt Stereleny's terminology in my presentation here. Marr's original formulation, somewhat 
confusingly, labels the ecological level as computational and the computational level as algorithmic. 
3 It should be clear here that although there is some overlap between levels of analysis and levels of 
organisation, the mapping is only partial. Psychological phenomena, for example, have no obvious place in 
our part-whole physical ordering of the world. We cannot say that memory is part of brains or that neurons 
are parts of memory, even though memories no doubt involve the action of many neurons, which are 
located in the brain. Part-whole orderings, however, do operate at the psychological level of analysis, 
although the relations are psychological ones. 
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The physiological level of analysis is concerned with the full range of physical processes. 
In psychology these processes mainly include brain functions at various levels of 
organisation, from neurons through to hemispheric functioning. At the psychological 
level of analysis important phenomena include intention, memory, imagery, 
consciousness, and the full range of mental states typically studied by cognitive 
psychologists. Levels of organisation also emerge at this level of analysis with 
psychological systems being embedded in larger systems in our overall cognitive 
architecture (e.g., Lycan, 1987; Dennett, 1978). The psychological level is seen to be 
supervenient on the physiological level. That is, although for each psychological state 
there is a physical state, the psychological level displays emergent properties not 
specifiable at the physical level. It is at this level of analysis that psychology claims 
autonomy from biology on the one hand and sociology on the other (Margolis, 1990). 
However, this autonomy can only be considered a relative one, because a full 
understanding of psychological states requires an understanding of their functional 
properties, their physical instantiation, and their environmental (often social) referents. 
Psychological phenomena, therefore, are biosociologically constrained (Bunge, 1990). 
Moreover, psychological states are important parts of sociological explanations and are 
themselves part of the subject matter of biology (e.g., cognitive ethology; Ristau, 1991). 
The social level of analysis is also an important one for many psychological phenomena. 
For as Manicas (1987) and others (Margolis, 1990; Secord, 1990) point out, much of the 
subject matter of psychology is concerned with the emergent properties of persons as 
they appear in social environments. 
Persons are surely minded, but they are best conceived as culturally emergent in 
exactly the sense that they have capacities (properties, causal powers) - for 
example, linguistic abilities - predicable of them only by virtue of the causal 
outcomes of the development of their biological complexity in a social 
environment. (Manicas, 1987 p. 296) 
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Just as the psychological level can be said to be realised by the physiological one, so too 
are social phenomena realised in psychological processes. That is, social phenomena such 
as status ranking or group decision-making are dependent on, but not reducible to, the 
thoughts and actions of individuals. 
It is important to note that each level of analysis provides important constraints on 
theorising at other levels. Therefore, our best theories of psychological phenomena 
should be coherent with our best physical and social theories, and should be functionally 
realisable. Furthermore, these levels of analysis, although broadly demarcating the range 
of phenomena studied by psychologists, are better conceived as continuous rather than 
discrete in nature. This is reflected in the various areas of inquiry which occupy spaces at 
the interstices of these levels such as cognitive neuroscience and social cognition. 
Moreover, many areas of psychology, such as emotion and development, transcend these 
boundaries and study phenomena across different levels of analysis. 
A brief reflection on the levels of organisation in nature that psychologists are interested 
in reveals that there is a considerable overlap in what psychologists study and what is 
investigated by biologists, sociologists, and anthropologists. Biologists are clearly 
concerned with the physiological underpinnings of brain and behaviour as well as the 
evolution of mind and social behaviour. Anthropologists investigate the psychological, 
social, and cultural aspects of human nature, as it is manifest across different 
environments. And sociologists are interested in the rich network of social relations and 
institutional features that playa role in influencing human behavour.Psychologists also 
study all these domains of interest. 
Psychology therefore, as Bunge (1990) suggests, can be considered as a quasi-
autonomous discipline, one with important connections to both biology and sociology. It 
follows that one way progress can be achieved in psychology is through a coherent 
integration of theories at different levels of analysis. The development of interdisciplinary 
studies such as cognitive science and sociobiology can be seen as attempts to provide this 
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conceptual integration. Ultimately, a complete understanding of the range of 
psychological phenomena will be obtained by providing detailed accounts ofbio-psycho-
social systems rather than discrete and localised analyses of a narrow spectrum of the 
organisational hierarchy. 
Questions regarding psychology's status as a science typically reflect a concern that the 
psychological and social levels of analysis are not explicable given the methods of 
natural science. A commitment to producing a coherent understanding of psychological 
phenomena renders this position somewhat problematic. It is conceptually messy, not to 
say counter-productive, to demarcate the science of psychology from the art of 
psychology on the basis of some reasonably arbitrary cut in the hierarchy of organization 
in nature or in terms of specific levels of analysis which are mutually interdependent 
rather than autonomous. That is not to say that phenomena at different levels of analysis 
or different levels of organisation all need to be investigated using identical methods. As 
I will argue below, the richer understanding of science afforded by a naturalistic-realistic 
perspective offers a way of providing a conceptual integration of the way the diversity of 
psychological phenomena should be understood. 
A naturalist-realist perspective on psychological science 
Anti-naturalist approaches to psychology maintain that psychology should be considered 
as radically discontinuous with the natural sciences and should develop its own methods 
and means of evaluation for investigation of its subject matter (e.g., Margolis, 1990). The 
push to establish psychology as a unique science independent from the natural sciences is 
interesting in the light of similar claims (for similar reasons), made by biologists (e.g., 
Mayr, 1982) for the autonomy of their own discipline. For example, Mayr (1982) points 
out, as psychologist do for their own discipline, that biology does not typically involve 
sUbsumption under universal laws4. Indeed, outside of some areas of physics, 
4 There are of course laws in both biology and psychology, but they tend to be more limited in application 
than those in physics. 
79 
80 
explanations m science do not typically involve the invocation of laws at all. 
Furthennore, biology, geology and other sciences, like psychology are not strongly 
predictive in nature. The problem in establishing a science of psychology, therefore, is 
not one of precision. Many sciences subsume explanations under probabilistic rather than 
universal laws. This is certainly true of evolutionary biology, as well as many of the 
geological sciences, notoriously of course, meteorology. Indeed, the activity of any 
dynamic system is going to be difficult to predict with any degree of accuracy. 
Explanation broadly speaking, therefore, as Kitcher (1981) argues is more fruitfully 
understood as unification rather than subsumption under covering laws. Scientists, in 
many diverse areas of inquiry, seek to unify phenomena by instantiating a small number 
of basic argument patterns or types. 
Explanation in biology, as in psychology, also has an essentially narrative structure. 
Because biological systems are characterised by variability, randomness, and complexity, 
accounting for individual action involves the invocation of historical narratives (which 
are individually unique) over various levels of temporal resolution (Mayr, 1982). 
Moreover, both biological and psychological phenomena are strongly context dependent. 
An investigation of individual structures can not proceed without due attention to the 
appropriate context, be it physical, ecological, social or cultural. Experiments in biology 
therefore, as in psychology, will have to be sensitive to this context dependency. As such 
observation and comparison become legitimate scientific strategies for coming to 
understand the nature of the phenomena in the domain in question (Mayr, 1982). 
It would seem then, on the basis of this preliminary analysis, that the bifurcation of 
psychology from the natural sciences cannot be sustained. Neither psychology's subject 
matter, explanatory style, or methodology can justify its separation from the natural 
sciences. Psychologists are right to reject physics as the model science from which to 
compare their discipline. However, few sciences live up to the inappropriate demands to 
be a 'science like physics', and psychology can be likened in some important respects to 
the natural sciences of biology and geology broadly conceived. 
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The foregoing suggests that the important issues regarding psychology's status as a 
science pivots not so much on the nature of psychology but on the way science itself has 
been and continues to be conceived. Certainly as long as psychologists remain adherents 
to the 'cult' of empiricism (Tou1min & Leary, 1992) with its commitment to hypothetico-
deductive method, the covering law model of explanation and an instrumentalist 
construal of theory, much of psychology will lie outside of the domain of science. This 
impoverished view of science, however, as has been widely, but far from universally 
recognised, cannot be sustained. 
One alternative would to be pursue one of the various social-constructivist approaches to 
science. This alternative is actively developed by a variety of psychologists in various 
different guises (see for example, Gergen, 1985, 1992; Packer, 1985; Hare-Mustin & 
Maracek, 1988). For reasons that I have elaborated upon in detail in chapter one, and 
which are aptly summarised by Greenwood (1987, 1992), post-modem perspectives fail 
to adequately portray the practice of scientists, the history of scientific thought, or the 
nature of reality itself. There is no reason to believe that the portion of the world 
investigated by psychology warrants a radically different philosophy of science, than that 
which best characterises the rest of scientific inquiry. 
Human belief, desire, and other intentional attitudes are certainly different from the 
phenomena studied by physicists or bio-chemists. However, there is no reason to believe 
that these phenomena are not also real and explanatory in the same sense that say quarks 
or genes are. From a realist perspective, psychological and social states are real properties 
of the world, which have real effects. That is, they can be invoked in the development of 
causal explanations of the manifest facts that psychologists study (Greenwood, 1988, 
1992; Manicas and Secord, 1983; Secord, 1990; Bunge, 1996). Psychologists then, like 
other scientists, should favour the construction of deep or postulational theories, which go 
beyond the data to invoke the operation of hidden causal mechanisms. That the 
mechanisms in question are psychological or social rather than physical in nature, should 
be no barrier to their development and use. 
81 
82 
It is worth emphasising at this juncture that explanation should not be conceived of as 
sUbsumption under generalised laws. Psychologists are surely right in their general, 
although not universal agreement, that there will be few if any true laws in psychology. 
However, this is no warrant to reject the hope of developing adequate explanations in 
psychology completely. As I have detailed in chapter one, explanation is more fruitfully 
understood in terms of unification and with respect to the elucidation of causal-
mechanistic processes. It is by invoking a small number of argument patterns to explain a 
range of phenomena and by detailing the mechanistic processes that give rise to the facts 
that we wish to explain, that our understanding to the world is promoted. 
I contend that this approach to explanation can be just as usefully applied to psychology 
as it can to other areas of intellectual inquiry. All humans are certainly unique and hence 
there are unlikely to be any laws of human action (Lykken, 1991; Robinson, 1985). To 
explain the individuality of humans we must invoke a myriad of historical, social, 
personal, genetic, physiological and cultural factors. This however, is true of any 
biological system and suggests that psychological explanations must advert to a 
multiplicity of specific causal processes of various kinds: physiological, psychological, 
social and so forth. This is just the kind of multi-dimensional explanation that is sought 
by biologists attempting to explain specific patterns of animal behaviour, or by 
meteorologists in explaining specific patterns of weather. Psychology, like biology or 
meteorology is, therefore, not a predictive science, or at best, only a weakly predictive 
one5; however, there is no reason to suggest that it is not an explanatory one. 
The importance of meaning and context in human action does not invalidate this 
comparison of psychology with the other sciences in terms of the kinds of explanations 
that it should be seeking. It is certainly true that the intention of human agents plays an 
important role in the explanations of their behaviour. Moreover, behavior can often only 
be understood through reference to its embeddedness in particular social contexts. 
However, it is unclear how these facts of human life prompt a rejection of explanation in 
5 Given enough background infonnation about an individual we can do considerably better than chance in 
predicting their behaviour given certain initial conditions. We are at least as reliable in this task as the 
average weather forecaster is in predicting specific patterns of weather. 
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favour of interpretation as a means of furthering our understanding of psychological 
phenomena. Providing rich, detailed, and sympathetic accounts of human behavior is an 
important aspect of psychology. However, I see this process fundamentally as a way of 
elucidating phenomena which it is the job of psychological theory to explain, rather than 
an end point in itself. That is, in providing an understanding of what it means to engage 
in certain patterns of social discourse we have uncovered some interesting empirical 
regularity about the (human) world which it is the job of psychological theory to explain. 
To advance our understanding of human action we need to go beyond description and 
interpretation to explanatory accounts of why certain instances of behaviour occur. 
Ideally these explanatory accounts will draw on both general features of humans under 
certain environmental contexts (i.e. unifying explanations) as well as specific details of 
local processes (i.e. causal-mechanistic explanations). That is, we want to explain both 
the regularities and invariances of human thought and action as well as accounting for 
specific individualistic instances of these phenomena. In science generally these two 
kinds of explanation are usually intimately connected. Ideally we should be able to 
invoke general argument patterns which provide explanations for a wide range of 
phenomena, while at the same time detailing the specific mechanisms which realise these 
general processes. 
Explanations in psychology can also be usefully conceptualised over a distal-proximate 
dimension. Figure three illustrates the range of explanations considered over different 
temporal frames. Explanations drawn at different temporal levels are likely to be 
intimately related to one another in a variety of ways. For example, we can invoke the 
history of an individual's personal development as part of the explanation for the kinds of 
beliefs and desires that they hold. Moreover, this individual history may be explicable 
given certain specific cultural antecedents. The specific details of the culture may in tum 
be explained by invoking evolutionary considerations of function that may themselves be 
illuminated by reference to certain psychological processes. To use a crude example, 
Bob's desire for pork and belief in the acceptability of porcine consumption may be 
explained by an upbringing, rich in crackling and apple sauce, explicable given prevalent 
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cultural beliefs III contemporary western (but not Muslim) cultures. The 
institutionalisation of livestock farming more generally may reflect an evolutionary 
history where humans have undergone selection for mechanisms which promote the 
consumption of animal flesh and the knowledge and control of livestock. 
The causal web here is clearly complex, and this is a simple example. However, like all 
other sciences, psychology should be aiming for complete explanations of the phenomena 
in its domain. Ideally we should be able to sketch out the physical, psychological, social, 
cultural, developmental, and functional processes which give rise to the phenomena of 
interest. Clearly it is a gross understatement to say that this is no easy task. It is likely 
that for any domain of interest in psychology there are multiple, interactive, causal 
processes in operation. It follows that one way progress in psychology might be achieved 
is through the development of increasingly richer connections between theories 
constructed at different levels of analysis and over different temporal frames. This 
necessitates not only increasing levels of communication between psychologists 
themselves, but also more elaborate connections between psychology and other sciences 
as well as between psychology and philosophy. 
Just which part of the ideal explanatory text that we will wish to illuminate will be, as 
noted in the previous chapter, determined in part by pragmatic concerns. The kind of 
explanation seeking why questions formulated by professional psychologists are likely to 
be somewhat different from those motivated by less practical concerns. However, 
progress in both clinical and academic psychology is only likely to be achieved to the 
extent that the sorts of explanations that are developed accurately capture the nature of 
real processes in the world. 
If our goal is the production of valuable truth, then we must pay due attention to the rich 
and complex connections that exist between academic and professional psychology as 
well as those between psychology, public policy and society. It is my contention that 
these aims are best achieved through the development of global research programmes. In 
the following sections I discuss the disunified nature of psychology as a science and 
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indicate ways that unification might be achieved in a manner commensurate with the 
goals of science. 
Systems of psychological explanation 
Psychology as a disunified science 
Psychology, if portrayed as a science at all, is often depicted as a science in disarray (e.g., 
Koch, 1981; Staats, 1989; Royce; 1985; Bevan, 1991; Giorgi, 1992). For example, Staats 
(1989, p. 149) suggests that, " ... fields of psychology have developed as separate 
entities, with little or no planning with respect to their relationships. Research areas grow 
in isolation without ever being called on to relate themselves to the rest of psychology." 
The disunity of psychology is manifest in various ways: institutionally, methodologically, 
and theoretically. At the theoretical level, for example, psychology is characterised by a 
proliferation of small-scale mini-theories (often little more than descriptions of empirical 
regularities), which are employed to explain a limited array of psychological phenomena. 
The growth of these local theories, moreover, is rarely pruned through judicious 
comparison with alternative theories and is not, typically speaking, integrated with other 
theories in different branches of psychology. 
The apparent disunity of psychology can perhaps be explained by psychology's relative 
youth as a science and the intrinsic complexity of its subject matter (Royce, 1985; Staats, 
1989). Staats (1989) argues that there is a progression in the natural sciences from 
periods characterized by disunity and a proliferation of local theories, towards more 
integrated unified disciplines. In some senses this echoes Kuhn's (1970) analysis of 
science which portrays disciplines as emerging from a pre-paradigmatic state, 
characterized by a diversity of competing schools, to a relative unity of research and 
theory within the boundaries of a given paradigm. However, as Kuhn would have it, 
science over time enters cycles of unity and disunity during periods of normal and 
revolutionary science. 
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The idea of science becoming increasingly unified over time is perhaps questioned by the 
often prolific growth of sub-disciplines in science. As new phenomena become accessible 
to scientific inquiry through developments in theory, methodology, and research 
techniques, the depth and breadth of disciplines increase. In biology, for example, the last 
fifty years or so has seen a plethora of new sub-disciplines, such as molecular biology, 
biochemistry, behavioral genetics and paleo-biology. However, in one important sense 
these sub-disciplines are unified in that they all, ultimately, appeal to the Neo-Darwinian 
theory of evolution. For psychology however, there is no such over-arching theoretical 
perspective which provides a similar degree of conceptual unification. The search for 
some kind of global theory in psychology is seen therefore by many to be a virtue (Staats, 
1989; Marx & Cronan-Hillax, 1987). Marx and Cronan-Hillax (1987), for example, argue 
that psychology will become a mature science when it moves from its present pre-
paradigmatic phase into paradigmatic science. The advance of science, it is argued here, 
is best served by theoretical monism: the construction of a single grand theory which 
serves to explain and organise the diversity of phenomena in a given domain. 
By comparison, the lack of unification in psychology has been argued by some to be a 
virtue, or at least an unavoidable consequence of, psychology's unique subject matter 
(Koch, 1981; Dixon, 1983; Gardner, 1995). Both Koch (1981) and Gardner (1995) argue 
that psychology will never become a coherent unified discipline because the various sub-
fields of psychology are so fundamentally different from each other. Psychology 
therefore, should be best conceived as a family of related sciences rather than a single 
unified enterprise. Dixon (1983) suggests that" psychological phenomena are sufficiently 
dynamic, interdependent, and multi-dimensional as to require multiple theoretical 
renderings and multiple modes of inquiry." Similarly, Little (1991) argues that the search 
for a unifying theory in psychology is mistaken because social and psychological 
phenomena are too diverse, complex, and open-ended to make any coherent over-arching 
theory viable. The best strategy for psychology therefore, it is argued, is to pursue a 
vigorous theoretical pluralism. That is, psychology should construct a diversity of theory 
commensurate with the highly heterogeneous nature of its subject matter. 
87 
88 
Psychology's subject matter, as elaborated upon earlier, includes conSCIOusness, 
intentionality, the nature of self, as well as perceptual, cognitive, and neural processes. 
However, there is nothing in principle that precludes the possibility of an approach that 
makes explicable all of these areas of inquiry within a single theoretical framework, 
while specifying how phenomena at different levels relate to each other in meaningful 
ways. I would argue that other areas of academic inquiry, such as biology, have a 
similarly diverse subject matter, but do manage to attain some degree of theoretical unity. 
Theoretical pluralism is surely necessary for the growth of science. Progress cannot be 
achieved unless there is an active development and comparison of alternative theoretical 
perspectives. As Royce (1985) notes however, theoretical pluralism manifests itself in 
different ways in different kinds of science; sequentially in mature sciences and 
simultaneously in immature ones. The initial push for explanation of phenomena in an 
immature science will see the development of a legion of different, highly localised 
theories. As Royce (1985) suggests, this is the only way the immature science can 
attempt to cover the full scope of its subject matter. Over time, however, there should be 
an attempt to produce theories of ever increasing explanatory coherence. Importantly, 
theories should be developed which are capable of explaining a wide range of diverse 
phenomena using a few basic argument patterns. Royce (1985, p.1l) suggests that "The 
recommended pragmatic action [for psychology] is to promote the proliferation of 
potentially viable theories and simultaneously to develop a small number of theories that 
show the greatest potential for eventually becoming conceptually powerful." 
There are two primary means whereby unification might be achieved. One is through the 
reduction of phenomena and the other is though the development of global research 
programmes. I shall consider these two options in tum and argue that psychology, like 
other sciences, is best served through the construction of GRP's which serve to unify the 
domains of interest. However, this view retains the idea that progress is achieved through 
the development of multiple theories of various degrees of globalness. Just what kind of 
theories will be preferred in psychology will be determined on the basis of the multiple 
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criteria for theory appraisal outlined in chapter one, and will be commensurate with the 
goal of producing valuable knowledge. 
Reductionism in psychology 
The notion of the unity of science has traditionally meant, as Trout (1991, p. 338) notes 
that "all events (properties, states, processes, etc.) that are implicated in the laws of any 
special science fall under the laws of physics." For psychology reduction has been 
construed in various ways. For example: from social to individual processes; from mind 
to brain and from mind to behaviour. Perhaps the most important and historically 
prevalent kind of reduction is the idea that psychology can be reduced to neuroscience. 
The strong portrayal of the identity thesis of the mind suggests that psychological types 
can be reduced to physical or neural types, so that (with the appropriate bridge laws) we 
could literally translate psychological phenomena into physical phenomena, with no loss 
of information or understanding. Given the multiple realisability of mental states6, 
however, this strong thesis was relaxed so that while each psychological state is 
conceived as physically instantiated, there is no lawful correspondence between 
psychological kinds and physical kinds (Burge, 1990). The autonomy of psychology from 
neuroscience has been defended by the majority of theorists in the philosophy of mind 
(e.g. Fodor, 1991b; Stereleny, 1990; Dennett, 1981; Lycan, 1987; Burge, 1990). It is 
argued that there are important generalizations at the psychological or functional levels 
that are not captured by theories in neuroscience. Neurophysiological theories of the 
brain simply do not explain, by themselves, the wide range of cognitive phenomena. 
However, psychological theories, of course, can never be entirely free of the 
considerations drawn from the neurosciences. For psychological phenomena there seems 
to be a partial dependence on, but not a reduction to, neural states. 
6 This is the idea that similar mental states can be realised by different neural states in different people, 
animals and (potentially) Martians, and in the same person at different times. 
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An alternative portrayal of psychology's relation to neuroscience is to suggest that 
psychological phenomena can be entirely eliminated by neuroscience (Rorty, 1971; P. M. 
Churchland, 1981, 1985). Paul Churchland (1981, 1985) argues that folk psychology is a 
radically false theory and that its conceptual machinery should be dismantled and 
discarded in favour of the more powerful theories of a completed neuroscience. Instead of 
'feeling pain' we should talk about the 'firing of C fibres' (Rorty, 1971), and instead of 
'having a belief that there is a wombat over there' we should say7 'there is a spiking 
frequency of 350 HZ in neural pathway X at the sixth level of the occipital cortex' 
(Churchland, 1985). 
The huge advances in neuroscience and Churchland's eloquence make such a proposition 
less absurd than it might initially seem. The arguments against eliminativism, however, 
seem as strong as those against psychological reduction. Jackson (1982, 1986) argues that 
there is knowledge above and beyond physical knowledge, such as the way things 
introspectively feel, which is an important part of psychology. It is also not clear how 
e1iminativism escapes the argument of multiple realisabi1ity that has been leveled at the 
identity thesis. My belief about wombats has a different neural instantiation, no doubt, 
than does yours (or that of a wombat for that matter); so even if we were to be hooked up 
to one another by splicing the nerve ends in our brains together (as Churchland suggests 
in one of his scenarios) we would not be able to understand one another. In an important 
paper McCauley (1986) argues that eliminativism fails because theories in neuroscience 
and psychology operate at different levels of analysis. 
The mistake all verSIOns of eliminative materialism make is to draw their 
eliminative conclusions about the inter level relationship between psychology and 
neuroscience on the basis of analysis of intra levels contexts ~ .. the history of 
science reveals no precedent for theory replacement or elimination in interlevel 
contexts. 
(McCauley, 1986 p.l97). 
7 Although in Churchland's scheme (1985), we do not have to say anything. With practice we should be 
able to directly introspect brain processes. 
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Skinner (1974) of course also pursued a fonn of elimitavism in psychology, in his 
programme of radical behaviorism. For Skinner the psychological level could be 
eliminated in favour of descriptions of patterns of behaviour in relation to the 
contingencies of the environment. In general, the sorts of criticisms directed against the 
elimitivism of Churchland are likely to hold also for Skinner's eliminative programme. 
Attempts at unification in psychology through reduction or elimination of psychological 
phenomena have proven untenable. An alternative approach to achieving unification in 
psychology is through the development of global research programmes that promise to 
make coherent the diverse collection of phenomena studied by psychologists. 
Global research programmes in psychology 
The disunified state of psychology can be attributed, in part, to a lack of a single, 
coherent, overarching theoretical framework. Unlike physics, biology, or geology, 
psychology does not possess a GRP or GRP's of sufficient coherence to unify the 
diversity of its subject matter. However, text-book presentations of psychology (e.g., 
Atkinson, Atkinson, Smith, Bern, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1996) often make distinctions 
between various different approaches or perspectives in psychology. For example, 
Atkinson et al. present what they view as five different approaches in psychology: 
behavioural, biological, phenomenological, cognitive, and psychoanalytic. This collection 
of different approaches, however, is mix of frameworks, domains and research 
programmes. GRP's are those large-scale collections of theories, methodologies, and so 
forth elaborated upon in chapter one. Frameworks are more diffusely organised ways of 
approaching a given subject matter characterised by particular methods and often limited 
to specific domains. Domains of inquiry represent different portions of the world at 
different levels of analysis or structural organisation. Finally, theories refer to those 
specific models of the world, which are employed to explain patterns of data. 
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From this perspective, cognitive and biological psychology are better characterised as 
domains of inquiry, which focus on psychological phenomena at different levels of 
analysis. Although there are specific cognitive and biological theories of psychological 
phenomena they are not typically organised in any unified way. 8 In the sense that 
cognitivism has a specific collection of experimental methods and explanatory styles, it 
might also be termed an approach ora framework from which to organise inquiry. The 
labeling of behavioral and psychoanalytic perspectives as approaches, while in some 
sense accurate, obscures the fact that there are also coherent GRPs roughly co-extensive 
with these labels. Both radical behaviorism and Fre'~dian psychoanalytic theory are 
organized in such a manner as to quality as GRPs in much the same sense as quantum 
physics or Darwinian theory are (although they have achieved somewhat less success). 
Radical behaviorism, for example, as formulated by Skinner (1938, 1974), possess a 
series of core assumptions including certain laws, a variety of auxiliary theories, specific 
methodologies, technologies, and a proposed programme of social action (see Skinner's 
utopian novel Walden II). Radical behaviorism, therefore, offers a truly coherent world 
view. 
The discussion of science in chapter one suggests that one way that progress in achieved 
is through the development of theories with ever increasing explanatory coherence. In the 
natural sciences the development and comparison of GRP's have typically achieved this. 
GRP's advance our understanding of a given area of science by providing explanatorily 
coherent theories, by developing and employing appropriate methodologies and 
technologies and by specifying satisfactory means of advancing our specific moral aims. 
The important questions for psychology here, is whether our understanding of 
psychological phenomena has been, or likely to be, also best served by the development 
ofGRP's. 
8 Although there are exceptions here. See for example, in the cognitive domain, Anderson (1983) and 
Newell (1990), and in the biological domain, Edelman (1989 ) 
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Progress and conceptual change in psychology 
One popular characterization of psychology is that it has progressed through a series of 
psychological revolutions of a Kuhnian nature. This perspective on the history of 
psychology suggests that introspectionist approaches to psychology at the beginning of 
the twentieth century were overthrown in favour of behaviorism which itself was toppled 
in the cognitive revolution of the 1960's and 1970's. 
The application of Kuhn's ideas to psychology, although widespread, have recently been 
criticized by a number of authors (e.g., Gholson & Barker, 1985; O'Donohue, 1993). It is 
suggested that the kind of Kuhnian revolutions that have been proposed for psychology 
simply have not occurred. As Leahey (1991, 1992) argues, the change of focus from 
introspectionism to behaviourism to cognitivism in psychology, were gradual in nature, 
and not precipitated by any specific anomalies in the supposedly supplanted approach. 
Reasons of explanatory coherence, as Thagard (1992) suggests, played only a minor role 
in this shift in emphasis, which occurred for primarily methodological reasons. It is 
difficult to characterise the cognitive approach as a better alternative than behaviourism 
although it does offer the possibility of greater explanatory coherence by admitting a 
wider range of phenomena to be explained. However, it would be fair to say that no one 
approach in psychology has anything like conceptual hegemony. Indeed, as a recent 
citation analysis (Friman, Allen, Kerwin, and Larzelere, 1993) suggests, although there 
have been an increasing number of citations to core journal in cognitive psychology since 
1979, there has been no corresponding decrease in citations to core behaviorist journals. 
Either the behaviorists are taking a long time to die off, or else psychology is still 
characterised by a plurality of evolving approaches, none of which have ultimate 
supremacy. 
Psychology, is often portrayed by its adherents as a science which is notable for its lack 
of progress (e.g. Lykken, 1991). Lykken argues that compared to other sciences, 
psychology has made little progress over the last century or so. As the foregoing analysis 
of the 'mythical' revolutions (Leahey, 1992) in psychology suggests, there has been no 
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real cumulative progress of theory in psychology, and our understanding of psychological 
phenomena has not been considerably advanced. Although I think that Lykken is 
somewhat pessimistic here, it is certainly true that psychology has not progressed this 
century to the extent that physics, geology, or biology have. 
Lykken (1991) highlights a number of reasons for this lack of progress. These reasons 
can be roughly partitioned into three categories: methodological, theoretical, and 
institutional. At the methodological level psychologists too often remain committed to an 
inappropriate and inadequate empiricist approach to scientific method (Meehl, 1967; 
Lykken, 1991) with an emphasis on hypothetico-deductive method and null hypothesis 
testing. These methodological woes are abetted by institutional features such as the 
conceptual divisions in psychology departments, the lack of adequate funding and an 
economic environment which promotes frenetic experimental activity at the expense of 
more detailed reflective analysis (Watchel, 1980). Finally, the construction of theory in 
psychology is pursued in a manner that promotes the proliferation of a plenitude of mini-
theories with highly restricted domains. Moreover, there is little attempt to relate these 
theories to one another in a manner which might promote the construction of more 
inclusive theories with greater scope and wider application. 
Ideally the construction of coherent and well-articulated GRP's in psychology would 
promote some means of ameliorating these problems. This would be especially true if the 
programmes were developed in a manner which favored the construction of connections 
between different GRP's of various degrees of globalness and in a manner which 
promoted institutional reorganization and an approach to science which paid due 
attention to the role of both epistemic and non-epistemic values in intellectual inquiry. 
Whether or not psychology is likely to best served by the construction of a single 
unifying GRP remains an open question. The diversity of psychology's subject matter 
and a century of trying, suggest that this might not be the case. However, that does not 
preclude the possibility of developing multiple programmes of various degrees of 
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globalness which serve co-operatively to further conceptual, empirical and social 
progress in psychology. 
Summary 
I have argued in this chapter, following Bunge (1990), that psychology is best 
characterised as a quasi-autonomous science, one with important connections to both 
biology and sociology. Psychology as a science spans a number of different levels of 
analysis and organisation in nature. Furthermore, explanation in psychology can fruitfully 
be pursued at both proximate and ultimate levels and in terms of both unification and the 
elucidation of specific mechanisms. 
In its current condition psychology is in a state of conceptual disarray. Psychology is a 
disunified science. Although theoretical pluralism is to be considered a virtue in science, 
there is also a need to actively to pursue general frameworks in which the construction of 
theory can be advanced in a manner commensurate with the multiple explanatory tasks of 
science. To employ a botanical metaphor: it is better to nurture a range of flowers in the 
controlled environment of glasshouse, than to toss handfuls of seeds to the wind and 
hope. 
Psychology, like other SCIences, should be seeking to develop increasingly unified 
theoretical accounts of the phenomena that fall in its domain. The most viable way for 
this to be achieved is through the construction and integration of GRP's which are 
capable of providing a means to further our understanding to the world and our place in 
it. From a naturalist perspective, the world is a coherent and unified entity, In the ideal 
explanatory text of science, the chapter of psychology needs to be fleshed out in a way 
which does justice to the domain of psychology itself, to the rest of science, and to 
society. 
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Chapter three 
The evolutionary programme in psychology 
The great biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky (1973) once published an article titled 
"Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution". Evolutionary theory is 
our only viable explanatory account for the diversity of biological phenomena on this 
planet. l Of course, as Sober (1993a) notes, many areas of biology such as biochemistry 
and ecology are not directly concerned with answering evolutionary questions. The day to 
day activity of a large number of biologists could proceed without explicit reference to 
evolutionary theory at all. Biochemists elucidate chemical pathways, anatomists lay bare 
the inner workings of organisms, while ecologists model the dynamics of food webs in 
ecosystems, without necessarily referring in any way to the theory of natural selection. 
However, once the importance of understanding biological phenomena at different 
temporal and spatial levels is made clear, and evolutionary theory itself is conceptualised 
in terms of a global research programme, the veracity of Dobzhansky's famous remark 
becomes more apparent. As I have pointed out in chapter three for psychology, biological 
phenomena also can be understood at different levels of analysis. The distinction between 
proximate and ultimate explanations, as Mayr (1982) has argued, is particularly important 
here. Biological phenomena will have both a proximate explanation in terms of 
physiological andlor cognitive processes, and an ultimate one by way of the relevant 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic pathways. A full understanding of any phenomenon in 
biology must advert to both proximate and ultimate causes. It is one of the main roles of 
global research programmes, as I proposed in chapter one, to make sense of and integrate 
lOr, more precisely, evolutionary theory is our best explanatory account. Creationist theories also attempt 
to explain biological phenomena, but provide, as Thagard (1992) clearly illustrates, an account which 
suffers in comparison to evolutionary theory in terms of global explanatory coherence. 
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these different levels of explanation. Our explanatory narratives therefore, although both 
spatially and temporally smeared, should ideally manifest a high degree of overall 
coherence. 
In the first part of this chapter I examine in more detail the structure of the evolutionary 
research programme in terms of the model of global research programmes detailed in 
chapter one. This presentation is necessarily incomplete, given the vastness of the 
programme in question, however it provides a useful sketch of the way explanations are 
conferred on biological phenomena. In the rest of the chapter I examine the ways in 
which the general evolutionary research programme has been employed to explain 
phenomena in the domain of psychology. It is clear here that the various attempts to 
explain human characteristics from an evolutionary perspective are framed very much in 
terms of the general evolutionary research programme. 
I begin by providing a sketch of the history of evolutionary ideas in psychology, with a 
focus on explaining the reasons behind the acceptability of evolutionary explanations at 
various times in the programme's history. I then examine the structure of the current 
evolutionary programme in psychology and discuss some of the different approaches that 
have been used to explain psychological phenomena from an evolutionary perspective. 
Although there appears to be considerable disagreement over just how to apply 
evolutionary theory to psycholoB)', I will argue that these differences have been somewhat 
overstated. I consider that these differences reflect a healthy, but not too divergent, 
plurality of opinion over several key aspects of the generalised evolutionary research 
programme that I outline at the start of the chapter. 
The structure of the evolutionary programme 
There is a large, rich, and diverse literature on the structure of evolutionary theory (e.g., 
Hull, 1974; Mayr, 1982; Brandon, 1990; Sober, 1993a). Most of this literature focuses on 
the principle of natural selection itself, the empirical content of the theory, and its 
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explanatory application across a range of domains. My approach differs from these 
accounts by utilising the model of global research programmes developed in chapter two 
to examine more broadly the diverse structure of evolutionary theory. As such, my 
analysis is considerably more coarse grained that those in the literature, and, given the 
size of the task, offers only a sketch of the important aspects of the evolutionary research 
programme. My focus here will be on those characteristics of the programme which bear 
the greatest relevance to my task of evaluating the role of evolutionary explanations in 
psychology. My account of the evolutionary research programme also focuses on its 
current state and ignores the evolution of the programme itself 2. This picture of the 
programme as it currently stands, of course, is likely to be modified in many respects over 
time. 
The hard core 
The hard core of the evolutionary research programme consists of the theory of natural 
selection itself as independently formulated by Charles Darwin and Alfred Russell 
Wallace. The principle of natural selection contains three basic conditions required for 
evolution to occur: variation, inheritance, and fitness (Lewontin, 1970, 1978; Brandon, 
1990). 
(1) Variation: For evolution to occur there must be variation in the distribution of 
phenotypic characters in a population. 
(2) Inheritance: These traits must also to some extent be heritable. That is, offspring 
should be more likely to resemble their parents than other members of the population. 
(3) Fitness: Different traits must also have fitness consequences, so that those members 
of a population which possess them are more likely to survive and reproduce than 
other members of the population who do not. 
2 Hull (1974) makes the distinction between the classical, genetical, and synthetic stages of evolutionary 
theory. My model is an account of the latter stage, also termed the "Neo-Darwinian synthesis" as it is an 
integration of theories of population genetics, morphology, systematics, embryology, biogeography and 
palaeontology (Mayr, 1982). 
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These three conditions in conjunction with the auxiliary theories of the evolutionary 
research programme potentially provide the explanatory means to account for all 
biological phenomena. It is worth noting, however, that the theory of natural selection is 
more generally a theory of evolution. It is entity neutral with respect to what is evolving. 
In this sense Darwinism is truly universal in nature. It should be able to explain evolution 
on other planets (if it has occurred) regardless of the physical details of the entities 
involved (Dawkins, 1983). The scope of the various auxiliary theories are, however, more 
parochial in nature and are likely, in general, to be specific to evolution on this planet. 
The protective belt 
The theory of natural selection itself has remained virtually unmodified smce its 
articulation by Darwin (1859). However, a range of apparent anomalies to this theory 
have, in part, been instrumental in the articulation of a large protective belt containing 
many auxiliary theories, methodologies, and technological processes. 
Auxiliary theories 
A detailed account of the full panoply of auxiliary theories is far beyond the scope of this 
analysis. However, a limited selection of theories include the laws of inheritance (both 
Mendelian and molecular); theories of speciation (allopatric and sympatric); development 
and embryology (including scaling theory in allometry); and theories of species diversity 
and distribution (such as the theory of island biogeography). Of particular relevance to 
psychology is a range of theories, developed predominately since the 1950's including 
sexual selection theory (Darwin, 1871), inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton 1964a, 1964b), 
reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), parental investment theory (Trivers, 1972), the theory 
of parent-offspring conflict (Trivers, 1974), sperm competition theory (Parker, 1982; 
Smith, 1984), gene-culture coevolution theory (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981) and dual-
inheritance theory (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). In explaining biological phenomena 
auxiliary theories are invoked in conjunction with the theory of natural selection. For 
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example, in explaining the altruistic characteristics of eusocial insects, which seem 
anomalous from a classical selectionist perspective, the theory of kin selection is 
employed. From this perspective, sterility and self-sacrifice can be seen as benefiting the 
individual via differential replication of close kin, and therefore the genes responsible for 
the altruistic behaviours. 
Methodologies and Technologies 
The evolutionary programme deploys a wide range of diverse methodologies supported 
by appropriate use of technology. Many of the methodologies used are more general to 
scientific inquiry such as the range of statistical and experimental procedures. Advances 
in methodologies and technologies, such as those used in DNA analysis and in dating 
techniques, have led to an increased understanding of a range of biological phenomena 
and prove to be an integral part of the programme's continuing scientific progress. The 
realisation that humans and chimpanzees shared a common ancestor between five and six 
million years ago, for example, has led to a radical rethinking of hominoid evolution 
(Hasegawa, Kishino, & Yano, 1989). 
Of particular relevance to an explanation of psychological phenomena is the comparative 
method in evolutionary studies (e.g., Harvey & Pagel, 1991). By examining the cross-
species incidence of a given character across a range of taxa, evolutionary trends can be 
identified and functions can be elucidated (Coddington, 1988). These studies themselves 
draw on both molecular dating techniques and DNA analysis to help establish the nature 
of the phylogenetic relationships under investigation. 
Domains of intellectual inquiry. 
The domain of the evolutionary research programme could be said to correspond roughly 
to the domain of living organisms conceived at various levels of structural organisation 
from molecules to ecosystems. Only roughly of course, because as I noted above, the 
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theory of evolution is neutral with respect to the medium of the evolving entities. 
However, the full panoply of auxiliary theories, methodologies, and so on are likely to be 
restricted in application to living systems. There may also be some aspects of living 
organisms which could be said to fall outside of the scope of the evolutionary 
programme, however widely conceived. For example, explanations of many human 
characteristics have traditionally been seen to lie outside of the explanatory purview of 
evolutionary theory. In particular social behaviour and human culture are often 
conceptualised as emergent properties of human systems which defy evolutionary 
analysis. I examine the role of evolutionary explanations in explaining social and cultural 
phenomena in chapter nine. 
Social features 
Because of the vast scope of the evolutionary programme, the scientific communities 
which investigate biological phenomena are widely distributed across different 
institutions and investigate a diverse range of different kinds of phenomena. Molecular 
biologists, behavioural ecologists, palaeontologists, and psychologists could all be said to 
have some allegiance with the evolutionary programme. This distribution of interests 
often leads to a lack of effective communication between participants and can provide 
seemingly different ways of understanding the nature of evolution itself 
For example, the palaeontologist Niles Eldredge (1995) draws a division between the 
views of geneticists, or as he terms them "Ultra-Darwinists", such as George Williams 
and Richard Dawkins, and those ofpalaeontologists or "naturalists", such as Stephen Jay 
Gould, Elizabeth Vrba, and Eldredge himself. This apparent division seems partly a 
consequence of the different perspectives afforded by palaeontology and genetics, and 
also perhaps the role of different political allegiances; but is certainly fuelled by media 
(mis) representation and the participants own, at times exaggerated, critiques of opposing 
positions. 
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Within any given field of the evolutionary programme there is also the usual share of 
disagreement, controversy and social manipulation. David Hull (1988) in his book 
Science as a process provides a particularly illuminating account of the somewhat 
acrimonious dispute between taxonomists. Similarly, Watson's (1967) autobiographical 
account of the discovery of the structure of DNA reveals the social nature of science in its 
competitive manifestations. 
Relations to other research programmes 
Like all global research programmes, the evolutionary programme has rich connections to 
many other theories at various levels of globalness. The methodology employed in 
experimental analysis clearly appropriates theories from the mathematical sciences, while 
explanations of many biological phenomena are augmented by reference to theories in 
geology and astronomy. The variation and distribution of species, for example, is in part a 
consequence of geological processes such as plate tectonics (Hallam, 1983), and global 
recycling of elements important for life (Lovelock, 1988). The importance of meteor 
collisions on the earth's evolutionary history is becoming increasingly apparent (Raup, 
1991), and is duly informed by theories in the relevant branches of the physical sciences. 
In explaining many psychological and social phenomena it is also likely that the 
evolutionary research programme would need to draw on the various specific theories 
developed by psychologists and sociologists. 
Technological applications and social implications 
Like all research programmes the evolutionary programme has a rich and complex 
relationship with the development of technology and with society more generally. The 
fruits of applied biology are a pervasive part of our society in terms of selective breeding, 
genetic engineering, medical techniques, and environmental control. The ethical 
implications of developments in the evolutionary programme are diverse and widespread. 
The use of evolutionary theory to buttress the philosophy of eugenic movements is amply 
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documented (e.g., Gould, 1981), while the rapid development of the human genome 
project prompts a host of ethical questions of immediate concern to human welfare (e.g., 
Kitcher, 1996; Kevles & Hood 1992). 
The very acceptance of evolutionary theory was, and is, hampered by a social inertia, 
fostered in part by religious doctrine, and more generally by the challenge Darwinian 
theory poses to our uniqueness as a species. That we are resistant to accept our close 
evolutionary affinity to other species is evident, I think, in the way that humans treat other 
animals, and our perceived moral obligations to them (Singer, 1995; Rachels, 1990). 
Another impediment to the acceptance of evolutionary theory is the past misuse of the 
theory to found eugenic or social Darwinist perspectives. This fear is particularly evident 
in the social sciences where the development of evolutionary theories of human 
behaviour have been hampered by claims of sexism, racism, and classism (e.g., Rose, 
Kamin & Lewontin, 1984; Sahlins, 1976). 
The evolutionary programme in psychology 
It should be clear that attempts to explain psychological phenomena from an evolutionary 
perspective are clearly ground in the general evolutionary research programme. Labels 
such as sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, therefore, refer to those specific parts 
of the general evolutionary research programme which are employed to explain social and 
psychological phenomena rather than being global research programmes in their own 
right. Attempts to explain psychological phenomena from an evolutionary perspective 
might be considered as attempts to extend the explanatory breadth of the evolutionary 
programme (Sober, 1993a). As will become clear, however, the use of evolutionary 
theory to explain aspects of mind and social behaviour in both humans and animals has 
been present since Darwin's first formulation of the theory of natural selection. 
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Historical overview 
The publication of Darwin's (1859) The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection 
may reasonably be said to mark the birth of the evolutionary programme in psychology. 
Although the Origin itself barely alluded to the implications of natural selection for 
human psychology,3 it was to provide the logical foundations for the future development 
of evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena. Those implications were to be 
spelled out in explicit detail by Darwin (1871) himself twelve years later in The Descent 
of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, but were taken up more immediately by Lyell 
(1863) and Huxley (1863) from somewhat contrary perspectives. Whereas Huxley (1863) 
clearly saw the importance and relevance of natural selection for explaining the origin 
and characteristics of humans, Lyell (1863) argued that the principle of natural selection, 
although possibly true of other animals, was not so of man. 
The acceptance of Darwin's theory of natural selection can be seen in part as based on its 
capacity for explanatory unification (Thagard, 1992). The mass of biological detail 
accumulated and presented by Darwin in the Origin can be seen as best explained by 
invoking evolution by natural selection. As 'Man' is also clearly a biological entity, his 
characteristics should also be able to be explained via the principles of natural selection. 
Darwin begins his argument in the Descent of Man by explicitly noting the similarities 
between humans and other animals in terms of their body structure, their nervous system, 
and their pattern of embryological development. It seemed clear to Darwin that if Man's 
physiological nature could be seen as continuous with other animals and therefore 
explicable in terms of natural selection, then his psychological characteristics must also 
be open to the same kinds of explanations. The idea of continuity between humans and 
other animals in their mental faculties was crucial to Darwin's argument here and 
bespoke of a gradual evolution of mind in humans from a non-human ancestor. 
3 Darwin omitted drawing out the implications of his theory for humans except in one brief but illuminating 
paragraph. "In the future I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology will be securely 
based on the foundations already well laid by Mr. Herbert'Spencer, that of the necessary acquirement of 
each mental power and capacity by gradation. Much light will be thrown on the origin of man and his 
history." (Darwin, 1859, p. 373). 
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If no organic being excepting man had possessed any mental power, or if his 
powers had been of a wholly different nature from those of lower animals, then 
we should never have been able to convince ourselves that our high faculties had 
been gradually developed. But it can be shewn that there is no fundamental 
difference of this kind. (Darwin, 1871 p. 445). 
To support his argument of mental continuity Darwin provided a wealth of data on the 
behaviour of other animals and their putative mental abilities. Attention, insight, memory, 
reasoning, and the full panoply of emotions, Darwin argued, can be seen, in rudimentary 
form at least, in other species. Darwin did not deny that there were real differences 
between humans and other animals, especially in their power of reasoning and· in their 
moral sense; however, these differences were conceptualised as being quantitative rather 
than qualitative in nature. "Nevertheless the difference in mind between man and the 
higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind" (Darwin, 1871, p. 
494) Moreover, the difference between man and ape in intellectual ability, argued 
Darwin, is certainly less than that between ape and ant. The psychological characteristics 
of man therefore can not be viewed as being so unique as to require a different kind of 
explanation. Psychology as a science, therefore, could be said to be subsumed by biology. 
As Darwin succinctly expressed it in his notebooks "He who understands baboon would 
do more toward metaphysics than Locke". 
The idea of psychology as a biological science was developed further in the works of 
Romanes (1881, 1888) and Francis Galton. Romanes sought to advance Darwin's 
biopsychology by developing a broad picture of evolution across species so as to trace the 
genesis of mind. To this end he provided, in Animal intelligence (1881), a densely packed 
volume of anecdotes interspersed with the odd experiment, to demonstrate the grades of 
intelligence from protozoa to primate. For Romanes, like Darwin, there was no difference 
in kind between animal and human intelligence. Psychology therefore, could be viewed as 
part of a general enterprise to explain the properties of mind in nature via evolution by 
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natural selection. Galton's work on hereditary genius furthered the explanatory power of 
the evolutionary programme in psychology by demonstrating that human mental and 
moral faculties could be passed on to subsequent generations. The mind therefore could 
be seen to function like any other biological trait, obviating the need for appeal to 
supernatural sources to explain human intellectual capacities (Richards, 1987). 
However, despite what might be been termed a flourishing evolutionary programme in 
psychology in the latter half of the nineteenth century, public opinion and the views of 
some of the central figures in the debates over evolutionary theory brought in to question 
the validity of explaining human characteristics via the principle of natural selection. 
Evolutionary theory itself was widely accepted in Darwin's lifetime, however, the idea 
that humans and the full array of their psychological and moral faculties were also subject 
to the principles of natural selection did not become part of the general consensus 
(Richards, 1987). This explanatory bifurcation of human and other animals remains a 
familiar theme in contemporary writings, as epitomised in a recent book by the 
philosopher David Stove (1995, p. vii.):4 "My object is to show that Darwinism is not 
true: not true at any rate, of our species. If it is true, or near enough true of sponges, 
snakes, flies, or whatever, I do not mind that. What I do mind is, it being supposed to be 
true of man" 
Part of the reluctance to extend the explanatory schemes of evolutionary theory to human 
psychology must be attributed to a kind of moral repugnance, felt by some, at the 
suggestion that humans are, in their fundamental aspects, the same as other animals. The 
more thoughtful challenges to the extension of evolutionary theory to human 
characteristics, however, can be viewed as questions regarding the explanatory coherence 
of the evolutionary programme. In particular, 19th century critics argued that evolutionary 
theory does not provide an adequate explanation of human psychological phenomena. 
4 It is probably worth noting here that Stove is not a creationist. 
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The notion of progress, central to many evolutionary thinkers, in particular Herbert 
Spencer, provided a challenge to the possibility of the evolution by natural selection of 
human mental faculties. If the unfit, in intellectual and moral terms, breed more than their 
psychological superiors (as they appeared to do in Victorian England), then how could 
evolution have fashioned the superior intellectual virtues of the civilised European?5 
(Richards, 1987). Although to contemporary readers this argument is predicated on the 
pervasive racist views of the time, it provides an at least plausibly logical problem for 
evolutionary theory. The problem here is one of empirical adequacy. The theory of natural 
selection did not appear to explain the pattern of intellectual ability and fecundity actually 
found in nature, at least not in human nature. The confusion here, of course, is between 
equating the attributes that a particular social milieu value with those valued by natural 
selection.6 
A further challenge to the explanatory breadth of evolutionary theory was provided, much 
to Darwin's chagrin, by the co-discoverer of natural selection himself, Alfred Russell 
Wallace (1891). Wallace, in later years, became interested in the spiritualist views of the 
time, and though admitting that the physical qualities of man were shaped by natural 
selection7, suggested that other forces must have been at work in the shaping of the 
human mind. As Gould (1980c) and Richards (1987) make clear, however, this 
alternative explanation for the human mind can not be attributed entirely to Wallace's 
flirtation with the spiritual world. Wallace was much taken with the latent capacities of 
the human mind as manifested in the ability of 'savages' to attain the accomplishments of 
civilised Europeans. It seemed to Wallace that human capacities far exceeded the needs 
5 This argument was advanced in a forceful manner by the Scotsman William Greg in an article titled "On 
the failure of natural selection in the case of man". Greg could not conceive how the superior virtues of say 
the civilised Scotsman could have been selected for given lower rates of fecundity than their less 
intellectually able neighbours. " The careless, squalid, una spiring Irishman, fed on potatoes, living in a pig-
sty, doting on superstition, multiplies like rabbits or ephemera:- the frugal, foreseeing, self-respecting, 
ambitious Scot, stem in his morality, spiritual in his faith, sagacious and disciplined in his intelligence, 
passes his best years in struggle and in celibacy, marries late, and leaves few behind him" (Greg, 1868, 
quoted in Richards, 1987, p. 173). 
6 Although a similar version of this problem has also arisen in contemporary debates. As the data collected 
by Vining (1986) illustrate, those individuals of high status and possessing material wealth actually leave 
fewer descendants, or at least have fewer children, than less wealthy individuals. 
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of survival dictated by evolutionary theory. Of what use, Wallace asks, is the refined 
abilities for music or the aesthetic appreciation for art in the struggle for existence. "We 
are ... driven to the conclusion that in his [man's] large and well-developed brain he 
possesses an organ quite disproportionate to his actual requirements - an organ that seems 
prepared in advance, only to fully utilised as he progresses in civilisation." (Wallace, 
1891, p. 193). As natural selection can only select for immediate benefit, the latent 
capacities of the human mind must have been provided by alternative means. From the 
perspective of the theory of explanatory coherence (Thagard, 1992), evolutionary theory, 
according to Wallace, did not provide adequately coherent explanations of psychological 
phenomena. The general point made by Wallace, although not his supernatural solution, 
is as we shall see at the heart of many contemporary criticisms of the evolutionary 
programme in psychology (see especially Gould, 1991c), and can be seen as a challenge 
to the explanatory breadth of the evolutionary programme. 
Another line of criticism, present in both contemporary and historical discussions, 
challenges the use of comparative methods to develop an evolutionary psychology of 
mind. The challenge here is to the use of analogical reasoning to buttress evolutionary 
explanations of human psychological phenomena.8 Because the use of analogy plays an 
important role in the overall explanatory coherence of a research programme (Thagard, 
1992) these criticisms served further to question the acceptability of evolutionary 
explanations in psychology. For Charles Lyell (1863) in the Antiquity of Man the superior 
intellectual and moral qualities of humanity suggested a placement for man in a unique 
kingdom apart for the rest of organic life. Lyell, a gradualist in geology, whose ideas had 
greatly influenced Darwin himself, could not comprehend how morality, language, and 
other mental faculties could possibly arise through gradual evolution. For Lyell, 
7 Although he did question the likelihood that humans' lack of hair and the nature of their hands and feet 
could have been fashioned by natural selection. 
8 I refer to this fonn of reasoning as analogical in nature even though Darwin and Romanes were seeking to 
establish evidence for homologous traits. The style of the argument typically proceeded from an analogy 
from a human trait to similar characteristics found in other animals. "Therefore, having full regard to the 
progressive weakening of the analogy from human to brute psychology; as we recede through the animal 
kingdom downwards from man, still, as it is the only analogy available, I shall follow it throughout the 
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Darwin's extensive use of analogical reasoning simply did not hold; the differences 
between humans and other animals is simply too great. 
The anecdotal method used prominently by Romanes and others as evidence of mental 
homologies in humans and other animals was called into question by Conwy Lloyd 
Morgan (1894), who, in his famous canon, exhorts the comparative psychologist not to 
over interpret an animal's behaviour as evidence of "a higher psychical faculty" if it could 
be explained through simpler processes. Lloyd Morgan, who argued that such abilities 
could not occur in the absence of language, disputed the kind of abstract reasoning skills 
attributed to other animals by Romanes.9 The extension of evolutionary theory from 
animals to humans, therefore, especially in the mental realm, was seen as problematic. 
Despite these various criticisms of the evolutionary programme in psychology, it would 
be fair to say that in both England and America evolutionary accounts of human mind and 
behaviour continued to receive considerable support by both psychologists and 
philosophers. In America for example, William James, Mark Baldwin, John Dewey, 
Charles Peirce and others, all utilised Darwinian thinking in various ways to develop 
theories of mind and behaviour consonant with the general programme outlined by 
Darwin himself. The classic text in social psychology at this time, which had widespread 
influence more generally in the social sciences, was William McDougall's (1908) Social 
Psychology. McDougall explicitly drew on Darwinian theory to develop an instinct 
centred psychology firmly couched in the comparative method. 
The decline of evolutionary thinking in psychology from the early part of the twentieth 
century to its re-emergence in the 1960's can be traced to a variety of causes. Some 
historians of science such as Degler (1991), and to a lesser extent Richards (1987), focus 
on the ideological reasons behind the perceived inadequacy of the evolutionary 
animal series."(Romanes, 1883, p. 9) Romanes also explicitly utilised a model of evolution based on grades 
of intellectual achievement regardless of strict phylogenetic relationships. 
9 In later years Lloyd Morgan somewhat softened his views on animal mentality and added in the second 
addition of his Introduction to comparative psychology that the cannon" by no means excludes the 
interpretation of a particular activity in terms of higher processes" (1903, p. 59). 
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programme in psychology. "What the available evidence does seem to show is that 
ideology or a philosophical belief that the world could be a freer and more just place 
played a large part in the shift from biology to culture." (Degler, 1991, p. viii) Darwinian 
thinking in the social sciences, according to Degler, became increasingly associated with 
the doctrine of social Darwinism and its implications for the eugenic movement 
championed by Galton and others in the latter half of the nineteenth century. If one 
accepted evolutionary theory, the promise of progress it was considered, could only be 
achieved via the selective weeding out of the inferior and the unfit. By 1930 this idea led 
to the passing of sterilisation laws for criminals and mental defectives in over thirty states 
in America. Ethical qualms over this widespread sterilisation programme and growing 
uneasiness about the rise of nazism and its even more draconian methods for assuring 
racial purity, made social Darwinism, and by implication evolutionary theory, 
increasingly unpalatable. In terms of the model of global research programmes presented 
in chapter one, the relations between the evolutionary programme and society were such 
as to make evolutionary explanations less acceptable, irrespective of their overall 
epistemic value. Social science turned accordingly from instinct to culture as a means for 
explaining human characteristics. lOIf individual learning and the social environments 
were viewed as the major determinants of behaviour then the American egalitarian dream 
could be better realised (Degler, 1991). 
Although it is clear that social factors did play an important role in the general shift away 
from evolutionary explanations in psychology and the other social sciences, I think more 
general questions of explanatory coherence played a pivotal role in this change. 
Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena by the tum of the century were 
seen as becoming increasingly less satisfactory. I I Much confusion was engendered over 
the role of instinct in the explanation of psychological and behavioural characteristics. L. 
10 This shift in explanatory focus occurred roughly simultaneously in both psychology and anthropology. 
Psychologists began to focus more on the learning trajectory of organisms, while anthropologists turned 
their attention away from human universals to a study of cultural differences in thought and behaviour 
(Degler, 1991; Richards, 1987). 
11 It is also worth noting that the acceptance of Darwinian evolutionary theory was somewhat on the wane 
more generally speaking. It was not until the emergence of the evolutionary synthesis in the late 1930's that 
Darwinism received widespread acceptance in biological circles (White & Gribbin, 1996; Mayr, 1982). 
111 
L. Bernard (cited in Richards, 1987) for example, catalogued 1594 different classes of 
instinct attributed to humans and other animals. The development of behaviourism saw a 
rapid attenuation of this class of instincts to a few basic processes. 12Although 
behaviourism did not deny that there were some innate components to behaviour, the 
explanatory burden shifted from an analysis of instincts shaped by natural selection to the 
reinforcing contingencies of the environments and the developmental trajectories of 
organisms. The explanatory breadth of evolutionary explanations, therefore, became 
substantially limited. Moreover, the logical empiricist philosophy of science adopted by 
the behaviourists suggested that science should limit itself to observable phenomena. As 
the minds of other animals are not open to direct observation, mental concepts should be 
expunged from the comparative psychologist's vocabulary. By the time Maier and 
Schneirla (1935) .had published their classic text on animal psychology, the study of the 
animal mind was no longer a legitimate domain of inquiry in mainstream psychology. 
We can see here the culmination of two persistent challenges to the role of evolutionary 
explanations in psychology. Firstly, evolutionary explanations were seen as lacking 
explanatory breadth in that it was considered that they could only furnish accounts of the 
few basic innate processes postulated by the behaviourists and therefore could not play an 
important role in explaining the full range of behaviour exhibited by humans (and other 
animals). And secondly, the important source of analogy drawn on by Darwin, Romanes 
and others, was seen as an illegitimate form of inquiry. Coupled of course with these two 
challenges was the rise of a serious competing research programme, behaviourism. 
Behaviourism promised, at least, an increase in explanatory unification of psychological 
phenomena via the invocation of a few basic learning processes and the contingencies of 
the environment.13 
12 Indeed, between 1928 and 1958 listings of instinct in the psychological abstracts compared to 
reinforcement and motivation reduced from 68% to 8% (Herrnstein, 1974). 
13 The hegemony of purely learning explanations in psychology for most of this century is nicely illustrated 
by the teaching of students in the 1950's that spiders learn to make their webs. ( Jim Pollard, personal 
communication) 
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Ethology and the emergence of sociobiology 
The publication ofE. O. Wilson's (1975) Sociobiology: The new synthesis can be seen as 
a pivotal work in the re-emergence of evolutionary thinking in psychology and the social 
sciences. Wilson's massive volume not only provided a comprehensive review of the 
evolutionary basis of social behaviour in animals, but also extended this evolutionary 
approach to explanations of human behavioural patterns. From Wilson's perspective, 
psychology, sociology, and anthropology could all be viewed as part of the general 
evolutionary synthesis. 
However, despite the importance of Wilson's work, an increasing interest in biological 
approaches to psychology and the other social sciences was beginning to emerge as eady 
as the late 1940's in America (Degler, 1991). This increasing interest in the evolutionary 
antecedents of behaviour in Anglo-American psychology can be traced, in part, to the 
development of ethology in Europe, epitomised in the work of Niko Tinbergen and 
Konrad Lorenz. V/hereas behaviourists focused their attention on the behaviour of 
animals (predominately rats and pigeons) in controlled laboratory environments to 
vanous contingencies of reinforcement, ethologists were more interested in the 
behavioural repertoire of animals as it occurred in their natural environment. In a long 
series of studies carried out from the 1930's onwards, Lorenz (1971) and Tinbergen 
(1973) demonstrated, contrary to behaviourist doctrine, that animals possessed a large 
number of species-specific instincts which give rise to adaptive behaviours under 
appropriate (and sometimes inappropriate) environmental conditions. Although not 
entirely rejecting learning as an explanation for behaviour, the focus of lorenz and 
Tinbergen was on behaviour which could occur in the absence of specific environmental 
contingencies and which seemed to emerge without periods of prior conditioning.14An 
explanation of these instinctual behaviour patterns was sought in evolutionary theory. 
14 Hence the emphasis on so-called deprivation studies. If a behaviour pattern was seen to emerge even 
when an animal was raised in isolation, it was argued that the source of that behaviour must be something 
internal and built into the animal, not a consequence ofleaming. 
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Certain patterns of behaviour, like the imprinting of geese, the egg fanning of 
sticklebacks, and the egg shell removal routines of black-headed gulls, were viewed as 
behavioural adaptations which had been selected for their ability to increase the 
reproductive success of the animals in question. 
Both Lorenz and Tinbergen clearly indicated that this evolutionary approach to animal 
behaviour could be extended to an analysis of human behavioural patterns. Tinbergen 
(1973) stressed the importance of comparative analysis and rejected any a priori 
assumption that humans were essentially different from all other animals. Likewise, 
Lorenz (1971) pushed for a comparative approach to human psychology and argued that 
an evolutionary perspective was crucial in providing explanations of mind and behaviour. 
The unquestionable and unquestioned fact of evolution automatically leads to 
recognition of the corollary fact that an enormous number of structural properties 
of human behaviour and the human mind owe their particular nature to unique 
historical pathways of phylogeny. Without knowledge of phylogenetic 
relationships, these features must remain incomprehensible. 
(Lorenz, 1971 p. 243.). 
The approach of Lorenz and Tinbergen was to have a substantial influence on subsequent 
developments in psychology, anthropology and sociology throughout the English 
speaking world. However, the reaction of American biologists and psychologists was not 
entirely favourable. Both Beach (1955) and Lehrman (1953) challenged the usefulness of 
the concept of instinct for explaining animal behaviour. Lehrman (1953), in a vehement 
critique of Lorenz's instinct theory, argued that it was simply not possible to demarcate 
what is learned from what is innate. Isolation experiments, according to Lehrman prove 
nothing, for it is conceptually impossible to entirely isolate an organism from its 
environment. Lehrman argued further that the use of analogy from animal to human was 
simply inappropriate; similar outcomes in behaviour need not bespeak similar causes. 
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The relative contribution of innate causes and learned causes, of course, has been, and 
continues to be, a source of much debate among psychologists, sociologists, and 
anthropologists. Lorenz's reply to the objections raised by Lehrman and others was to 
point out that the fact of learning was not denied, but the way leanling was achieved 
could not be adequately explained from a behaviourist perspective. The learning of 
organisms, Lorenz argued, is directed in nature in a way that is only explicable from an 
evolutionary point of view (Richards, 1974). In the words of the contemporary biologist 
Peter Marler (1991, p. 37), organisms have an "instinct to learn". 
This insight, that learning is directed in a way explicable by evolutionary theory, was to 
have far reaching implications for developments in Anglo-American psychology, where 
the hegemony of behaviourism was beginning to be challenged. One source of 
disillusionment over the value of the behaviourist approach to research was in the highly 
uncomparative nature of their comparative research (Beach, 1965; Bitterman, 1960). Over 
half of all studies prior to 1950 were carried out on a single, by now highly inbred 
species: the Norway rat. The rat was simply viewed as a convenient organi.sm whereby 
the universal laws oflearning might be realised. As Beach (1965, p. 10) queried in 1950: 
"Are we building a general science of behaviour or merely a science of rat learning?" 
The behaviourist approach also ignored questions regarding the evolutionary origin of 
behaviour, and in particular eschewed instinctual explanations for animal behaviour 
patterns. The laws of learning, as formulated by the behaviourists, assumed that virtually 
all learning was via association (of some kind), and that all stimuli to be associated are 
equally meaningful to the organism. The rej ection of instinctual behaviour and the 
assumption of the equipotentiality of stimuli, however, were beginning to be questioned 
from a variety of sources. 
Chomsky'S (1959) influential review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior critiqued the idea that 
language was learned and controlled by the contingencies of reinforcement exercised by 
the verbal community. Chomsky explicitly drew on the work by ethologists such as 
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Lorenz and Tinbergen, which demonstrated that organisms have a propensity to learn in 
certain directions at certain times of their life. Chomsky (1959, p. 57) concluded that 
behaviourism simply provided an inadequate explanation for the phenomenor:. of 
language learning: 
The fact that all normal children acquire essentially comparable grammars of great 
complexity with remarkable rapidity suggests that human beings are somehow 
specifically designed to do this, with data-handling or hypothesis-formulating 
ability of unknown character and complexity. 
The important role of instinct in explaining behaviour was also demonstrated by Breland 
and Breland (1961), who in the course of training animals using operant and classical 
conditioning techniques ran in to a certain kind of problem. Breland and Breland found 
that after a period of operant conditioning, animals would start to display non-conditioned 
behaviour and would not continue with the task for which they had been trained. Pigs for 
example, which had been conditioned with food reinforcers to transfer dollar coins in to a 
'piggy bank' would start dropping the coins to root at them and toss them around. In 
short, the pigs seemed to be displaying the instinctual behaviours associated with natural 
foraging. Breland and Breland (1961, p. 684) termed this phenomenon 'instinctual drift' 
and concluded: 
After 14 years of continuous conditioning and observing thousands of animals, it 
is our reluctant conclusion that the behaviour of any species cannot be adequately 
understood, predicted, or controlled without knowledge of its instinctive patterns, 
evolutionary 1:-.dstory, and ecological niche. 
Through a number of experiments it also became clearly apparent that certain behaviours 
are more readily acquired and more easily associated with certain classes of stimuli than 
others, thereby contravening the equipotentiality assumption of the behaviourists. 
Seligman and Hager (1972) argued that organisms bring with them into the laboratory not 
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only a history of learning but also an evolutionary history. Animals, Seligman and Hager 
suggest, are 'prepared' to learn some things easily but not others. Garcia and colleagues 
(Garcia & Koelling, 1972; Garcia, Ervin & Koelling, 1972) demonstrated this 
phenomenon of 'preparedness' in an elegant series of studies. Garcia demonstrated that 
rats more readily associate radiation-induced nausea with food than they do with other 
stimuli such as electric shocks or lights, whereas audio-visual stimuli were more easily 
paired with foot shocks than with food. This kind of prepared learning was also manifest 
even after long delays between the pairing of the food stimulus and the subsequent 
nausea, challenging the notion that recency is an important criterion in accounting for the 
strength of the association. 
These challenges to behaviourism as an explanatorily adequate account of animal and 
human behaviour was clearly an important part of the return of evolutionary theory to the 
psychological sciences. In addition to this repudiation of some of the central behaviourist 
assumptions was a development of a range of new theories in evolutionary biology which 
provided a conceptual means to expand the explanatory scope of the evolutionary 
programme in psychology. 
In a pair of classic papers, Hamilton (1964a, 1964b) augmented the core assumptions of 
natural selection with his theory of kin selection. By arguing that selection can favour 
behaviour which increases the reproductive success of one's kin, Hamilton provided a 
means to explain the altruistic behaviour of many animal species, and hence increase the 
explanatOlY breadth of the evolutionary programme. Additional theories developed 
throughout the 1970's such as parental-investment theory (Trivers, 1972), reciprocal 
altruism (Trivers, 1972), parent-offspring conflict theory (Trivers, 1974) and game theory 
(Maynard-Smith, 1974) provided further explanatory resources for the evolutionary 
programme. The important consequence for psychology and the other social sciences of 
these conceptual developments was the potential for satisfactory explanations to be 
articulated for social behaviour. Accompanying these theoretical developments was also a 
dramatic increase in the number of naturalistic studies of animal (and importantly 
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primate) social behaviour documented in some detail in Wilson (1975). As a 
consequence, by the time Wilson's (1975) Sociobiology was published there existed a 
coherent body of theory and empirical work that could be used to develop potentially 
satisfactory explanations of human behaviour from an evolutionary framework. 
Wilson is often, perhaps justly, criticised (e.g., Kitcher, 1985) for writing two separate 
books in Sociobiology; one, a careful, detailed and elaborate account of animal social 
behaviour from an evolutionary perspective, and the other a highly speculative and 
unsubstantiated evolutionary view of human social behaviour. Wilson (1975, p. 3) 
defined sociobiology as " The systematic study of the biological basis of all social 
behaviour" and demonstrated to great effect the power of evolutionary theory, and in 
particular the newly developed theories of Hamilton and Trivers, to explain patterns of 
social behaviour among a wide variety of animal species. Like many earlier attempts to 
explain patterns of human behaviour with evolutionary theory, Wilson drew strongly on 
arguments from analogy (and homology) with other species, and emphasised the unifying 
power of the evolutionary programme. Wilson, in his detailed studies of ant societies was 
impressed by the strong convergences of social behaviour between a wide variety of 
species, including humans (Wilson, 1994). The social sciences, according to Wilson, 
were ripe to be absorbed using the newly emerging principles of sociobiology, embedded 
as they were in the more general evolutionary research programme . 
. . . sociology and the other social sciences, as well as the humanities are the last 
branches of biology waiting to be included in the modern synthesis. One of the 
functions of sociobiology, then, is to reformulate the foundations of the social 
sciences in a way that draws these subjects into the modern synthesis. 
(Wilson, 1975 p. 4). 
Evolutionary theory therefore, according to Wilson, could provide the most explanatorily 
unifying account of social behaviour across species, including humans. 
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The early sociobiological programme, however, as developed by Wilson (1975, 1978) in 
respect to human phenomena, often proceeded in the speculative mode. Wilson's (1975, 
1978) strategy was to list attributes of human behaviour such as aggression, incest 
avoidance, religion, ethics, ritual, culture, magic, homosexuality, reciprocity and so forth 
and to argue that they represented genetic predispositions which lead ultimately to 
increased reproductive success. Typically Wilson's accounts fell very much to the "how 
possibly" end of the epistemic spectrum and tended to ignore the details of the proximate 
psychological, developmental and social mechanisms underlying the phenomena in 
question. Indeed Wilson's early sociobiological writings tended to be somewhat 
reductionistic in several different senses. Firstly, Wilson provided a strong gene 
selectionist account of evolution, and secondly, Wilson seemed to advocate a 
physiological reduction of mind to brain. For example, in Sociobiology Wilson (1975 p. 
575) suggested that "having cannibalised psychology, the new neurobiology will yield an 
enduring set of first principles for sociology". As Wilson (1994) notes in his 
autobiography, he was highly impressed by the success of the reductionistic method in 
molecular biology and sought a similar approach for the social sciences. As a 
consequence Wilson's (1975, 1978) early writings on sociobiology tended to leapfrog 
entirely the psychological level of explanation and advocated physiological explanations 
of behavioural patterns in humans and other animals. This is perhaps one reason why the 
impact of sociobiology was greatest initially in sociology and anthropology, rather than 
psychology. 
Indeed, prior to 1980 evolutionary approaches in the social sciences were most prevalent 
in the anthropological literature where researchers such as Alexander (1979), Chagnon 
and Irons (1979), and others were applying evolutionary theory to explain patterns of 
cultural behaviour in traditional societies. By the late 1980's two similar but distinct 
evolutionary approaches to human behaviour had emerged: Human behavioural ecology 
and evolutionary psychology. There has been much confusion over just what terms to 
employ to distinguish the different evolutionary approaches to the human sciences and 
just how they differ in their theoretical perspectives. I will examine some of the 
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similarities of the different approaches in more detail below, but I think we can make 
rough sociological, epistemological and methodological distinctions between human 
behavioural ecologists on the one hand and evolutionary psychologists on the other. 
Blurton-Jones (1990) also argues that there is a third evolutionary approach to the study 
of human behaviour - Dual inheritance theory - as characterised in the work of Boyd and 
Richerson (1985). However, I would suggest that dual inheritance theory be considered 
an additional auxiliary theory in the evolutionary programme which can be drawn on by 
both human behavioural ecologists and evolutionary psychologists to explicate patterns of 
cultural transmission from an evolutionary perspective, rather than a distinct alternative. 
The terminology employed for evolutionary approaches to human behaviour has been 
highly variable. Researchers who would have earlier identified themselves as 
sociobiologists may now prefer to be called human behavioural ecologists or evolutionary 
psychologists, while other labels such as human ethology, biosociology, socioecology, 
Darwinian anthropology and Darwinian psychology have also been employed. To 
simplify matters I will retain the crude, but reasonable distinction between human 
behavioural ecology and evolutionary psychology. 
Human Behavioural Ecology 
Human behavioural ecology can be defined as "the study of the evolutionary ecology of 
human behaviour. Its central problem is to discover the ways in which the behaviour of 
modem humans reflects our species' history of natural selection" (Cronk, 1991, p. 25) 
and its focus as Borgerhoff Mulder (1991, p. 69) states is to "determine how ecological 
and social factors affect behavioural variability within and between populations." 
Researchers who identify themselves as human behavioural ecologists (e.g., Borgerhoff 
Mulder, 1991; Irons, 1979; Crook and Crook, 1988; Alexander, 1979, 1990; Turke, 1990) 
can be distinguished disciplinarily from evolutionary psychologists in that they tend to be 
anthropologists whereas evolutionary psychologists typically (but not always) have a 
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background in the psychological sciences. This sociological difference seems to be part of 
the reason behind the different methodological approaches employed by the two groups. 
The focus of human behavioural ecology, therefore, is on detailed ethnographic studies of 
contemporary human populations with a particular focus on traditional, non-industrial 
societies. The aim is to demonstrate that the patterns of behaviour detailed in the research 
can be viewed as adaptive in nature. That is, individuals are viewed as behaving in a way 
that maximises their reproductive success (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1987). Human 
behavioural ecologists subscribe to the idea that humans have a highly variable phenotype 
which exhibits considerable behavioural plasticity. Therefore humans have the capacity to 
vary their behaviour in different social and ecological circumstances in a manner that 
leads to inclusive fitness maximisation (Cronk, 1991; Borgerhoff Mulder, 1987, 1991; 
Alexander, 1990; Irons, 1979a). In particul'fr, it is argued that despite variations in 
cultural traditions behaviour can adaptively track these variations and that success in 
cultural terms also tends to leads to Darwinian success in terms of increased reproductive 
fitness (Irons, 1979). Borgerhoff Mulder (1996, p. 205/206) summarises the approach of 
the human behavioural ecologists as follows: 
In brief, individuals are viewed as facultative opportunists who assess, either 
consciously or not, on either the behavioural or the evolutionary time scale, a wide 
array of environmental conditions (both social and ecological) and determine the 
optimal fitness-maximising strategy whereby they can out compete conspecifics in 
terms of the number of genes transmitted to subsequent generations. 
This flexibility in behavioural response is emphasised in the work of Alexander (1979; 
1990) who argues that humans have evolved a capacity - consciousness - which allows 
them to develop scenarios in a way that which helps them to respond adaptively to 
changes in social and ecological contexts. It is npt argued that human consciously strive 
to increase their reproductive fitness, but simply that reproductive fitness IS a 
consequence of their striving for other goals which are highly correlated with 
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reproductive fitness. For example, Napoleon Chagnon's (1988) work on the Yanamomo 
of South America demonstrates that the culturaily valued trait of fierceness correlates 
with reproductive success. Those fierce members in a group help to prevent warring raids 
by other groups and obtain elevated status in their own group which leads to an increase 
in marital and reproductive success. 
The emphasis on humans as highly facultative fitness maximisers is clearly seen in the 
work of Borgerhoff Mulder (1988, 1997), and Crook and Crook (1988). In Borgerhoff 
Mulder's study ofkipsigis bride-wealth payments, it was found that physical correlates of 
lifetime fertility in women, such as early menarche, engendered greater bride-wealth 
payments from men. However, when economic conditions changed so that large families 
became insupportable, this correlation disappeared. Borgerhoff Mulder (1997)' concludes 
that these modifications in mating effort may reflect the underlying assumption of fitness 
maximisation. Men prefer highly fertile woman when conditions allow for potentially 
large families, but under changin3 ecological circumstances this preference becomes less 
important. These preferences are reflected in the size of bride-wealth payments. In a 
similar vein Crook and Crook (1988) in their study of Tibetan polyandry argue that 
polyandry is an adaptive response to specific ecological circumstances associated with 
low levels of subsistence and little opportunity for expansion and dispersaL 
The methodological approach employed by human behavioural ecologists is highly 
similar to that used in the study of other animals. Optimal patterns of behaviour are 
derived from a consideration of natural selection and the auxiliary theories of the 
evolutionary programme. Extant populations are studied and reproductive success is 
measured. How well the evolutionary programme. predicts and explains differential 
patterns of reproductive success gauges the success of any particular study. IS 
15 Although I have outlined this basic methodology in sequential terms, research may start at any point in 
this sequence. For example, the detailed collection of data may proceed prior to the development of specific 
evolutionary hypotheses. 
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Inclusive fitness theory and the theory of reciprocal altruism, for example, predict that 
patterns of food sharing should be different depending on the degree of genetic 
relationship between individuals, and on past instances of food sharing. Research on food 
sharing on Ifaluk (Betzig & Turke, 1986) and among the Ache of Paraguay (Kaplan & 
Hill, 1985) have borne out some of these predictions. On Ifaluk food sharing is more 
frequent among close genealogical kin and individuals take into account specific costs 
and benefits in their distribution of food (Betzig & Turke, 1986). Among the Ache some 
sources of food but not others were shared preferentially among kin; meat and honey 
tended to be shared band-wide, whereas other food sources were shared more among 
close'kin groups. Sharing food also raised the nutritional status among all individuals as 
the important food sources of meat and honey fluctuated highly ill their abundance. This 
increase in nutritional status tended to reflect band-wide sharing rather than networks of 
reciprocal alliances. However, individuals who procured more game tended to increase 
their reproductive success through their overall value to the band (and hence higher 
status) and through an increase in extra-marital relationships. This finding bears out one 
of the general predictions of the human behavioural ecological approach: that striving for 
cultural success (in particular prestige) leads to an increase in reproductive success, even 
though the specific forms of behaviour may be highly variable (see Hill, 1984). 
The key features of human behavioural ecology can be summarised as (1) an 
anthropological focus on human behaviour in traditional societies; and (2) the way this 
behaviour represents adaptive responses to changing ecological and social contexts, 
measured by (3) the degree of reproductive success, or some proxy of, those individuals 
concerned. Predictions are drawn from the generalised evolutionary research programme 
and comparative studies are used where necessary to support the various claims that are 
made. 
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Evolutionary psychology 
Evolutionary approaches to human behaviour have received widespread criticisms from a 
variety of sources. These criticisms can be roughly partitioned into those directed from 
outside the evolutionary research programme and those which have emerged from within 
the programme itself. The approach of the human behavioural ecologists has received a 
variety of criticisms from an emerging group of researchers who characterise themselves 
as evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Symons, 1989, 1990; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987, 
Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Buss, 1995). Two main interrelated criticisms have been 
directed at the methodological and conceptual approaches adopted by the human 
behavioural ecologi~ts. 
The first criticism suggests that the focus of the human behavioural ecologists on 
behaviour is simply too fine grained. Because humans are characterised by a considerable 
degree of phenotype plasticity it is highly unlikely that specific behaviours will represent 
evolutionary adaptations (Symons, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Sterelny, 1992). This 
focus on behaviour follows from what the evolutionary psychologist's see as the 
inappropriate assumption that humans are inclusive fitness maximisers and that they 
possess mechanisms with that goal (Buss, 1995). As Tooby and Cosmides (1992) argue, 
humans are not fitness maximisers per se, but are adaptation executors. There is no 
simple 'maximise fitness' rule, so the variety of behaviours investigated by human 
behavioural ecologists, regardless of their apparent adaptiveness may not be adaptations 
and therefore are not (in any clear cut way) amenable to evolutionary explanations. 
The second, related criticism, suggests that measunng reproductive success is an 
inadequate means of elucidating adaptations. Reproductive success can only tell us about 
current directional selection, it cannot be used to illuminate adaptive design. Evolutionary 
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psychologists suggest that the human behavioural ecologists have got the approach to 
identifying adaptations backwards: 
In the study of adaptation, the key issue is not whether a given phenotypic feature 
influences reproductive success, but rather whether differential reproductive 
success historically influenced the form of the phenotypic feature. 
(Symons, 1989, p. 137) 
The notion of adaptation is a historical concept. If we are to side-step the old tautology 
argument against natural selection: that the survival of the fittest can be reformulated as 
the survival of the survivors, then we need to get a handle on adaptive design (Williams, 
1966; Symons, 1989, 1992). Because the environments that humans inhabit have changed 
quite considerably since the evolution of Homo sapiens our current behaviours, however 
adaptive in the sense of reproductive success, may be a poor guide to elucidating 
adaptations. The kind of study undertaken by Crook and Crook (1988), for example, is 
problematic from the evolutionary psychologist's perspective. As Symons (1990) argues, 
it is highly unlikely that Tibetan polyandry is an adaptation, because however facultative 
a species humans may be, natural selection cannot favour designs which are likely to 
produce adaptive response to the range of novel circumstances faced by Tibetan farmers 
such as agricultural estates, landlords, taxation, primogeniture and so forth. Symons 
(1989, p. 139) concludes: 
Polyandry obviously must be underpinned by some array of psychological 
mechanisms, with specific selection histories, but it is an adaptation only if at 
least one of these mechanisms was designed to specifically to produce it. If no 
such specialised mechanisms exist, then polyandry is not a Darwinian adaptation, 
and measuring reproductive differentials among individuals who do and do not 
marry polyandrously is irrelevant. Reproductive differentials would be significant 
only if they constituted evidence for the existence of, or nature of, a specialised 
polyandry-producing mechanism in the human psyche. 
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This quote from Symons highlights the core concern of a number of authors regarding 
sociobiology and human behavioural ecology: evolutionary approaches to human 
behaviour cannot ignore the pivotal role of proximate mechanisms in producing 
behaviour (Symons, 1989, 1992; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; 
Buss, 1995; Sterelny, 1992; Kitcher, 1985, 1990). Adaptations are not seen at the 
behavioural level, but instead occur at the level of psychological mechanisms. According 
to Cosmides and Tooby (1987, p. 281) "Natural selection cannot select for behaviour per 
se; it can only select for those mechanisms that produce behaviour", so " The causal link 
between evolution and behaviour is made through the psychological mechanism" 
(Cosmldes & Tooby, 1987, p. 277). 
The cognitive level of explanation therefore is primary because " Adaptive behaviour is 
predicated on adaptive thought: an animal must process information from its 
environments in ways that lead to fit behaviour while excluding unfit behaviour" 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1987, p. 283). A focus on psychological mechanisms is important, 
argue the evolutionary psychologists, because this is the level at which invariance 
emerges. The variability in phenotype expression found across individuals reflects a 
uniformity in psychological mechanisms in interaction with varying environments 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Buss, 1985). 
Psychological mechanisms have evolved to solve adaptive problems in what is termed the 
environment of evolutionary adaptiveness (EEA). The EEA is given a precise definition 
by Tooby and Cosmides (1996, p. 122). 
The EEA is the set of selection pressures (i.e., properties of the ancestral world) 
that endured long enough to push each allele underlying the adaptation from its 
initial appearance to effective fixation (or to frequency-dependent equilibrium), 
and to maintain them at that relative frequency while other necessary alleles at 
related loci were similarly brought to near fixation. Because moving mutations 
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from low initial frequencies to fixation takes substantial time, and sequential 
fixations must usually have been necessary to construct complex adaptations, 
complex functional design in organism owes its detailed organisation to the 
structure of long-enduring regularities of each species' past. 
The importance of understanding psychological mechanisms as adaptations to ancestral 
environments highlights the potentially problematic nature of looking for adaptations at 
the behavioural level in contemporary environments. Given changes in the environment, 
the precise forms of behaviour, although underwritten by adaptations in the form of 
psychological mechanisms, are not likely to be adaptations themselves. 
Evolutionary psychologists such as Buss (1995) and Tooby and Cosmides (1992) suggest 
the humans have evolved a large number of psychological mechanisms that have been 
selected to solve specific adaptive problems. The cognitive architecture of the mind, 
therefore, is likely to posses a wide range of domain-specific psychological mechanisms 
which serve distinct functions. Some examples of psychological mechanisms suggested 
by Buss (1995) include those which underlie sexual jealousy, fear of snakes, language, 
landscape preference, mate selection and reciprocal exchange. 
Tooby and Cosmides (1989) argue that the importance of reciprocal altruism in hominid 
evolution would have led to the selection of a wide range of psychological mechanisms 
underlying reciprocal exchange. One important problem faced by early hominids 
engaging in social exchange would have been the detection of cheaters: those individuals 
who take the benefits of an exchange without reciprocating in kind. Tooby and Cosmides 
(1989) hypothesised that there should be a special mechanism that subserves this adaptive 
function and which operates in the social domain. They interpret the content effect on the 
Wason selection task as evidence of this specialised mechanism, or more appropriately, 
as a phenomenon which is adequately explained by the presence of such a mechanism. 
The Wason selection task is an exercise in deductive reasoning which involves subj ects 
being presented with four cards. In the abstract reasoning condition each card has a letter 
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on one side and a number on the other. The subjects may be shown the cards E, K, 2, 7, 
and asked which two cards that they need to tum over to see if the following claim is 
correct: "If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other." 
Performance on this task is usually extremely poor. However, when the cards presented 
have ages on one side and beverages on the other (e.g., beer, coke, 22, 16), and the 
subjects are asked which cards need to be turned over to determine the rule: "If a person 
is drinking beer, he or she must be over 19", performance is substantially enhanced. 
Success on the Wason selection task seems to be content dependent. Abstract problems 
tend to elicit lower success rates than those embedded in a social contract. This higher 
success rate, Tooby and Cosmides (1989) demonstrate, is not the consequence of 
familiarity per se, but it is due to the problem being expressed in the form of a social 
contract. 16 
Other examples of domain specific mechanisms which are suggested to have a distinct 
evolutionary basis include those underlying language (Pinker, 1994), the attribution of 
mental states to others (Baron-Cohen, 1995), preference for landscapes (Orians, 1992), 
mate selection and judgements of attractiveness (Buss, 1994), jealousy (Wilson & Daly, 
1992) and spatial ability (Gaulin & Hoffman, 1988). 
The argument for domain specificity is both conceptual and empirical in nature. The 
conceptual arguments for domain-specificity are related to the general problem of 
induction and learning. In order to narrow the range of possible interpretations of the 
environment, there need to be ways of organising or framing that information. It has been 
argued by some (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Symons, 1990; Buss, 1995) that a 
domain-general architecture cannot, in principle, guide adaptive behaviour. The central 
point here is that what counts as fit behaviour differs dramatically from domain to 
domain. When the solution to two adaptive problems are incompatible we would expect 
the evolution of two specialised mechanisms which are capable of solving those different 
16 Cosmides' social contract theory has been extended somewhat by Gigerenzer and Hug (1992), who 
clarify the role of cheater detection in the Wason selection task. Social contract theory, however, has not 
escaped criticism from a variety of sources (e.g., Cheng & Holyoak, 1989 Politzer, & Nguyen-Xuan, 1992). 
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problems. We see this kind of specialisation, of course, in the physiological architecture 
of the human body, so we should also expect it at the psychological level. Just as there are 
specialised organs which subserve the function of pumping blood and excreting waste, so 
should there be specialised psychological mechanisms dedicated to language processing 
and to the processing of information involved in object recognition. 
Simple trial and error learning using generalised learning mechanisms is too costly a 
process for organisms to typically burden. As the work of Garcia et al. (1972) and others 
has demonstrated, organisms are so designed as to be prepared to learn certain 
associations in the world but not others. A truly domain-general system simply cannot 
cope with the world's complexity over the trajectory of a single lifetime; instead, 
evolution is likely to have fashioned organisms with ways of demarcating the world and 
responding to it in a manner specific to the problems encountered regularly in their 
environment. 
The idea of domain-specific mechanisms, or what in earlier parlance Cosmides & Tooby 
(1987) termed 'Darwinian algorithms' is tied closely, but is logically distinct from, the 
idea of cognitive modules, popular in the cognitive science literature. Fodor's (1983) 
Modularity of mind thesis brought to the attention of psychologists and philosophers the 
idea that the mind may be organised in terms of a series of perceptual and cognitive 
modules. A module, in Fodorian terms is a specialised computational device which is 
innately specified, informationally encapsulated, and which operates in a specific domain 
on a certain class of inputs. Fodor ,however, limited his modularity of mind to perceptual 
processes (although he did include language) and argued that conceptual or central 
processes were non-modular in nature. The approach of the evolutionary psychologists is 
that the architecture of the mind is overwhelmingly modular in nature. Not only are their 
specialised modules for perceptual processes, but there are also specialised cognitive 
modules serving a wide range of higher order functions. 
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The empirical evidence for domain specificity and for a modular cognitive architecture 
comes from a variety of sources. Evidence from developmental psychology which 
suggests the existence of specialised learning mechanisms is found in studies which 
demonstrate that young infants acquire information about the world and learn new skills 
in a way not compatible with general learning processes. Evidence here is strongest when 
the developing skills and knowledge are radically underdetermined by the input from the 
environment and do not seem to follow from any obvious history of reinforcement. The 
best example here is language, which emerges rapidly in the absence of any obvious 
learning history; however, specialised learning mechanisms underlying object perception 
(Spelke, 1991), the classification of inanimate and animate objects (Gelman, 1990), the 
development of a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1995), and natural history classification 
(Atran, 1990) have also been suggested. 
Further evidence for the modularity of mind is drawn from the neuropsychological 
literature. Selective impainnent and sparing of specific functions after neurological insult 
of some kind, suggests the existence of specialised neural machinery which underlie the 
functions spared or impaired. 17 These kinds of impairment can occur in a wide variety of 
different systems. Visual agnosias are the result of specific neural damage which leads to 
inability to recognise objects, with prosopagnosia, the inability to recognise faces as a 
specific instance of this disorder. Individuals with such agnosias are often quite 
unimpaired in other perceptual and cognitive domains, suggesting the existence of 
specialised modules which underlie the function of object and face recognition. Language 
can also be specifically impaired with focal brain damage to Brocas or Wernickes area, 
and it has recently been suggested (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995) that autism is a specific 
impairment to the theory of mind module that serves the function of attributing mental 
states to others. Modular approaches to the mind, however, have also received a· fair 
degree of criticism, and there is no general consensus about just how to characterise 
17 The results from such studies, however, are rarely unequivocal and it is usually difficult to demonstrate 
any clear one-to-one relationship between specific brain areas and specific functions. Given that parts of the 
brain typically work in conjunction with one another, and that evolution is gradual in nature, this is perhaps 
what we would expect. However, the relevant studies, from neuropsychology do often suggest a relative 
amount of modularity and a degree of autonomy in brain systems. 
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modularity or domain-specificity. I will discuss some of these issues in more detail 
below. 
The general research strategy of the evolutionary psychologist, then, is to focus on the 
identification of psychological mechanisms which have evolved to solve specific adaptive 
problems in the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness. By focusing on the function of 
the mechanisms concerned, it is argued that we should be able to carve the mind at its 
proper joints. Cosmides and Tooby (1994) urge that we should study not what the mind 
can do but what it was designed to do. Because form follows function, an emphasis on 
the adaptive origin of psychological mechanisms should also help us to uncover the 
underlying cognitive architecture of the mind and the way cognitive mechanisms interface 
witl-t the environment to produce behaviour. 
Criticisms of evolutionary psychology: getting the best out of 
evolutionary theory for psychology 
The approach adopted by evolutionary psychologists has received criticism from a variety 
of sources from within the evolutionary programme itself. Human behavioural ecologists 
(e.g., Turke, 1990; Smuts, 1990; Alexander, 1990) have defended their methodological 
and conceptual approach to the evolution of behaviour, and have argued that a focus on 
psychological mechanisms is inappropriate and the notion of the EEA is vague and 
unhelpful. Other lines of criticism suggest that evolutionary psychologists have adopted 
an excessively individualistic approach to human evolution that ignores the importance of 
social groups (Brewer &Caporael, 1990; Caporael & Brewer, 1991; Caporael & Baron, 
1997). Furthermore, this emphasis on individuals, it has been suggested, obscures the 
possibility of group selectionist arguments for human characteristics. 
I shall examme each of these criticisms in tum, argue that the differences between 
alternative approaches has been exaggerated, and sketch out the wayan evolutionary 
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approach to psychology needs to aim for complete explanations which draw on the full 
resources of the evolutionary programme. 
Mind or behaviour? 
A crude rendition of the debate between evolutionary psychologists and human 
behavioural ecologists would be to see it as an argument over whether the psychological 
or behavioural level of explanation is the appropriate one to look for human adaptations. 
Both Turke (1990) and Alexander (1990) defend an approach which views focuses on the 
behavioural level. Alexander (1990) argues that it is behaviour which is directly visible to 
natural selection and that psychological mechanisms are only selected to the extent that 
they realise behaviour. Moreover, it is argued that behaviour is easier to study than the 
underlying mechanisms, which often remain obscure. While Turke and Alexander 
emphasise the importance of studying behaviour, they also point out that it is the whole 
system which is subject to selection and hence to adaptation explanations. 
This is surely a reasonable point and one on which the evolutionary psychologist would 
concur. We need detailed evolutionary explanations of psychological, physiological and 
developmental mechanisms that give rise to adaptive behaviour under the relevant 
ecological circumstances. This would of course mean that the anthropological studies 
conducted by the human behavioural ecologists need to focus more on cognitive 
processes than they have in the past. This follows from the general and valid point urged 
by evolutionary psychologists, that variable behaviour can be underwritten by invariant 
psychological mechanisms operating in different environments. 
Instances of behaviour, therefore, can only be viewed as adaptations to the extent that 
they are part of a co-ordinated system specifiable (in principle at least) in psychological, 
physiological, and developmental terms, which has been selected for its effects in given 
environments. Tibetan polyandry can only be viewed as an adaptation, regardless of how 
adaptive it is, if there are specific psychological and developmental processes which have 
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evolved to respond to specific environmental cues in a way that leads to the decision to 
marry polyandrously. In this particular example, like many, the question of adaptation 
hinges on the nature of both the putative mechanisms and the appropriate environmental 
cues. These two factors provide avenue for further debate between alternative approaches. 
TheEEA 
Part of the problem evolutionary psychologist's have with studies such as those by Crook 
and Crook (1988) and Borgerhoff Mulder (1988) is that the behaviour hypothesised as 
adaptive is elicited in response to what is seen as highly novel circumstances, ones which 
could not have occurred in our evolutionary history and therefore which could not have 
been part of specific selective regimes. Part of this problem and subsequent disagreement 
hinges around the specificity of the features in the environment that humans are 
responding to. It is surely true that humans do not have specific mechanisms which have 
evolved to construct certain types of behaviour under conditions of pastoralism, taxation, 
and so forth; but these features of contemporary environments may reflect more 
invariantly fluctuating aspects of our ecology such as resource availability, population 
structure or social mobility. 
Just what our ancestral environments were like is a matter for some debate and human 
behavioural ecologists argue that the notion of the EEA as used by evolutionary 
psychologists is simplistic and ill-defined (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1991). I think it is 
certainly important to provide richer detail of the past environments that humans in 
particular and hominids in general have adapted to. The Pleistocene certainly does not 
represent a homogenous ecological or social environment, and ancestral humans 
themselves have of course changed in important respects over the last five million years. 
The general point urged by evolutionary psychologists however - that adaptation is a 
historical concept - remains valid. 
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What is required then for complete explanations of human characteristics are detailed 
reconstructions of past environments and those organisms which have populated them. 
The evolutionary programme in psychology, therefore, needs to draw on the full resources 
of archaeology and paleoanthropology, which have begun to provide increasingly richer 
theoretical accounts of hominid behavioural, social and cognitive evolution and the 
ecological contexts in which it has occurred (e.g., Foley & Lee, 1989; Foley, 1987, 1996; 
Mithen, 1996; Mellars, 1989). It is also apparent that although environments have 
changed in important respects since the emergence of hominids, there are many features 
which have remained relatively stable. Studies on contemporary populations, therefore, 
are not just a means of evoking some vestigial mechanisms that have evolved to operate 
under radically different circumstances, but may also reflect the proper functioning of the 
systems concerned under normal conditions. This kind of analysis naturally has to be 
taken on a case by case basis and should be informed by thos''! relevant studies in 
paleoanthropology. Part of the problem in detailing those aspects of the environment that 
humans have evolved to respond to hinges on the nature of the mind that has evolved to 
interface with the environment to produce adaptive behaviour. It is here, I would argue 
that human behavioural ecologists and evolution~ry psychologists differ most in their 
approach. 
Reconstructing human cognitive architecture: degrees of domain specificity 
The approach of evolutionary psychologists favours a cognitive architecture that is richly 
endowed with a collection of domain-specific mechanisms which serve specific functions 
in response to typically a limited set of environmental conditions. Human behavioural 
ecologists, on the other hand, although not favouring an all-purpose domain-general 
mind, argue that there must be a considerable degree of domain generality to account for 
the flexibility of human behaviour. Alexander (1990), for example, has argued that 
several domain-general mechanisms such as consciousness and social imitation can 
provide the foundation for a wide range of adaptive behaviour across a variety of different 
circumstances. 
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There are several broad challenges to the idea of a domain-specific or modular cognitive 
architecture. Firstly, there is the problem of how a modular mind can account for the 
integration of information across a wide variety of different domains. An allied problem 
is how modularity can lead to the creativity and flexibility so apparent in human thought 
and behaviour. Thirdly, the full range of human abilities seems difficult to account for 
given a modular mind. How can an innately specified domains-specific mind possibly 
lead to the current abilities of humans in a wide range of specialities, such as advanced 
mathematics or musical composition? All of these problems seem to suggest the presence 
of more domain-general processes favoured by human behavioural ecologists such as 
Alexander (1990). 
It is certainly true that humans can integrate information from a variety of different 
sources and are highly flexible in their behavioural responses. Such conceptual 
integration is at the heart of much of science and is embodied in our everyday use of 
analogy. It is just such cognitive creativity which led Fodor (1983) to construct his two-
tier model of the mind: highly modular perceptual processes and non-modular conceptual 
ones. However, a domain-specific approach can handle this problem of conceptual 
integration and others in a variety of ways. 
To begin with it is worth making the distinction between modules and domain-specificity. 
Modules can be said to refer to specific, neurally isolatable mechanisms which operate on 
specific classes of information. Domain specificity can simply refer to responses which 
are framed in terms of a specifically delineated domain. It follows that domain specificity 
can be underwritten at the neural level by brain circuits that serve a variety of functions, 
and may be spatially distributed in the brain. The notion of functional specialisation, as 
Shallice (1988) suggests, may be a more useful concept than strict modularity, certainly in 
terms of central processes. We can still posit domain specific mechanisms for something 
like jealousy, therefore, even though these mechanisms may draw on different neural 
circuitry, say those which realise anger, grief and fear. This suggests that domain-
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specificity does not entail strict infonnational encapsulation and that there may be 
considerable exchanges of infonnation between functionally distinct subsystems. fudeed, 
among many who favour modular approaches to human cognition there tends to be an 
emphasis on the way different systems are integrated together, and the way these systems 
are influenced by a host of environmental factors. For example, Gardner's (1983) theory 
of multiple intelligences stresses the role that cultural factors play in the development of 
the different kinds of intellectual competencies. Kanniloff-Smith (1988) also takes a 
developmental perspective in examining the process of modularization which involves a 
series of phases that result in the redescription of implicit knowledge in a way which 
leads to more explicit representation. Following Kanniloff -Smith, Mithen (1996, 1997) 
has proposed a similar transition, but one which can be viewed on the broader time-scale 
of hominid evolution. Specifically, Mithen proposes that from a mind dominated by 
domain-general processes, early hominid minds became increasingly specialised with 
distinct, isolatable modules subs erving language, natural history, technical and social 
intelligences. These isolated processes became increasingly integrated in the minds of 
anatomically modem humans and were responsible for the flowering of art and material 
culture in the upper Palaeolithic. 
Another modular approach to the problem of cognitive creativity would be simply to 
suggest the evolution of an increasing number of domain specific processes (e.g., 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1994). Although conceptually messy, the gradual addition of many 
micromodules may well give the appearance of domain-generality in tenns of the 
flexibility of responses that they allow. The view of evolution as a tinkering process 
(Jacob, 1977) and the idea that the mind is a kludge (Clark, 1989) - a cobbled together 
product selected for efficacy not elegancy - is congenial to this idea of profligate domain 
specific mechanisms. 
Dan Sperber (1994, 1996) suggests a somewhat different solution to the flexibility 
problem. Sperber accounts for the human ability to integrate infonnation from different 
contexts by positing another module: one that has the function of meta-representation. 
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This module naturally accumulates representations from a wide variety of different 
sources which are available for reflexive analysis. The domain of this meta-
representational module is simply the set of all those representations which humans are 
capable of apprehending. Through language and the transmission of ideas, the content of 
this meta-representational module becomes bloated with all manner of beliefs and 
concepts. According to Sperber it is this module which underlies human creativity at the 
conceptual level, and allows us to entertain the esoteric ideas of quantum physics and the 
epic nalTatives embodied in mythology. 
Accounting for novel behaviour and new, apparently maladaptive, traits is also possible 
from a domain specific perspective. Sperber's (1994) distinction between the actual and 
the proper domains of modules is usefully employed here. Although modules have 
evolved to respond to specific classes of input, there may well be novel features of the 
environment which also fulfil the input conditions of the module, and hence the domain 
of the module may be extended. In general outline, this is also the approach adopted by 
evolutionary psychologists such as Cosmides and Tooby (1994) to explain novel 
behaviour. Different inputs will lead to different outputs even though the underlying 
mechanisms may remain invariant. 
It would be fair to say that there remain many unanswered questions regarding the extent 
and nature of modules or domain-specific mechanisms. However, on both conceptual and 
empirical grounds it is highly unlikely the mind is overwhelmingly domain general in its 
functioning, although there are surely some domain general mechanisms. Just how many 
domain specific mechanisms there are and how they should be identified remains 
somewhat of an open question. Certainly, much of the debate between human behavioural 
ecologists and evolutionary psychologists hinges on the way the cognitive architecture of 
the mind is ultimately characterised. At present there is no definitive answer to the way 
the mind is organised, although the extremes of adaptive flexibility, sometimes posited by 
human behavioural ecologists, is unlikely to reflect the specific evolutionary function of 
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domain general processes. Such flexibility in behaviour may however be explicable in 
terms of some set of processes which do have proper functions under normal conditions. 
Ignoring groups: Evolutionary psychology and the social environment. 
Another line of criticism directed against the approach adopted by the evolutionary 
psychologists is to suggest that their perspective is overly individualistic in nature. 
Caporael and Brewer (1989, 1991), Brewer and Caporael, (1990), Caporael and Baron, 
(1997) have argued that evolutionary psychologists, by focusing on psychological 
mechanisms, have ignored the crucial role of social groups in hominid evolution. 
Although not advocating the role of group selection in human evolution, Caporael and 
Brewer (1991) argue that the social group has been an especially important selection 
environment for humans. Social psychology it is argued, rather than cognitive 
psychology, should be the focal discipline in evolutionary studies of human behaviour. 
The general point made by Caporael and Brewer is a fair one: humans have evolved in the 
context of social groups, so many of their cognitive and behavioural adaptations shouid 
reflect the complex demands of group living. However, although leaning somewhat 
towards methodological individualism, the approach of evolutionary psychologists has 
not been to ignore the role of the social environment in developing adaptation 
explanations of psychological phenomena. The work by Cosmides and Tooby (1989, 
1992) on reciprocal altruism for example is explicitly developed in terms of 
psychological adaptations for the complex dynamics of reciprocal exchange, although 
admittedly the focus here is on dyadic interactions rather than larger group processes. 
The social level of explanation in terms of emergent group properties and in terms of the 
social environment are clearly important aspects of the evolutionary programme in 
psychology. Any complete account of the evolution of human mind and behaviour must 
take notice of the importance of social factors. However, rather than viewing social 
psychology as the focal discipline in the evolutionary programme in psychology, I would 
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suggest that it is better conceived as one important source of empirical and conceptual 
resources that can and should be drawn upon. 
A somewhat different perspective on groups has been forwarded by David Sloan Wilson 
(1997). Rather than simply viewing groups as an important selection environment, 
Wilson argues that evolutionary accounts of human mind and behaviour must also 
consider the possibility of selection operating at the group level. Wilson argues that 
modem analyses of fitness tend to average fitness across groups therefore obscuring the 
possibility of inter group differences and the likelihood of group selection. An intriguing 
case study is presented by Wilson which suggests than human decision making may have 
evolved in part due to group selection processes. Although individuals are fully capable 
of autonomous decision making, groups in their decision making processes display 
properties not reducible to individuals, such as cognitive division of labour and group 
cohesiveness. Such differences, among others, would lead to differences in decision-
making efficacy between groups, and hence be open to group selection. 
There is considerable dispute in the philosophy of biology regarding the appropriate level 
of selection which evolution can be viewed as operating on. The standard Darwinian 
picture views evolution as a struggle between individuals culminating in differential 
replication. Although Darwin did admit the possibility of group selection, especially as an 
explanation for human morality. As Hull (1984 p. 142) expresses it "genes mutate, 
organisms are selected and species evolve" This standard view has been challenged by 
various alternatives operating at both below (Dawkins, 1976, 1982, 1996) and above 
(Wilson & Sober, 1994; Gould, 1989c; Eldredge, 1995) the level of the organism. 
Richard Dawkins has vigorously and eloquently argued that we should consider the gene 
as the unit of selection. Groups, species and even clades have also been considered as 
possible alternatives (Gould, 1989c; Brandon, 1990). A radically different approach 
argues that it is entire developmental systems which are inherited and which should be 
considered as the appropriate unit of selection (Griffiths, 1992b; Griffiths & Gray, 1994). 
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As there is no widely agreed upon consensus regarding this issue, the best strategy is to 
embrace the plurality of approaches and at least consider the possibility of group selection 
processes operating during the course of human evolution. The relative importance of 
group selection in human evolution, as in the rest of biology, however, awaits further 
empirical and conceptual developments. 
Summary 
Overall, the similarities between the various approaches to evolutionary explanations of 
human behaviour far outweigh the differences. First and foremost, all perspectives are 
clearly framed as part of the general evolutionary research programme and draw on the 
theory of natural selection and the various auxiliary hypotheses in developing their 
explanatory accounts. Most of the differences are also masked by a general desire to 
provide a unifying explanatory framework for psychological phenomena. As such, all 
perspective draw, wherever relevant, on comparative studies to further their explanations. 
The general idea is that one general explanatory framework should be sufficient to 
account for patterns of behaviour in both humans and other animals. 
Part of the difference in various approaches can be attributed to institutional factors, 
which follow from the differences in focus between anthropologists, psychologists and 
sociologists. However, there are also real conceptual and methodological differences 
between the different perspectives which pivot primarily on different understandings of 
the notion of adaptation, and different views on the appropriate way to characterise the 
human mind. At our current state of knowledge the best overall strategy is to promote a 
plurality of different approaches and to evaluate them as progress in the relevant areas is 
achieved. 
In chapter two I argued that psychology, like other SCIences, should be aiming for 
complete explanatory accounts of the phenomena within its domain. These complete 
accounts are likely to include multiple explanations drawn over different temporal, 
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conceptual, and spatial levels of organisation. The evolutionary programme in psychology 
should seek to develop such complete accounts. As Kitcher (1985, 1990) has argued, we 
need to provide rigorous and detailed accounts of the relevant genetic, developmental, 
physiological, psychological, historical, and functional factors which are important in any 
particular case. As such, the two approaches that I have discussed in this chapter - human 
behavioural ecology and evolutionary psychology - are potentially compatible with one 
another. Detailed cross-cultural accounts of patterns of behaviour under various 
ecological circumstances, elaborations of psychological mechanisms, and developmental 
and social information are all pertinent in explanations of most psychological phenomena. 
The general message here for the evolutionary research programme in psychology is that 
it needs to draw on the full resources of the general evolutionary research programme and -
allied disciplines. To elucidate the nature of human cognitive architecture, for example, 
relevant information should be drawn from cognitive psychology, cognitive ethology, 
palaeoanthropology, cognitive archaeology, evolutionary biology, social psychology and 
neuropsychology. These sorts of syntheses are beginning to emerge as illustrated by the 
models of human cognitive evolution developed by a variety of authors (e.g., Mithen, 
1996; Corballis, 1989; Donald, 1991, Dunbar, 1996). Evolutionary psychology and 
human behavioural ecology, therefore, should be considered as truly interdisciplinary in 
nature and attempt to provide complete explanations of psychological phenomena. 
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Chapter four 
Challenges to the evolutionary programme in psychology: 
An overview 
Evolutionary explanations of human mind and behavior have been forwarded since 
the origin of the evolutionary programme itself. Starting with the fact of natural 
selection and its applicability across all forms of life, it has seemed reasonable by 
many to explain those specific features of human nature that psychologists are 
interested in by reference to evolutionary theory. However, despite the long history of 
attempts to explain psychological phenomena from an evolutionarj perspective, the 
evolutionary programme has become nothing like the dominant theoretical view in 
psychology. 
One can postulate many reasons for evolutionary theory failing to obtain conceptual 
hegemony in psychology. Perhaps the evolutionary programme is simply theoretically 
inadequate. Although it may explain a diverse range of phenomena in other animals, it 
might be considered explanatorily impotent when it comes to explaining human 
psychological phenomena. Or perhaps instead, or as well as it's explanatory 
inadequacy, evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena are seen as being 
morally unacceptable in that they are perceived as promulgating an unsavory and 
ultimately dangerous view of human nature. 
I believe that it is fruitful to consider the challenges to the role of evolutionary 
explanations in psychology in terms of questions regarding the programme's overall 
explanatory coherence (Thagard, 1992). Moreover, the way that the evolutionary 
programme is related to issues of social and moral concern, has also been instrumental 
in restricting the scope of evolutionary theory in the human sciences. In general then, 
the viability of evolutionary explanations in psychology can be judged by assessing 
the global adequacy of the evolutionary research programme and its relations to the 
relevant domains of inquiry, other research programmes, and to society. 
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In the following four chapters I consider the various criticisms which have been 
directed at evolutionary explanations in psychology and the social sciences. Chapter 
five reviews the criticisms that have arisen as the result of the perceived moral 
inadequacy of the evolutionary research programme. Regardless of it's truth valuer, 
the evolutionary programme has been perceived by many to be forwarding a view of 
human nature which is likely to retard social progress and which can only serve to 
legitimize inequalities in society. Recalling the model of global research programmes 
outlined in chapter one, this challenge can be viewed as being directed at the nature of 
the relationship between the programme in general and society, and between the 
internal social features of the programme and the kinds of theories that have been 
developed. If the social features of the programme can be shown to have exerted an 
undue influence on theory construction and development, or the relations between the 
programme and society are inevitably morally pernicious, then the overall 
acceptability of the evolutionary programme in psychology is diminished. 
Chapter six reviews criticisms of the evolutionary programme in psychology which 
have been directed at the use of comparative studies in furthering evolutionary 
explanations of psychological phenomena. These criticisms can be conceptualized as 
challenges to the use of analogical reasoning in the evolutionary programme and in 
terms of questions regarding the explanatory breadth of the programme. As outlined 
in chapter one, explanatory breadth and analogy are important components of 
Thagard's model of explanatory coherence. If it can be shown that the use of 
analogical reasoning in general is invalid and that evolutionary explanations cannot be 
extended from non-human to human animals, then the overall explanatory coherence 
of the programme would be decreased. 
In chapter seven I discuss the role of adaptation explanations in psychology. The 
challenges to the evolutionary programme are various here. Firstly, and most 
importantly, it is suggested by some that most of the phenomena that psychologists 
study cannot be reasonably characterized as evolutionary adaptations, nor can they 
adequately be expiained by reference to adaptations. The challenge, in this case, is to 
the explanatory breadth of the programme. If the evolutionary programme only has 
1 Although ethically based critiques of evolutionary explanations often link the claim of moral 
inadequacy with scientific inadequacy. 
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the conceptual resources to explain a small subset of psychological phenomena, then 
the role of evolutionary explanations in psychology is likely to be considerably 
restricted. Evolutionary psychologists and sociobiologists have also been criticized for 
their use of what are termed 'just-so stories': claims for adaptations based on limited 
evidence. The challenge to the evolutionary programme is two-fold here. Firstly, there 
is a challenge to the empirical adequacy of the programme. That is, it is suggested that 
adaptation explanations are developed on the basis of little empirical evidence. 
Secondly, there is the suggestion that there is a needless proliferation of explanatory 
hypotheses which are deployed to explain any anomalies to the evolutionary 
programme which may occur. As the coherence of an explanatory system is decreased 
relative to the number of propositions that it contains, this criticism can be seen as an 
another challenge to the overall explanatory coherence of the evolutionary 
programme. Finally, it is suggested that there are perfectly adequate alternative 
explanations for psychological phenomena that do not need to invoke the concept of 
adaptation. Competition between theories is, of course, an important component of 
theory appraisal. If it can be shown that there are better alternative explanations for 
various psychological phenomena then those offered by the evolutionary programme, 
then the acceptability of evolutionary explanations in psychology will be diminished. 
One important source of competing explanations for psychological phenomena is to 
suggest that they can be explained as a consequence of culture, or more specifically, 
social learning. If the role of social and cultural factors in the explanation of 
psychological phenomena is viewed as central or primary, then it is suggested that the 
scope of evolutionary explanations, and hence their overall explanatory coherence, 
may be considerably attenuated. In chapter eight I discuss the various criticisms 
directed at evolutionary explanations in psychology from this perspective. 
There are several general points that should be noted in my discussion of the various 
issues outlined above over the next four chapters. Firstly, the various criticisms need 
to be taken on a case by case basis. That is, it may be that the criticisms hold for some 
specific explanations, or instances of explanation, but not for others. However, given 
this point, we can also evaluate the . criticisms as they hold generally for the 
evolutionary research programme in psychology. In this context it is worth 
considering whether the various criticisms can be met by improvements in the 
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appropriate portions of the programme or whether they necessarily hold for 
evolutionary explanations in general. 
Secondly, as theory appraisal is always a comparative affair, ideally the explanatory 
coherence of the evolutionary programme should be directly compared to alternative 
theoretical accounts. However, although I do discuss alternative sources of 
explanation, most of the criticisms of evolutionary explanations in psychology do not 
typically offer coherent and integrated alternative theoretical accounts. Instead, the 
comparative process seems to be done on a piecemeal basis, if at all. Moreover, it is 
often the case that alternative theoretical accounts are perfectly compatible with 
evolutionary ones. The issue of the compatibility of evolutionary explanations with 
alternative theories is addressed in more detail in chapters nine and ten. 
In general I shall provide reasons to believe that the explanatory coherence of the 
evolutionary programme is not considerably diminished by the various sorts of 
criticism that have been leveled against it. What the replies to the various criticisms 
do suggest, however, is the kind of role that evolutionary explanations are likely to 
play in psychology. The precise nature of this role will be discussed in more detail in 
the final chapter. 
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Chapter five 
Ethical issues in the evolutionary research programme in 
psychology 
It has become increasingly clear in recent years that science is permeated with values 
at all stages of the scientific process. These values can be crudely, but helpfully, 
delineated as either epistemic or non-epistemic in nature. As I have discussed in 
Chapter One, a host of epistemic values such as explanatory breadth, simplicity, and 
empirical adequacy, are employed in evaluating the worth of theories and in 
adjudicating between alternative research programmes. Values of a non-epistemic 
nature, such as, for example, those embodied in political ideology, can also influence 
the course of scientific inquiry. As a realist I have rejected the idea, advanced by 
some, that such non-epistemic values typically determine the nature of scientific 
inquiry. However, as a naturalist I believe that it is also clear that science is, 
importantly, a human endeavor, and that the ideological world views of scientists and 
the cultural milieu in which they are embedded can potentially influence the nature of 
the scientific process. Moreover, the results of science embodied in empirical research 
and articulated in theory can have a profound influence on important issues of general 
moral concern for society. The idea that science can be insulated from such effects is 
neither viable nor ethically acceptable. It follows that the acceptability of a theory or 
research programme is not only influenced by the kinds of values embodied in 
Thagard's theory of explanatory coherence, but also by a host or more or less 
explicitly moral values. 
There are two related issues of concern here when evaluating the moral acceptability 
of a theory or research programme. One, have the theories, methodologies and 
empirical results been influenced to a notable degree by factors of a non-epistemic 
nature such as the class, race or sex of the scientists concerned, or by specific features 
of the institutions involved? And two, are the results of the scientific research such 
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that they may impact in a potentially deleterious way on any entities of moral 
concern? These two different ways non-epistemic values can permeate science I will 
label internal and external values accordingly. This internal/external division can be 
elaborated further. Internal values can permeate science in a variety of ways. The 
choice of topic, the kinds of models and metaphors employed and the way empirical 
findings are conceptualized can all potentially be influenced by social and political 
factors. Although typically this kind of bias is both subtle and 'accidental' in nature, 
in extreme cases it may lead to fraud and fabrication, as in the Cyril Burt affair 
(Joynson, 1989). In evaluating theories we should only be concerned if this kind of 
bias provides us with a significantly distorted view of the world. External values also 
can play an important role in science. The social and political impact of a theory may 
seem to be isolated from the actual process of theory development and appraisal. 
However, although the suppression of research should only be carried out in extreme 
circumstances, it is reasonable to expect greater standards of evidence, and more 
coherent theories in areas which have a greater capacity for social impact. Similarly, 
questions of risk assessment should enter the evaluative process, and be one means 
whereby theories are deemed as more or less acceptable. The model of global research 
programmes that I outlined in chapter one incorporates these valuational aspects as 
important parts of the overall structure of a research programme itself. It follows that 
in any global assessment of a research programme's adequacy the role of both internal 
and external values will need to be elucidated. 
The way science can be impregnated with values is clearly seen in the history of the 
evolutionary research programme and the various ways in which evolutionary ideas 
have given birth to certain social policies and beliefs in society. The key figures in the 
development of evolutionary theory in the 19th century were, without a doubt, 
products of their time and widespread racist and sexist ideas penetrated the biological 
sciences in a variety of ways at this time. For example, the attitude of Europeans 
towards other races clearly played a role in the widespread belief that different races 
were the product of evolutionary divergence in our distant past. Different races were 
conceived by many as distinct sub-species which explained the 'manifest differences' 
in their intellectual and social abilities. This kind of bias in evolutionary anthropology 
probably reached its apotheosis in the explicit fraud of Piltdown man, the 
acceptability of which was dictated in part by its conformity with notions of European 
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superiority (Gould, 1981). There are two cases here where the development of theory 
and the interpretation of evidence can be seen to be influenced to some extent by pre-
existing social and political biases. 
The social impact of evolutionary theory is perhaps most evident in its use, by some, 
to justify a host of morally dubious social practices and to legitimise inequalities in 
society. Of greatest notoriety must be the explicit 'use' of evolutionary theory to 
sanction selective immigration and sterilization policies in America and elsewhere, 
culminating ultimately in the racial 'cleansing' of Nazi policy. This misappropriation 
of Darwinian theory to validate overt selective regimes continues in some areas, as 
illustrated in the recent Singaporean policy of providing incentives for the more 
educated to breed and the less educated to suppress reproduction (Gould, 1985). 
The acceptability of the evolutionary research programme in psychology and the 
social sciences has also been challenged because of explicit claims that it embodies 
and justifies a range of values which many see as socially pernicious. The extent of 
feeling that many experienced with the development of sociobiology is demonstrated 
by the extraordinary reaction to E. O. Wilson and his sociobiological views. 
Following the publication of Sociobiology there rapidly appeared a strong left-wing 
reaction, leading to the formation of the group Science for the People, explicitly set up 
to challenge the ideas of sociobiology. Various forms of protest also occurred, 
including leaflet campaigns, the shouting of anti-sociobiological slogans during 
Wilson's lectures, and the dousing of Wilson with cold water by protesters at a lecture 
(Wilson, 1994). 
The general charge against sociobiology and allied attempts to explain human 
phenomena from an evolutionary perspective is that such approaches promulgate a 
determinist view of human nature which serves to legitimize the social and political 
status quo (e.g., Allen, 1978; Sociobiology Study Group, 1978; Sahlins, 1976; Rose, 
Kamin, & Lewontin, 1984). There are three interrelated criticisms of the evolutionary 
programme in psychology here: (1) That it demonstrates bias explicable in terms of 
the race, class, and sex of the scientists concerned; (2) that it espouses a fallacious 
genetic determinism; which (3) justifies current social arrangements by claiming that 
they are both natural and inevitable. These general arguments are summed up by Rose 
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et al. (1984, p. 236): "Sociobiology is a reductionist, biological detenninist 
explanation of human existence" whose appeal "is in its legitimization of the status 
quo. If present social arrangements are the ineluctable consequence of the human 
genotype then nothing of any significance can be changed." Sociobiology is charged 
here with committing the naturalistic fallacy. As Allen (1978, p. 261) explains: " ... 
for Wilson, what exists is adaptive, what is adaptive is good, therefore what exists is 
good" 
Sociobiology is viewed as part of a long history of attempts to explain human social 
behaviour from an evolutionary perspective in a way which justifies inequalities in 
society. "There is nothing that separates the programme and specific claims of the 
social Darwinism of the 1870's from the Darwinian sociobiology of the 1970's" 
(Rose et aI., 1984, p. 243). I think it is important to separate two lines of criticism in 
the accounts presented by Rose et al. (1984) and others. In brief, the first criticism 
argues that evolutionary explanations of human behaviour represent bad (or at least 
misguided) science; the second line of criticism argues that it is dangerous science. 
The next three chapters is devoted to a discussion of the epistemic worth of the 
evolutionary programme in psychology, so I will confine myself here to a discussion 
of the moral acceptability of the programme. Once this is done, I think it becomes 
clear that the main force of the ideological attack on the evolutionary programme in 
psychology is absorbed by a better and more sophisticated understanding of how 
evolutionary theory is, and can be, used to explain human behavior. There still 
remains, however, a significant residue of criticism which does raise important 
questions regarding the role of non-epistemic values in the evolutionary programme. I 
shall discuss these various ethical challenges to the evolutionary programme in 
psychology in tenns of claims of class, sex, and race bias. 
Class 
Vigorous attacks have been made on biology in general and sociobiology in partiCUlar 
on the basis that they embody a pervasive and pernicious ideological bias (e.g., 
Sahlins, 1976; Rose et aI., 1984). "What is inscribed in the theory of sociobiology is 
the entrenched ideology of western society: the assurance of its naturalness, and claim 
of its inevitability" (Sahlins, 1976 p. 101). I shall discuss this charge in tenns of both 
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internal and external values. In fonnulating evolutionary theory and in particular the 
theories of sociobiology, it is argued that there is an entrenched class bias. The strong 
claim here is that biological detenninism with respect to political class was invented 
in order to further certain political aims. "It is precisely to meet the need for se1f-
justification and to prevent social disorder that the ideology of biological detenninism 
has been developed" (Rose et aI., 1984 p. 68). A somewhat weaker, but still important 
criticism, is that the tenninology, concepts, and theories of the evolutionary 
programme have been borrowed from capitalist ideology and applied, inappropriately, 
to the natural world. Metaphors such as competition, investment, niche, division of 
labour, costlbenefit analysis, and so forth, have been appropriated from capitalism, it 
is argued, and been transferred to the biological realm (Sahlins, 1976). As such, it is 
suggested that our Western view of nature is penneated by the notions of 
individualism and exploitation. Sahlins (1976) in particular, sees a pernicious slide 
from the notion of differential reproduction through competition between organisms, 
to self-maximisation and exploitation of others. Evolutionary theory and sociobiology 
are characterised as the intellectual culmination of Hobbes's bellum omnium contra 
omnes: the war of all against all. 
What are we to make of these charges? Firstly, I think that the strong claim that the 
concepts of the evolutionary programme were fonnulated for the explicit purpose of 
justifying the social and economic stratification of western society can be rej ected. 
Certainly there is no evidence that evolutionary thinkers from Darwin to Wilson 
developed their theories as political strategies. Indeed part of the reason that Darwin 
held off from publishing his theory of natural selection for some twenty years was his 
fear that it might be employed to further certain political ends (Desmond & Moore, 
1991). The weaker claim, however, needs some consideration. Without doubt the 
choice of language, the use of metaphor, and the articulation of models must reflect to 
some extent the social and political climate in which they are developed. This point is 
almost trivially true. In searching for appropriate analogies and metaphors scientists 
can only draw on the corpus of their own beliefs, which are likely to reflect, in part, 
the historical and social circumstances of their existence. As long as we reject extreme 
fonns of social constructionism, there is no necessary bias in this. Bias, however, can 
occur if these metaphors and analogies do not adequately represent those' real 
150 
processes operating in the world. That is, if they are retained and used in spite of what 
our interactions with the world tell us. 1 
I think there is some reason to believe that this might be the case in the development 
of evolutionary theory, although its effect on the growth of biological ideas has been 
relatively negligible, and falls far short of the pervasive bias indicated by Sahlins 
(1976) and Rose et al. (1984). Darwin himself, influenced by the ideas of both 
Malthus and Adam Smith, made extensive use of the notion of competition in the 
struggle for finite resources. Although Darwin made explicit note of the metaphorical 
nature of this struggle (for example, it could be said to refer just as much to a plant 
'struggling' with the inclement conditions at the edge of a desert as two lions snarling 
over a wildebeest carcass), it is certainly true that the focus was on individual 
, competition. In contrast, the Russian biologist Kropotikin in Mutual Aid paid more 
attention to the important role of co-operation in nature. This emphasis may reflect 
both the Russian political and ecological environment (Gould, 199Id). However, 
Darwin did not ignore the role of co-operation in evolution, and indeed both co-
operation and exploitation are rife throughout the natural world. Indeed, as I have 
argued in the previous chapter, the evolutionary programme in psychology needs to, 
and to some extent has, emphasised the importance of both individual conflict and 
group living in developing its theoretical structures. Even E. O. Wilson, who tended 
to favor reductionist style explanations, explicitly developed an explanation of human 
morality in terms of group selection processes and adaptations for group living, as of 
course did Darwin. From a realist perspective, the explanatory success of the 
evolutionary research programme in general, suggests that the metaphors and 
concepts employed tell us something about the real world, and do not merely reflect a 
blanket ideological bias. 
As well as charging the evolutionary programme with internal ideological bias it is 
also claimed that evolutionary theory is employed in order to legitimize the status quo 
in society (Sahlins, 1976; Rose et aI., 1984). It is suggested that this justification for 
1 Of course it might be argued here that our beliefs and desires influence the way that we perceive the 
world so that we cannot accurately determine whether the concepts that we use are true representations 
of reality. Although I think this claim must be true to some extent, as I have argued in chapter one, the 
history of science suggests that the concepts that people possess do not determine their percepts, and 
hence evaluations of the truth of theories is possible. 
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present inequalities is seen most acutely in evolutionary explanations of social 
behaviour " ... sociobiology contributes primarily to the final translation of natural 
selection into social exploitation" (Sahlins, 1976 p. 73). There is no doubt here that 
evolutionary theory has been pressed into service as a scientific means to buttress the 
ideological beliefs of many. That arch capitalist, John D. Rockefeller, for example, 
was reported to have stated: "The growth of a large business is merely a survival of 
the fittest ... this is not an evil tendency in business. It is merely the working out of a 
law of nature" (quoted in Rose et aI., 1984 p. 26). Darwinism, it was considered, 
could provide a legitimisation of the laissez- faire politics of capitalism by placing the 
process squarely in the natural realm. If such a process was natural, it was seen by 
many to be good. 
These ideas, often labeled Social Darwinism, are typically traced to the 19th century 
evolutionary thinker Herbert Spencer. Spencer believed that there were inexorable 
laws of nature that governed the physical, mental, and social realms. Human nature 
moves towards perfection by its complete adaptation to the social state. It followed in 
Spencer's philosophy that government interference can only deform this natural 
progression. The enactment of poor laws and the like were seen by Spencer as 
retarding the progress of the species (Richards, 1987). Left-wing critiques of 
evolutionary biology argue that these ideas merely illustrate the naturalistic fallacy: it 
is not possible to derive is statements from ought statements. Just because some state 
of the world has evolved it does not follow, therefore, that it is morally good (Rose et 
aI., 1984). Richards (1987) for one, however, has exonerated Spencer from the charge 
of committing the naturalistic fallacy. Spencer's moral philosophy was based on the 
oft invoked ethical maxim of the greatest happiness principle. This principle was not 
derived from the fact of evolution, but rather evolution was seen as the means to 
realise this goal. The dubious implications of Spencer's philosophy, therefore, can be 
seen as a consequence of fallacious ideas about evolution and society rather than an 
outright violation of deductive logic and the direct transfer of is to ought. 
Capitalists such as Rockefeller and those advocating extreme forms of eugenic policy 
can be less easily pardoned. The belief that a forced reduction in the reproductive 
output of the lower classes was morally justified by an invocation of Darwin's theory 
of natural selection is clearly an example of faulty reasoning. Indeed any overt 
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intervention in human society can hardly be seen as simply an enactment of natural 
selection. 
Evolutionary theory certainly can, and has been, put to malfeasant ends, but is this 
typically the case with the current evolutionary programme in psychology? It is 
important to note that the critique presented by Rose et al. (1984) hinges on a strongly 
genetic determinist reading of evolutionary explanations of social behaviour. It is not 
only the claim that certain social atTangements are the product of evolution that 
incites moral concern, but the claim that these arrangements are genetically 
determined and therefore inevitable. For Rose et al. (1984, polS) biological 
determinism is clearly politics by another name. 
For if human social organization, including the inequalities of status, wealth, 
and power, are a direct consequence of biology, then, except for some gigantic 
program of genetic engineering, no practice can make a significant alternation 
of social structure or the position of individuals or groups within it. What we 
are is natural and therefore fixed. 
If this really is the belief of evolutionary social scientists then there is certainly cause 
for concern and a clear case where the social impact of a scientific theory counsels 
extreme caution in its development and promulgation. I will defer a more detailed 
discussion of determinism to later in this chapter, but I note in passing that I can seen 
no evidence that any evolutionary biologists or psychologists subscribe to the view of 
genetic determinism which is sometimes attributed to them. Even Wilson (1975, 
1978), who leans most closely to the genetic determinist perspective, clearly invokes 
the role of the environment in influencing final outcomes. However, \Vilson does see 
social and cultural evolution as constrained by biological processes. " ... there is a 
limit, perhaps closer to the practices of contemporary society than we have the wit to 
grasp, beyond which biological evolution will begin to pull cultural evolution back to 
itself' (Wilson, 1978, p. 80). Wilson is really making a claim here about the norms of 
reaction of human behaviour (Kitcher, 1985). There is only a potentially narrow set of 
possibilities in which human societies can be arranged. "Biological constraints exist 
that define zones of improbable or forbidden entry" (Wilson, 1978 p. 81). It is 
understandable how these sorts of claims can elicit genetic determinist interpretations. 
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However, I think it is clear that even for Wilson current social arrangements are not 
some ineluctable consequence of evolutionary processes. 
Indeed, a more thoughtful evolutionary analysis would suggest that the present social 
stratification in Western societies is an anomaly in evolutionary terms. For the vast 
majority of our evolution hominids are likely to have subsisted in small groups of a 
generally egalitarian nature. Although it is highly likely that these societies would 
have exercised some form of division of labour, this would have been primarily on 
sex rather than class lines. The accumulation of wealth and material possessions was 
possible only since the relatively recent advent of agriculture. The class based society 
found in many contemporary populations, therefore, can not be justified by reference 
to evolutionary theory even if the means of justification were legitimate. 
The current evolutionary programme in psychology and the social sciences, therefore, 
can not be deemed as unacceptable due to any pervasive class bias. There is a need, 
however, to understand human psychological phenomena as a product of both 
competition and co-operation, and not to subscribe to overly individualistic models of 
human evolution. This need, I would suggest, follows from the likely process of 
evolution rather than any specific ideological bias. Given the often considerable slack 
between academic formulation, popular reporting and the understanding of the public, 
there is also a constant concern for precise formulation and constant qualification of 
evolutionary explanations of human behaviour. This is true of ideas regarding social 
stratification, but perhaps more so of those pertaining to sex and race. 
Sexism and evolutionary theory 
The evolutionary research programme in psychology has also been charged with a 
pervasive and pernicious sexism. The criticism is summed up in a recent paper by 
Travis and Yeager (1991, p. 127). 
The persistence of and tolerance for the theoretical and empirical limitations 
of sociobiological applications to human behaviour suggest that human 
sociobiology serves a pervasive sexism in modem society. While much of 
science may be socially constructed, it is also the case that science is often 
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used as a camouflage for bias in the construction of social life. Bolstered by 
. reductionism and biological determinism, a narrow explanation of very 
complex social patterns has been socially constructed in a way that reflects 
and supports historical and cultural values more relevant to a sexual status quo 
than to the scientific investigation of evolutionary theory. 
This sexist charge, like the one made against class, has both an internal and external 
dimension. The internal claim for sexism is predicated on the idea that the language, 
concepts, and models of the evolutionary programme reflect an androcentric bias. 
Moreover, it is argued that this bias has exercised an influence on the way the world 
has been perceived. The primatologist Sarah Hrdy (1986) for example, has 
documented how research in primatology has been male focused. Until very recently 
the male orientation of primate research, Hrdy argues, has resulted in the fostering of 
the myth of coy females and ardent males, and diverted attention way from important 
areas of research such as male paternal care and female-based dominance systems. 
More recent research indicates that females, far from being coy, are often seen to 
solicit copulations from males. The role of males in offspring provisioning in a 
number of primate species has also been revised. The point Hrdy makes is that the 
preconceptions of male primatologists has led to a representation of primate 
behaviour not wholly consistent with the truths of primate society, as they are 
currently being revealed. 
I think there is something to this charge, especially when the results of primate 
research have been used to explain patterns of sexual differences found in human 
society. It is likely the values of male scientists have influenced to some extent the 
course of research relating to sex differences in behaviour. These values themselves 
are perhaps explicable (although not excusable) in the light of evolutionary theory. 
Human males due to a chronic uncertainty over paternity should be more concerned 
with their partner's sexual infidelity than females. To the extent that females benefit 
from extra-pair copulations - and recent research suggests that this benefit may be 
considerable (Baker & Bellis, 1995) - then they should be more concerned with 
concealing sexual infidelity and males may be more motivated to believe in female 
coyness. 
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A full expose of these kinds of biases that have influenced research on the 
evolutionary origins of sexual behaviour can only serve to further progress in this 
field, and will not by themselves invalidate the nature of the programme itself. The 
recognition of these kinds of biases serves as a rejection of the kind of constructionist 
philosophy of science promulgated by Travis and Yeager (1991). The way we view 
the world is surely influenced by a host of factors relating to sex, class, and so forth, 
but it is not determined by these things. Moreover, the kinds of sex differences, which 
have been suggested by various researchers, are typically consistent with evolutionary 
theory and are not usually formulated ad hoc to shore up a male dominant political 
system. 
The stronger claim made by Travis and Yeager and others is that the evolutionary 
research programme has been used to justify sexual differences in society as both 
natural and inevitable. The view of females as naturally coy, submissive, passive 
homemakers and males as naturally dominant, powerful breadwinners is certainly one 
that is bandied about in the public sphere from time to time. This suggests that 
evolutionary scientists need to be cautious in their research on sex differences 
especially in areas that have potential political impact. However, research directed at 
identifying and elucidating sex differences is not implicitly sexist in nature, nor do 
evolutionary scientists typically claim that current differences between men and 
women in society reflect inevitable patterns of differentiation. 
The tremendous volume of research on sex differences in mind and behaviour in 
psychology seems to indicate that there are real differences between men and women 
and that these differences are not wholly explicable in terms of different patterns of 
socialization. For example, there is a consistently reported difference in the spatial 
abilities of men and women. Men typically are superior to women on a range of 
spatial tasks. This difference has been explained in terms of the male/female division 
of labour and the larger horne range size of men in our evolutionary past (Gaulin & 
Hoffman, 1988). Silverman and Eals (1992) also argue, however, that women are 
superior at other spatial tasks, ones that involve the ability to recognise and recall the 
spatial configuration of objects. It is argued that this difference reflects the different 
selection pressures for women related to foraging. These differences in spatial ability 
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between men and women, furthermore, seem to be associated with hormonal changes 
and do not reliably emerge until after puberty. 
What are the social and political implications of these kinds of differences? 
Importantly, I think it is worth noting that social inequality and equality of 
opportunity are predicated on an understanding of underlying differences. If there are 
real differences between males and females then similar treatment will not elicit 
similar results. It follows that in order to achieve anything like equality we should be 
aware of any underlying differences between males and females and their putative 
causes, and develop our social policies accordingly (Tavris, 1992). Moreover, an 
elucidation of differences says nothing necessarily about the relative superiority or 
inferiority ofthose differences (Ruse, 1981). 
It should also be clear that elucidating the evolutionary underpinnings of behaviour is 
not tantamount to justifying that behaviour. For example, even if rape is a facultative 
adaptation as Thornhill and Thornhill (1990) claim, this cannot in any way legitimize 
rape or render it morally excusable. These sorts of evolutionary claims however 
should be treated with caution. Given the potential political ramifications of claims 
like those made by the Thornhills, I would suggest that there should be greater 
standards of evidence for such hypotheses and due care in their presentation in the 
public realm. 
Once overt claims about the genetically determined nature of evolutionary arguments 
are rejected I think the evolutionary programme in psychology can be freed from the 
charge of pervasive and pernicious sexism. However, we should always be aware of 
potential bias in research and investigations of a politically volatile nature need to be 
undertaken with due care. 
Evolutionary theory and racism 
The role of bias in the scientific investigation of race has a long and perfidious 
history. As Gould (1981) documents, both pre and post Darwinian evolutionary 
scientists, influenced by a priori notions of white supremacy, developed theories, 
manipulated data and presented results in a manner which served to reinforce their 
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existing beliefs. The fashionable 19th century discipline of craniometry, for example, 
was utilised to demonstrate the supposed scientific basis for intellectual differences 
between different races. Indeed, many theorists viewed blacks and other races as 
intermediate species or sub-species between whites and apes (Gould, 1981). Needless 
to say the widespread prevalence of such views served only to legitimize racial 
inequality and to preserve existing social hierarchies. 
Are such biases and beliefs prevalent in contemporary evolutionary accounts of 
human behaviour? Certainly Gould (1981) and others (e.g., Rose et aI., 1984) think 
this is the case. Gould suggests that the hereditarian program in IQ testing is a simple 
continuation of spurious attempts to delineate races on the basis of supposed 
differences in mental ability. Furthermore, it is argued (Gould, 1981; Rose et aI., 
1984) that such attempts only serve to justify the status quo as both natural and 
unchangeable. 
It is certainly clear that there are differences between different races in their IQ test 
scores. Just what these differences tell us and what their underlying cause or causes 
are is a matter of considerable debate. I do not propose to delve into this issue in any 
detail here, but I would say that at present it is unclear to what extent differences can 
be attributed to genetic variation or to environmental factors, if indeed we can make a 
conceptually sound distinction between these causal influences. However, regardless 
of the basis of IQ differences, it is highly unlikely that any cogent evolutionary 
account could be provided to explain the pattern of differences found. Given the likely 
recent origin of different racial groups, and the considerable interbreeding between 
different races that has occurred, it is implausible to suggest that there are substantial 
genetic differences in cognitive abilities between different races. Genetic differences 
between different racial groups is small, with within group variation exceeding 
between group variation (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a). That there are some genetic 
differences between groups is clear, given differences in skin colour, physical form 
and the prevalence of certain genetic disorders. These differences may reflect some 
adaptation to local conditions, but are probably to a large extent due to chance factors 
such as genetic drift, and pathogen-driven variability at the molecular level. Given 
that psychological adaptations are probably underwritten by numerous genes and 
instantiated in complex developmental pathways, it is highly unlikely that different 
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racial groups will demonstrate any significant innate differences in their cognitive 
abilities. 
That is, of course, not to deny the possibility of small differences due to genetic 
factors. Regardless, the data analyzed by Flynn (1987) demonstrating the large 
intergenerational gains in IQ scores indicate that IQ scores themselves are unlikely to 
reflect any innate and immutable quality as is often assumed in the hereditarian 
programme in IQ testing. Furthermore, evidence for genetic differences in the 
intellectual ability between races by itself, as even those in favour of the hereditarian 
programme admit (e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994), have no pernicious implications 
for social policy. 
A slightly different criticism of evolutionary accounts (e.g., Rose et al., 1984), 
directed at Wilson and others, calls into question the idea that racism itself may have 
an evolutionary explanation. Wilson (1975, 1978) claims that xenophobia may have a 
genetic basis and reflect an evolutionary history where aggression between different 
groups may have been prevalent. The study of in-group/out-group biases, and 
attitudes towards different races, however, is surely a legitimate area of scientific 
inquiry, and one in which plausible evolutionary accounts can be developed. 
Although, as in research on sex differences, the way this research is conducted and the 
information disseminated needs to be carefully monitored, any further understanding 
we can glean regarding the sources of group conflict can only be helpful. That is, it is 
unlikely that we can make any substantial progress in ameliorating racial conflict 
without a more detailed understanding of the causal mechanisms that are responsible 
for its occurrence. 
Summary: the role of non-epistemic values and the acceptability of the evolutionary 
research programme. 
The claim that the evolutionary programme in psychology is permeated by values of a 
non-epistemic nature is predicated on three main arguments: 
(1) The understanding of evolutionary processes has been distorted due to the class, 
race, and sex of the scientists concerned. At its extreme, this line of reasoning 
claims that evolutionary theory itself is a social construction which merely, or at 
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best predominately, reflects those interests of a white, male orientated, capitalist 
society. 
(2) Evolutionary explanations of psychological and social phenomena are presented 
in terms of the deterministic outcome of genes. Biology is equated with destiny. 
(3) There has been widespread and inappropriate use of the argument that because 
something has evolved it is therefore good. This leads to the justification of 
present inequalities in society as both natural, and in combination with point (2), 
as inevitable. 
I believe that a fair assessment of these criticisms should be taken on a case by case 
basis. My objective in this summary, however, is to consider the general style of 
argument typically employed by sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists while 
acknowledging a considerable diversity of ideas that have emerged from those 
wishing to explain human behaviour from an evolutionary perspective. 
It is certainly true that cases of bias and distortion of theory and data have been 
present in many areas in the evolutionary programme (and, of course, elsewhere in 
science). Furthermore, these biases can, and have, had a considerable and at times 
chilling impact on social policy and public attitudes to questions of race, class, and 
sex. To further the aims of science, as I have outlined them in chapter one, these 
sources of bias should be identified and eliminated wherever possible. However, 
evolutionary theory itself is not merely a proj ection of the social beliefs and biases of 
certain classes of individuals. The understanding of evolutionary theory by 
contemporary scientists provides no basis for the existence of significant and 
overwhelming differences between different individuals. As Gould (1985) expresses 
it, human equality is a contingent fact of history. Indeed, evolutionary psychologists 
more often than not are keen to emphasise the unity of human kind as a consequence 
of species wide selection for universal psychological adaptations (e.g., Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990a). Evolutionary explanations for race and especially class 
differences, therefore, are likely to be on shaky grounds. It is more plausible, from an 
evolutionary perspective, to postulate sex differences in behaviour; however, the 
presence of differences says nothing about the relative value of those differences. 
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A strong value based critique of the evolutionary research programme in psychology 
can; I believe, only be sustained if determinist legitimizations of inequality are widely 
promulgated. However, I see no evidence that this is typically the case, especially in 
recent discussions. Indeed, evolutionary scientists are usually at pains to distance 
themselves from any claims regarding the genetic determination of psychological 
traits and social systems. As Tooby and Cosmides (1992, p. 39) express it: 
Neither "biology", "evolution", "society" or "the environment" directly 
imposes behavioral outcomes, without an immensely long and intricate 
intervening chain of causation involving interactions with an entire 
configuration of other causal elements. Each link of such a chain offers a 
possible point of intervention to change the final outcome. 
There is no question, therefore, that certain social arrangements are in any sense 
inevitable, as the history of human societies has demonstrated: 
. . . the human psychological system is immensely flexible as to outcome: 
everything that every individual has ever done in all of human history and 
prehistory establishes the minimum boundary of the possible. The maximum, 
if any, is completely unknown" (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, p. 40) 
Similarly, it is hard to see any evidence for the naturalistic fallacy in any 
contemporary evolutionary accounts in psychology. Although there is interest in the 
evolutionary antecedents of a wide range of human behaviour, there is no general 
claim that these explanations in any sense legitimise such behaviours. However, in 
developing appropriate ethical theories and formulating social policies we need to be 
aware of what humans are capable of. Is does not imply ought; but ought does imply 
can. This I think, is the general thrust of Wilson's position regarding the evolutionary 
limitations on social change. It follows as a more general point that in taking 
ameliorative action in the social sphere we need to have some understanding of the 
causal processes which underlie the current state of affairs and how they can be 
tweaked to realise our social goals. To the extent that evolutionary theory provides an 
adequate means for developing explanations in the social sciences, then it will have 
some role to play in the development of acceptable moral systems and in contributing 
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to ethically motivated social intervention. In order to develop a fairer society and 
achieve what is of most value in existence we need to draw on the full resources of 
the evolutionary research programme as part of a general strategy to understand the 
causal underpinnings of human nature. As Tooby and Cosmides (1992, p. 40) argue 
" Knowing the details of the mechanisms involved will prove crucial in taking any 
kind of constructive or ameliorating action. 'Solutions' which ignore causation can 
solve nothing" 
However, despite this exoneration of evolutionary explanations in psychology from 
charges of ideological bias, I believe it is important that scientists consider in some 
detail the likely social impact of their ideas, before they become widely distributed. 
As Kitcher (1985) points out, evolutionary social scientists need to proceed with 
caution because their theories have politic,al clout quite apart from the political 
opinions of their supporters. As such, the quality of research and the interface 
between science, society and social policy need to be carefully monitored. I think it is 
fair to say that this has not always been the case and it is one area of the evolutionary 
programme in psychology to which due attention needs to be paid. 
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Chapter six 
Anthropomorphism and analogy: the role of comparative psychology 
in the evolutionary programme 
Evolutionary explanations of human mind and behaviour have often drawn heavily on 
comparisons with other animals. Certainly the 19th century evolutionary research 
programme in psychology made extensive use of comparative explanations to develop 
theories about the evolutionary origins of human psychological phenomena (e.g., 
Darwin, 1871, 1872; Romanes, 1881). In contrast, much of contemporary psychology 
has proceeded as though there were a sharp division between valid and valuable 
explanations of human mind and behaviour and that of all other animals. As such, 
comparative psychology has often been marginalised and seen simply as a source for 
animal models of human states and processes. In ignoring comparative psychology, 
Demarest (1987, p. 147) argues that psychologists " ... have overlooked the one 
common thread that ties together almost all of the diversity found in mainstream 
psychology: an evolutionary perspective." 
Comparative psychology plays an important role III developing evolutionary 
explanations in psychology in four related ways: 
(1) Comparative psychology is utilised to elucidate adaptation VIa the study of 
homologous traits. 
(2) Arguments from analogy are deployed as heuristic devices to further the claims 
for the evolutionary basis of similar psychological and behavioural traits. 
(3) Comparative analyses can be used to establish general trends which occur across 
species. 
(4) Comparisons in the characteristics between species are used in reconstructions of 
the phylogeny of human psychological and behavioural traits. 
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In general, comparative psychology plays an important role in assessments of the 
explanatory coherence of the evolutionary research programme in psychology. More 
specifically, the extension of evolutionary theory to psychological phenomena is seen 
as more plausible given cogent accounts of the same or similar phenomena in other 
speCIes. Comparative arguments are used, therefore, in extending the explanatory 
breadth of the evolutionary programme. This extension is often achieved via 
analogous reasoning. If trait S has evolved in species T for the function ofU, then an 
analogous trait Sl in humans may also have an evolutionary explanation in humans in 
terms of function U. Even stronger claims for evolutionary explanations of human 
phenomena can be achieved for homologous traits, that is, ones which humans share 
with closely related species and which reflect lines of common descent. 
Furthennore, advocates of evolutionary approaches to human behaviour point to the 
unifoing power of the evolutionary research programme. If one kind of explanation 
can account for both human and non-human animal behaviour, then we should prefer 
this kind of explanation over separate explanatory accounts for humans and for other 
animals. Humans, it is argued, should be explicable ultimately in the same way as 
other animals. 
Critics of evolutionary explanations in psychology, however, have quest~oned the role 
that comparative studies play in the development of explanations of human mind and 
behaviour. These criticisms can be viewed as challenges to the explanatory breadth of 
the evolutionary programme, and to the validity of analogous reasoning in developing 
evolutionary accounts of human characteristics. These concerns, it is argued, are 
exacerbated by a pervasive and fallacious anthropomorphism which sees the 
misapplication of human concepts to animal behaviour. 
Challenges to the role of comparative psychology in the evolutionary programme 
The finnest footing for comparative accounts of different traits should be found in 
homology. If two closely related species have a given characteristic not possessed by 
more distantly related species then there is prima facie evidence of a common 
evolutionary origin, genetic basis, and probably, adaptive function. However, many 
critics of the evolutionary programme argue that even arguments for homologous 
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traits become mired in confounding factors when used to develop explanatory 
accounts of human phenomena. Lewontin (1990) argues that there is simply too much 
evolutionary distance between humans and our closest evolutionary relatives to make 
an investigation of homologous traits in any sense worthwhile. Furthermore, even 
though the genetic difference between humans and chimpanzees may be slight (they 
share about 98% of the same genetic material), mild quantitative changes may lead to 
large qualitative ones (Kennedy, 1992). Moreover, there are so few close relatives 
with which to compare humans (Lewontin, 1990). 
These factors lead to the possibility that similar traits expressed by both chimps and 
humans may not reflect common evolutionary origins, but may instead be merely 
analogous in nature, and underwritten by very different causal processes (Rose et al., 
1984; Sociobiology Study Group, 1978). 
Claimed external similarity between humans and our closest relatives (which 
are by no means very close to us) does not imply genetic continuity. A 
behaviour that may be genetically coded in a higher primate may be purely 
learned and widespread among human culture as a consequence of the 
enormous flexibility of our brain. (Sociobiology Study Group, 1978, p. 284) 
If arguments based on homologous traits are problematic then those based on purely 
analogous reasoning may be doubly so. The Sociobiology Study Group (1978) 
suggests that arguments from analogy are on shaky ground unless the similarity 
between humans and animals is so precise that identical function cannot be denied. 
Sober (1993a) makes an important distinction in this context betweenfunctional and 
accidental similarity. The wings of birds and bats, for example, are functionally 
similar; they have evolved for same, or similar reasons, whereas the green coloration 
of ferns and lizards is an accidental similarity; they are the products of different 
evolutionary processes. Because many human traits may be maintained via cultural 
transmission rather than natural selection, there could be a high degree of superficial 
or accidental similarity between the traits of humans and other animals which is not 
due, in the case of humans, to evolutionary processes. To say, for example, that 
slavery in ants is analogous to slavery in humans is to ignore the very different causal 
processes which have given rise to the phenomenon in the two different species. Ant 
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'slavery' is maintained by hard-wired processes based on olfaction and probably 
represents a specific adaptation, whereas human slavery is a consequence of certain 
social forces which are unlikely to have any obvious evolutionary history. This kind 
of criticism, taken to its logical extremes, suggests that there is a decisive and 
unbridgeable chasm between the worlds of humans and that of other animals. As Reed 
(1978, p. 37) suggests, "Although humans retain features in common with the 
animals, once they created their own social and cultural institutions, they made a 
drastic departure from the animal condition and became non-animal, or human." A 
rather more modest conclusion is that we need to pay more attention to the causal 
processes which are responsible for the character in question before evaluating the 
worth of specific comparative claims (Kitcher, 1985, 1990; Sober, 1993) 
The problem of identifying analogous and homologous traits between humans and 
other animals is further exacerbated, it is argued, by anthropomorphic thinking. It is 
claimed (e.g. Rose et al., 1984; Reed, 1978; Kitcher, 1985) that human concepts have 
been widely and fallaciously applied to other animals. Notions such as castes, slavery, 
polygyny, rape and so forth, it is asserted, are simply misapplied when used to 
describe the behaviour or social arrangements of other animals. Kitcher (1985, p. 184) 
suggests that "there may grow up a largely unexamined collection of unsubstantiated 
hypotheses latent in our linguistic usage, that allows us to pass freely from 
conclusions about non-human animals to conclusions about ourselves." This issue is 
not merely one of linguistic purity, argues Sober (1993b), but involves substantive 
claims about the way the world is. 
Sober (1993a, 1993b) is especially concerned here that species of behaviour are so 
broadly defined that they are stripped of their full, real world complexity. Human 
concepts are pared of their rich relationship to social worlds in a manner which 
renders them meaningless. 
Sex and food are categories of human endeavor. Both categories include some 
behaviours that are unique to human beings and others that we share with 
other species. Sociobiologists typically use broad definitions of behaviour, so 
that the behaviour defined is not uniquely human. Much of what we include 
under the heading of sex and food in common parlance is thereby pushed into 
166 
the shadows, as not part of the 'real' phenomenon at all. By broadening the 
definitions of the behaviours, we perhaps can obtain an explanandum that is 
tractable from an evolutionary point of view. The danger is that we may 
confuse this part with the whole from which it was extracted. There is much to 
food and sex that goes beyond the evolutionary explanation of why we eat and 
copulate. (Sober, 1993b, p. 203) 
The transfer of human concepts to animals is doubly dangerous. Not only do we 
jeopardise the richness of the human characteristic as Sober suggests, but we also risk 
mistakenly attributing to animals concepts which are not entirely applicable. The 
widespread use of anthropomorphic thinking is labeled a 'disease' by Kennedy 
(1992), who argues that this way of thinking is built into us: we are predisposed to see 
human characteristics in other animals. Our evaluation of camels as haughty and 
robins as cute, for example, reflects (as Lorenz has argued) innate biases in our way 
of processing information about faces. Camels' nostrils are placed slightly higher than 
their eyes mimicking a disdainful expression while robins display the short face and 
large head characteristic of youth in humans. These are qualities that we perceive in 
other animals which do not necessarily accurately reflect their true natures. 
To sum up these main ideas, criticisms of the use of comparative explanations in the 
evolutionary programme in psychology pivot on claims that (1) humans are simply 
too different from other animals to engender comparison (2) similar traits in humans 
and animals may reflect very different causal processes and (3) humans are prone to 
misapply human concepts to animals. 
A limited defense of comparative explanations 
The use of comparative analyses of animals' mind and behaviour plays an important 
role in developing evolutionary explanations in psychology. If it can be shown that 
such comparisons are invalid in general, then the explanatory power of the 
evolutionary research programme in psychology is considerably diminished. I will 
argue here, however, that the four uses to which comparative psychology is put can all 
be defended as valid in principle. The crucial point here is that we need to take a case 
by case approach to assessing the validity of comparative explanations (Kitcher, 1985; 
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Sober, 1993; Fisher, 1991). As long as we reject the idea that humans are so radically 
different from other animals in all respects, then we can retain the possibility that 
similar causal processes can be identified as being responsible for similar traits in 
humans and a wide variety of other species. 
The question of continuity between humans and other animals is one with a long and 
acrimonious history. Darwin insisted that humans have no special place in the grand 
scheme of things, and that there are rich and detailed connections between the 
attributes of humans and those of other animals. These details reflected a history of 
common descent as well as the operation of similar evolutionary processes. Charles 
Lyell, on the other hand, as we have seen, while accepting the fact of evolution could 
not see how the obvious differences between humans and other animals could be 
bridged. This dispute regarding the uniqueness of humans remains prevalent in 
contemporary discussions on the value of comparative psychology. That humans do 
have characteristics which are not shared by other animals is indisputable. However, 
this is true of any animal species at some level of analysis. As the title of a book by 
Robert Foley (1987) suggests, humans are just Another Unique Species. It is difficult 
to see how this fact by itself requires alternative kinds of explanations to be developed 
for human characteristics.! 
Anthropomorphism, as Fisher (1991) notes, is no obvious category error. It is not a 
logical fallacy to attribute human properties to other animals, or to assume that a 
single terms will encompass both the traits of humans and other animals. Indeed, the 
nature of evolutionary processes suggests that similarity in function due to similarity 
in causal process is a common feature of evolutionary history. Evolutionary 
processes, as Sterelny (1992) argues, are more robust than critics sometimes suggest. 
Many processes appear reliably across different species; convergent evolution is a 
relatively common phenomenon. Sterelny (1992, p. 100) suggests that this 
convergence should be just as apparent in behaviour as it is in form: "If similar 
evolutionary processes in similar environments can carve similar morphologies, the 
same must be true for behaviour". 
1 Although it may be said, plausibly enough, that some unique human characteristics such as language, 
social learning and culture have created phenomena which are effectively removed from the biological 
sphere. I consider this possibility in a discussion of the nature of culture below. 
168 
What is important to isolate here is proper function. In terms oHhe realist approach to 
science that I advocate in chapter one, functional categories can be viewed as real in 
the sense that they carve the world at its proper joints. The biological category 
'digestion', for example, carves the world at a functional joint. Despite the wide 
variety of organisms that can be said to engage in digestion, and various physiological 
ways of realizing this process, there is something real about the category 'digestion', 
and we can happily apply it to what goes on inside cows, humans, and venus fly-traps. 
What makes digestion a real, definable property of the world, is its biological 
function: the extraction of nutrients from the environments via external and internal 
processes of decomposition in order to obtain energy. There may well not be 
necessary and sufficient conditions for what is to count as digestion, but what is 
important in determining function is the selective forces in the environment acting 
upon the evolution of organismic systems. Function carves and is carved from the 
world. 
So what is important in our attribution of similarity is the causal process which has 
given rise to the trait in question. Are such attributions easy to make when it comes to 
behaviour, or do other processes obscure proper function so that comparative analyses 
are mired on a pervasive causal indeterminacy? To reiterate, this can only be decided 
on a case by case basis. The distinction between homology, functional analogy and 
accidental analogy, however, can be made. There is no logical problem here, although 
the distinctions may be methodologically difficult to isolate. An example will help to 
clarify here, just how we can go about making the distinction between superficial and 
functional similarity. 
In his book The Evolution of Desire, the evolutionary psychologist David Buss (1994) 
discusses the copulatory behaviour of the 'lovebug' Plecia neartica. Lovebugs remain 
in a copUlatory embrace for three days. This is a male strategy to assure female 
fidelity and to increase paternity certainty. While attached to the female the male is 
preventing the possibility that other males will mate with the female. Other strategies 
are employed by different insects for the same effect, such as the use of vaginal plugs, 
mate guarding, and sperm scrapers. These different strategies attempt to solve the 
adaptive problem, common to all males, of paternity uncertainty. Buss (1994) goes on 
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to say that this problem is solved in humans by the psychological mechanism of 
jealousy and the various behaviours that it motivates. 
Buss is clearly not making a case for homology here. What he seems to be doing is 
employing the comparison with lovebugs ~.s a heuristic device for bolstering claims 
about the evolutionary origins of jealousy in humans. The argument works like this: 
(1) There is a general problem, P, for males of all sexually reproducing species of 
retaining a mate and assuring paternity certainty. 
(2) This problem is solved in species X via the mechanisms Yand Z. 
(3) The mechanisms A and B in humans also seem to solve the general problem P. 
(4) If the mechanisms Y and Z in species X have an evolutionary explanation, then 
this adds plausibility to the claim that mechanisms A and B in humans also have 
an evolutionary explanation. 
The argument from analogy, therefore, is employed to elucidate the origins of quite 
different behaviour: the embrace of the lovebug and jealousy in humans. The 
argument hinges on functional rather than superficial similarity. As the focus of 
explanation becomes more similar, then stronger cases can be made for common 
evolutionary origins. For example, both male swallows (Moller, 1987) and human 
males (Flinn, 1988) engage in mate guarding. The males of both species spend more 
time with their mates when they are fertile than when they are not. Mate guarding, it 
is argued has evolved for similar reasons in both humans and swallows: it decreases 
the probability of extra-pair copulation and increases the paternity confidence of the 
male. Daly, \Vilson and Weghorst (1982) discuss a variety of tactics that are 
employed by human males in different cultures such as the foot-binding of Chinese 
women, incarceration, and infibulation. They argue that all these practices should be 
understood as confidence-of-paternity mechanisms. 
Can we really consider infibulation in humans to be analogous to the strategies of 
other animals, such as the use of vaginal plugs? It is easy to see that they both may be 
adaptive, but have they arisen due to the same causal processes? The answer to this 
question is probably no. Infibulation is almost certainly not an adaptation at all; it has 
not been selected for during the course: of our evolutionary history. Alternative 
explanations would suggest that infibulation is the product, partly if not primarily, of 
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certain cultural forces (e.g. Hicks, 1993). Tms issue touches on some core areas 9f 
concern regarding evolutionary explanations in psychology: how to identify 
adaptation, the role of competing explanations, and the appropriate level of analysis to 
employ. I shall confine myself here to a discussion of tms issue as it pertains to the 
problem of comparative analysis. 
Figure four outlines a variety of ways that males of different species attempt to solve 
the problem of paternity certainty. The diagram is incomplete, but I have sketched 
two main pathways in which increasing paternity certainty can be realised. One, 
through a variety of physical and physiological mechanisms and two, through a range 
of different behaviours. The possibility that humans and rats can adjust their levels 
and type of sperm depending on the likelihood of extra-pair copulation (Baker & 
Bellis, 1989, 1990) is prima jacie, a strong case for functional similarity. Although 
the physiological mechanisms underlying sperm competition in rats and humans may 
well be quite different, they both can be furnished with a similar evolutionary 
explanation: those rats or humans who increased the number of sperm in their 
ejaculate in response to cues which indicate a recent copulation by the female with 
another male would have increased the representation of their genes in the next 
generation. Male sexual jealousy and the mechanisms underlying mate guarding are 
also plausibly analogous in the strong sense that they both reflect the action of the 
same causal process: evolution by natural selection. Mate guarding itself in both 
humans and swallows is more weakly analogous. Although superficially similar and 
no doubt both adaptive, mate guarding in humans is unlikely to be an adaptation in its 
own right, but instead one possible manifestation of psychological jealousy. The 
causal mechanisms underlying mate guarding in swallows and humans therefore are 
more diffusely related. Once we consider the case of infibulation, the analogy with 
other species all but breaks down. Although the practice may in some sense be related 
to male sexual jealousy, any explanation of the nature of infibulation, its geograpmcal 
extent, its cultural significance and so forth, will need to draw heavily on the relevant 
cultural and historical forces. The causal histories of infibulation in humans and 
vaginal plugs used in many species of insects, reptiles and mammals, therefore, are 
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Figure four Comparative causal taxonomy of phenotypes relating to 
the problem of paternity c,ertainty 
Vaginal plugs 
(Rats, Bees etc.) 
Sperm removal 
Infibulation (Islamic Northeast 
African cultures) 
F ootbinding (some Chinese 
communities) 
Belief profile of community ____ 
----.. Beliefs, attitudes and desires of males 
regarding females. 
Threat of violence 
~I 
Sexual Jealousy (e.g., Humans) 
Mate guarding .------- __ ... I_ ... ~_ 
(e.g., Swallows, Elephant seals, 
Humans) 
Adjust number and type of sperm (Rats, Humans, 
etc.) 
Physiological mechanisms relating to 
sperm competition. 
Adaptive problem: Increasing paternity 
confidence. 
BehaviouraV Psychological mechanisms which 
function to decrease the level of extra-pair 
copulations. 
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likely to be distant enough, despite some superficial similarity, for the use of ' 
analogous reasoning to be unsound. 
The use of analogous reasoning, therefore, can be deemed sound in some cases but 
not others. Similarly, it seems reasonable to apply the same term for animal behaviour 
as for humans in some contexts but not in others. In our development of concepts and 
the way that they map onto the world, we are always going to create categories of 
entities which are similar but variable. By a careful use of phylogenetic and ecological 
information, however, we should be able to reasonably define and limit the extent of 
the categories that we employ and the terms that refer to them. Although there may be 
much more to the concept of eating for humans than for cows, and much more to 
olfaction in dogs than humans, the categories 'eating' and 'olfaction' are capable of 
embracing the actions of multiple species. 
Problems with cognitive explanations of animal behaviour 
Now that the emphasis in evolutionary explanations of human behaviour has shifted 
towards an understanding of psychological mechanisms, the importance of developing 
an understanding of animal minds has come to the fore. Long banished as a legitimate 
source of scientific inquiry, the minds of other animals has now become an area of 
heated discussion, research, and some controversy. Since Donald Griffin (1978, 1984) 
resurrected the comparative psychology of Romanes (1881) and others twenty years 
ago, there has been a burgeoning of research in a variety of areas relating to animal 
cognition, intentionally, and consciousness (e.g., Walker, 1983; Dennett, 1983; 
Burghardt, 1985; Ristau, 1991; Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Previde et al., 1992). Can 
such a comparative approach to mind, however, be sustained? What can we possibly 
know (if anything) about the minds of other animals? 
Critics of comparative explanations in evolutionary accounts of human behaviour 
argue that the problems of identifying analogy and homology and the general problem 
of taxonomy are especially acute in accounts of animal cognition (Lewontin, 1990). 
Moreover, it is argued (e.g., Kennedy, 1992) that humans are especially prone to over 
interpret animal behaviour as the consequence of complex mental processes when 
other explanations are more reasonable. Kennedy (1992) argues that comparative 
173 
psychologists from Romanes to Griffin have followed an inappropriate methodology 
of extrapolating from human mind to animal mind via their behaviour. Similar 
behaviours in other animals, it is argued, can be performed without complex 
cognition. " ... evidence that animals behave adaptably and adaptively is not evidence 
that they think consciously" (Kennedy, 1992, p.13). Kennedy (p. 31) advocates an . 
epistemically cautious attitude to the attribution of mental states to other animals. 
"Although we cannot be certain that no animals are conscious, we can say that it is 
most unlikely that any of them are." 
I certainly think there is a general problem here in determining the nature of 
psychological mechanisms in other animals, and over liberal interpretations of animal 
behaviour are easy to construct. However, as mentioned in the discussion of 
comparative explanations more generally, a case by case process needs to be adopted. 
Certainly we should not rule out, on any a priori basis, the possibility of mentalistic 
explanations of animal behaviour. Indeed, I believe we should adopt the same 
epistemic attitude towards our explanations of animal behaviour as we would any 
other phenomena. Given some pattern of behaviour in a given species, we should 
abductive1y generate a range of plausible explanations for that behaviour. At a distal 
level we may invoke evolutionary accounts of the survival and reproductive benefits 
of the behaviour concerned, while at a proximate level we should consider the kinds 
of mechanisms which might have evolved to realise these goals. In general there are 
three, not necessarily mutually exclusive, alternatives: 
(1) The physiological stance. The behaviour is due to purely physiological processes 
which have been wired to respond to a certain class of environmental 
contingencies. 
(2) The behavioural stance. The behaviour is a result of a history of learning and is 
explicable in terms of the processes of operant and respondent conditioning. 
(3) The intentional stance. The behaviour is explainable in terms of the cognitive 
processes which are operating in the mind of the animal. 
That we cannot observe mental processes should not be a barrier to their invocation in 
explaining certain patterns of behaviour. After all, many explanatory hypotheses in 
science draw on unobservable causal processes. We need to operate on a case by case 
basis and accept the best explanation for the pattern of behaviour to be explained. 
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There are certainly some good reasons to believe that animals do possess cognitive 
processes, and that an understanding of these processes is an important part of the 
evolutionary programme in psychology. Firstly, as Dupre (1996) notes, explanations 
of the behaviour of many animals under natural conditions are typically not best 
served by reference to purely behavioural or physiological processes. This is 
especially true once we consider the complex social behaviours exhibited by primates 
(e.g., deWaal, 1982, 1996; de Waal & Luttrell, 1987; Whiten & Byrne, 1988; Byrne, 
1995). Secondly, if we accept the evolutionary continuity between humans and other 
animals, then we should expect that other animals, especially primates, possess some 
of the properties found in the human mind (e.g. de Waal, 1991). This point is 
reinforced by considerable similarity at both the neural and behavioural level between 
humans and other primates (Crisp, 1996). 
Moreover, detailed studies of the minds of other primates, particularly chimpanzees, 
is likely to illuminate, contra Lewontin (1990), the evolutionary history of the human 
mind. Recent work by Povinelli and others (Povinelli, Nelson, & Boysen, 1990; 
Povinelli, 1993; Byrne, 1995) on the chimpanzee 'theory of mind', for example, 
suggests that chimpanzees share with humans some of the psychological mechanisms 
underlying the attribution of mental states to others. Although it is unclear that 
chimpanzees possess a full-blown theory of mind module (Povinelli & Preuss, 1995), 
a detailed account of what they are capable of provides a fruitful area for the 
elucidation of potential evolutionary pathways, and hence increases our understanding 
of this phenomenon in humans. Indeed the rudiments of an ability to attribute mental 
states to others may be seen in the putative ability of many species to be attentive to 
the gaze direction of other animals. For example, in a study on plovers, Ristau (1991) 
demonstrated that plovers were clearly sensitive to the gaze direction of a potential 
intruder and were more likely to perform distraction displays when this gaze was 
directed towards their nest. Attention to gaze direction emerges at an early stage in 
human development with infants sensitive to this dimension by six to twelve months 
(Butterworth, 1991 ). 
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Summary 
Criticisms of the role of comparative explanations in the evolutionary programme in 
psychology do not, I would argue, significantly diminish its overall explanatory 
coherence. The use of a.nalogical reasoning can be viewed as legitimate, although we 
must pay due attention to the relevant causal processes underling the traits to be 
compared. Furthermore, although humans posses some important attributes not found 
in other species, there is no reason to believe that humans, in general, are so radically 
different from other animals in all respects so as to warrant radically different kinds of 
explanations. Comparative psychology therefore, I believe, plays and will continue to 
play, an important role in the evolutionary programme in psychology. FurthelIDore, 
comparative approaches to mind are likely to prove as fruitful as those developed with 
reference to physiology or behaviour. In developing n coherent picture of the 
biological world, one which pays due attention to underlying and unobservable causal 
processes, and one which is consistent with evolutionary theory, we must draw on the 
full resources of the comparative approach. 
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Chapter seven 
The use of adaptation explanations in the evolutionary programme in 
psychology 
Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena draw heavily on the notion of 
adaptation. Sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists discuss the function of the 
traits they study in terms of the putative survival and reproductive benefits they would 
have conferred over the evolutionary course of the species in question. Male sexual 
jealousy, for example, is conceptualised as a psychological mechanism with the 
proper function of decreasing the likelihood of extra-pair copulations by a male's 
mate, therefore increasing paternity confidence in subsequent offspring (Wilson & 
Daly, 1992). Similarly, the cheater-detection mechanisms studied by Cosmides & 
Tooby (1989, 1992) have the function of maintaining symmetrical benefits in the 
context of social exchange. The psychological mechanisms underlying jealousy and 
social exchange are viewed as adaptations; they have evolved because they further the 
survival and reproductive goals of those who possess them relative to others, in 
appropriate environmental contexts. 
The use of adaptation explanations in psychology, however, has drawn a range of 
criticisms from a variety of sources. Many of the challenges to the use of adaptation 
explanations in psychology are based on more general criticisms of what is sometimes 
termed the adaptationist programme in evolutionary biology. In this chapter I consider 
the range of criticisms which have been directed at adaptation explanations in general 
before examining some of the specific criticisms which have been directed at the use 
of adaptation explanations in psychology. These criticisms can be conceptualised 
predominately as challenges to the overall explanatory breadth of the evolutionary 
programme. 
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Adaptation and natural selection 
At the heart of the theory of natural selection, the core of the evolutionary research 
programme, is the notion of adaptation. For evolution to occur, different traits of 
organisms must have different fitness values. These traits which confer fitness 
benefits to organisms are termed adaptations. Or, more precisely, adaptations are traits 
which have been selected for because of their role in furthering the survival and 
reproductive success of organisms that possess them, and hence in increasing the 
frequency of those traits in the population relative to other traits. 
Understanding the causal processes that have led to the evolution of particular 
adaptations provides an answer to the pervasive 'why questions' directed at biological 
entities. 1 Why do mammals have eyes? Why are flowers brightly coloured? Why do 
birds sing? Are all questions which demand an answer in terms of the selective 
pressures which have given rise to the trait in given environments. Mammals have 
eyes in order to see, brightly coloured flowers attract pollinators, and birds sing to 
attract mates and to define territories.2 These questions are all teleological in nature; 
they request an answer in terms of the function of the item in question. 
There is a crucial distinction to make here between something's function and 
accidental properties of the same item. The heart has the function of pumping blood, 
for that is the property of the organ by virtue of which it continues to be maintained in 
the popUlation of organisms with hearts. The fact that the heart also beats, is red, and 
so on, are accidental or non-functional properties of this organ. This etiological theory 
of function (Wright, 1973; Millikan, 1984, 1986, 1989, 1993) takes the distinction 
between accidental and causal properties of an item to be understood by reference to 
historical processes: the selective forces which have shaped and maintained some 
aspects of biological characters over others during the course of evolutionary history. 
Sober (1984, p. 100) makes an important distinction here between selectionfor, and 
selection of '" Selection of pertains to the effects of a selection process, whereas 
1 There are also of course 'how questions', in terms of the proximate physiological and psychological 
mechanisms underlying the trait in question. 
2 These answers here are all very vague, but as will become apparent, the answers to our 'why 
questions' can, and should be, as rigorously formulated as possible. 
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'selection for' describes its causes. " So the heart has been selected/or a blood pump, 
while there has been selection a/beating, redness, and so on. 
This etiological notion of function can be distinguished from accounts of function 
which focus on the dispositional properties of items. Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) 
articulate a theory somewhat along these lines. An item has the function it does when 
it confers a survival-enhancing propensity on an organism that possesses it. Their 
theory is forward looking in that even before an item is selected (by virtue of its 
function) that item can be said to have that function. On the other hand, a character 
which is no longer survival-enhancing, say the coat of a polar bear in a globally 
warmed future, will not be considered to have the function of keeping the animal 
warm anymore. 
The dispositional theory of function, however, fails to make the crucial distinction 
between current utility and evolutionary function. It is therefore unable to provide 
normative guidelines as to what is to count as abnormal or malfunctional. Moreover, 
it fails to adequately address the why questions that we want to ask of biological 
entities by ignoring the historical processes which have given rise to the traits in 
question. 
History is important because function can only be forged in the crucible of selection. 
Using the terminology developed by Millikan (1984, 1987, 1989, 1993), an item has 
the proper function it does by virtue of its natural selection over other items, due to 
the functions it has Normally performed during the course of evolution, which have 
contributed to the survival of the organism, and hence the differential reproduction of 
those genes (in part) responsible for that item. "Normal" is understood by Millikan 
not in the sense of average or even statistically likely, but more in relation to ideal or 
optimal conditions: ones that have at some time in the organism's past contributed 
significantly to the selection of the character due to its functioning in those conditions. 
An item may not, indeed need not, fulfil its function all the time for it to attributed 
with that function. Many biological traits will be of this nature. The proper function of 
the croak of a male frog, for example, is to attract female frogs in order for 
reproduction to occur. However, the average or indeed normal (not Normal) male call 
probably does not achieve this effect. There may be no females in the vicinity for 
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example, or there may be females about but they mate with caller's neighbor, or the 
caller (or his potential mate) is eaten before the call achieves its proper function. 
The idea of Normal conditions highlights the important role of the environment in 
elucidating adaptations. A trait is only adaptive in the context of the appropriate 
environment. Therefore, a full understanding of the function of any item can only be 
achieved by an analysis of the ecological conditions in which the item in question is 
embedded, during the process whereby the trait has been, and continues to be, 
selected for. There is a mesh here between the nature of the trait and the environment 
of which it is a part. Function is, therefore, necessarily an environment relative 
concept. 
Challenges to adaptationism 
The etiological account of function detailed above and its relation to the concept of 
adaptation and the theory of natural selection, could be considered the received view 
in evolutionary biology (Brandon, 1990). However, in recent times there has been 
much debate over the power of natural selection and hence the relative importance of 
adaptive reasoning in explaining the morphological, behavioural, and psychological 
characteristics of organisms. The hegemony of adaptive explanations in evolutionary 
biology has been challenged in a series of papers by Stephen Jay Gould, Richard 
Lewontin, and colleagues (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Lewontin, 1978; Gould & Vrba, 
1982; Gould, 1980a, 1980b, 1991a, 1991b, Eldredge, 1995). 
The critique of what Gould and Lewontin (1979) term the adaptationist programme or 
'Panglossian paradigm' pivots on what is perceived as an inappropriate and over 
extensive use of adaptationist reasoning in explaining the origin of biological 
characters. Evolutionary biologists in general and sociobiologists in particular, it is 
argued, are prone to constructing 'just so' stories of organismic traits which trade on a 
naIve plausibility based on the misguided notion of the omnipotence of natural 
selection (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Lewontin, 1979; Gould, 1989; Caplan, 1989). 
Furthermore, these just so stories, it is claimed, are unfalsifiable and produced ad hoc 
to explain biological phenomena. For if one 'just so' story fails, it is the strategy of 
the adaptationist to simply fashion another one, until ultimately, in this procrustean 
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fashion the explanation fits. Gererally speaking, it is argued, there simply will not be 
adaptive explanations for many organismic traits; not all structures have a why, many 
only have a how. 
The critique presented by Gould and Lewontin (1979) comes in four interrelated 
parts. Firstly, adaptationists inappropriately atomize the traits of organisms into 
discrete parts. Secondly, adaptationists assume a kind of Panglossian optimality with 
respects to the traits of organisms. Thirdly, adaptationists ignore other evolutionary 
forces in their explanations of biological phenomena. And lastly, adaptationists 
confuse current utility for historical origiu in their attributions of function. Before I 
examine these criticisms in more detail, it is important at this point to distinguish the 
content from the rhetoric of this challenge to adaptationism (see Dennett, 1995, for a 
further elaboration of this point). At times it appears as though Gould and Lewontin 
want to forsake adaptation explanations entirely, in favour of other evolutionary 
forces. This is not the case. Their critique is a challenge to the power of natural 
selection and to the methodology employed by adaptationists. As such, they do not 
propose an alternative to natural selection as the core of the evolutionary research 
programme, but instead, provide some plausible ways of augmenting that core with 
auxiliary theories and alternative methodologies. 
Adaptationists, so Gould and Lewontin (1979) argue, have the tendency to atomize 
organisms into discrete traits. However, no biological item exists in isolation; it is 
necessarily part of a larger system. Breaking an organism up into discrete parts and 
telling a selective story about each of these traits is ignoring this fact. The human chin 
for example, is not a thing (let alone a thing with a function), but just the by-product 
of an interaction between two growth fields. Just as the spandrels of st. Marks 
cathedral are necessary architectural by-products of mounting a dome on rounded 
arches, so to will there be many spandrels to be found among biological items, which 
are by-products of more specific biological design (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). This 
problem of demarcating adaptations from by products of adaptations is, as we shall 
see, especially acute in evolutionary explanations in psychology, and is part of a more 
general problem of identifying the natural 'suture lines' of organisms (Lewontin, 
1979), especially organisms with any degree of phenotypic plasticity. Out of the 
myriad of phenotypic expressions of any organism, which traits can we point to and 
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say that they have a proper function and a selective history, and which traits are mere 
effects of adaptive design? 
I shall examine the important problem of identifying adaptations in more detail below, 
but it is worth noting now that even by-products have, as it were, adaptive 
explanations. That is, the nature of the by-product itself can be explicated by 
reference to the appropriate adaptations. Consider the extraordinarily maladaptive 
behaviour of 'flame-seeking' among moths. Our (just about) mythical arch 
sociobiologist may attempt some kind of 'just so' story to explain this behaviour, 
perhaps in terms of helping to incubate eggs, sexual titillation, or the luring of rival 
moths to a fiery evolutionary dead-end. But this kind of explanation is clearly neither 
necessary nor helpful. In a world before naked flames were common, small bright 
sources of light would have represented escape holes from hollow logs or caves, or 
celestial bodies at optical infinity (Dawkins, 1982). This suggests several plausible 
adaptive explanations for the light-seeking behaviour of moths: escape, navigation, or 
perhaps both. Flame-seeking behaviour therefore has no function, but itself can be 
explained by reference to behaviour that does. The problem of carving the natural 
world at its functional joints is then, I would argue, predominately a problem of 
specificity: that is, identifying the level at which the character in question has been 
selected. 
The second major line of criticism directed at the adaptationist programme by Gould 
and Lewontin (1979) is their charge of Panglossian reasoning in explicating the 
character of biological traits. According to the Panglossian paradigm this must be the 
best of all possible worlds; organisms are manifestations of this optimism and are 
literally optimal. Or as Gould (1991 d, p. 60) expresses it: Panglossianism is "the 
notion that everything must fit, must have a purpose, and in the strongest version, 
must be for the best". A major theme of much of Gould's writing (e.g., Gould, 1989b, 
1991) is the role of historical contingencies on the current character of living 
organisms. "Pathways of history ... impose such jury-rigged solutions upon all 
creatures. History inheres in the imperfections of living organisms ... " (Gould, 1991d, 
p. 61). Mother nature, as Jacob (1977) aptly expresses it is a tinkerer not a designer. 
All organisms are the cobbled together products of many millions of years of 
contingent evolution. As a consequence, the design of many organisms are sub-
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optimal, certainly in terms of what a mythical creator might have been able to conjure 
up given enough time; materials, and foresight. These 'senseless signs of history' 
(Gould, 1980) are everywhere. The upside-down vertebrate retina, the crossover of 
the digestive and respiratory system in the mammalian throat, and the circumlocutory 
route of the human male urinogenital tract are all sub-optimal legacies of the 
evolutionary process (Williams, 1992). Gould's (l980a) favourite example is the 
evolution of the panda's 'thumb'. As members of the order carnivora, the panda's 
fingers had evolved from ancestors who used them for running and scratching, not 
grasping and manipUlating. The switch from a carnivore's to a vegetarian's diet and 
the subsequent need to manipulate food items resulted in the evolution of a grasping 
digit actually constructed from the radial sesamoid bone, part of the panda's wrist. 
Other kinds of constraints on optimality include developmental constraints, available 
genetic variation, and time lags in tracing environmental change (Dawkins, 1982). 
Developmental constraints as Maynard-Smith, Burian, Kauffman, Alberch, Campbell, 
Goodwin, Lande, Raup, and Wolpert (1985, p. 266) define them are biases" on the 
production of variant phenotypes caused by the structure, character, composition, or 
dynamics of the developmental system." Allometry, for example, is an especially 
relevant kind of developmental constraint. Allometry refers to a yoked correlation in 
the character of two variables (Williams, 1992). Parts of organism which may seem to 
serve no purpose may actually be the consequence of modifications in correlated 
parts. Panda's for example, as well as having a thumb constructed from an enlarged 
radial sesamoid bone also have an enlargement to the tibia sesamoid bone in the foot. 
This enlargement serves no proper function and is just the consequence of 
enlargement to the wrist bone with which it is developmentally yoked (Gould, 1980a). 
A lack of optimal fit between an organism and the environment may also be the result 
of time lags. Evolution is often too slow to track rapid environmental change 
(Dawkins, 1982). The kakapo for example, a three kilogram flightless New Zealand 
parrot with low breeding rates, may not be adaptive in a post-human environment 
which includes stoats, rats, and dogs, but in a predator-free environment 
flightlessness, gigantism, and low-fecundity will not be sub-optimal. The importance 
of teasing apart current environments from those which organisms have evolved in is 
particularly crucial in isolating adaptive mechanisms in humans. This is especially 
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relevant since humans have, in some respects, radically altered their environments 
over the last ten thousand years or so. In general the problem of time lags emphasises 
the role that Nonnal conditions play in identifying the proper function of biological 
traits. 
The presence of constraints on perfection should serve as an important reminder of 
the role of historical and developmental factors on the evolution of organismic traits. 
The presence of such constraints, however, does not by itself, invalidate the central 
features of the adaptationist programme (although it may serve to eliminate more 
extreme versions). Sewall-Wright's metaphor of the adaptive landscape is useful for 
understanding the relevance of this point. If we conceive of design space as a three 
dimensional topographical map with hills and mountains representing adaptive peaks, 
then we see that selection can not redesign; it can not cross the less adaptive valleys 3 , 
it can only push parameter values towards local optima. These peaks in the mountain 
range may not represent the best solution to adaptive problems, but the are the best 
available to the organism given its particular evolutionary trajectory. 
Like a river, natural selection blindly meliorizes its way down successive lines 
of immediately available least resistance. The animal that results is not the 
most perfect design conceivable, nor is it merely good enough to scrape by. It 
is the product of a historical sequence of changes, each one of which 
represented, at best, the better of the alternatives that happened to be around at 
the time. (Dawkins, 1982, p. 46). 
The third line of criticism against adaptationism provided by Gould and Lewontin 
(1979) concerns the role that other forces apart from natural selection have to play in 
the explanation of biological phenomena. Not all biological items will have proper 
functions, because forces other than natural selection are causally responsible for their 
existence. Other agents of evolutionary change include pleitropy, genetic drift, 
chance, and phyletic and ontogenetic constraints. 
3 Although this will generally be the case, if selection pressures are sufficiently relaxed, mountain 
peaks can be descended, valleys crossed, and higher peaks scaled (Dawkins, 1996). 
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Genetic drift is a stochastic process which occurs in small isolated populations where 
the frequency of alleles may be fixed by random factors rather than by selective 
forces. The role of genetic drift in the production of biological characters is a matter 
of some controversy. However, both Dawkins (1982) and Williams (1992) argue that 
it is unlikely that drift plays a large role in the fixation of maladaptive traits. Pleitropic 
effects occur when a gene is causally responsible for the production of more that one 
trait. One of these traits may be adaptive while the other is maladaptive. I think it 
would certainly be a mistake to call the maladaptive trait an adaptation, although as in 
the moth example outlined earlier, it may ultimately be explained by reference to an 
adaptation: the functional trait whereby it gains its foothold in the organism. 
One important developmental constraint, mentioned earlier, is allometry, which may 
also be causally responsible for character traits which have no manifest function. 
According to Gould (1991a), the extremely large egg of the kiwi relative to body 
size4is a classic example of a trait whose origin lies in allometric scaling rather than 
simple adaptation to ecological circumstances. In asking the question why do kiwis 
have such large eggs, Gould suggest that we should go beyond answers which rest 
with what the egg is good for and address the historical origin of large eggs in kiwis. 
It is likely that kiwis evolved from much larger ancestors. As body size reduces so too 
does egg size, but not to the same extent. The large size of the kiwi's egg, therefore, is 
simply a consequence of dwarfing coupled with normal allometric scaling of egg to 
body size. This example provides useful lessons in the importance of establishing the 
historical origin of current traits. However, it fails to invalidate the role of adaptive 
explanations in general and more specifically in this example. Whatever the 
evolutionary origin of a given trait is, it should still count as an adaptation as long as 
it is maintained by natural selection. Kiwis may have large eggs relative to their body 
size because their ancestors were considerably larger and their subsequent dwarfing 
resulted in a relatively lower decrease in egg size as expressed through allometric 
scaling principles. However, the maintenance of this trait in the popUlation is likely to 
due to the fact that larger eggs produce more precocial chicks which can survive for 
longer periods without food early in life. As well as being the largest egg relative to 
body size, the kiwi's egg is also the most nutritious, with a higher percentage of yolk 
4 Kiwis' eggs range up to 25 % of the female body weight at 400-435 grams. For a bird the size of a 
kiwi one would expect an egg size of 55-100 grams. 
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than any other egg. The absence of predators in the New Zealand environment 
allowed this development to take place by not handicapping the egg bound female 
relative to those birds who tended to lay smaller eggs. Whether or not the 
consequence of allometric scaling is likely to be adaptive should be taken on a case by 
case basis. The enlarged tibia sesamoid bone of the panda, for example, is likely to a 
truly non-functional part of that organism's phenotype, 
This case by case approach should also be adopted when assessing the causal role of 
developmental constraints more generally. This is nicely illustrated in another of 
Gould's (l99lb) essays 'male nipples and clitoral ripples'. Gould argues that an 
explanation of male nipples and female orgasms is most appropriately sought from an 
understanding of growth and development rather than an application of adaptation by 
natural selection. Male nipples certainly seem to have no function and even the most 
imaginative of pop-sociobiologists in unlikely to produce even a vaguely plausible 
'just so' story for their possible adaptive role. 
Male mammals have nipples because females need them - and the embryonic 
pathways to their development builds precursors in all mammalian foetuses, 
enlarging the breasts later in females but leaving them small (and without 
evident function) in males. (Gould, 1991b p. 127). 
Gould (1991b, p. 129) adopts a similar position on the putative function of the female 
orgasm: " The reason for a clitoral site of orgasm is simple - and exactly comparable 
with the non-puzzle of male nipples." However, I think in this case Gould's 
imagination has failed him. There are some good reasons to believe that female 
orgasms do have an evolutionary function. For a start, the sensitivity of the clitoris is 
three times greater than that of the homologous penis: a difference which is unlikely 
given a non-functional hypothesis. Moreover, the cervical contractions produced 
during orgasm provide a means to rapidly up suck male sperm deposits and speed their 
way to the female ova. Baker and Bellis (1995) in their book Human Sperm 
Competition have· argued that the timing and frequency of the female orgasm is a 
means of manipulating the likelihood of conception with any given partner. Orgasm 
functions therefore as a kind of internal means of sperm screening. Whether or not 
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this explanation is true remains an open question, but one which is surely worth 
pursuing in more detail. 
Structural constraints on organisms' phenotypes caused by phylogenetic inertia and 
non-functional legacies of past evolution are also likely to produce character traits 
which are non-adaptive. Vestiges of course are the classic example, and most animals 
will carry around atrophied and non-functional products of past evolutionary 
processes. The general role of history in explaining character traits lies behind 
Gould's insistence in distinguishing between current utility and historical origin. 
Indeed, Gould and Vrba (1982) have proposed a change in terminology to 
characterise this distinction. 
Gould and Vrba (1982, p. 6) make what they see as a crucial distinction between 
adaptations and what they term exaptations. 
An adaptation is any feature that promotes fitness and was built by selection 
for its current role. Characters evolved for other usages (or for no function at 
all) and later co-opted for their current role are exaptations. 
Only adaptations have functions, exaptations merely have effects. The evolution of 
wings and feathers in birds is used as an example in distinguishing adaptation from 
exaptation. Feathers originally evolved as thermoregulatory devices, but were later 
(with suitable modification) co-opted for flight, whereas wings' original function was 
for insect catching, and more latterly for powered flight (see Ostrom, 1974). 
Thermoregulation then is the function of feathers, while catching insects or flight are 
the mere effects of this prior function; they are exaptations. As feathers were co-opted 
for the new purpose of flight, modifications arose in the structure of feathers, the 
wings, and (presumably) the neuro-cognitive mechanism underlying flight behaviour. 
These modifications Gould and Vrba (1982) term secondary adaptations. Any 
complex character, it is suggested, is going to be a (in principle distinguishable) 
mixture of adaptations, secondary adaptations, and exaptations. 
The distinction that Gould and Vrba (1982) make between exaptation and adaptation 
is problematic. Is it really meaningful to talk about feathers as exaptations for flight, 
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if they have been independently maintained by selection for this function? In the case 
of feathers, there has been selection for a modification of structure, so that feathers 
function within the context of flight. Given that all biological items have some past 
proto-items as their base, how far should we take the item back to uncover its real 
function; what should count as the primary adaptation? I agree with Gould here that it 
is important to demarcate the current use of an item form its historical origin and 
proper function, but I would argue that this falls naturally from the etiological account 
of function outlined earlier. As Griffiths (l992a) points out, the notion of vestige is 
important here. If a trait no longer serves a function, then typically it will begin to 
atrophy. The rapid loss of sight and pigmentation among cave dwelling animals is a 
good example of this. Vestiges may, however, be maintained by natural selection for 
their role in organising embryological development (Griffiths, 1992a). 
It is certainly important to demarcate the current use of an item from its historical 
origin and proper function. We need to be able to distinguish the evolved function of a 
trait from selectively irrelevant by-products, or spandrels. However, I would argue 
that this distinction falls naturally from the etiological account of function outlined 
earlier without recourse to additional terminology. Some trait will have a function, 
that is, be an adaptation, if it was originally selected for that function or it is 
maintained by selection for that function regardless of its evolutionary origin 
(Griffiths, 1992a; Brandon, 1990). Traits which are currently useful or used for novel 
purposes, but have neither been selected for nor maintained by natural selection, will 
properly be considered as by-products, or effects of selection processes. 
A general defense of adaptationism 
Clearly evolutionary biology could not proceed without some reference to function or 
adaptation without a radical change to the hard core of the evolutionary programme 
itself. As is suggested earlier, Gould, Lewontin, and colleagues, despite the hype 
surrounding their critique of adaptationism, do not dispute the truth of natural 
selection; they only question its relative importance in explaining biological 
phenomena. 
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A pragmatic defense of adaptationism is provided by Mayr (1983), Dennett (1983), 
and Dawkins (1982). These authors argue that although not all traits will be 
adaptations this should be the first line of explanation for any complex biological 
character. 
" [The evolutionist] must first attempt to explain biological phenomena and 
processes as the product of natural selection. Only after all attempts to do so 
have failed, is he justified in designating the unexplained residue tentatively as 
a product of chance. (Mayr, 1983, p. 326.) 
As Dawkins (1982) notes, adaptationism as a working hypothesis has led to some 
outstanding discoveries. Von Frisch's path-braking work on colour vision in fish and 
bees, for example, proceeded on the basis that colours in fish and bees must be for 
something (other than the delectation of human senses). Ultimately, as Sober (1984, 
1993) emphasises, it is an empirical question (although not always one settled by the 
'facts'),whether or not a given character is the product of natural selection or is only a 
by-product of that process, or has arisen by chance. 
Assuming that many but not all traits will be adaptations, and that current function is 
often a poor indicator of proper function, how then can we go about deciding where 
function exists? Out of the myriad of potential phenotype expressions of any organism 
(especially those which are relatively plastic) how are we to decide which are real, 
functional, adaptive properties of the organism, and those which are so much noise; 
spandrels, not amenable to functional explanations?5 
Clear SIgnS of a selectionist ongm include complexity of design, with 
'heterogeneous structure' producing a 'unity of function' that can be 'stated 
independently and more economically than description of the structure' and 
that is 'special because it specifically benefits the organism that has it' 
(Millikan, 1993, p. 4.) 
The eye, for example, is clearly an adaptation for sight. The eye's complexity 
precludes the possibility that all the elements which go in to producing integrated 
5 Although, as I argue above, some spandrels although not adaptations themselves can be furnished 
with satisfactory causal explanations by reference to adaptations. 
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function occurred by chance factors alone. Although the physical details of eyes vary 
considerably between different species (It is estimated that the eye has evolved 
independently over forty times [Dawkins, 1996]), the function of eyes remains 
invariant. Eyes benefit the organisms that possess them by providing them with rich 
and detailed infonnation about the world. 
A related approach to identifying adaptations is the comparative method. Convergent 
evolution is a familiar phenomenon to evolutionary biologists and strongly suggests, 
in the absence of unifonn phyletic constraints, that the trait converged upon has some 
adaptive explanation (Harvey & Pagel, 1991). For example, one unusual characteristic 
of the New Zealand flora is the high number of divaricating plants that it contains. 
Divaricating plants are" small-leaved shrubs or tree juveniles which characteristically 
have a wide branching angle, as a result of which the branches fonn an interlaced, 
three-dimensional structure with a relatively leafless exterior" (McGlone & Webb, 
1981, p. 20). New Zealand has fifty-four species of divaricating plants which belong 
to twenty genera, representing seventeen families - some ten per cent of the entire 
woody flora. In addition a number of trees go through a juvenile divaricating stage 
before reaching maturity (Greenwood & Atkinson, 1977). Because of the high 
proportion of divaricating plants, their representation across different species, and 
their rarity outside of New Zealand, it is assumed that there must be some kind of 
adaptive explanation. "Any hypothesis as to the origin and evolution of divaricating 
plants must therefore explain the adaptive significance of their structure and show 
why this life fonn is rare in other parts of the world." (McGlone & Webb, 1981 p. 20) 
Deciding that something has a function (i.e., selective history), however, is but the 
first step in uncovering what that function might be. Two main hypotheses have been 
put forward to account for the proliferation of divaricating plants in the New Zealand 
flora. McGlone and Webb (1981) argue that divarication is a climatic adaptation, 
which arose during tree-less periods of glaciation in the Pleistocene, to protect 
growing points and leaves from wind abrasion, desiccation, and frost damage. The 
alternative explanation, championed by Greenwood and Atkinson (1977), is that 
divarication arose as an adaptation in response to browsing by moas (a guild of now 
extinct New Zealand birds). It is not my place to make a decision in this debate (the 
evidence for the two hypotheses seems fairly evenly balanced), but to note that often 
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it is clear that something is an adaptation, without necessarily knowing what that 
something is an adaptation for. 
Many putative adaptation explanations are of the kind outlined above: they strongly 
suggest some proper function for the item in question without unequivocally 
delineating what that function is. Typically speaking, too many pieces of the 
explanation are missing to make any definite decision on what the function of the item 
in question is. Brandon (1990, p. 163) argues that there are five components to an 
ideally complete adaptive explanation: 
(1) Evidence that selection has occurred. 
(2) An ecological explanation of the fact that some types are better adapted 
that others. 
(3) Evidence that the trait in question is heritable. 
( 4) Information about the structure of the popUlation from a genetic and 
selectionist perspective. 
(5) Phylogenetic information concerning primitive and derived characteristics. 
Almost no current adaptive explanation will fill all of these criteria to everyone's 
satisfaction. However, explanations that fall short of the ideal, are not therefore 
epistemically worthless. Incomplete explanations provide us with an increase in 
understanding of the trait in question and serve to stimulate inquiry so as to fill in the 
explanatory omissions. A further distinction is made by Brandon (1990) between how 
possibly and how actually explanations of biological phenomena. Most adaptation 
explanations trade on their plausibility; they are how possibly explanations. But such 
explanations have a cognitive value that is independent of whether or not they reflect 
the way the trait actually evolved. 
This point I think goes some of the way in rebutting the charge of adaptationist story 
telling. Adaptive claims are certainly not falsifiable in rigid Popperian terms, but 
many theories in science, and particularly theories in the life-sciences, are going to be 
of this nature. It is certainly not true that modifications to adaptive claims are just so 
much ad hoc story telling. After all, the story is not arbitrarily chosen, and it is 
independently testable. The strategy of trying another hypothesis after the first has 
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failed (as Mayr, 1983 notes) is a usual methodological practice in all branches of 
science. 
A more general point here is that we should be looking for the best explanation 
(Harman, 1964; Thagard, 1992) for any given phenomenon. Our initial strategy when 
confronted with a biological trait to be explained is to abductively generate a range of 
plausible6 explanations, of which adaptive explanations will figure prominently but 
not exclusively. As we generate more information regarding the phenomenon in 
question, we can evaluate our alternative explanations in terms of their overall 
explanatory coherence (Thagard, 1992). As I have emphasised in the first chapter of 
this thesis, our most explanatory coherent explanations may well not be true (indeed 
they will surely be false in some respects), but it will be epistemically rational to 
retain this explanation until a better one is proffered. An active search for alternatives 
(in the manner of Gould, Lewontin, and others) is surely an important part of this 
process, but we should not reject plausible accounts of biological phenomena unless 
we have alternatives which are more explanatorily coherent. 
I have examined the concept of function and the role of adaptive explanations in some 
detail here because these issues are particularly relevant to an evaluation of 
evolutionary explanations in psychology. At the heart of many critiques of the 
evolutionary programme in psychology are challenges to the use of adaptationist 
reasoning in explaining psychological phenomena: In particular, it is argued that 
many of the manifestly observable characteristics of humans are non-functional and 
therefore defy an evolutionary analysis. 
The use of adaptation explanations in the evolutionary programme in 
psychology 
Adaptation explanations are used widely in evolutionary biology to explain the 
characteristics of many animal species. The use of such explanations in the context of 
human psychology, however, has drawn a variety of criticisms. The criticisms of 
6 Plausibility here can be thought of in terms of generalisations that we believe to be true, such as 
natural selection itself and the relevant auxiliary theories of the evolutionary programme. 
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adaptation explanations in the evolutionary programme in psychology comes in three 
broad categories: 
(1) Methodological. It is argued that there is widespread and inappropriate invocation 
of adaptation on the basis of scant evidence. Moreover, adaptation explanations in 
human psychology are constructed ad hoc, and are unfalsifiable in nature. 
(2) Taxonomic. The taxonomic criticism suggests that the traits which are invoked as 
adaptations are at the wrong level of analysis. That is, there is an arbitrary 
partitioning of the phenotype which does not reflect evolutionary design. 
(3) Alternative explanations. Many, if not most, of the interesting phenomena that 
psychologists study, it is argued, will not have adaptation explanations as they are 
the consequence of other causal factors such as learning and culture, or are merely 
the by-products of a cognitive system which has evolved for other reasons. 
In general these criticisms can be seen as challenges to the methodological adequacy 
and explanatory breadth of the evolutionary programme in psychology. If it can be 
demonstrated that it is methodologically implausible to use adaptation reasoning in 
psychology and/or that much of what psychology studies (and should study) bears no 
relation to biological adaptations, then the scope of the evolutionary programme will 
be radically attenuated: evolutionary explanations will get no explanatory purchase on 
psychological phenomena, and other types of explanations will be favoured. In this 
section I will discuss these three general kinds of criticism in tum, and clarify what I 
take to be the role that adaptation explanations have to play in psychology. It will be 
argued that adaptation explanations in psychology can be (but not always are) 
methodologically acceptable, and that while falling short of explanatory omnipotence, 
adaptation explanations provide us with an increased understanding of a wider range 
of psychological phenomena than some critics allow. 
Methodological problems 
Adaptation explanations in psychology and the social sciences have been charged 
with a pervasive panglossianism (e.g., Gould, 1989a; Sociobiology Study Group, 
1978; Lewontin, 1979; Rose et aI., 1984; Kitcher, 1985; Flanagan, 1991). It is 
suggested that sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists attempt to explain every 
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aspect of the human phenotype as being evolutionarily advantageous. For example, 
Flanagan (1991, p. 278) criticizes Wilson for trying to find an adaptive advantage in 
all human characteristics. "In both Sociobiology: The New Synthesis and On Human 
Nature Wilson tells one Panglossian story after another. For instance, he cites the 
religiously sanctioned cannibalism of the Aztecs as a cultural response to the 
genetically programmed need for protein". Similarly Rose et al. (1984) argue that 
there· is a fallacious conflation of what is possible with what is optimal, and that 
"Sociobiology is Pangloss made scientific through the agency of Charles Darwin". 
There are two general points of contention here. One, that not all human 
characteristics are the product of natural selection. And two, that evolutionary 
orientated scientists engage in facile storytelling rather than constructing detailed 
arguments. The first point stresses that we should not expect that behaviour and 
morphology to be the inevitable result of natural selection and that there are other 
potential causal factors in operation (Gould, 1989a, Gould & Lewontin, 1979, 
Lewontin, 1979). The second point claims that sociobiologists are spinners of 
unfalsifiable "just so" stories, with "Virtuosity in invention replacing testability as the 
criterion for acceptance" (Gould, 1989a, p. 530). The approach adopted in developing 
evolutionary explanations of human characteristics is described as "imaginative 
reconstruction" (Lewontin, 1979), with the simple invention of reasons why some 
traits may have selective advantages. As the Sociobiology Study Group (1978, p. 28) 
bemoan: "The trouble with the whole system is that nothing is explained because 
everything is explained. If individuals are selfish, that is explained by simple 
individual selection. If on the contrary they are altruistic, it is kin selection or 
reciprocal altruism". Rose et al. (1984) make a similar point in claiming that the 
combination of direct selection, kin and reciprocal altruism provides unlimited 
explanatory resources which are "insulated from any possibility of being contradicted 
by fact" (p. 261). Indeed it is argued that sociobiology is so methodologically defunct 
that "it does not have a claim to be a serious form of scientific investigation" 
(Lewontin, 1979, p. 6). 
At the heart of these criticisms are disputes about the standards of evidence which are 
deemed acceptable by evolutionary scientists. Kitcher (1985) urges for greater rigour 
in the identification and analysis of adaptations in human psychology. "Conclusions 
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about adaptation" Kitcher (1985, p. 177) quips" are not to be established by free 
association". Lewontin (1979, 1990) makes a similar point in highlighting the extreme 
epistemic problems in reconstructing the origins of past adaptations. What is required 
to demonstrate proper function, Lewontin argues, is not that some trait might have 
been favoured by natural selection but that it was favoured. To this end we need 
details about the genetic basis of the trait, the genetic variation for the trait in the 
population, and evidence that the trait in question has contributed to the past 
reproductive success of those who possess it. These problems, Lewontin (1990) 
argues, are especially acute in evolutionary explanations of human psychological 
characteristics. Firstly, because the genetic evidence required is unlikely to be 
forthcoming, and secondly, because the reconstruction of the psychological profiles of 
our ancestors is likely to prove impossible. Lewontin (1990, p. 229) concludes: "We 
know essentially nothing about the evolution of our cognitive capabilities and there is 
a strong possibility that we will never know anything about it" 
In summary, the methodological criticism of the evolutionary programme in 
psychology claims that adaptation explanations in psychology are subject to a 
fallacious Panglossianism, are unsupported and insupportable by the evidence, and are 
unfalsifiable in nature. I think it is important to disentangle two different 
interpretations of these criticisms which are sometimes run together. The first 
interpretation suggests that evolutionary explanations of human psychological 
phenomena are necessarily invalid because they are impossible to either adequately 
verify or falsify. The second interpretation is a claim about the actual practices of 
sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists who are charged with typically 
constructing evolutionary stories on the basis of limited or non-existent evidence. 
I certainly think there is something to the second claim here, and that adaptation 
explanations need to be more rigorous at times. Indeed there has been a tendency in 
early evolutionary accounts of human behaviour to commit many of the errors 
outlined above. However, the claim that the evolutionary programme in psychology is 
bankrupt due to inherent methodological problems is unwarranted and cannot be 
sustained. As I have elaborated earlier, there are many reasons to believe that not all 
aspects of all phenotypes are likely to be adaptations, let alone the consequence of 
optimal design. Changes in the environment, developmental and phylogenetic 
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constraints, trade-offs, conflicts of interest, and so forth will all lead to organisms 
which are not the gleaming product of designed foresight. Moreover, the operation of 
other evolutionary forces and the subsidiary effects of adaptations will mean that not 
all morphology can be given clear-cut adaptive explanations. A large part of the 
problem here is taxonomic in nature. As discussed in chapter three, and elaborated 
upon below, the level at which the adaptation is identified is important. Given the 
flexibility of human behaviour and the plurality of environments that humans inhabit, 
items of behaviour are unlikely to be good candidates for adaptations, although they 
may be explained by them. Ritualised cannibalism by Aztecs is unlikely to be an 
adaptation, therefore, however adaptive the practice might be (to some parts of the 
society at least), although the desire for protein embodied in meat may well be. In the 
evolutionary study of phenotypic characteristics there needs to be a realisation that not 
all characteristics are likely to be adaptations. Although guilty therefore of an 
inappropriate Panglossianism at times, the evolutionary programme in psychology is 
by no means committed to such an approach, and more recent accounts have avoided 
some of the more egregious errors of this nature perpetrated by earlier investigations. 
The claim that evolutionary explanations explain too much and are unfalsifiable in 
nature has also been discussed earlier. The persistence of this critique, however, 
warrants a more detailed response. The first important point to make is that general 
research programmes are not subject to direct empirical disconfirrnation. What is 
under test, therefore, is not the general evolutionary research programme or even 
sociobiology or evolutionary psychology, but the specific hypotheses which have 
been generated from those research programmes. As elaborated in chapter one, the 
hard core of a research programme is immune from falsification by virtue of the 
protective belt of auxiliary theories. The theories of reciprocal altruism and kin 
selection, therefore, rather than providing an illicit means of explaining 'everything' 
as Rose et al. (1984) claim, are merely an extension of the hard core of the 
evolutionary programme, and do real explanatory work. It would seem to me that the 
explanatory riches of the evolutionary programme should be considered an epistemic 
virtue, not a source of embarrassment. 
While downplaying the role of testability as the sine qua non of a scientific theory, it 
is still important that theories have empirical consequences and that certain states of 
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the world can be seen as incompatible with specific theoretical claims. Typically 
speaking, the specific claims of sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists do 
have important empirical consequences and certain states of the world can be seen as 
incompatible with specific theoretical claims. For example, the theory of natural 
selection, coupled with principle of natural selection suggests that there should be a 
difference in the cues that elicit feelings of sexual jealousy in human males and 
females. Because of paternity uncertainty, males should be more sensitive to 
indicators of sexual jealousy on the part of their mate, while females should be more 
concerned with cues suggesting that their partners are diverting resources to other 
females (Buss, 1994). This leads to the specific and highly testable hypotheses that 
males will report more jealousy and greater autonomic nervous system arousal, 
imagining a situation of sexual infidelity, while females will experience greater 
jealousy and more arousal imagining their partners spending more time with another 
female. Of course, if the results did not pan out as expected, it would not be rational to 
abandon the principle of natural selection or even the theory of parental investment. 
However, any modifications that were made of the basis of the pattern of results 
would need to be both independently testable and coherent with the rest of the 
programme. 
The epistemic problem of unequivocally demonstrating adaptation is certainly not an 
easily tractable one. Recalling the distinction between 'how possibly' and 'how 
actually' explanations (Brandon, 1990) made earlier in this chapter, we can align 
adaptation explanations along a spectrum of epistemic plausibility regarding the 
specific causal forces which are responsible for the traits which are being explained. 
While conceding that many explanations of human characteristics have fallen 
squarely at the 'how possibly' end of this epistemic continuum, there is no need for 
global pessimism regarding the possibility of developing increasingly plausible 
adaptation explanations of human characteristics. 
As discussed earlier, adaptations can be identified by a number of different means. 
Typically adaptations will be species typical, well organised, mesh with the 
environment, and be characterised by special design features such as economy, 
efficiency, complexity, precision, specialisation and reliability (Tooby & Cosmides, 
1990b). Complex mechanisms, as Dawkins (1986) emphasises, do not arise by 
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chance, or as by-products of other processes, but instead are evidence of design or of 
a process - natural selection - which mimics design. The comparative method can also 
be deployed in identifying adaptations that are shared with different species because 
of either common descent or convergent evolution. 
An idealised complete adaptation explanation (Brandon, 1990), will include, among 
other things, details about the genetic basis for the trait, genetic variation in the 
popUlation, and the reproductive success of those bearers of the traits under Normal 
conditions. As Lewontin (1979, 1990) notes, there is nothing like this kind of detail 
for any extant evolutionary explanation in psychology. However, this is not a problem 
peculiar to psychology and we have very few complete adaptation explanations for 
any biological trait. There are several reasons for this. Because natural selection uses 
up genetic variation, there is unlikely to be substantial genetic differences between 
individuals in a species, especially where there is a considerable degree of 
interbreeding, as in humans. The heritability of most adaptations, therefore, is likely 
to be zero (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a). At the current state of genetic science we also 
have no detailed information about the genetic basis of most biological traits, 
especially those which involve the operation of many genes as is the case with most 
behaviours. 7 
Accumulating the necessary evidence that a given trait has been selected for because 
it has been advantageous to the organisms that possess it, is also difficult to achieve. 
One approach, often adopted by behavioural ecologists (e.g., Clutton-Brock, 1988), is 
to measure the actual reproductive success of contemporary popUlations of organisms 
which vary on some given characteristic. This is also the approach to identifying 
adaptations advocated by some human behavioural ecologists (e.g., Borgerhoff-
Mulder, 1987; Caro & Borgerhoff-Mulder, 1987). Caro and Borgerhoff-Mu1der 
(1987) argue that measuring reproductive success or correlates of reproductive 
success is a more epistemically viable option then constructing explanatory accounts 
of past, and observationally opaque, selection pressures. There is no doubt that the 
methodological problems of identifying adaptations are lessened by studies of 
7 Although this may not always be the case. Moreover, it is possible to get some idea of the potential 
genetic basis of a given trait by comparing individuals who have genetic abnormalities which impair 
their performance on given tasks. 
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contemporary populations. However, as I have outlined in chapter three, evolutionary 
psychologists (e.g., Symons, 1989, 1990; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987, Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990b) have cogently argued the measures of current reproductive success 
can only tell us about present directional selection and cannot inform us about past 
selective pressures. As the data accumulated by Vining (1986) illustrates, putative 
correlates of reproductive success in past environments such as status and wealth do 
not lead, in Western populations at least, to greater reproductive success. Current 
reproductive success, in some environments, may be useful as a heuristic device, but 
the focus in identifying adaptations should be on those underlying design features 
which imply a selectionist origin (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). 
There are clearly many methodological barriers in developing complete adaptation 
explanations in psychology. These problems, however, do not warrant a global 
pessimism regarding the evolutionary programme in psychology, as Lewontin and 
others suggest. Lewontin (1979, 1990) argues that all adaptation explanations can 
only be considered plausible storytelling. This is true. Because adaptation is 
necessarily a historical concept, and because in the absence of time travel technology 
we cannot directly observe the past, our hypotheses regarding adaptation cannot be 
vindicated by the appropriate data regarding genetic differences and reproductive 
success. This does not mean, however, that we should abandon the whole explanatory 
enterprise embodied in the adaptationist programme. 
Lewontin's conclusions are based, I would argue, on an insupportably stark and 
inadequate empiricist philosophy of science. Such a philosophy emphasises the role of 
hypothetico-deductive method and counsels a scientific approach based on the 
generation of hypotheses and their subsequent evaluation in a manifestly observable 
world. Such an approach, as I have argued in the first two chapters, fails to do justice 
to either the actual practice of good science or the underlying complexity of the world 
itself. It is important to note that many sciences rely on explanatory hypotheses 
regarding the action of unobservables in both spatial and temporal terms. Sub-atomic 
physicists study elementary particles via indirect measures, cosmologists develop 
theories of unobservable historical events such as the big bang, and paleontologists 
speculate about causes responsible for mass extinctions. In all these cases the 
explanatory theories are appreciably underdetermined by the evidence and are not 
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directly confirmable via observation. In the case of theories about the big bang or 
. mass extinction no crucial experiment can be employed to distinguish between rival 
theories (although the theories may well have different empirical consequences). 
Evolutionary reconstructions of psychological adaptations are in a similar epistemic 
position. Our theories of past cognitive function are grossly underdetermined by the 
available evidence, and there is no way of directly testing the alternative theories 
because observational evidence is not readily accessible. However, this should not 
necessarily be cause for despair here, anymore than it is in cosmology or 
paleontology. A methodological approach to science ground in abductive method 
suggests that a plurality of theories should be generated in order to explain the range 
of relevant phenomena in the domain. Our best epistemic strategy is to evaluate the 
range of relevant theories in tenns of multiple criteria, such as those embodied in 
Thagard's theory of explanatory coherence. It should be then possible to choose the 
best explanation from a range of alternatives. 
Given that complexity of design is a good indicator of natural selection, it is 
reasonable to attempt to develop adaptation explanations of highly integrated, 
complex psychological phenomena. Other explanations of those phenomena, not 
based on the process of natural selection, will also be generated. At any given moment 
in the explanatory history of the phenomenon, it will be more rational to pursue one 
explanation over the other. The degree of epistemic acceptability of the explanation 
will be measured in tenns of various general criteria for theory appraisal, of which 
empirical adequacy is only one. 
The evolutionary programme in psychology, therefore, does not flounder on 
intractable methodological difficulties. A case by case approach would indicate that at 
any given time adaptation explanations will be more or less plausible than alternative 
accounts of the psychological phenomena in question. 
The problem of taxonomy 
Human behaviour is highly flexible. The vast array of potential phenotypic 
expressions in humans dwarfs that of any other species. As many have noted (e.g., 
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Kitcher, 1985, 1988, 1990; Rose et al. 1984; Lewontin, 1979) this poses a potential 
problem for the evolutionary programme in psychology. The problem is one of 
identifying the natural 'suture lines' of evolutionary dynamics (Lewontin, 1979). That 
is, out of the vast array of phenotype expressions manifest in humans, which are true 
adaptations, and which are merely the by-products of adaptations or the consequence 
of other causal processes? 
Sociobiologists have been criticised for employing arbitrary agglomerations of 
behavioural traits (e.g., Rose et al. 1984). Rose et al. (1984) argue that putative 
adaptation explanations of slavery, dance, cannibalism, and so forth fail to adequately 
identify natural kinds. The problem here is that such an approach ignores underlying 
mechanisms (Kitcher, 1985, 1988, 1990; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Tooby and 
Cosmides, 1989). What has been selectedfor by evolutionary processes (as elaborated 
in chapter three) is not instances of behaviour per se, but entire suites of 
developmental processes, including psychological mechanisms, which interface with 
the environment in such a way as to produce, under Normal conditions, adaptive 
behaviour. In developing adaptation explanations of behaviour, therefore, it is 
important to advert to the underlying mechanisms which produce the behaviour in 
given environmental contexts. 
Many adaptations in most organisms are, to some extent facultative, not fixed in 
nature. Animals often have multiple strategies for interfacing with the world 
depending on context. It follows that in identifying adaptations in other animals, and 
especially in humans, the appropriate level of analysis must be sought at the level of 
the underlying mechanisms, for it is at this level which selection has occurred. This 
point is recognised in most contemporary accounts in the evolutionary programme in 
psychology (Symons, 1989, 1990; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Tooby & Cosmides, 
1989, 1992; Buss, 1995). 
Alternative explanations: the scope of adaptation explanations in psychology 
There is general agreement that the human mind is the product of natural selection. 
Indeed, in the absence of alternative causal processes this must be the case. However, 
there is considerable dispute over the explanatory import of this fact. Critics of the 
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evolutionary programme in psychology argue that the capacities that human minds 
possess overwhelm the explanatory significance of their origin by natural selection. 
There are three general, related, points to this line of argument. One, culture provides 
an alternative explanation for adaptive behaviour; two, evolutionary theory can only 
explain the operation of very general cognitive processes and therefore gains no 
explanatory purchase on specific psychological phenomena; and three, there is much 
more to human phenomena than can be explained via evolutionary theory. Taken as a 
whole, this line of criticism attempts to reduce the explanatory coherence of the 
evolutionary programme by reducing its explanatory breadth, and by positing 
potentially more cogent alternative explanations for psychological phenomena. 
Culture has often been invoked as an alternative explanation to evolutionary theory 
for apparently adaptive human phenomena. As Gould (l989a, p. 532) explains: " ... 
the existence of adaptive behaviour in humans says nothing about the probability of a 
genetic basis for it or about the operation of natural selection." Because humans have 
an alternative transmission system - culture - apparently adaptive traits may have 
arisen by trial and error and spread through the population by learning. The 
universality of a given behaviour or psychological characteristic, moreover, is no 
proof of its selectionist origin. As Dennett (1995) argues, cultural universality may be 
the product of reinvention by organisms with similar psychological characteristics. 
The simultaneous appearance of agriculture in MesoAmerica and the Nile valley 
about ten thousand years ago, for example, requires no explanation in terms of genetic 
changes or selective pressures. 
Apparently adaptive behaviour, therefore, may not reflect the presence of underlying 
adaptations, but may merely be the product of cultural forces. Related to this point, 
the problem of developing adaptation e)xplanations of human psychological 
phenomena is exacerbated, argues Gould and others (e.g., Gould, 1989, 1991; Kitcher, 
1988; Flanagan, 1991), because evolution is likely to have built very general 
capacities such as the ability to form beliefs and desires. Specific adaptation 
explanations for a range of human psychological phenomena, therefore, may not be 
plausibly constructed. Gould (1991c, p. 55) utilises his concept of exaptation to 
forward this point. 
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I wish to present an argument for regarding the human brain as, prima jacie, 
the best available case for predominant exaptation - in other words, for a near 
certainty that exaptations must greatly exceed adaptations in number and 
importance. 
Explanations for human psychological characteristics, therefore, suggests Gould, are 
not typically speaking going to be adaptation explanations. Wallace (1869), as 
discussed in chapter three, viewed the vast range of human abilities as greatly 
exceeding our basic survival and reproductive needs. As a hyper-selectionist, 
committed to seeing function in all traits, Wallace was pushed into the position of 
denying an evolutionary origin for the human mind (Gould, 1980c). Gould suggests 
that the concept of exaptation and the notion of spandrels, allows us to understand the 
extended repertoire of human abilities in a manner commensurate with, but not 
explicable by, natural selection. 
Natural selection built the brain; yet, by virtue of structural complexities so 
engendered, the same brain can perform a plethora of tasks that may later 
become central to culture, but that are spandrels rather than targets of the 
original natural selection. (Gould, 199Ic p. 57) 
For example: 
The universals of language are so different from anything else in nature, and 
so quirky in their structure, that origin as a side consequence of the brains 
extended capacity, rather than as a simple advance in continuity from ancestral 
grunts and gestures, seems indicated. (Gould, 1989c p. 14) 
In conclusion, Gould (I99Ic p. 58) is emboldened to suggest" The concept of 
exaptation provides a one-line refutation of sociobiology" 
The problem highlighted by Gould is one of specificity and comes in the strong 
version outlined by Gould above, which challenges the notion that even apparently 
central human cognitive processes like language might be considered adaptations, and 
weaker versions which question the explanatory role of evolutionary theory in 
accounting for the myriad of specific beliefs and practices which humans possess and 
engage m. 
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Moreover, because such beliefs play an important role in the cultural significance of 
much human behaviour, adaptation explanations will fail to provide an increase in our 
understanding of the full panoply of psychological phenomena. As Sober (1993) has 
suggested, there is more to food and sex, than an evolutionary analyses of eating and 
copulating might indicate. Psychologists, according to Sober (1985), will end up 
studying many traits which have no proper function. Sober (1985, p.190) argues that" 
We must relativise our ascriptions of functions to certain privileged capacities of the 
containing system." Only certain aspects of human psychology, therefore, might be 
amenable to evolutionary explanations. 
The problem of specificity in adaptation explanations provides a challenge to the 
explanatory breadth of the evolutionary programme in psychology. If, as Gould 
suggests, only the very general aspects of the human mind have a selectionist origin, 
then the scope of evolutionary explanations in psychology will be considerably 
diminished. Even if a larger range of psychological phenomena are admitted as 
adaptations, the weaker version of the specificity argument suggests that we will get 
limited explanatory purchase on the kinds of things that we want a science of 
psychology to explain. Evolutionary explanations, if the specificity argument is 
sound, will only play a strictly limited role in our understanding of psychological 
phenomena. 
In what has become a slightly repetitive theme, I would suggest that questions 
regarding the validity of adaptation explanations in psychology must be taken on a 
case by case basis. For each putative adaptation explanation we should evaluate its 
explanatory worth in comparison with alternative theoretical accounts. Having said 
that, I believe that there are good reasons to reject the strong version of the specificity 
argument espoused by Gould. However, weaker versions of the argument may well 
play an important role in delimiting the scope of evolutionary explanations. 
Firstly, it is important to clarify Gould's claims with respect to some of the 
terminology that he employs. This is important, because it is my impression that 
social scientists often employ the term 'exaptation' in the context of discussing 
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spandrels or by-products of adaptations rather than in the situations, originally 
delimited by Gould 'and Vrba (1982). Some of this confusion is abetted by Gould 
himself who lumps together exaptations, spandrels, and by-products of adaptations in 
the same epistemic bag. However, as I have made clear earlier in this chapter, 
exaptations are adaptations. There is an important distinction to be made between the 
proper function of an item and subsequent uses of that item; however, this distinction 
is not illuminated by the notion of exaptation. It is hard to see, therefore, how 
exaptation provides a one line refutation of sociobiology even if exaptations in 
humans do vastly out-weigh adaptations in numbers. Indeed my point above suggests 
that such a comparison is otiose. 
The argument, which does potentially challenge the explanatory power of the 
evolutionary programme in psychology, is the claim that natural selection has 
favoured a general purpose mechanism - the mind - which, due to its plasticity, can 
fulfil a vast array of different functions. These functions, however useful in nature, 
will not be adaptations, but will be the by-products or spandrels of an organ designed 
for other reasons. Gould is sure that the number of spandrels or by-products will 
vastly outweigh, in number and significance, the proper functions of the mind. Just 
why Gould is so sure is unclear; there is no detailed argument to support his claim and 
no a priori reason why adaptations in the realm of the human mind should be few in 
numbers and result in so many unintended and undesigned effects. 
The strong form of Gould's argument flounders on his favourite example of a 
spandrel: human language. Gould (1989d, 1991) and others (e.g., Chomsky, 1972, 
Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989) argue that language is not an adaptation but instead is a by-
product of other evolutionary forces which have led to an increase in brain size and 
can therefore be explained in terms of general laws of structure and growth. 
Others however, have argued that human language is prima facie an excellent 
candidate for an explanation in terms of evolved function (e.g., Pinker & Bloom, 
1990; Pinker, 1994; Dennett, 1995). The complexity of interrelated parts which 
operate together to achieve the single function of communication of propositional 
structure over a serial channel, strongly suggests that language was specifically 
designed by natural selection for this function (Pinker & Bloom, 1990; Pinker, 1994). 
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It is highly improbable that the mechanisms underlying articulate vocal control, 
auditory processing of speech, the construction of grammar, and the physiology of the 
mouth and larynx, all serendipitously emerged together as the product of other, more 
general processes. 
As figure five suggests, at our current state of knowledge, the best explanation for 
language is the theory that it is an evolutionary adaptation with the specific function 
of communication of propositional structure over a serial channel. The claim put 
forward by Gould and others, that language is merely the spin-off of an 
overwhelmingly domain-general mind is difficult to sustain. As Pinker and Bloom 
(1990, p. 720) explain: 
" There is no psychologically realistic multi-purpose learning program that 
can acquire language as a special case, because the kind of generalisations that 
must be made to acquire a grammar are at cross-purposes with those that are 
useful in acquiring other systems of knowledge for example." 
Moreover, the dissociability of language from other cultural and cognitive systems in 
both developmental and neuro-physiological terms is strongly indicative of domain-
specificity, not of some general cognitive learning ability. 
It is certainly true that we have nothing like a complete adaptation explanation for 
language at the current state of knowledge. However, the hypothesis that language is 
an adaptation is far removed from the weakest of 'how-possibly' explanatory 
accounts. Because natural selection uses up genetic variation we should not expect 
qualitative differences in the genetic basis for language acquisition in humans. 
However, evidence for specific language deficits (Gopnik, Dalalakis, Fukuda, 
Fukuda, & Kehayia, 1996), and qualitative variation in people's grammatical ability 
(Pinker, 1994), are suggestive (although far from conclusive) of an underlying genetic 
basis for language. 
Detailed and plausible scenarios of language evolution have also been constructed 
(e.g., Corballis, 1991; Davidson & Noble, 1989; Dunbar, 1993; Aiello, 1996). 
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Figure five Explaining language: 
Alternative approaches 
Explanations for language 
(1) Language is a by-product of other 
evolutionary forces. It is not a 
specific adaptation but is the result of 
general laws of structure and growth 
and has spread via cultural 
transmission. (Gould, 1991, 
Chomsky, 1972). 
I 
Explained by: 
Unknown laws of growth. General 
mechanisms not elucidated. 
(2) Language is a domain speci c 
biological adaptation with e 
function of communicating 
propositional structures over a e 
channel. (Pinker & Bloom, 1989'--,-~ 
Pinker, 1994/) 
Explained by: 
Selective advantages of language r 
hominids under pleistocene ecologic 
and social conditions. 
(e.g. Corballis, 1991; Dunbar, 1993; 
Aiello, 1996). 
Language phenomena to be explained 
(from Pinker & Bloom, 1989; Pinker, 
1994) 
• Language is universal. All humans 
are proficient language users. 
• All languages use the same basic 
mechanisms and representations. 
• No correlation between language 
complexity and technological 
progress. 
Selective impairing and sparing of 
language functions relative to other 
cognitive processes. 
• Brain areas dedicated (primarily) to 
language processing. 
• Specialised physiology of the larynx 
which compromises other functions. 
• Children fluent speakers of language 
by age three without formal tuition. 
• Language learning maturational 
process with critical period for 
acquisition. 
Specialised processing in auditory 
perception which decodes speech 
into linguistic segments. 
• Variability in language fluency 
among different speakers. 
• Local differences in type of language 
spoken. 
• Evidence for specific, genetically 
based language disorders. 
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Although these accounts differ in their explanations of just when, how, and why 
language arose, there is general agreement that language is an adaptation with the 
specific function of communication, and that its phylogenesis can be reasonably 
elaborated. The current, selectively relevant function of language may well be the 
result of co-option of structures used for other purposes8; however, a strongly 
plausible case can be made for the reproductive benefits of a communication system 
with increasingly greater expressive power. So, although our adaptation explanation 
for language remains a 'how possibly' one, it is also the most explanatorily coherent 
explanation for language phenomena and as such is the one it would be the most 
rational to accept. 
The strong specificity argument proposed by Gould, therefore, seems difficult to 
sustain. From one example, of course, one cannot reject the possibility that the mind 
is predominately a general purpose machine whose effects far outstrip it functions. 
However, as discussed earlier, there are both good conceptual and empirical reasons 
to believe that the mind contains, along with general mechanisms, an array of domain-
specific processes. A number of these processes, e.g., natural history intelligence 
(Atran, 1990), language (Pinker, 1994), mental state attribution (Baron-Cohen, 1995) 
moreover, can be formulated with plausible adaptation explanations. This suggests 
that evolutionary explanations will have some role to play in psychology. The extent 
of that role, however, remains an open question and relies to a large degree on the 
validity of the weaker versions of the specificity argument. 
Weaker versions of the specificity argument propose that a large number, but not all, 
psychological phenomena which psychologists attempt to explain are not evolutionary 
adaptations, nor are they readily explicable in terms of underlying adaptations. The 
problem, it is suggested, is one of grain (e.g., Kitcher, 1988; Sober, 1993). Much of 
what is of interest to psychologists and social scientists, it is claimed, is so far 
removed from evolutionary dynamics that explanations need to be furnished 
predominately, ifnot exclusively, in terms of other causal processes. 
8 Calvin (1993), for example, develops the plausible idea that language mechanism have been co-opted 
from ones underlying sequential processing, especially as related to throwing. 
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It is important to distinguish here between the claim that most psychological 
phenomena are not adaptations and the claim that most phenomena cannot be 
adequately explained by adaptations to some degree or other. Evolutionary 
psychologists are typically happy to concede the first point; however they do claim 
that many phenomena, although not good candidates for adaptations, may well be 
satisfactorily explained in terms of proper function, at least in part. For any organism 
with some degree of behavioural plasticity, diverse phenotype expressions may well 
be understood in terms of underlying adaptation across varying environmental 
contexts. 
An important point to note here is that adaptations are usually relational in nature 
(Millikan, 1993; Sperber, 1996). "To have biological functions an item need neither 
have the same categorical properties, e.g., the same absolute structure, as items that 
participated in the life cycles of ancestors, nor need its junctions, when categorically 
described, be functions performed by any of its ancestors" (Millikan, 1993, p. 173). 
Millikan asks us to consider the imprinting mechanism of ducklings. Although the 
mechanism has the proper function of forming a relation to the 'mother of the 
duckling, the specific content of the imprint will be different for each duckling (all 
mothers are unique). The important point to note here is that the specific content of 
most internal states can only be understood with reference to those particular features 
of the environment which gives rise to those states. Those features will naturally be 
variable (individuals have different histories), but the variability is only explicable 
with reference to the mechanisms which underlie such variability (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1989). A complete explanation for most phenotypic characters, this 
suggests, must typically advert to both underlying adaptation mechanisms and 
features of the environment during individual development. 
A simple example will help to clarify this point. Humans in many contemporary 
cultures have a preference for cakes, chocolates, and Coca-Cola. This preference can 
be given an adaptation explanation even though the manifest behaviour is both novel 
and maladaptive. The explanation adverts to those feature of human olfaction and 
gustation which have evolved to enjoy the taste of food substances high in sugars. In 
ancestral environments the presence of sugar would have been indicative of a highly 
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nutritious food source such as fruit. The abstract structure of the argument runs as 
follows: 
(1) Mechanism P produces trait Q in environment Z. (Mechanism P is selected for 
due to the reproductive benefits conferred by trait Q in environment Z). 
(2) Mechanism P produces trait N in environment W. (The same mechanism produces 
different [perhaps maladaptive] behaviour under different environmental 
circumstances ). 
(3) To explain trait N we refer to the mechanism P, producing the trait, and why it 
produces this trait in environment W. This explanation, although drawing on local 
features of the novel environment, will be,primajacie, an adaptation explanation. 
Of course, most examples in psychology will not be so simple. However, the sheer 
presence of novel behaviour, variable phenotypes, and heterogeneous. environments 
do not by themselves invalidate the possibility of constructing explanations in which 
reference to natural selection plays an important role. A useful distinction in this 
context is the one employed by Sperber (1990, p. 5) between actual and proper 
domains: "The actual domain of a conceptual module is all the information in the 
organism's environment that may (once processed by perceptual modules and 
possibly by other conceptual modules) satisfy the module's input conditions. Its 
proper domain is all the information that it is the module's biological function to 
process." 
The proper domain of the sweet-detecting mechanisms in humans is likely to have 
been predominately fruit. In contemporary environments the actual domain includes 
all those sweet food items which satisfy the input conditions of the module and will 
include, among other things, cakes, chocolate and coca cola. In this example, knowing 
something about the proper domain gives us certain explanatory resources to account 
for phenomena in the actual domain of i11terest. For many areas of interest m 
psychology, however, this may not be the case. As Sperber (1994, p. 54) explains: 
. . . the actual domain of any human cognitive module is unlikely to be 
coextensive with its proper domain. The actual domain of any human 
cognitive module is sure, on the contrary, to include a large amount of cultural 
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infonnation that meets its input conditions. This results neither from accident, 
nor from design. It results from a process of social distribution of infonnation. 
We can, perhaps, understand patterns of social transmission via a detailed elaboration 
of psychological mechanisms and their proper function9. However, in many cases the 
actual phenomena of interest may be so insulated from those causal processes 
embodied in adaptation by natural selection, that an evolutionary explanation for the 
phenomena becomes untenable. In other words, alternative explanations, in tenns of 
culture, or the belief-desire profiles of individuals screen off adaptation explanations 
from the phenomenon in question. The notion of screening off suggests that one class 
of explanation makes another class statistically irrelevant. In the context of the present 
discussion proximate causes are suggested to screen off ultimate ones. This issue is 
discussed in more detail in the final chapter. 
It is possible to construct a continuum of phenomena in which adaptation explanations 
play an increasingly less or more important role. For example, consider music. No 
clear and well articulated adaptation explanation has been constructed for the origin of 
music. It is plausible to suggest, however, that an explanation for music construction 
and appreciation is the actual domain of the proper domain for language (Sperber, 
1996). Because the acoustic properties of music satisfy (perhaps super-satisfy) the 
input conditions of language, people have the necessary discriminative ability and 
motivational force to create and enjoy music. Our derived adaptation explanation 
gains us some explanatory purchase on the phenomenon of music: It may explain the 
universality of music, why some acoustic properties of music are preferred over 
others, why we enjoy bird-song, why some scales make us feel happy and others sad 
and so on. Once, however, we want to explain the emergence of jazz music in the 
1920's in America or the transition from bebop to cool in the 1950's, our adaptation 
explanation does little if no explanatory work. In the case of music, Sperber (1996) 
argues the cultural domain is often much more salient and relevant than the proper 
domain. Many critics of evolutionary explanations in psychology would argue that the 
example of music highlights a general problem for the evolutionary programme in 
psychology. For example Dennett (1995, p. 491) suggests: 
9 This point is elaborated in more detail below, but as Sperber (1994, p. 54) points out the factor which 
effects the distribution of ideas is their "compatibility and fit with human cognitive organisation". 
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Whereas animals are rigidly controlled by their biology, human behaviour is 
largely determined by culture, a largely autonomous system of symbols and 
values, growing from a biological base, but growing indefinitely way from it. 
Able to overpower or escape biological constraints in most regards, cultures 
can vary from one another enough so that important portions of the variance 
are thereby explained .... Learning is not a general-purpose process, but 
human beings have so many special-purpose gadgets, and learn to harness 
them with such versatility, that learning often can be treated as if it were an 
entirely medium-neutral and content-neutral gift of non-stupidity. 
The first point to make regarding this general problem is that in psychology, as in 
other sciences, we should be trying to develop complete, vertically integrated 
(Barkow, 1989) explanations of psychological phenomena. These explanations will 
draw on accounts of the myriad of causal processes which are likely to be responsible 
for the phenomena in question. The question for psychology, therefore, is to what 
extent certain causal processes are likely to do the most explanatory work. This, of 
course, can only be adjudicated on a case by case basis. In reference to the 
explanatory breadth of the evolutionary program in psychology there are three 
alternative tiers of phenomena in which adaptation explanations play more or less of a 
role: 
(1) Psychological phenomena with fairly clear selectionist ongms and coherent 
adaptation explanations which furnish us with a deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon in question. 
(2) Phenomena in which selectionist accounts provide us with some explanatory 
purchase and therefore remain relevant, but which also require considerable causal 
input form predominately non-selectionist mechanisms such as cultural evolution. 
(3) Psychological phenomena that are so far removed from the evolutionary process 
so as to virtually eliminate the explanatory worth of selectionist explanations. 
The explanatory scope of the evolutionary programme in psychology will be 
determined to a large extent by the number of phenomena which fall in to class one 
and two compared to class three. While trying to avoid any sweeping claims here, I 
would suggest that for psychology at least, most, but certainly not all of the 
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phenomena of interest, fall into classes one and two. For sociology, and to some 
extent cultural anthropology, the phenomena of interest may well accumulate 
predominately in tier three and hence be less amenable to adaptation explanations. 
Summary 
In this chapter I have argued that adaptation explanations have a legitimate role to 
play in evolutionary biology in general and in evolutionary explanations in 
psychology more specifically. Whether or not something should be considered an 
adaptation should be taken on a case by case basis. That is, we should compare 
adaptation explanations with alternative accounts in tenns of their explanatory 
coherence in explaining the phenomena in question. The role of evolutionary 
explanations in psychology will be detennined, in part, to the extent that the 
phenomena that psychologists study are adaptations or amenable to adaptation 
explanations. My discussion suggests that there are some clear examples of 
psychological adaptations in humans which can be furnished with epistemically 
plausible adaptation explanations. Moreover, many of the traits which characterise 
contemporary human populations may be explained, in part, by reference to 
underlying adaptations. 
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Chapter Eight 
Explaining diversity: Culture and learning as alternative 
explanations 
Nativism vs. Empiricism: The role of learning and the environment in evolutionary 
explanations. 
As many have noted, the proposed dualism between nature and nurture has a long and 
acrimonious history. In psychology this dispute has centered on whether the rich 
repertoire of human and other animal behaviour is the consequence of learning 
mediated by the social and physical environment, or is the result of innate, genetically 
determined developmental processes. In discussions of the validity of the evolutionary 
programme in psychology the schism between nature and nurture has been framed in 
terms of alternative causal explanations. On the one hand, evolutionary social 
scientists have been characterised as advocating a form of 'bean-bag genetics' where 
behavioural traits are tightly linked to the genes that purportedly 'code' for them 
(Sociobiology Study Group, 1978; Rose et aI., 1984). While on the other hand, 
mainstream psychologists are seen as promulgating a view in which the forces of 
learning and culture mould individual behaviour in a way not explicable by biological 
processes. 
This dispute regarding the role of different causal forces in explaining human 
behaviour remains an important one, even though there is wide-spread agreement that 
genetic and environmental factors are reciprocally related during development and 
that it is inappropriate to oppose biological and learning explanations (e.g., Rose et 
al., 1984; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992; Sterelny, 1992; 
Sober, 1993). As Tooby and Cosmides (1990a, p. 19) point out: "Anyone with a 
biological education acknowledges that the phenotype is the result of the interaction 
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between genes and environment, and all aspects of the phenotype are equally co-
determined by this interaction." 
If there is widespread agreement on the thoroughly epigenetic nature of development, 
then why do questions of determinism remain to the fore in discussions of the validity 
of the evolutionary programme in psychology? One reason, as discussed earlier, 
probably lies with the ethical concerns which are associated with evolutionary 
explanations of human behaviour. In the lay public's mind at least, the invocation of 
evolutionary arguments are still, to a wide degree, associated with inevitability, and 
perhaps acceptability. For psychologists, however, I think the predominant issue at 
stake is one of explanatory primacy. Although there may be agreement on the 
reciprocal role of genes and the environment during development, there is 
considerable dispute over which causal factor exerts the greatest influence and hence 
provides us with the best explanation for the phenomenon in question. In many ways 
the dispute here is misguided. If genetic and environmental factors are mutually 
interdependent, then it is conceptually impossible to disentangle their relative causal 
influences. What is at stake, however, is the extent to which certain developmental 
trajectories can be satisfactorily given rich evolutionary explanations and to what 
extent they are best explained in other terms. This debate pivots on the degree to 
which learning is conceptualised as being specifically directed in nature in a manner 
commensurate with evolutionary theory. 
An extreme nativist position suggests that the role of learning is minimised and 
consists of simply filling in the slots of richly structured, innate conceptual system. 
The role of the environment is drastically attenuated and is seen as simply providing a 
triggering role in the maturation of innate biological processes. In this view the genes 
direct development which unfolds according to an innately specified design; the 
environment only provides the necessary support, it plays no active role. At the other 
extreme, the role of genetic factors are downplayed and learning itself comes to the 
fore. All learning is conceived of as guided by general rules, with the environment 
providing the essential forces by which the organism comes to gain an understanding 
of the world. From this perspective, evolution may provide some general biological 
endowment, but the environment plays the pivotal role in directing, moulding, and 
shaping this endowment into myriad phenotypic forms. 
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It is doubtful whether anyone actually adheres to either of these polar perspectives, 
although Chomsky and Fodor lean towards extreme nativism, as did some early 
ethologists, while the extreme empiricist position may be seen in the work of some 
behaviourists and perhaps those advocating connectionist models of learning (Keil, 
1990). There is certainly a large range of alternatives between these two extreme 
positions, or as Stere1ny (1992, p. 102) pithily expresses it: "There are levels of 
analysis between an appeal to an unspecialised plasticity and the attribution of 
biological function to bathsong." There is a general agreement that there must be 
some constraints! on learning (e.g., Keil, 1990; Seligman & Hager, 1972; Millikan, 
1993; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). That is, there must be some a priori bias on the 
kinds of information which an organism responds to and the sorts of representations 
which it constructs about the world. The world can be partitioned in a limitless variety 
of ways, but only a fraction of these partionings are going to be such as to allow the 
organism to respond to the world in a manner which is likely to ensure its survival. It 
is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that learning is typically guided in such a way 
which is explicable given the evolutionary history of those learning mechanisms and 
the kinds of environments that they have been embedded in. Constraints therefore are 
intrinsically interactional in nature. ". .. they are constraints on what sorts of 
knowledge representations an organism will construct given a range of environments" 
(Keil, 1990). 
This epigenetic view of learning suggests that there can be no partioning of genetic 
influences from environmental ones. That is, genes and environments are not separate 
causal processes . 
. . . every feature of every phenotype is fully and equally codetermined by the 
interaction of the organism's genes (embedded in its initial package of zygotic 
cellular machinery) and its ontogenetic environments - meaning everything 
else that impinges on it. By changing either the genes or the environment any 
outcome can be changed, so the interaction of the two is always part of every 
complete explanation of any human phenomenon. As with all interactions, the 
1 Although Tooby and Cosmides prefers the term 'enablers' rather than constraints. 
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product simply cannot be sensibly analysed into separate genetically 
determined and environmentally determined components or degrees of 
influence. For this reason, everything, from the delicate nuance of Richard 
Strauss's last performance of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony to the presence of 
calcium salts in his bones at birth, is totally and to exactly the same extent 
genetically and environmentally codetermined. "Biology" cannot be 
segregated off into some traits and not others. (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, p. 
83/84) 
This constructivist view of development reaches its most elaborate treatment in the 
work of the developmental systems theorists (e.g., Oyama, 1985, 1991; Griffiths, 
1992; Griffiths & Gray, 1994). The developmental systems approach emphasises that 
all developmental interactants have comparable theoretical status. Genes are not 
causally prior to or a primary factor in development; nor is the environment. It 
follows that an explanation for any phenotypic characteristic must be embedded in an 
account of the developmental process and not reduced to either genetic or 
environmental factors. Nature is re-conceptualised, on this account, as the product 
while nature is the process. 
This view of development is surely correct. However, their still remains the question 
of explanatory relevance. There does still seem to be an asymmetry in the sort of 
explanation that we deem acceptable for accounting for, say, musical preference on 
the one hand and eye colour on the other. This difference in preferred causal 
explanation, can be conceptualised as differences in main effects (Sober, 1993a). The 
developmental conditions for some phenotypes such as eye colour are extremely 
reliable, so that differences in eye colour are likely to reflect differences in genes. For 
other traits, varying conditions will lead to quite different results; musical preference 
is likely to reflect predominately environmental differences. Both of these 
phenomena, however, are equally co-determined by genes and environment. 
For the development of adequate evolutionary explanations of psychological 
phenomena what is required is not that the trait in question is strongly influenced by 
genetic factors, but simply that the developmental processes which give rise to the 
characters in question are stable enough to allow for selection to occur, and hence for 
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adaptation explanations to be forwarded. The biological, the psychological, the social, 
and the cultural, as Oyama (1991) urges, should not be considered as opposing forces, 
but instead as different levels of analysis. In developing complete explanations of 
psychological phenomena, we need to consider a range of different levels of analysis 
which are appropriate in accounting for the phenomenon in question. 
Culture as an alternative explanation 
The value of the evolutionary programme in psychology can only be ascertained 
relative to the value of alternative, competing explanations. While there are few 
coherent global research programmes in the social sciences, there is a body of 
literature which draws on the processes of culture, social structure, and social learning 
as the main causal forces which lie behind the generation of psychological and social 
phenomena. One pervasive criticism of the evolutionary programme in psychology is 
that it fails to do adequate justice to the concept of culture as both an alternative 
causal explanation and as a legitimate source of meaning in the analysis of human 
behaviour. 
Many critics of evolutionary accounts of social behaviour (e.g., Gould, 1978; Sahlins, 
1976; Kitcher, 1985, 1988) have argued that culture provides a cogent alternative 
explanation for patterns of apparently adaptive behaviour. Unlike other animals, in 
humans functional behaviour, even if universal in nature, may be maintained via 
patterns of cultural transmission rather than by the processes of natural selection. 
Individuals, therefore, may be conceptualised as primarily a product of culture rather 
than biology. While biology is not denied some role in the causal production of 
behaviour, this role is often characterised as being extremely limited in nature. For 
example, Sahlins (1976, p. xi) suggests: "Biology, while it is an absolutely necessary 
condition for culture, is equally and absolutely insufficient: it is completely unable to 
specify the cultural processes of human behaviour or their variations from one system 
to another." Evolutionary theory it seems, may provide us with an explanation of how 
cultural learning may be achieved, but it fails to tell us anything meaningful about the 
content of culture (Dennett, 1995). 
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Culture therefore, is conceptualised as an autonomous or semi-autonomous process 
which can be effectively decoupled from biological evolution. Sober (1993b, p. 215 ) 
illustrates this position clearly: 
Biological selection produced the brain, but the brain has set into motion a 
powerful process that can counteract the pressures of biological selection. The 
mind is more than a device for generating the behaviours that biological 
selection has favoured. It is the basis of a selection process of its own, defined 
by its own measures of fitness and heritability. Natural selection has given 
birth to a selection process that has floated free. 
Importantly, because this selection process operates by Lamarckian means (Gould, 
1980) and hence is many orders of magnitude faster than genetic evolution, it can 
effectively swamp the influences of biological selection (Dennett, 1995). This is 
clearly illustrated by the proliferation of seemingly maladaptive behaviour found in 
many cultures. For example, Barkow (1989) discusses the denial of colostrum to 
infants in many societies as evidence of a trait which is reliably replicated from 
generation to generation, but from an evolutionary perspective is highly deleterious in 
nature. The seemingly bizarre menagerie of behaviour found in different cultures 
around the world, (and no less in the West), seems to be prima facie evidence that the 
proliferation of specific beliefs and ideas is not yoked in any clear or detenninistic 
fashion to the forces of biological evolution. 
It follows from these points that culture provides a potentially more appropriate level 
of analysis for explanations of human behaviour patterns. As Dennett (1995, p. 340) 
claims "What we are is very much a matter of what culture has made us." By 
themselves evolutionary explanations are inadequate because they ignore the social 
and historical embeddedness of human behaviour (Flanagan, 1991), and have avoided 
discussion of the meaning, role and consequence of contemporary behaviour in social 
and cultural tenns (Cantor, 1990). 
These criticisms of the evolutionary programme in psychology and the social sciences 
can be summarised as follows: 
(1) Culture serves as an alternative explanation for patterns of human behaviour. 
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(2) Culture is an autonomous process decoup1ed from biological evolution. 
(3) Cultural processes, because they operate on vastly faster time scales than 
biological ones, swamp evolutionary processes. 
(4) Culture provides the appropriate context for understanding the meaning of human 
behaviour. 
Therefore: 
(5) Culture serves as a different and more apposite level of analysis form which to 
explain psychological and social phenomena. 
This argument suggests that the scope of evolutionary explanations in psychology will 
be severely limited. This will be the case as long as learning, and especially social 
learning processes, is conceptualised in very general terms, and if the content of 
learning is considered to be the primary focus for explanations in psychology and the 
other social sciences. 
Is culture unique to humans? 
The concept of culture plays an important role in many explanations in the social 
sciences. A precise and widely agreed upon definition of culture, however, is hard to 
come by. Boyd and Richerson (1985, p. 2 ) define culture as "the transfer of 
information by behavioural means, most particularly by the process of teaching and 
imitation." Barkow (1989) argues that this definition is too narrow in scope and is a 
better characterisation of what might be termed 'proto-culture'. Barkow argues that 
there are three ideas which are central to the definition of culture. One, culture 
involves social transmission; two, the transmission consists of information; and three, 
the information is organised in some systematic manner. Given this definition can we 
say that other animals, apart from humans, may be said to possess a culture, or engage 
in cultural learning? This issue is important because criticisms of the evolutionary 
programme in psychology often make reference to the asymmetry between humans 
and other animals on certain characteristics where culture is often cited as the relevant 
difference. 
Despite a large body of literature directed at the topic of animal culture (e.g., 
Tomasello et al. 1987; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993; Heyes, 1993; Boesch, 
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1996; Heyes & Galef, 1996; Wrangham et aI, 1994), there is no widespread 
agreement regarding whether or whether not other animals may be said to possess 
culture. There are certainly different behavioural traditions found in many different 
animal species. Two well-known examples include the milktop puncturing behaviour 
of some British tits and the sand-washing behaviour found among some populations 
of macaque monkeys. The richest source of behavioural traditions, however, can be 
found among wild populations of chimpanzees. Chimpanzees possess a number of 
population specific behaviours such as nut-cracking, ant-fishing, leaf-clipping, 
termite-fishing, and leaf-sponging (Boesch, 1996). 
Critics argue that what distinguishes these population specific behaviours found in 
chimpanzees from fully realised patterns of cultural transmission evident in humans is 
the processes which underlie social learning (Tomasello, et al., 1993; Tomasello, 
1994). Tomasello et al. (1993) point out that social learning can be achieved in a 
variety of different ways. For example, learning can be achieved via local or stimulus 
enhancement where the observer's attention is directed towards the model and the 
stimulus which is the focus of the model's attention. This is a form of socially 
facilitated individual learning because it is the individual who actually works out how 
to perform the .relevant behaviour. In contrast, behaviour can also be acquired via 
imitative learning or through teaching. The behaviour here is directly modeled on, or 
moulded by, the relevant other in the learning situation. Tomasello et al. (1993) claim 
that only humans are capable of imitative learning or direct teaching, and that it is this 
difference which is responsible for the differences in richness and complexity of 
behavioural tradition in humans compared to other animals. Several experiments 
support this conclusion. For example, it was found with controlled studies of food-
washing and tool-use in cebus and macaque monkeys that patterns of social learning 
. could be explained entirely in terms of local and stimulus enhancement with no 
evidence of imitative learning having occurred (Visalberghi & Fragashy, 1990). 
Experimental studies of chimpanzee-learning seem to support this conclusion. After 
watching a model obtain a food source with a given method, chimpanzees focused on 
the goal obtained and the tool used to achieve a similar result, whereas young children 
tended to directly model the method employed (Tomasello, 1994). It is suggested that 
humans have this capacity for imitative learning, which other animals lack, because 
humans possess a theory of mind which enables them to engage in perspective taking 
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and hence allows then to learn not just from but also through other individuals. It is 
thisfonn of learning, which results in the high-fidelity transmission of cultural traits 
which gives culture its cumulative nature (Tomasello et aI, 1993). 
Many primatologists on the other hand (e.g., McGrew, 1992; Boesch, 1996) argue 
that other primates, in particular chimpanzees, can be said to possess cultures, and 
perhaps engage in fonns of social learning similar to humans. Boesch (1991), for 
example, argues that he has seen evidence of teaching among wild chimpanzees. The 
chimpanzee popUlation that Boesch has studied engages in nut-cracking behaviour. 
The techniques required to break the nuts are difficult and take some time to acquire 
via trial and error learning. Boesch claims to have witnessed instances of direct 
intervention by mothers on their infants learning efforts in a manner which facilitated 
their performance. Furthermore, Boesch (1996) following Reyes (1993), argues that 
what is important in producing culture is not the specific mechanisms underlying 
learning but simply that learning is achieved via some degree of social canalization. 
It is clear that there is no widespread agreement on the uniqueness of culture or the 
mechanisms which are necessary for cultural learning. Certainly there are important 
differences between human and other animal 'cultures', but it is unclear whether these 
differences are qualitative or quantitative in nature. What I think does emerge from a 
comparative study of culture is the importance of elucidating the variety of 
mechanisms which appear to underlie social learning and the sorts of contexts in 
which they are likely to emerge. Regardless of whether chimpanzees or other animals 
may be said to possess cultures, it is clear that in a similar fashion to humans, an 
elucidation of the behaviour of other primates is likely to involve, in part, the role of 
local social and behavioural traditions. 
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Does culture represent a truly alternative explanation? 
The idea that culture represents an autonomous, alternative explanation for patterns of 
human behaviour has been challenged from various sources. Evolutionary 
psychologists argue that culture does not represent a complete or alternative 
explanation for psychological and social phenomena. Biological and cultural forces, it 
is argued, are not mutually exclusive, but instead should be conceptualised as being 
complementary in nature (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Culture and biology, therefore, 
should not be regarded as two separate classes of causes, but as part of a single 
unified process. As Buss (1995, p. 14) expresses it: 
"Culture," "learning,", and "socialisation" do not constitute explanations, let 
alone alternative explanations to those anchored in evolutionary psychology. 
Instead, they represent human phenomena that require explanation. The 
required explanation must have a description of the underlying evolved 
psychological mechanisms at its core. 
Similarly, philosopher Kim Sterelny (1992, p. 164) emphasises the point that culture 
is not a distinct and parallel process to genetic evolution, but should be conceptualised 
instead as simply an instance of adaptive plasticity. "Cultural life is the product of a 
very complex interaction of plastic creature with a richly varied and changing 
environment. Cultural evolution does not pre-empt appeal to natural selection. Rather, 
enculturation is a special case of adaptive plasticity." 
Culture is certainly an important selective and developmental environment for Homo 
sapiens (Barkow, 1989), but this does not by itself invalidate an evolutionary 
approach to cultural traits. Just as there is no such thing as a fully functioning fish 
without water, there cannot be a proper functioning human without culture. Invoking 
culture as the primary cause of human behaviour, however, may be inappropriate. 
What remains to be explained is culture itself and how different patterns of behaviour 
become reliably reconstructed under different environmental conditions where social 
structure represents important slice of the environment. 
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Explaining individual differences from an evolutionary perspective: Universalism vs. 
Relativism. 
Culture seems to be a powerful explanation for human behaviour, because behaviour 
does vary across cultures, but has strong similarities within cultures. On the face of it 
its seems reasonable to attribute these patterns of similarities and differences to 
processes of learning from one's social environment. The approach of evolutionary 
psychologists to the phenomenon of cultural differences is to argue that such 
differences reflect the operation of universal psychological mechanisms under 
different environmental conditions (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Buss, 1995). Because 
humans exhibit extreme flexibility in their behavioural repertoire, we should expect 
behavioural differences to emerge under different environmental contexts. 
"Behavioural variation" Cosmides and Tooby (1987, p. 281) claim" is not an 
embarrassment to evolutionary theory, it is a prediction of evolutionary theory." 
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) argue vigorously for the notion of the 'psychic unity' of 
humankind. It is claimed that at the level of underlying psychological adaptations 
humans will exhibit uniformity, regardless of local cultural differences2. Individual 
differences, therefore, primarily reflect different developmental trajectories as a 
consequence of slight genetic differences and different environmental circumstances; 
they do not typically reflect discretely different personality types or morphs (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990a). Cultural differences cannot be explained without reference to 
psychological mechanisms, and an account of how those mechanisms come to provide 
different behavioural results under different environmental circumstances (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992; Buss, 1995). 
An important distinction is drawn by evolutionary psychologists here between the 
evolved and the manifest. The evolved refers to those mechanisms, developmental 
traj ectories and so forth, shaped by natural selection, while the manifest is the 
behavioural products or outcomes of those mechanisms (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). 
This approach to individual differences is summarised by Tooby & Cosmides (1992, 
p.45): 
2 Although T ooby & Cosmides (1992) suggests that there may also be a 'thin film' of population 
specific or frequency dependent adaptive variation. 
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One observes variable· manifest psychologies or behaviours between 
individuals and across cultures and views them as the product of a common, 
underlying evolved psychology, operating under different circumstances. The 
mapping between the evolved architecture and manifest behaviour operates 
according to principles of expression that are specified in the evolved 
developmental mechanisms and the psychological mechanisms they reliably 
construct; manifest expressions may differ between individuals when different 
environmental inputs are operated on by the same procedures to produce 
different manifest outputs. 
A similar point is made by Brown (1991) in his book Human Universals. Brown 
claims that there has been a bias in anthropology and other culture studies in favour of 
looking for differences between different cultures. However, underlying the manifest 
differences between cultures, Brown argues, are human universals. For example, 
although cultures around the world differ dramatically in the number of colour words 
that they have in their lexicon, there are universal patterns of colour discrimination. 
Regardless of the number of colour words that a culture possesses, members of that 
culture can see and categorize the same number of colours in the same way as 
individuals from other cultures. Indeed, as Brown (1991) points out, anthropological 
research could simply not be carried out without the extended repertoire of similarities 
that exist between peoples of different cultures. From this perspective, psychological 
and social phenomena remain stable across different cultures, even though they may 
vary in their expression, regulation, and importance. 
To take a simple example, people in different cultures speak different languages. 
These differences may be termed cultural differences. However, underlying what 
appears to be a considerable diversity of phenotypes is a species typical language 
acquisition device which is universal across cultures. In explaining why people 'speak 
Japanese' or 'speak English' we need an account of the operation of the psychological 
mechanisms underlying language acquisition and the specific social context in which 
they develop. 'Speaking Japanese' therefore is neither solely a cultural trait not a 
biological one, but one which is the result of a reliable developmental process 
operating under certain cultural condition. It is a biocultural phenomenon. 
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The example outlined above very neatly reflects the operation of innate psychological 
processes under varying environmental contexts. In this case there is a clear unity at 
the evolved level which explains the diversity at the manifest leveL Other examples 
are a little more obscure. Consider the phenomenon of ritualised homosexuality in 
Melanesia (Herdt, 1984). Among many diverse tribes in Melanesia male adolescents 
go through a period of ritualised homosexual behaviour. These rituals centre on the 
power of sperm and its role in developing male vigour and strength. Among the 
Sambia of Papua New Guinea this belief is coupled with idea that female secretions 
are dangerous and strength sapping to males. As a consequence, young boys must go 
through an extended period of separation from their mothers and indulge in fellatio to 
build up their strength for man-hood. Associated with the development of homosexual 
behaviour is the initiation of nose-bleeds, which are used to expel the evil fluids male 
boys are subjected to at their mothers breasts. Male homosexuality among the Sambia 
is embedded in a rich meaning-based context and is surrounded by a farrago of 
seemingly bizarre practices and beliefs specific to this culture. 
No doubt it would be possible in this example to invoke the action of psychological 
mechanisms underlying sexual and perhaps homosexual behaviour (e.g., see Baker & 
Bellis, 1995). However, the behaviour which is manifest in this example seems to be 
only diffusely related to these specific psychological processes and is embedded in a 
belief-system which is culturally unique. How do evolutionary approaches to culture 
explain these kinds of examples of cultural practices embodied in the case of 
ritualised homosexuality? 
Explaining culture 
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) attempt to explain the diversity of cultural phenomena by 
invoking a distinction between three different types of culture: meta-culture, evoked 
culture, and epidemiological culture. Meta-culture refers to the shared culture of 
human-kind and reflects the operation of mechanisms which are functionally 
organised to interact with regularities of the environment so as to produce universal 
human traits. Evoked culture is culture which represents the facultative operation of 
psychological mechanisms under different environmental conditions. This leads to 
226 
within-group similarities and between group differences. Finally, epidemiological 
culture refers to the accumulation of representations from the social environment via 
social learning mechanisms. 
The first two types of culture are clearly wedded to evolutionary processes. 
Psychological adaptations undermine both the similarity and differences found across 
cultures. The third type of culture - epidemiological culture - is less clearly influenced 
by psychological adaptations, but according to Tooby & Cosmides (1992) is not 
therefore a free-floating process. This is because ultimately what influences the 
distribution of representations from one generation to the next is their compatibility 
with our evolved psychological architecture. 
Dan Sperber (1996) articulates an epidemiological approach to culture along similar 
lines. The focus of Sperber's work, as with that of Tooby and Cosmides, is on the 
psychological mechanisms which underlie cultural learning. To explain culture, 
Sperber argues, we need to account for why some ideas or beliefs happen to be widely 
distributed while others are not. Sperber (1996) favours an attraction model of culture, 
one in which the role of both cognitive processes and the environment are brought to 
the fore. We should focus, Sperber argues, on the psychological and ecological factors 
of attraction which influence the distribution of representations. 
The environment determines the survival and composition of the culture-
bearing population; it contains all the inputs to the cognitive systems of the 
members of the popUlation; it determines when, where and by what medium 
transmission may occur and it imposes constraints on the formation and 
stability of different types of public productions. The mental organisation of 
individuals determines which available inputs are processed, how they are 
processed, and which information guides behaviours that, in turn, modify the 
environment. (Sperber, 1996, p. 113) 
We need rich and detailed accounts, therefore, of both the social and historical 
circumstances in which an individual is embedded as well as an understanding of the 
underling evolved psychological mechanisms that humans possess. Cultural diversity, 
Sperber argues, can be primarily conceptualised as the actual domains of proper 
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domains. Over time the actual domains may become considerably distanced from 
their proper domains; however, ultimately, mental modules fix the range of cultural 
content. 
The approaches of both Sperber and Tooby and Cosmides emphasise the importance 
of understanding the evolved psychological processes which underlie learning. They 
also both point to the importance of explicating the social and cultural context in 
which the individual develops. A more explicitly co-evolutionary model has been 
developed in some detail by Boyd and Richerson (1985). The approach of Boyd and 
Richerson also places considerable importance on the role of psychological processes 
in explaining culture, but there is also attention paid to the way population-level 
processes influence the distribution of ideas within and across social groups. 
The basic argument forwarded by Boyd and Richerson can be formulated as follows 
(Richerson & Boyd, 1987): 
(1) Cultural variation is shaped by evolved psychological predispositions. Some 
information, beliefs and the like are more likely to be acquired than others. 
(2) Some beliefs are weakly affected by evolved predispositions, therefore other 
processes are important in cultural evolution. 
(3) Such beliefs can affect behaviour. 
(4) Properties of culture are important selective environments of humans and explain 
the nature of many evolved predispositions. 
The first point in Boyd and Richerson's argument is similar to the positions adopted 
by Sperber and Cosmides and Tooby, and indicates one legitimate way in which 
culture can be given an evolutionary explanation. However, Boyd and Richerson also 
stress the importance of transmission patterns that are only weakly influenced by 
specific evolved predispositions. They also point out that the profile of beliefs and 
ideas in a culture can exert an influence on natural selection, for example via 
culturally specified mating patterns. Just which cultural traits are strongly or weakly 
influenced by evolved predispositions can only be adjudicated on a case by case basis 
(Richerson & Boyd, 1987). However, Boyd and Richerson do not advance, as some 
claim, a decoupling of genetic and cultural evolution, although it seems that some 
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traits may be more directly influenced by evolved biases than others. In their model, 
Boyd & Richerson suggest three different kinds of biased transmission. 
A somewhat different approach to culture, one in which genetic evolution is 
decoupled from cultural evolution, is that of memetics (e.g., see Dawkins, 1976; 
Dennett, 1995). Memetics proposes that cultural change is a truly evolutionary 
process. Cultural traits or 'memes' are the units of information which get transmitted 
over time via diverse media (books, brains etc.), vary in their nature, and exhibit 
differential survival rates. Just as genes compete for space in the species genome, so 
to do memes compete for space in the infosphere of human ideas. Memetics has some 
attractive aspects to it. It seems to account for the sheer proliferation of seemingly 
bizarre and irrelevant ideas in human cultures. Ideas proliferate not because they are. 
necessarily useful, let alone reproductively beneficial, but simply because they are 
good at ensuring their own replication. 
However, despite some attractive properties, meme theory, critics argue, possesses 
some telling differences from genetic evolution - differences which render the 
analogy between cultural and biological evolution problematic. One problem, 
highlighted by Sperber (1996), is that there is simply too much slack between descent 
and similarity; the mutation rate of memes is simply to high. Cultural representations 
are not reliably replicated from one mind to another, but are transformed as a result of 
cognitive processes. Memetics, it is argued, omits the crucial role of psychological 
factors in the distribution of ideas. Furthermore, as Sterelny (1992) points out, 
memetics is problematic because, in its current guise, there is no handle on why some 
ideas are preferred over others. Natural selection is not a tautology as some have 
argued, because we have an independent grasp of what fitness is. Memetics however, 
as Sterelny argues, fails to evade this problem. Indeed it seems to me that the only 
way we can float a viable mimetic approach to culture is by including the role of 
evolved psychological mechanisms which influence the distribution of ideas between 
and across cultures. Any such approach, of course, cannot sustain the idea that culture 
is an alternative explanation of psychological and social phenomena. 
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Summary 
The main arguments directed against the evolutionary programme in psychology from 
the perspective of culture cannot be sustained. It is difficult to see how culture can be 
truly considered as either a completely alternative explanation or an entirely parallel 
process to the forces of biological evolution. Evolutionary theory, therefore, is likely 
to play some role in the explanation of cultural traits. That is not to deny that much of 
what is of interest to psychologists has to be understood at the social level. Moreover, 
it is clear that a rich and detailed account of cultural and historical forces is required 
as part of many complete explanations of psychological phenomena. I think, however, 
this serves to emphasis the crucial role that the environment plays in developing 
satisfactory explanations of any biological phenomena. There still remains, however, 
a lingering doubt that the kind of phenomenon illustrated by the ritualised 
homosexuality example, seems to be so far removed from evolved psychological 
mechanisms, and so clearly embedded in local cultural circumstances as to make 
evolutionary theory irrelevant in explaining its origin and nature. 
This issue highlights a repeated concern regarding the specificity of evolutionary 
explanations. Evolutionary theory may provide an explanation for a range of 
capacities that humans posses, but fails to satisfactorily further understanding of the 
details of human life. A way of reconciling some of these concerns is illustrated in the 
following chapter in the context of jealousy and is elaborated more fully in chapter 
ten. 
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Chapter Nine 
Explaining jealousy: A case study 
Jealousy is an emotion which can play an important role in the dynamics of human 
romantic and sexual relationships. This role has been explored in countless films, 
novels, and plays, notably of course in Shakespeare's searching portrayal of sexual 
jealousy in Othello. In this chapter I will critically examine the various different 
explanations for jealousy that have been developed. My primary focus here is on the 
epistemic worth of evolutionary explanations of jealousy in comparison to alternative 
theoretical accounts. This chapter, then, is an exercise in theory appraisal. That is, I 
will examine to what extent the evolutionary programme provides a more 
explanatorily coherent account of the various phenomena associated with jealousy 
than do other theoretical approaches. As will become clear in my analysis, however, 
the main task will be in elucidating the complementary nature of the various different 
approaches. As such, this chapter serves as a case study of the way evolutionary 
explanations in general are likely to figure in attempts to promote an understanding of 
psychological phenomena. 
The choice of jealousy as a topic is somewhat arbitrary in nature and I think that other 
examples would have equally adequately served my purposes here. However, jealousy 
in particular and the study of emotion more generally are areas in which detailed 
evolutionary accounts have been offered by a variety of authors (e.g., Panksepp, 1982; 
Ekman, 1992; Plutchik, 1990). The psychology of emotion has also been pursued 
from a range of other perspectives such as cognitive (Lazarus, 1991), social (Harre, 
1986) and cultural. The diversity of different approaches to emotion is highlighted by 
Strongman's (1996) text on the psychology of emotion which discusses over a 
hundred and fifty different theories of emotion. In my analysis of the nature of 
jealousy and the sorts of explanations that have and should be developed I will offer 
some ideas regarding ways of integrating various different theoretical perspectives to 
provide coherent and unifying explanatory accounts. 
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I begin this chapter with a discussion of the nature of jealousy and the various 
different aspects of jealous experiences which need to be explained. My account here 
is somewhat loose in the sense that I provide a relatively motley collection of things 
to be explained regarding jealousy rather than detailing specific phenomena which 
have been reliably and repeatedly demonstrated. This in part reflects the relative 
paucity of research in this area. However, my portrayal of jealousy provides a 
reasonable characterization of the sorts of things that we need to be able to explain to 
further our understanding of the nature of jealousy. 
This discussion of jealousy is followed by an elaboration of the various different 
kinds of theories or approaches that have been developed in an attempt to explain the 
nature of jealousy. Finally, I discuss the ways in which the various different 
approaches to jealousy relate to one another, with a particular focus on the role that 
evolutionary explanations have to play in furthering our understanding of jealousy. 
Some of the ideas regarding the nature of scientific explanations presented in chapter 
one and two will be employed to clarify just what kinds of explanation are being 
offered by the various different approaches and how in general our understanding of 
jealousy is likely to be advanced. 
The nature of jealousy 
Various authors have offered a variety of different definitions of jealousy. Some 
approaches lump together romantic and sexual jealousy with sibling jealousy, or with 
the emotion of envy (e.g., Salothey & Rothman, 1991). I shall confine my analysis, 
however, to what might be termed romantic/sexual jealousy; that is, jealousy that 
occurs in the context ofa romantic-sexual relationship. Wilson and Daly (1992, p. 42) 
define this kind of jealousy as "the state of being concerned that ones sexual 
exclusivity is or might be violated." This definition is similar to that offered by most 
authors. For example, Bringle and Buunk (1985, p. 42) characterise jealousy as an 
"aversive emotional reaction that occurs as the result of a partners extradyadic 
relationship that is real, imagined, or considered likely to occur." 
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There is some agreement among various different researchers that jealousy does not 
represent a discrete emotion, but is better considered a blend of other emotions such 
as anger, fear, and sadness (Sharpsteen, 1991; White & Mullen, 1989). Moreover, 
jealousy is often characterised as a system rather than a discrete entity, which 
comprises "particular patterns of emotions, thoughts and actions that emerge in 
particular social and psychological situations" (White & Mullen, 1989, p.l). In 
detailing the aspects of jealousy that need to be explained we need to focus on those 
particular thoughts, feelings and actions which are typically invoked under particular 
environmental contexts. 
General features of jealousy 
The first and most important thing that is in need of an explanation is the phenomenon 
of jealousy itself and why it is reliably experienced in certain contexts but not in 
others. That is, why do individuals experience jealousy when they perceive a potential 
threat to their relationship in the form of a sexual or emotional rival for their partner's 
affections? We need to be able to explain here why jealousy is experienced in this 
context, but not say in the context of a threat to a relationship which is instigated by 
other means, such as partner incompatibility, or geographical separation. We also 
need to explain the ubiquity of jealousy. That is, why is jealousy reliably experienced 
by both females and males, by peoples of different cultures and by people at different 
times in history? That is, why is jealousy such a common problem in close 
relationships? 
We also need to be able to explain the specific phenomenological experience of 
jealousy. In the appropriate context subjects report experiencing a 'jealous flash', an 
emotion often described as intense anger or fear (White & Mullen, 1989). Anger 
appears to be the most common emotion experienced in a jealous episode, followed 
by fear and sadness (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Conner, 1987). The exact 
experience, however, depends in part of the specific context. Suspicious jealousy is 
more often associated with feelings labeled as jealousy and insecurity, whereas 
confirmed jealousy is typically associated with emotions of anger and sadness 
(Zammer & Fischer, 1991). 
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. Responses to jealousy 
Responses to jealousy-invoking situations may be various, but they seem to fall into 
certain patterns. Three factors that emerged in a factor analytic study conducted by 
Buunk (1982) were avoidance, reappraisal and communication. White and Mullen 
(1989) extended this list to identify eight different coping strategies which include 
improving the primary relationship, developing commitment, derogating the partner 
or rival and developing alternatives to the primary relationship. 
One important strategy identified by a number of authors (Buss, 1988; Buunk, 1982) 
was to improve the quality of the primary relationship. Subjects suggested that 
fulfilling the desires of the other partner, and hence increasing the value of the 
relationship could achieve this. Tactics that subjects in a study by Buss (1988) 
suggested would be effective were the provisioning of gifts and kindness by males 
and the enhancement of appearance by females. More generally speaking, any 
behaviour which could be seen as fulfilling the preferences held by the partner would 
be likely to be successful. 
Another general strategy is to employ forms of emotional manipulation. For example, 
the inducement of guilt in a partner might be used to prevent or stop the occurrence of 
an extra-dyadic relationship. This might be achieved by invoking either the norms of 
society or the norms, explicitly or implicitly, established in the relationship itself 
(Buunk, 1991). The deliberate inducement of jealousy is also reported on by a number 
of researchers (e.g. White & Mullen, 1989) as a strategy to increase commitment from 
one of the partners or as revenge for a prior infringement of the relationship's 
exclusivity by one of the partners. 
Another kind of response reported by subjects, more appropriate to SUSpICIOUS 
jealousy, was to maintain some kind of vigilance on one's partner (Buss, 1988). This 
sort of vigilance might include calling on the partner at unexpected times, reading 
their correspondence and spending long periods of time with the partner thereby 
decreasing their opportunities for extra-dyadic affairs. These kinds of responses are 
seen in both sexes, although they seem to be more prevalent among men (Buss, 1994). 
In a study by Flinn (1988) male mate guarding was also shown to correlate with the 
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likely fertility of the partner. Mate guarding seemed to be less prevalent for older 
partners or partners who were pregnant. The concealment of partners is another 
method employed to reduce the possibility of extra-dyadic relationships, and might be 
especially used in contexts where rivals are likely to be present (Buss, 1994). 
More severe forms of vigilance and mate-guarding include claustration in India, the 
veiling of women's bodies in Arabic cultures, guarded harems, foot-binding practiced 
by some Chinese cultures and the practice of chaperoning (Daly, Wilson & Weghorst, 
1982). Other measures employed to prevent the likelihood of extra-dyadic sexual 
relations include the practices of clitorodectomy and infibulation which are performed 
on women in many countries throughout north-eastern Africa. These procedures 
involve the surgical removal of parts of the female genitalia, typically the clitoris, and 
in infibulation the suturing shut of the labia majora so as to make sexual intercourse 
impossible l (Dalyet aI., 1982; Hicks, 1993). 
Other strategies sometimes employed in response to actual or suspected infidelity, 
include aggression and violence. At the psychological level this may involve 
derogation of the partner or the potential rival. Physical violence is also a not 
infrequent response to sexual jealousy (Daly & Wilson, 1988; Daly et aI., 1982). 
Indeed, male sexual jealousy is the most common cause of all types of violence 
directed at wives. Jealousy is also the major motive for homicides of spouses and 
other men (Daly & Wilson, 1988). In research conducted by Buss (1988), 46% of all 
married men reported that they had threatened an intra-sexual competitor within the 
last year. Although violence and occasionally homicide is more frequently reported to 
be carried out by men, it is also a strategy employed by women as well. 
Finally, another reasonably common response to infidelity by one's partner is simply 
to leave the relationship. In a detailed study of 160 sample societies carried out by 
Betzig (1989), adultery was significantly the most common cause of conjugal 
dissolution. Infidelity across cultures seems to be widely regarded as an acceptable 
reason for marriage break-ups. 
1 Typically young girls are infibulated at puberty and defibualted when they get married. They also 
may be reinfibulated after the birth of a child or if their husband is going away for some period of time 
(Hicks,1993 ) 
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Modifying variables 
A number of different variables have been identified by various authors as modifying 
the nature and intensity of jealousy responses. Many of these factors are associated 
with the self-esteem of the individual concerned and their overall amount of 
relationship dependency. For example, perceived inadequacy as a partner is strongly 
correlated with the likelihood and intensity of jealous experiences (White, 1981; 
White & Mullen, 1989). Similarly, highly dependent partners were also more likely to 
express jealousy and experience increased levels of jealousy (White & Mullen, 1989). 
Furthermore, subj ects with greater expected difficulty in finding partners were also 
more likely to be jealous and experience more intense jealousy (White, 1981). 
Conversely, levels of satisfaction and commitment were negatively associated with 
the degree of jealousy experienced. 
The qualities of the rival also play an important role in moderating the degree and 
likelihood of sexual jealousy. More jealousy is invoked, for example, when the rival is 
perceived as being similar to the partner (White, 1981). Furthermore, when the rival is 
perceived as being superior to the self on attributes valued by the individual, more 
jealousy is also experienced (Salothey & Rothman, 1991). 
Aspects of the relationship also play an important role in moderating the nature of the 
jealousy experience. For example, expectations of sexual exclusivity are strongly 
related to jealousy (White & Mullen, 1989). Jealousy is also more intense when 
individuals do not have an extra-dyadic relationship of their own at that time (Buunk, 
1991). 
Gender differences 
Many of the variables and strategies identified above have been demonstrated to have 
fairly reliable gender differences. It is firstly worth noting that there are no reliable 
gender differences in the degree and intensity of jealousy experienced. Both men and 
women reliably report experiencing jealousy in the context of a threat to the primary 
relationship imposed by a potential or actual rival (White & Mullen, 1989). However, 
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men and women seem to be more sensitive to different kinds of threat to the primary 
relationship. Men report experiencing greater distress to potential sexual infidelity on 
their partner's behalf. Women on the other hand, report experiencing greater distress 
to emotional rather than sexual infidelity (Buss, Larsen, Westen, & Semmelroth, 
1992; Buunk & Hupka, 1987). Physiological responses such as heart rate and 
electrodermal activity also follow a similar pattern. Men experience more physical 
distress to the sexual rather than the emotional infidelity scenarios, whereas women 
experience greater levels of physiological response to the emotional rather than the 
sexual infidelity scenarios. The basic pattern of these results, although with somewhat 
different magnitudes, has also been replicated in samples form Germany and the 
Netherlands (Buunk, Angleitner, Oubaid, Buss, 1996), and from China (Geary, 
Rumsey, Bow-Thomas, Hoard, 1996). Although this finding is a robust one, it also 
should be noted that men and women differ in their expectations that casual sex is 
likely to lead to emotional attachment. Harris and Christenfeld (1996) demonstrate 
that women are more likely to believe of men than men are of women that casual sex 
is not going to lead to an emotional attachment with the opposite sex. 
In general there seems to be a reasonably robust gender difference regarding the 
importance of sex in the context of a possible extra-dyadic relationship. Men more 
than women, for example, emphasize chastity as an important attribute in a mate and 
see promiscuity as an especially undesirable property of a potential partner (Buss & 
Barnes, 1986). Indeed, in a study by Buss and Schmitt (1993), men rated faithfulness 
and sexual loyalty as the most important traits that they look for in a partner for a 
committed long-term relationship. Unfaithfulness also emerged as the most upsetting 
behavior that a woman can inflict on a man in a committed relationship. 
Unfaithfulness is also ranked as distressful for females, but not quite so highly (Buss, 
1989). 
Males also experience greater threat to their primary relationship when a rival is 
perceived as superior in terms of sexual behavior. Females on the other hand 
experience greater threat when the rival is perceived as being more physically 
attractive and superior in social skills than they are (White & Mullen, 1989). Related 
to this finding, males but not females were more jealous if an extra-dyadic 
relationship on the part of their partner led to sexual deterioration in the primary 
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relationship (White & Mullen, 1989). In general, expectations of sexual exclusivity 
are better predictors of male rather than female jealousy. 
The coping strategies employed by females and males also tend to differ to some 
extent. Males are more likely to employ violence or extreme vigilance tactics than are 
females and are also more likely to end a relationship or consider an alternative 
relationship if their partner is engaged in an extra-dyadic affair. Women on the other 
hand, are more likely to engage in activities aimed at reconciliation and strategies 
designed to further increase the emotional commitment in the primary relationship. 
These differences are also seen in patterns of divorce in different cultures. In twenty-
five societies, out of a sample of 160, divorce follows from adultery by either partner, 
in fifty-four societies it follows from adultery on the wife's part and in two societies it 
follows only from adultery on the males part (Betzig, 1989). 
Cross-cultural aspects of jealousy 
Jealousy appears to be a cross-cultural universal. There are virtually no reports in the 
ethnographic literature which indicate that there are any jealous-free societies (White 
& Mullen, 1989; Buss, 1994). There is also some evidence to suggest that the 
intensity of emotions experienced in different cultures is fairly similar (e.g., Zammer 
& Fischer, 1991). However, there does seem to be some variation in the kinds of 
situations that elicit jealousy and in the nature of the subsequent responses to 
jealousy-evoking situations in different cultures. For example, among the Pawnee of 
the American plains requests by another male for a cup of water from one's wife is a 
sign that the other man is after the wife, whereas in the Saora of India a husband must 
actually witness his wife engaged in sexual congress with another male before she can 
be accused of jealousy (White & Mullen, 1989). 
Typical coping strategies also vary in different cultures and will depend in part on the 
laws, customs and norms of a given society. There is, however, a widespread 
acceptance in many cultures that homicide is a justified response to partner infidelity, 
especially on a males part (Daly, Wilson & Weghorst, 1982). The severity of 
aggressiveness by men in jealousy situations, however, seems to be determined in part 
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by the importance attached to marriage in the society, restrictions to extra-marital sex, 
and the relative emphasis placed on private property (Hupka, 1991). 
There is also some evidence to suggest that there are cultures where sexual infidelity 
is condoned or even encouraged in some contexts (Ford & Beach, 1952). In some 
Innuit groups, for example, mutual agreement may be reached between two families 
to exchange mates. Altogether Ford & Beach (1952) identified seven out of one 
hundred and thirty nine societies where normal prohibitions against extra-marital 
intercourse are relaxed. However, as Daly et aI. (1982) point out, despite the relative 
sexual permissiveness of these cultures, jealousy is not absent and violent reactions to 
sexual infidelity are not uncommon. Indeed, jealousy is the leading cause of spousal 
homicide in Innuit societies (Daly et aI., 1982). 
Jealousy in open marriages 
It would seem from the cultural evidence that sexual permissiveness in a society does 
not necessarily result in the absence of jealousy. The same seems to be true of open 
marriages or swinging couples. In a study by Buunk (1981), 80% of individuals in 
open marriages experienced some jealousy. If the various ground-rules set by 
swinging couples are strictly adhered to, however, jealousy can be reduced (Buunk, 
1991). However, despite a strong self-selection bias for lack of jealousy, jealousy 
seems to a reasonably common problel? experienced in open marriages and swinging 
couples. As White and Mullen (1989, p. 122) conclude: "despite [considerable] efforts 
up to a third of swingers soon drop out because of their own or their partner's 
jealousy." 
Legal and social structures 
Many of the laws that exist or have existed regarding sexual infidelity reflect to a 
considerable degree the features of jealousy illustrated in the foregoing discussion. 
For example, many laws cross-culturally and historically reflect male concerns over 
sexual infidelity and a double standard with respect to the morality of adulterous 
behaviour. There are many laws in force, for example, which exonerate a man for 
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killing his adulterous wife or wife's lover. In Texas until 1974 it was legal for a 
husband to kill his wife and her lover if he found them engaged in sexual intercourse 
(Daly & Wilson, 1988). Cross-culturally, adultery is often viewed as a mitigating 
circumstance in the context of homicide. Many of the laws relating to adultery seem 
to reflect general laws regarding property rights and adultery is usually defined in 
terms of the marital status of women (Wilson & Daly, 1992). 
An evolutionary approach to jealousy 
From an evolutionary perspective jealousy is conceived of as a system of feelings, 
thoughts, and behaviours, which have evolved because of the reproductive advantages 
that they conferred on our ancestors. That is, those individuals, both males and 
females, who experienced jealousy under certain narrowly delineated circumstances 
and acted in various sorts of ways were more likely to be reproductively successful 
than those individuals that did not experience jealousy. Jealousy, therefore, is 
hypothesized to be an adaptation: a trait with a proper function under normal 
conditions (Daly et aI., 1982; Wilson & Daly, 1992; Buss, 1995). 
Explanations of jealousy from an evolutionary perspective draw on both the hard core 
of the evolutionary programme, as noted above, and the conceptual resources of two 
important auxiliary theories - parental investment theory and sexual selection theory. 
Parental investment theory (Trivers, 1972) suggests that in any species with internal 
fertilisation there will be an asymmetry between the two sexes with respect to their 
confidence regarding the certainty that any offspring will be their own and not 
somebody elses. Females in most species can be assured that the offspring that they 
raise are their own; typically males are rather less certain. This uncertainty of 
paternity represents a strong selection pressure operating against extended paternal 
investment. Because a male can never be sure that the offspring that he is investing in 
is his own, the benefits of investing time and resources into raising offspring are 
likely to outweighed by the potential costs of being cuckolded. 
In species where parental investment has evolved, we would expect the evolution of 
various strategies that increase the likelihood of paternity certainty. That is, there 
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would be strong selection pressures for the evolution of any mechanisms which 
decreased the likelihood that the investing male would raise and provision offspring 
that were not his own. Similarly, to the extent that paternal investment is an important 
component for the viability of offspring, we would expect the evolution of various 
mechanisms in females which decreased the likelihood that their mate would desert 
them or divert resources to other females. The strength of the selection pressures here 
will be determined, to a large extent, by the likelihood that either sex will indulge in 
sexual activity outside of the primary mateship. The evolution of mechanisms 
designed to decrease paternity uncertainty and increase the confidence of paternal 
investment will be a function, in part, of the sexual proclivities of both sexes. 
Furthermore, sexual selection theory suggests that both females and males would 
benefit by selecting partners which are most likely to further their evolutionary goals 
in terms of assuring paternity certainty and assuring continued paternal investment in 
offspring. 
Evolutionary approaches suggest that the mechanism that has evolved in humans to 
decrease paternity uncertainty and increase confidence in paternal investment is the 
psychological/motivational/emotional complex which we label jealousy (Daly et aI., 
1982; Wilson & Daly, 1992; Buss, 1994). 
Ancestral hominids needed a psychological mechanism specifically designed 
to alert them to potential threats from the outside, a mechanism that would 
regulate when to swing into action in deploying mate guarding strategies. That 
mechanism is sexual jealousy. 
(Buss, 1994, p. 125) 
Those who promote an evolutionary approach to jealousy suggest that the 
evolutionary research programme offers a coherent and unified way of understanding 
the various factors associated with jealousy. The emotion of jealousy exists because it 
represents an adaptive solution to the problems associated with paternity confidence 
and assuring paternal investment. Jealousy only, or at least predominately, occurs in 
the context of threats to the primary relationship brought about by actual or possible 
extra-dyadic relationships on the part of one of the partners because it is just this kind 
of threat which may possibly lead to a drastic decrease in reproductive success. The 
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break-up of a pair-bond for other reasons, although detrimental in terms of wasted 
time and resources, does not· represent quite such a threat. This is because the 
occurrence of extra-dyadic relationships threaten to totally undermine the investment 
of the male as he may end up provisioning children which are not his own. For 
women the possibility of an extra-dyadic relationship on the part of her partner 
threatens the flow of key resources potentially essential for the survival of her 
offspring. 
The adverse phenomenological nature of jealousy can be explained in terms of 
general evolutionary approaches to emotion. The affective nature of emotion exists in 
order to motivate individuals to behave in certain ways that are adaptive. The pain of 
jealousy has evolved as a means of promoting various ways of acting that relieve that 
pain and which generally are likely to lead to successful reproductive outcomes. 
The typical patterns of thoughts and actions associated with jealousy are explained 
from an evolutionary perspective as ways of either preventing extra-dyadic 
relationships (mate-guarding, vigilance, etc.), preventing the break-up of a 
relationship (investing more resources, derogating the rival, using emotional 
manipulation), signaling to the partner and relevant others the unacceptability of the 
extra-dyadic behaviour (violence, homicide), or simply cutting one's losses (leaving 
the relationship). The evolutionary approach argues that jealousy is a facultative 
adaptation which can lead to a variety of different strategies depending of the context 
of the situation and the nature of the relationship. 
Explanations of jealousy drawn from the evolutionary research programme can also 
further our understanding of the range of variables associated with jealousy. The 
relationships between jealousy, self-esteem, relationship dependence and the quality 
of the potential rival can be understood in terms of the relative importance of the 
specific relationship to the individual and the likelihood that the relationship will be 
subverted by a relevant other. In the context of an extra-dyadic threat, low-quality 
mates who are highly dependent on the current relationship are likely to suffer greater 
reproductive losses than high-quality mates who may be able to easily find another 
mate. If the rival is superior to oneself and is similar to the partner in their attributes, 
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then the chances that the relationship will be undermined will be considerably 
increased. 
The various gender differences found in jealousy have also figured prominently in 
evolutionary accounts. The pervasive gender difference in the salience of sexual vs. 
emotional infidelity is explained in terms of the different reproductive threats faced by 
men and women. For men, a single sexual encounter by one's partner2 may result in 
the costs of rearing offspring that are not one's own. This potentially represents a 
major fitness cost. Hence, this explains why men seem especially concerned with 
sexual infidelity and why chastity but not promiscuity are valued traits in a mate. This 
also explains why jealousy is greater when the extra-dyadic relationship is related to a 
decrease in sexual activity in the primary relationship and why jealousy is sometimes 
associated with sexual arousal. From the male's perspective, even given the presence 
of a significant other, current and continued sexual activity with one's mate is likely 
to be adaptive. For women, the major fitness cost resulting in one's partner's extra-
dyadic sexual relationships is the divergence of resources from the current mateship to 
the new one. This explains why emotional infidelity is more salient to women, as it is 
a more reliable indicator that her mate is likely to abandon her or to decrease his level 
of paternal investment. Or course both emotional and sexual infidelities are of 
concern to both males and females because they are likely to be highly, but not 
perfectly, correlated with one another. 
The difference between men and women in coping strategies can also be explained 
from an evolutionary perspective. Because the costs of sexual infidelity are greater for 
males than for females, the use of vigilance, violence, and desertion represent 
strategies designed to prevent extra-pair copulations and to immediately withdraw 
resources if extra-dyadic sexual relations are discovered. The prevalence of 
relationship improving tactics on the part of females can be explained in terms of the 
importance for women in maintaining the flow of resources that are obtained in the 
primary relationship even in the face of some sexual infidelity. 
2 Under historical conditions of course, the lack of reliable contraception would make this a real 
possibility. 
243 
The ubiquity of jealousy across cultures is explained by the evolutionary perspective 
in terms of the presence of universal psychological adaptations. The fact that jealousy 
occurs in all societies and even in the context of marriage situations which sanction 
extra-pair relations, is explained in terms of the developmentally robust construction 
of those processes that underlie jealousy and is testimony to the reproductive 
advantages that accrue to those individuals who possess those mechanisms. 
Differences in responses between different individuals in different cultures and the 
variety of different specific strategies which are employed by individuals in various 
cultures are not directly explained from an evolutionary perspective, even though it is 
argued that evolved psychological mechanisms are at the heart of any explanation of 
these differences. Specific phenomena such as infibulation are only partly explicable 
in terms of men's evolved psychological mechanisms, and the relevant details of the 
social structure, and the beliefs of the community also need to be invoked to advance 
a complete understanding of this phenomenon. 
The prevalence of certain laws relating to adultery has also been explained from an 
evolutionary perspective as the formal instantiation of male's concerns regarding 
sexual infidelity. Because in most societies males have political power, many of the 
laws will reflect the interests and concerns of men. The legal formalization of the 
double standard, therefore, is just a manifestation of male's sexual proprietriness and 
the chronic male fear of cuckoldry. Evolutionary theory only offers part of the 
explanation here, however, because specific laws and changes in the law are also 
caused be various social mechanisms not necessarily related to the evolved 
psychological preferences of men. 
The evolutionary approach to jealousy, therefore, seems to offer a coherent and 
unified approach to explaining many of the phenomena associated with jealousy. 
Questions, however, have been raised regarding the viability of the evolutionary 
approach. Just what evidence is there to suggest that jealousy really is an evolutionary 
adaptation? The first step in developing a viable evolutionary explanation for jealousy 
is to establish that the conditions under which humans evolved were such, given 
parental investment and sexual selection theory, that we would expect a mechanism 
like jealousy to be selected for. 
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Contemporary humans are characterized by internal fertilization and gestation, pair-
bonding with considerable male investment, and a tendency towards polygyny. 
Moreover, in humans female ovulation is concealed, therefore increasing the window 
of potentially relevant sexual infidelity to which human males should be sensitive. 
Importantly it is worth noting that pair-bonding, socially sanctioned in marriage, is a 
human universal. Furthermore, although the amount of contribution will vary 
individually and cross-culturally, males often invest heavily in terms of time and 
resources in the raising of offspring. Contemporary studies of extra-dyadic 
relationships also suggest that infidelity is a not too infrequent occurrence for both 
males and females (see Baker & Bellis, 1995). Pair-bonding, parental investment and 
sexual infidelity certainly characterize contemporary human populations, but what 
evidence is there to suggest these features were present in our evolutionary past when 
the putative mechanisms underlying sexual jealousy were selected for? 
Several lines of evidence suggest that pair-bonding between males and females with 
reasonably high levels of parental investment may have characterized the social 
structure of early hominids. The evolution of pair-bonding in Homo has been linked to 
bipedalism, increase in brain size, the shift to a predominantly terrestrial environment 
and the increasing dependency on meat as a primary food source (e. g., Lovejoy, 1981; 
Foley, 1987; Foley & Lee, 1989). In the increasingly dry and mosaic environment 
characteristic of the Pleistocene two million years ago, it is suggested that early Homo 
began to rely more heavily on meat, either scavenged or hunted, as an important 
source of food. A consequence of meat eating, given the relative patchiness of 
resources, is the increase in home range and day range size. About two million years 
ago a rapid increase in brain size is also observed. Given the biomechanics of giving 
birth to a large-brained infant from a body adapted to bidepalism, a relatively 
premature birth would have been the only solution. Indeed, for a mammal of our brain 
size a pregnancy of 21 months would normally be expected. The premature nature of 
Homo infants means that they required extended periods of care and provisioning. 
Increasing maternal reproductive costs associated with infant vulnerability and the 
wider home range associated with meat consumption would have led to the increase 
in the frequency and intensity of male-female associations (Foley & Lee, 1989). One 
solution to these problems would have been the establishment of stable pair-bonds 
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between males and females. 3 The advantage to females is the increased viability of 
their offspring through male provisioning of meat. The presence of such bonds would 
also have been advantageous to men in that they were capable of monopolizing a 
single female. This may have been especially important given the evolution of 
concealed ovulation in females and hence the uncertainly for men regarding optimal 
times for copulation. The low levels of sexual dimorphism characteristic of the Homo 
line also suggest the likelihood of some form of pair-bonding. The relative difference 
in size between males and females in a good indicator, across species, of the degree of 
polygamy found in that species. Large differences between males and females, as 
found say in elephant seals, is associated with high level of intra-sex competition and 
a strongly polygamous mating strategy. The relatively slight sexual dimorphism found 
in Homo, is indicative of monogamy or mild levels of polygamy. The available 
evidence, therefore, seems to suggest that the pair-bond, ubiquitous in contemporary 
human populations, was a feature of our ancestors for some two million years or so. 
There is also evidence to indicate that sexual infidelity in the form of multiple matings 
was a feature of Pleistocene sexual behavior for both males and females. Firstly, it is 
worth noting the potential reproductive benefits that both males and females might 
have accrued by pursing a strategy which involved some degree of sexual infidelity. 
For males, unburdened with the costs of gestation, lactation and so forth, any 
additional copulations would represent a low-cost boost to their overall reproductive 
success. Therefore, we would expect fairly strong selection pressures in favour of 
male sexual promiscuity. However, the extent of male sexual promiscuity will be 
determined, in part, by the preferences of females. That is, male promiscuity could not 
have been selected for if historically females had denied males the expression of that 
trait (Smith, 1984). The advantages for female sexual promiscuity may seem less 
obvious. After all, a female's reproductive success is limited to the number of 
offspring that she can sire and cannot be considerably increased through additional 
sexual couplings. 
3 An alternative strategy would have been to increase female kin-bonding and the use of other females 
as providers. Foley and Lee (1989) argue, however, that given the demographic and ecological 
constraints characteristic of early Homo populations this would have been difficult to establish. 
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A number of benefits, however, have been suggested for female promiscuity (Smith, 
1984; Baker & Bellis, 1995). Firstly and most importantly, it has been suggested that 
a strategy of multiple matings employed by females is one way of obtaining 'good 
genes'. Some females may have to settle for relatively inferior males in their primary 
mateship. A mixed strategy of adopting a fayade of monogamy while obtaining 
resources from a primary mate, and pursing copulations with available superior mates 
would have proved a reproductively beneficial option (Smith, 1984). Following 
Hamilton and Zuk (1982), it is suggested that females seek partners who exhibit 
indicators of pathogen resistance. To the extent that their primary partner does not 
possess such indicators, females may benefit from pursuing copulations with healthier 
males. Some empirical support for this idea is offered by a variety of studies (e.g., 
Gangestad & Simpson, 1990; Gangestad & Thornhill, 1987) which suggest that males 
who possess indicators of pathogen resistance4 are judged as more attractive by 
females and have relatively more sexual partners than those men who do not posses 
such indicators. 
Other potential advantages to females who pursue a covert polyandrous strategy 
include the accumulation of material resources, physical protection, and fertility back-
ups. Multiple matings can also be viewed as a means of increasing the genetic 
diversity of offspring (Smith, 1984). 
Both human males and females possess a number of physiological attributes, which 
suggest a long history characterized by casual sex, infidelity, and multiple matings. 
Sperm competition theory (Smith, 1984; Parker, 1982; Baker & Bellis, 1995) suggests 
that in males the size of the testis, the number and type of sperm, and the size and 
shape of the genitalia provide strong clues as to the degree of sperm competition or 
double-matings that a species has experienced in its evolutionary past. 
In primates the size of the testis, which are positively correlated with overall sperm 
production, are strongly associated with the kind of mating system that is found 
4 One important indicator, it is suggested here, is the level of fluctuating asymmetry. Fluctuating 
asymmetry, or the degree of asymmetry of bilateral characters, appears to be heritable and indicates the 
relative levels of developmental perturbation. The level of fluctuating asymmetry, therefore, increases 
with exposure to environmental factors such as pathogens. 
247 
(Harcourt, Harvey, Larsen and Short, 1981; Martin & May, 1981). Among the 
hominoids, gorillas and orangutans have the smallest testis relative to body size and 
hence the lowest overall production of sperm. Both the mating systems of gorillas and 
orangutans are characterized by male monopolization of females either in the context 
of harems, as in gorillas, or in terms of defending a portion of territory, as in 
orangutans. Double matings are extremely rare occurrences in both gorilla and 
orangutan societies, hence there is little selective pressure for increase in sperm 
production. Chimpanzees by contrast have the largest testis relative to body weight of 
any hominoid. The chimpanzee has a multi-mating system in which an estrous female 
is sequentially mated by a large number of males over a short period of time. 
Consequently there is a strong selection pressure for an increase in sperm production. 
Human males have testis somewhere intermediate in size between chimps and 
gorillas; this suggests that our evolutionary history has been characterised by a 
moderate degree of sperm competition and a reasonable amount of doub1e-matings. 
The kind of sperm that humans produce further supports the idea that doub1e-matings 
were prevalent in our evolutionary past. Recent work by Baker and Bellis (1995) 
indicates that only a relatively small percentage of sperm are actually programmed as 
egg-getters. Most of the sperm produced by males seem to function in the context of 
sperm-competition by either acting as 'blockers' preventing the movement of alien 
sperm, or as 'kamikaze sperm' actively seeking out and demobilizing the sperm of 
other males. Furthermore, Baker and Bellis (1989, 1995) provide some evidence to 
suggest that the total production of sperm in an ej acu1ate is adjusted depending on the 
relative likelihood that the male's partner had engaged in an extra-pair copulation in 
the recent past. 
Human females also possess a number of physiological mechanisms which indicate a 
history of casual mating and extra-pair copulations. The evolution of concealed 
ovulation and continuous sexual receptivity can be viewed as a way of concealing 
current reproductive value and hence encouraging continual material support from the 
primary partner, as well as enhancing opportunities for extra-dyadic sexual relations 
(Smith, 1984). The finding that females are more likely to engage in extra-pair 
copulations when they are ovulating and that their patterns of orgasm are 
differentially geared to increase the likelihood of conception from males outside of 
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the primary pair bond, provides further support for the idea that casual matings were 
likely to be a prominent feature of our evolutionary history. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the conditions whereby jealousy might have 
evolved were likely to have been a prominent feature of our evolutionary past. This 
adds plausibility to the claim that jealousy is a psychological adaptation which has 
evolved to solve the problems posed by uncertainty over paternity and paternal 
investment. Evolutionary approaches provide further support for the idea that jealousy 
is an adaptation by drawing on comparative studies of other species (e.g. Buss, 1994; 
Wilson & Daly, 1992). In other words, analogical reasoning is employed to further the 
explanatory coherence of evolutionary approaches to jealousy. That is, if it can be 
shown that other animals possess similar strategies to those possessed by humans then 
the claim that jealousy-related mechanisms in humans are adaptations is strengthened. 
The absence of parental investment in other primates and mammals generally 
suggests that the most fruitful source of analogy for human jealousy might be drawn 
from the avian order (Wilson & Daly, 1992). In a series of studies Anders Moller 
(Moller, 1987, 1988) has demonstrated a number of attributes found in swallows 
related to the risk of sexual infidelity which are seemingly analogous to those found in 
humans. For example, swallows engage in active mate-guarding of their partner but 
only while their mate is fertile. Males who possess attributes preferred by females and 
which may be possible indicators of pathogen resistance are also more likely to 
achieve extra-pair copulations and less likely to be cuckolded themselves. Male 
parental effort also seems to be adjusted relative to the likelihood that the male's 
partner had engaged in extra-pair copulations during her fertile period. That is, male 
parental care is positively correlated with the number of in-pair copulations that the 
male and her partner had engaged in and negatively correlated with the number of 
extra-pair copulations that the male's mate had experienced. 
Similar patterns of sexual proprietariness are also observed in a number of other 
species of birds, such as dunnocks (Davies, 1986), as well as in a number of different 
insect species (Thornhill & Alcock, 1983). Many of these species also posses a 
variety of mechanisms relating to sperm competition such as the use of copulatory 
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plugs, sperm scrapers, and the adjustment of ejaculate size and type (Baker & Bellis, 
1995). 
In developing evolutionary explanations of human jealousy these comparisons with 
other species are actively drawn upon. For example, Wilson and Daly (1992, p. 297) 
argue that the studies carried out on birds "provide strong evidence that paternity 
investing male animals have evolved sexual psychologies designed by selection to 
reduce both the likelihood of cuckoldry and its costs once incurred." and conclude 
that, "we may expect no less of the evolved psyches of paternally investing Homo 
sapiens." Similarly, Buss (1994, p. 125) argues that: " Although the phylogenetic 
distance between humans and insects is vast, the basic adaptive logic behind holding 
onto a mate shows striking parallels. Males in both cases strive to inseminate females 
and to prevent cucko1dry. Females in both cases strive to secure investments in return 
for sexual access." However, "human tactics to retain a mate take on uniquely 
intricate forms of psychological manipulation ... " 
Comparative explanations are used, therefore, as a means of furthering the claim that 
jealousy represents an evolved adaptation designed to solve a specific adaptive 
problem in the environments which humans inhabit and have inhabited throughout the 
course of the Pleistocene. The evolutionary research programme provides an 
explanation for jealousy in humans which draws on the general resources of the 
programme and which seeks to explain a diverse range of physiological, 
psychological and behavioral characteristics of a variety of different species. These 
characteristics are explained in terms of the problems of assuring paternity certainty 
and paternal investment under specific ecological conditions that involve pair-
bonding, paternal investment and extra-pair matings. 
Criticisms of evolutionary approaches to jealousy 
The evolutionary approach to jealousy has received a range of different criticisms 
from a variety of authors (e.g., White & Mullen, 1989; Hupka, 1991; Desteno & 
Salovey, 1994). Typically speaking, these criticisms reflect some of the general 
criticisms of evolutionary explanations in psychology discussed in chapters four to 
eight. Critiques of evolutionary approaches to jealousy, therefore, can be viewed as 
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challenges to the overall explanatory coherence of the evolutionary research 
programme in its attempts to provide satisfactory explanations of the various 
phenomena related to jealousy. 
Many of the criticisms of evolutionary approaches to jealousy are directed towards the 
idea that jealousy can be reasonably considered as an adaptation with a distinct 
evolutionary history. These criticisms suggest that evolutionary explanations of 
jealousy are based on inadequate evidence, weak methodology, and inappropriate 
generalisations from other species (e.g., White & Mullen, 1989; DeSteno & 
Sa10vey) 994). For example, White and Mullen (1989) claim that evolutionary 
psychologists adopt what they terms as the 'Pleistocene fallacy', assuming the 
existence of jealousy in our common ancestors on the basis of little or no evidence. 
Jealousy obviously leaves no fossils, so how can we know that it truly represents an 
adaptation to Pleistocene conditions? The answer here of course is that we cannot 
know with absolute certainty that jealousy was a feature of hominid social behavior 
during the Pleistocene. However, as I have elaborated upon at various points in this 
thesis, the unobservable status of entities should be no barrier to their use in the 
development of adequate explanatory theories. Moreover, there are various 
converging lines of evidence to suggest, as I have discussed in some detail above, that 
the conditions for the evolution of jealousy were present throughout the evolutionary 
history of our ancestors. 
The view that evolutionary explanations of jealousy are vague, disconfirmab1e and 
based on after-the-fact reasoning have also been forwarded (White & Mullen, 1989; 
DeSteno & Sa10vey, 1994). White and Mullen suggest, for example, that the use of 
after-the-fact and analogous reasoning are inferior forms of argument which they 
consider to be 'pre-scientific' in nature. These comments, as I have argued in other 
contexts earlier, reflect a misunderstanding about the nature of science and what 
constitutes good scientific practice. A realist approach suggests that science is 
primarily in the business of elucidating and explaining phenomena. It is a reasonable 
practice, therefore, to develop explanations for events in the world after clarification 
of just what those events are. The use of analogy in developing explanations is also a 
legitimate form of scientific reasoning. Indeed, as Thagard (1992) has illustrated, the 
development of the theory of natural selection by Darwin (among other examples) 
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drew heavily on the use of analogies between artificial and natural selection. The use 
of comparative explanations in evolutionary accounts of jealousy, therefore, is 
perfectly legitimate. However, as I note in chapter five, we should be careful to avoid 
facile comparisons which do not pay due attention to the causal processes underlying 
the traits of comparison. 
The criticism that evolutionary explanations of jealousy are unfalsifiable is also a 
common but mistaken one. Certainly no one experimental result will lead to a 
rejection of evolutionary theory or even parental investment theory, but for what it is 
worth, the specific hypotheses offered by evolutionary approaches are disconfirmable 
in pretty much the same way as any specific hypotheses developed from any 
theoretical approach. The claim by Buss et al. (1992) that there should be a gender 
difference in the kinds of situations that elicit the greatest amounts of jealousy, for 
example, could have been clearly shown to be inconsistent with the subsequent 
experimental results. 
Critics of evolutionary accounts have also pointed to various apparent anomalies in 
the jealousy literature which they argue cannot be explained adequately from an 
evolutionary perspective. For example, how ask White and Mullen (1989), can 
murdering one's spouse in a fit of jealousy possibly be reproductively advantageous? 
Evolutionary psychologists have offered various different explanations for this 
apparent anomaly. Daly and Wilson (1988) argue that homicide is simply a slip in a 
mechanism that was designed to promote anger and aggression under certain 
circumstances, but not necessarily murder. Buss (1994) however, suggests that 
homicide might well be adaptive in the sense of increasing relative reproductive 
success, and by issuing a clear message to future potential partners. Whether or not 
either of these suggestions is correct remains an open question. However, it is also 
worth noting that it is not clear how the other approaches to jealousy, that I will 
outline shortly, adequately explain why homicide is a potential response to a jealousy 
evoking situation. 
Other kinds of criticism directed at evolutionary approaches to jealousy suggest that 
they fail to take into account the plasticity of humans and the role of culture and social 
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structure in determining behavior (e.g., Hupka, 1991; White & Mullen, 1989). For 
example Hupka (1991, p. 254) suggest that: 
It appears reasonable to propose that human beings have evolved the capacity 
to be emotional; however, in light of their high levels of intelligence, immense 
investment of time in the care of offspring, and long periods of learning, it is 
also reasonable to propose that all other facets of emotion (e.g., their 
elicitation, expression, modulation, the target of the emotion, etc.) are learned. 
Similarly, DeSteno and Salovey (1994) claim that it is impossible to prove that 
genetic factors, as opposed to other social and psychological variables, represent the 
true causes of jealousy. These kinds of criticisms, I believe, confuse the way that we 
should understand the role of different causes in development. As I have elaborated in 
chapter eight, for any species with some degree of phenotypic plasticity, traits are best 
conceived of as being constructed during ontogeny due to the influences of multiple, 
interactive causes. What is required for an evolutionary explanation of jealousy is not 
to demonstrate that it is genetically determined, but simply to show that jealousy is a 
reliable developmental outcome under specific environmental contexts. Hupka's 
(1991) claim that jealousy is a social construction is certainly true in some important 
senses. Jealousy would not occur outside of the specific social arrangements that 
characterize human societies which include exclusive relationships between two 
individuals. For the evolutionary psychologist, however, these facts simply represent 
the selective environments that have characterized both contemporary and ancestral 
human societies in which the emotion of jealousy has evolved. In other words, 
exclusive pair-bonds represent the Normal conditions in which it is the proper 
function of jealousy to be activated. Evolutionary psychologists view the variability in 
the expression of jealousy across cultures as the result of slightly different 
developmental inputs into the universal psychological mechanisms underlying jealous 
expenences. 
It is certainly the case that evolutionary accounts of jealousy fall short of an ideally 
complete adaptation explanation; however, they are also far removed from the realm 
of the highly speculative 'just-so' stories which have been offered for some traits. The 
idea that jealousy in humans is an adaptation with an evolutionary history, therefore, 
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. should be considered to be an epistemically plausible suggestion and one that 
warrants further consideration. Ultimately, the value that we place on evolutionary 
approaches to jealousy will be determined by the extent that they increase our 
understanding of the various phenomena related to jealousy. That is, we should prefer 
evolutionary explanations to alternative accounts if they provide more coherent 
explanations of the various aspects of jealousy. 
Cognitive approaches to jealousy 
Various authors have offered explanations of jealousy from a broad-based cognitive 
perspective. Drawing on the work of Lazarus (1991), Mathes (1991), White and 
Mullen (1989) and Parrott (1991) all articulate theories of jealousy which follow from 
a cognitive appraisal perspective on emotion. This sort of approach focuses on the 
appraisal processes which individuals undergo in certain contexts. That is, the focus is 
on the evaluation of events in terms of their relevance and significance to an 
individual's life and the goals that they may possess. 
The cognitive model offered by Mathes (1991) proposes three major stages in the 
experience of jealousy: primary appraisal, secondary appraisal and reappraisal. 
During primary appraisal an individual evaluates an event for its significance to that 
person's well being. Events can either be appraised as irrelevant, benign/positive, or 
stressful. Secondary appraisal involves the evaluation of various possible courses of 
action based on the primary appraisal of the situation experienced. During reappraisal 
the situation is reevaluated depending on changes in the relevant circumstances 
brought about by coping, further reflection and so forth. 
Thus, when an individual is confronted with an actual or potential love triangle, they 
engage in primary appraisal of the situation. If the situation is likely to lead to loss of 
resources valued by the individual or the thwarting of important goals, then it will be 
appraised as stressful in nature and the individual will experience jealousy. During 
secondary appraisal the individual determines what kind of strategies to employ to 
cope with the situation. These may involve the use of physical force, emotional 
manipulation and so forth. Just what strategies are employed may be determined by a 
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variety of factors including the details of the situation encountered, the values of the 
individual concerned and aspects of the individual's personality. Secondary appraisal 
is followed by the implementation of the various coping strategies and by a 
reappraisal of the situation (Matthes, 1991). 
White and Mullen's (1989) model is similar in many respects to the one presented by 
Mathes (1991). The focus as with Mathes, is on the various stages of appraisal and the 
implementation of coping strategies of either a cognitive or behavioral nature. White 
and Mullen also emphasis in their model the role of self-esteem in the evaluation 
process, as their definition of jealousy implies: " Romantic jealousy is a complex of 
thoughts, emotions, and actions that follows loss of or threat to self-esteem and/or the 
existence or quality of the romantic relationship" (White & Mullen, 1989, p. 9). 
During secondary appraisal, evaluation of the self relative to the rival or potential 
rival, plays an important role in the jealousy experience. As with Mathes, a variety of 
variables are identified as influencing the nature of the jealous experience in terms of 
the way the situation is appraised by the individual. 
If the partners motives are strong, if the rival has greater resources than the 
jealous person to satisfy those motives, if the jealous person is greatly 
dependent on the primary relationship, and if the potential loss is great, then 
the threat will be considerable. (White & Mullen, 1989, p. 43). 
The way a situation is appraised and the choice of coping strategies that are ultimately 
employed will also depend, as Parrott (1991) suggests, on whether there is merely 
suspicion of an extra-dyadic relationship on the part of one's partner, or whether it has 
actually occurred. 
The cognitive appraisal approach to jealousy provides a detailed and useful treatment 
of the proximate psychological mechanisms that underpin the experience of jealousy. 
As such, it provides an explanation of how the various kinds of variables associated 
with jealousy influence the way a situation is appraised and the kind of coping 
strategies that are employed. Factors such as relationship satisfaction and dependency 
are viewed as moderating variables on the kinds of secondary appraisals that an 
individual engages in. Cultural factors can also be nicely incorporated into the model 
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as factors that influence primary appraisal, and make salient different courses of 
action. The incorporation of self-esteem in the appraisal process by White and Mullen 
(1989) also provides a means of explaining the relevance of the properties of the rival 
to the way the situation is appraised and the kind of coping strategies that are 
implemented. Gender differences in jealousy are explained in terms of differences in 
sex roles and power in relationships. Because women have greater interpersonal skills 
they are more likely to focus on maintaining the relationship rather than adopting 
alternative strategies. Furthermore, because sex is more important to a man's self 
concept, sexual indiscretion on the part of the man's partner is more salient and 
becomes a more potent elicitor of jealousy (White & Mullen, 1989). The gender 
differences that are found between men and women, White and Mullen (1989, p. 
132) claim are due to the differences in the degree and type of investments and 
rewards that each sex offers. "Females may be more likely_ to invest emotions and 
value intimacy, whereas males may be more likely to invest money and value sexual 
relations. Hence women may be more likely than men to link emotional investment 
and intimacy, and men may be more likely to link material input and sexual 
availability. " 
What the cognitive-appraisal approach does not really adequately explain is just why 
certain events, but not others, are appraised in a manner which leads to the experience 
of jealousy. That is, they do not provide us with an understanding of why the threat 
posed by a rival to one's relationship is universally appraised as a threat which leads 
to the specific experience of jealousy. The explanation of gender differences that are 
offered is also only partial in nature. It may be true that there are differences in sex 
roles and the kinds of things that women value, but this just represents a re-
description of the phenomena that need to be explained. In other words, the cognitive 
approach fails to adequately explain why just these differences occur and why they 
occur in the context of a threat to one's primary relationship by an extra-dyadic affair. 
In summary, cognitive approaches to jealousy provide a useful treatment of the 
proximate psychological processes which underlie the appraisal of a situation as 
jealousy-invoking and which lead to the range of cognitive and behavioral coping 
strategies. The variety of different variables which have been shown to modify the 
experience of jealousy can be incorporated into the cognitive model as factors which 
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influence the appraisals undertaken and the choice of the appropriate coping strategy 
to implement. However, I would suggest that cognitive approaches only provide a 
partial explanation of the sorts of things that we need to account for in furthering our 
understanding of jealousy. 
Social-cognitive approaches 
A range of theories has also been developed from what might be loosely characterized 
as a social-cognitive perspective. Buunk (1991) for example, offers an exchange-
theoretical perspective on jealousy. Following Kelley's (1986) interdependence 
theory of close relationships, Buunk suggests that people form close relationships in 
light of the rewards that such relationships offer. Partners are important to one another 
because they help each other obtain valued outcomes. Jealousy is experienced when 
the flow of rewards, especially exclusive rewards, that such relationships offer is 
threatened or disrupted by a rival. 
Buunk's account focuses on the way norms and values influence and modify the 
nature of the jealousy experience. Partners abide by both societal and relationship 
norms, such as those regulating fairness and reciprocity. When these norms are 
violated, as in the context of an extra-dyadic relationship, the emotion of jealousy is 
experienced. The nature of the prevalent norms and the nature of the relationship itself 
will determine the strength and the nature of the jealous experience. 
The exchange-theoretic perspective on jealousy is clearly compatible with both the 
evolutionary and cognitive approaches outlined earlier. People obtain things of value 
from a relationship and when a rival threatens that relationship the flow of those 
valuable resources is jeopardized. As such, the exchange-theoretic perspective details 
some of the proximate reasons for the experience of jealousy. A focus on the norms 
that are related to relationships also provides a means of explaining the differences 
between individuals in their experience of jealousy depending on the specific details 
of their relationship and the nature of prevalent norms in their culture. Gender 
differences in jealousy would be explained from this perspective, in terms of the 
different norms that govern male and female sexual behavior. The exchange-theoretic 
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perspective, however, fails to adequately explain just why it is in the context of an 
extra-dyadic relationship on the part of one's partner that jealousy is experienced. 
Relationship break-ups for other reasons do not lead to jealous responses on the part 
of the individuals concerned even though the threat to the flow of resources is just the 
same if not greater. It is unclear why the specific violation of some norms rather than 
others lead to jealousy experiences. The exchange-theoretic perspective therefore fails 
to account for the context-specificity of jealousy. There also remains the question of 
just why certain norms are prevalent in relationships and in society in general. Why 
for example is the norm of exclusivity such a prominent feature of relationships? And 
why are there robust similarities in the kinds of gender-based norms that are seen in 
different cultures? The high incidence of jealousy among swinging couples is also 
difficult to explain from this perspective. Even in the presence of strict and acceptable 
norms regarding the non-exclusivity of extra-pair relationships, jealousy is still a 
common occurrence. 
Salovey and Rothman (1991) offer another social-cognitive perspective on jealousy in 
their self-evaluation maintenance view of jealousy and envy. Basically it is proposed 
that jealousy is experienced, or most likely to be experienced, when an individual's 
relationship is threatened by a potential rival whose abilities in domains which are 
important to the individual are superior to the individual concerned. The instigation of 
jealousy, on this view, is primarily determined by a comparison between self and rival 
on whatever dimensions the individual views as a particularly salient in terms of their 
self-concept. 
Based on Tesser's self-evaluation maintenance theory, this approach to jealousy 
recognizes the importance of comparison with the rival as a relevant modifying factor 
in the experience of jealousy. There is some attempt here, therefore, to provide an 
explanation of the context-specificity of jealousy. This domain-relevance approach 
can also provide some explanation of gender and cultural differences in the 
experience of jealousy as representing differences in the importance of domains 
which vary across cultures and which vary between men and women. Like the other 
theories of jealousy, however, there is no explanation of why there are stable and 
robust gender differences in just what domains are important for one's self-concept. 
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The self-evaluation maintenance view of jealousy also fails to explain the experience 
in jealousy by both men and women, when the rival or potential rival is not superior 
in any qualities to the individual concerned. Moreover, it is difficult to see why 
jealousy is experience by both sexes even when they have no idea who the rival 
actually is. The self-evaluation maintenance view also fails to adequately explain the 
range of tactics deployed by jealous individuals. Although the derogation of one's 
rival or the pursuit of alternative relationships makes sense from this perspective, it is 
difficult to see how aggression, mate guarding, desertion, and so forth operate to 
increase one's self-esteem. In summary, the self-evaluation maintenance view of 
jealousy, to my mind, really just serves to highlight one important aspect of the 
jealousy process rather than offering and broad and coherent explanatory account of 
the range of features associated with jealousy. 
Socio-cultural approaches 
Jealousy has also been approached from perspectives which focus on jealousy as a 
socio-cu1tural construction (Hupka, 1991). Hupka argues that jealousy as a process 
can be explained in terms of social structure and the social construction of the gender 
system. "The motive [for jealousy] is a product of the culture and can vary across 
cultures because it is an inescapable consequence of social structure" (Hupka, 1991 p. 
261). Hupka suggests that individuals learn what is of most value in male-female 
relationships and therefore acquire the motive for jealousy. The experience of 
jealousy, therefore, is motivated when an individual experiences threats to learned 
values and customs. What is threatened in these cases is whatever is gained by being 
married to a partner in a given cultural context. "The cuckolded individual is 
responding to the betrayal of a norm of expectation regarding sexual behavior. In all 
societies the betrayal represents the loss of something of value as a result of the 
interlopers interferences" (Hupka, 1991, p. 265). 
Hupka's approach, with its focus on social norms, is similar to many respects to the 
one offered by Buunk (1991) and can be evaluated in a similar way. A focus on 
specific features of different cultures is an essential part of many explanations of 
specific instances of jealousy. It is difficult, for example, to explain the severity of 
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responses to female infidelity and potential infidelity in some cultures without 
discussing those features of the culture which makes these responses likely. The 
universal, or near universal, nature of the norms which regulate extra-dyadic 
relationships of course is itselfin need of explanation. It is unclear just why this area 
of human relationships is regulated in similar manners across cultures. The approach 
of Hupka as with Buunk also fails to adequately explain the incidence of jealousy 
when under rare circumstances, these norms are relaxed. Although it may well be the 
case that jealousy is in some sense 'learned' we still need an explanation of why it is 
learned and why it is such a reliable feature of adult psychology. 
Explaining jealousy: Relating the alternative perspectives 
What is the best explanation/or jealousy? 
In the preceding pages I have outlined five different approaches to explaining 
jealousy. These different perspectives represent some of the main, but by no means 
only, theoretical attempts to understand the nature of jealousy. To the extent that these 
different approaches offer alternative ways of explaining jealousy we should be able 
to compare them in terms of their overall explanatory coherence (Thagard, 1992). 
Ideally it would be preferable to actually run the program ECHO.2 designed and 
implemented by Thagard to establish which approach is the most explanatorily 
coherent one. However, a pen and paper approach will provide some kind of 
indication of the general explanatory coherence of the different approaches. 
Figures six and seven provide respectively an overview of the evidence that needs to 
be explained regarding jealousy and the main theories which have been developed to 
explain the evidence. Figure eight indicates which pieces of evidence that I believe 
each of the theories adequately explains. No doubt there would be much dispute over 
just whether or whether not each item is adequately explained by the various 
approaches. Herein in lies one of the main problems in comparative theory analysis. 
In many cases a theory or theoretical perspective will only partly explain a given 
phenomenon. I have somewhat crudely indicated this in my analysis by providing half 
marks for kinds of evidence only partially explained by the theories. 
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Figure six Jealousy-related evidence 
El Jealousy is experienced only in 
the context of an extra-dyadic 
threat to a close relationship. 
E2 Jealousy is an extremely 
powerful and averSIve 
emotional experience. 
E3 Jealousy IS a cross-cultural 
universal experienced by both 
men and women. 
E4 The experience of jealousy is 
associated with a variety of 
strategies, including: 
.. Mateguarding and vigilance 
.. Violence, aggression and 
homicide 
.. Improving quality of self 
and relationship 
.. Psychological derogation of 
partner and rival 
.. Desertion 
E5 The experience of jealousy is 
influenced by a number of 
variables, including: 
.. Self-esteem and perceived 
adequacy as a partner 
.. Relationship dependency 
.. Attributes of the rival 
.. Quality of the relationship 
• Relationship norms 
E6 There are gender differences in 
jealousy, including: 
• Men experience greater 
jealousy to situations 
involving sexual infidelity. 
.. Women experience greater 
jealousy in situations 
involving emotional 
infidelity. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
Men are more generally 
concerned about chastity 
and sexual unfaithfulness 
than women. 
Men are more likely to 
engage in strategies such as 
violence, vigilance and 
desertion. 
Women are more likely to 
engaged in strategies which 
emphasize emotional 
commitment and improving 
the quality of the primary 
relationship. 
E7 Although universal the 
experience of jealousy and the 
range of different strategies 
employed by individuals varies 
across cultures. Examples of 
strategies related to jealousy 
employed in different cultures 
include infibulation, 
footbinding, claustration, 
veiling, and chaperoning. 
E8 Jealousy is still experienced in 
the contexts of open marriages, 
swinging couples and in 
cultures which on some 
occasions condone extra-dyadic 
sexual relationships. 
E9 Legal and social structures 
related to jealousy: 
* Prevalence of laws that 
exonerate men for jealousy 
related homicide. Laws related 
to adultery typically focus on 
marital status of women. 
* Prevalence of language 
which denotes marital and 
sexual status of women but not 
men . 
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Fig seven Overview of theories of jealousy. 
Theories of Jealousy 
Evolutionary approaches (Tl) 
Main hypotheses 
• Species of organic beings have 
evolved and their characteristics 
are the product of natural 
selection. 
• In species with paternal 
investment there will be strong 
selection pressures for 
mechanisms that are designed to 
assure paternity certainty and 
paternal investment. Jealousy in 
humans is just one such 
mechanism. 
• Males and females should prefer 
mates who posses those attributes 
which further their reproductive 
goals in these respects. 
Auxiliary hypothesis 
• Some adaptations (such as jealousy) 
are faculative and their expression 
will vary in different contexts. 
Cognitive-appraisal theories (T2) 
Main Hypotheses 
• Individuals are evaluative 
organisms who perceive the world 
in terms of their needs and desires. 
• Emotion is the result of a series of 
appraisal and coping processes in 
which events in the world are 
evaluated in terms of their 
relationship to an individual's 
well-being. 
• Jealousy is experienced when a 
situation is appraised as 
representing a threat to an 
individual's relationship 
• Coping strategies are employed 
which reduce the threat to the 
relationship or to an individual's 
self-esteem. 
Exchange-Theoretic perspective 
(T3) 
Main hypotheses 
• Individuals form and continue close 
relationships in light of the rewards 
that they offer 
• Individual relationships are regulated 
by a series of norms and rules. 
III Jealousy is experienced when a 
relationship is threatened and lor the 
rules and norms regulating the 
relationship are violated. 
Auxiliary hypothesis 
• Emotions in relationships are 
strongly influenced by specific 
features of the relationship such as 
attributional analysis and degree 
of dependency. 
Self-evaluation maintenance 
theory (T4) 
Main Hypotheses 
• Individuals are motivated to 
maintain or increase self-esteem 
• Self-esteem is strongly domain 
relevant. Threats to self-esteem 
are greater in areas of relevance to 
oneself 
• Jealousy is experienced when a 
relationship is threatened by a 
rival whose characteristics in 
relevant domains are superior to 
one's own. 
Socio-cultural approaches (TS) 
Main Hypotheses 
• The capacity for emotion is 
evolved 
• All facets of emotion are the 
consequence of learning from 
one's social environment 
• Jealousy is a social construction. It 
is the consequence of violations to 
socially learned values and norms 
regarding relationships. 
• To the extent that different 
societies value different things and 
have different norms, jealousy 
should vary across cultures. 
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Figure Eight The comparative explanatory breadth of theories of jealousy 
Tl 
Explains: 
El,E2,E3,E4,E5,E6,E8 
Partially explains: 
E7,E9 
T2 
Explains: 
E2,E5,E7,E8 
Partially explains: 
E3, E4, E6, E9 
T3 
Explains: 
E2, E5, E7 
Partially explains: 
E3,E4,E6,E9 
T4 
Explains: 
E8 
Partially explains: 
El, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, E9 
T5 
Explains: 
E7 
Partially explains: 
El,E2,E3,E4,E5,E6,E9 
Explanatory breadth score 
8 
6 
5 
5 
4.5 
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It is clear from figure eight that the evolutionary programme offers the most unifying 
theoretical account of the various features of jealousy that we need to explain. Other 
considerations suggest that it also offers the most explanatorily coherent one as well. 
Firstly, the evolutionary programme explains a wider range of phenomena than do 
alternative approaches; that is, it has greater explanatory breadth (Thagard's principle 
2.1). This is especially true once we consider the wide range of different strategies 
employed by a variety of different species to solve similar adaptive problems that the 
evolutionary programme also explains. By drawing on the conceptual resources of 
parental investment theory, sexual selection theory, and sperm-competition theory, the 
evolutionary programme can explain not only those psychological and physiological 
adaptations that humans possess, but also the range of traits possessed by other 
species which function in similar contexts. By contrast, the socio-cultural approach 
offered by Hupka or the exchange-theoretic approach of Buunk, by emphasising the 
role of social norms and values, cannot adequately account for the presence of these 
mechanisms across different species. It should be noted here, however, that many of 
the other approaches, for example the cognitive appraisal approach, draw on theories 
which are more generally applied to emotion and hence do have reasonably broad 
scope. This is also true of the evolutionary research programme more generally in that 
it offers a general theoretical approach to emotion. 
The evolutionary approach also gams coherence through the explanation of the 
theories of parental investment and sexual selection which are used in tum to explain 
jealousy (Thagard's principle 2.2). These theories are themselves explained by 
inclusive fitness theory and the hard core of the evolutionary programme. The 
coherence of the evolutionary research programme is further increased via Thagard's 
third principle of explanatory coherence, analogy. The idea that the mechanisms 
underling jealousy are evolutionary adaptations gains greater acceptance thorough 
demonstrating that analogous mechanism have evolved in other animals for similar 
reasons. 
Incoherence between alternative explanatory schemes may also occur when 
evaluating the different approaches to jealousy. For example, the idea that gender 
differences in jealousy are purely the result of contemporary social structure and due 
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to a general learning of gender-based nonns is incoherent (in this fonnat at least) with 
the suggestion that gender differences represent the consequence of different selection 
pressures on human males and females in the context of partner infidelity. I think it is 
clear that the alternative theories do compete with one another in some areas. 
However, as I will elaborate below, there is also a considerable degree of consistency 
between the different approaches. In fact the different approaches should be, to some 
extent, conceived of as being explanatorily connected. 
My use of Thagard's theory of explanatory coherence is somewhat infonnal here. 
However, I think that it does indicate that an evolutionary approach to jealousy 
provides a coherent and unifying scheme for furthering our understanding of the 
nature of jealousy. By itself though, the evolutionary programme is insufficient for 
explaining all the relevant aspects of jealousy, especially the details of specific jealous 
experiences. To achieve this aim it necessary to consider how the alternative 
approaches to jealousy might be conceptually related to one another and to examine 
just what sort of explanations that they provide. 
The relations between alternative approaches 
DeSteno and Salovey (1994) in their summary of the different perspectives on 
jealousy argue that alternative theoretical approaches should be considered as 
supplementary rather than antagonistic and that all the various approaches help to 
increase our understanding of jealousy. I agree here with the general sentiment 
expressed by Desteno and Salovey (1994), although I believe that the different 
approaches are not entirely compatible with one another and that we should, while 
accepting the value of theoretical pluralism, be rather less egalitarian in our treatment 
of alternative perspectives. 
In chapter one I discussed some of the different ways that the relationships between 
theories can be conceptualized. In comparing an evolutionary approach to alternative 
perspectives5 I think it is clear that the theories are not entirely compatible with one 
5 This comparison is best done on a pair-wise basis, however, I generalise my evaluation between 
evolutionary approaches and the rest of the alternative theories. In general the conceptual relation 
between evolutionary approaches and any of the other theories will be roughly the same. 
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another, because evolutionary theory does entail something about the psychological 
and psycho-social processes operating in jealousy, which is the focus of the 
alternative approaches. For example, evolutionary theory suggests what factors are 
likely to be psychologically salient and indicates what sort of events are likely to be 
appraised as harmful or threatening. Evolutionary theory can also not be said to 
completely absorb or incorporate alternative theories because at some points, as 
indicated above, they are incompatible with one another. Furthermore, evolutionary 
approaches only furnish us with partial explanations of some phenomena. 
I would suggest that the best way of understanding the relationship between 
evolutionary approaches and alternative theories is to consider the relationship to be 
one of sublation or reinforcement. The evolutionary research programme partially 
incorporates and provides a rationale for the alternative theories while rejecting some 
of their assumptions. For example, an evolutionary approach can explain why the 
three constructs of commitment, insecurity, and arousability proposed by Bringle's 
(1991) transactional model are important in the context of j ealousy-invoking 
situations while rejecting the idea presented by Bringle that there are no a priori 
situations that are jealousy invoking and that jealousy in entirely a social construction. 
A clearer understanding of the relationships between the different theories of jealousy 
can also be profitably achieved by examining the levels on which the explanations 
operate and the kinds of explanation that they afford us. 
In chapter two I discussed the various levels at which explanations in psychology can 
be conceptualized. These levels include the functional, the physiological, the 
psychological and the social. In developing complete explanations of jealousy, ideally 
we should consider the function of jealousy (in evolutionary terms), the physiological 
basis of jealousy, the various psychological processes underlying jealousy and the 
relations between these processes and the social environment. One way of relating the 
alternative theories of jealousy, therefore, would be to view them as primarily 
addressing different levels of analysis. The evolutionary approach helps to explain the 
function of jealousy, the cognitive approaches delineate the relevant psychological 
processes, while the socio-cognitive and socio-cultural approaches help us to 
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understand the relations between individual psychological processes and the social 
environment. 
Furthermore, we might view the evolutionary approach as offering us the ultimate 
explanation for jealousy, whereas the various other theories provide details of the 
more proximal mechanisms that mediate jealousy responses. Consider for example 
the following series of hierarchically nested why questions and answers: 
Q: Why did Bob kill his wife's lover? 
A: Because Bob was jealous. 
Q: Why was Bob jealous? 
A: Because Bob found his wife's lover in bed with his wife. 
Q: Why did this make Bob jealous 
A: Because the presence of a sexual rival threatened Bob's relationship with his wife. 
Q: Why does this lead to jealousy? 
A: Because those individuals ancestral to Bob who experienced jealousy in such 
situations and responded in certain ways were more likely to be reproductively 
successful. 
In this senes of questions we move from proximate explanations in terms of 
antecedent conditions and the cognitive appraisals of Bob, to ultimate explanations of 
the causal processes responsible for these patterns of appraisal to certain conditions. 
Just which explanation we may prefer at any given time will depend in part on 
pragmatic issues. Moreover, we may want to know why Bob murdered his wife's 
lover rather than choosing some alternative course of action. This explanation may 
draw heavily on some of the important proximate causes operating in the specific 
situation such as the details of Bob's personality and the salience of the event in terms 
of Bob's relationship with his wife. 
For a complete explanation of jealousy we need to consider the full range of causal 
processes operating at different levels of analysis and over different chronological 
frames. Moreover, we need to consider how these different explanations might be 
integrated with one another to provide a full causal picture. Figure nine outlines the 
explanatory relations operating between different levels of analysis in attempts to 
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Figure nine Model of romantic jealousy detailing levels of 
roximate explanations 
Social-cognitive 
explanations 
Features of the 
such 
as dependency. 
Personality factors 
as level of 
Ultimate 
explanations 
with 
analysis and explanatory relations 
/ 
Psychological explanation 
Primary 
Does the situation 
represent a threat? 
Just what sort of threat? 
What to 
employ? 
Cognitive coping 
regularities: 
Threat to pair-bond posed 
by Pair-bond 
important for flow 
valuable resources. 
Functional 
explanation 
To and 
assurance of paternal investment. And hence to 
overall reproductive success. 
Social/Cultural 
ex p lanati ons 
Norms, 
sanctions and customs 
community 
and 
infidelity. 
infidelity. 
7 
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explain jealousy. Ultimate explanations for jealousy drawn from the evolutionary 
research programme help to explain some of the proximate causes of jealousy such as 
those embodied in appraisal processes. Evolutionary explanations, however, will also 
have to draw on specific features of the intra-personal, social and cultural contexts in 
order to explain the specific patterns of thought and behaviour that are elicited in any 
given situation. For example, the acceptability in some cultures of homicide as a 
reasonable response to sexual infidelity coupled with high levels of arousability in an 
individual will help us to explain why murder was appraised by that person to be an 
acceptable method for responding to a situation involving an extra-dyadic relationship 
on the part of their partner. 
In a general overview of cultural variations in emotion Mesquita and Frijda (1992) 
suggest that different aspects of the emotional experience are likely to differ to 
varying extents across cultures. For example, cross-cultural similarities are likely to 
occur in terms of universal response modes and universal event types. Differences 
between cultures are likely to be demonstrated in terms of specific forms of behavior 
and different appraisal propensities. For jealousy there are cross-cultural universals in 
terms of the context of jealous experiences and the aversiveness of these experiences. 
Cultural variation is reflected in terms of different appraisal processes and different 
patterns of response. The norms, rules, and laws regulating behavior in different 
cultures is likely to make salient different courses of action in the context of sexual 
and emotional infidelity. 
Once we start to explain specific phenomenon which are culturally localised, our 
explanation will draw heavily on the specific features of the culture and the belief 
structure of the community. The practice of infibulation, for example, is often 
mentioned in the context of evolutionary explanations of jealousy and explained as a 
consequence of evolved male psychologies (e.g., Daly et aI., 1982; Buss, 1994). 
However, although the evolved psychological mechanisms that males possess must 
play some role in a satisfactory explanation of infibulation, we will also need to draw 
heavily on the beliefs of both men and women in infibulating cultures and the source 
of those beliefs in terms of specific features of the culture, such as the widespread 
influence of Islam. 
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In general, I think the most fruitful way of conceptualizing the role of evolutionary 
approaches to jealousy is to see the evolutionary research programme as providing a 
unifYing explanatory framework for the general phenomena related to jealousy. By 
instantiating the few argument patterns associated with adaptation explanations and 
by drawing on the specific auxiliary theories of the evolutionary programme we can 
unify a wide range of different kinds of phenomena in both humans and other animals 
related to the problems of paternity certainty and paternal investment. The 
evolutionary research programme provides a means of understanding why jealousy 
exists, why it occurs in certain narrowly delineated situations, and why there are 
important gender differences in the kinds of situations that elicit jealousy responses. 
We also, however, need specific causal-mechanistic explanations of the various 
processes that bring about the experience of jealousy. The cognitive appraisal 
approach is one such attempt at providing the details of the psychological mechanisms 
which underlie jealousy. Similarly, a consideration of psycho-social mechanisms can 
also further our understanding of jealousy by showing how jealousy is influenced by 
various processes of a social nature. 
It should be clear from my discussion in chapter one that these two approaches to 
explanation - explanation as unification and explanation as elucidation of causal 
mechanisms - are essentially connected with one another. Unifying explanations tell 
us why certain patterns and processes exist in the world by drawing on theories with 
broad scope, while causal-mechanistic explanations detail just how these processes 
are instantiated in any given instance. To explain jealousy in general we may want to 
take a specifically evolutionary approach, while our explanations of particular 
instances of jealousy may draw more heavily on the various theories which delineate 
the causal mechanisms which underlie jealousy experiences. 
Because humans exhibit a high degree of plasticity, we would expect a diversity of 
different responses to jealousy invoking situations. We need to pay due attention, 
therefore, to the specific features of the individuals concerned and the relevant local 
details of their environment. It is towards an attempt at explaining these variables that 
most theories of jealousy developed by psychologists have been directed. Indeed, 
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although I may not have done full justice to the approaches that I have discussed, it 
seems to me that perspectives like the transactional model and the socio-cultural 
approach really represent a summary of some of the important variables associated 
with jealousy rather than being well-articulated theories. That is, they appear to be 
predominantly descriptions of empirical regularities rather than truly explanatory 
theories. This by itself is not a bad thing. Indeed, the elucidation of phenomena is an 
important part of the scientific process. However, it is important that we go beyond 
such local descriptive work to develop integrated accounts of the causal mechanisms 
which underpin jealousy as well as detailing the ultimate explanations for why 
particular mechanisms which serve specific functions are instantiated in humans. 
Pragmatic concerns 
Just what sort of explanation that one seeks regarding jealousy will depend, to some 
extent, on the specific question that is being asked. That is, what is accepted as an 
adequate explanation is partly a question of salience. For example, consider how the 
following questions direct attention to specific features of the jealousy system and 
hence require different kinds of explanation. 
(1) Why do humans get jealous when they discover sexual infidelity of the part of 
their partner? 
This question, I would suggest, requires an explanation drawn specifically from the 
evolutionary research programme. In answering the question above we need to be 
able to provide an answer which tells us just why jealousy is experienced in this 
context but not others. By referring to the evolutionary history of humans and the 
specific adaptations that they possess we can furnish an explanation which satisfies 
these specific epistemic needs. 
(2) Why did Bob not want his wife to meet his attractive and intelligent friend 
Hamish? 
One reasonable answer to this question would be to suggest that Bob experiences low 
self-esteem, perceives himself to be inadequate in certain ways relative to Hamish, 
and therefore feels threatened by the possibility of Hamish meeting his wife. In order 
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to answer this question we need to draw on the specific details of Bob's personality 
and the kinds of situations that often elicit jealous responses. 
(3) Why did Javed pour boiling water over his wife's face when he discovered her 
having a sexual relationship with another man? 
Our explanation here is likely to draw on specific features of Javed's culture, such as 
the lack of sanctions against spousal violence in the context of extra-dyadic 
relationships. We may also want to invoke Javed's high level of trait jealousy and 
arousability and his specific beliefs regarding women and their role in the marriage. In 
other words we answer this question in terms of the specific details of the social 
environment and the psychological development of the individual in this context. 
In answering the last two questions we simply assume that jealousy exists and that it 
occurs in some situations and not others and that it can lead to certain courses of 
action such as mate vigilance or violence. We do not specifically ask why this 
happens to be the case. 
These three questions can all be viewed as requests for explanatory information; 
information which represents part of the ideal explanatory text. A complete answer to 
any of the three questions, would require the full explanatory details offered by the 
evoluti<mary research programme in conjunction with the relevant specific theories of 
the causal mechanisms as well as the details regarding important contextual features. 
In our treatment of some of the moral issues relating to jealousy we need to pay due 
attention to full causal-explanatory story even though it may appear more relevant in 
some contexts to focus only on portions of the ideal explanatory text. If we want to 
take a reasonable clinical approach to ameliorating some of the specific deleterious 
consequences of jealousy it is helpful to have an idea of the larger explanatory 
picture. A useful clinical strategy, given what we know about jealousy, would not be 
to try and eliminate it. Understanding the function of jealousy from an evolutionary 
perspective provides a way of conceptualising jealous experiences as a normal and 
perhaps inevitable part of romantic relationships. What is not inevitable is the specific 
course of action taken by individuals in any given situation. It is here that a detailed 
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understanding of the underlying cognitive and social mechanisms provides a way of 
allowing us to intervene in the relevant mechanisms so as to bring about desirable 
results. For example, if self-esteem and relationship dependency are relatively 
important variables which determine the extremity of the jealous response, therapeutic 
efforts might be helpfully directed at increasing autonomy or bolstering self-esteem. 
Similarly, changes to legal sanctions and cultural norms, while not eliminating 
jealousy, in some societies may reduce the amount and severity of jealousy induced 
violent behavior. 
Summary 
The phenomenon of jealousy, like many in psychology, has led to the development of 
a plethora of theories which attempt to increase our understanding of why jealousy 
occurs and why it has the specific features that it does. My suggestion here is that in 
developing a complete explanatory account of what jealousy is we must develop 
appropriately integrated and coherent theoretical perspectives. The evolutionary 
research programme plays a central role in furthering our understanding of jealousy 
by providing an understanding of why jealousy exists and why certain mechanisms 
have developed which underlie jealous experiences in certain specific environmental 
contexts. The various other theoretical approaches offer specific details of the causal 
mechanisms underlying jealousy and provide descriptions of the key variables which 
mediate the experience of jealousy. 
The evolutionary research programme can be viewed as sublating these vanous 
approaches in that it provides a rationale for the specific theories and relevant 
variables, while rejecting some of their assumptions. The general explanatory strategy 
here, I suggest, is that we should deploy the evolutionary research programme in 
conjunction with a range of specific and local theories in our attempts to further our 
understanding of this and other emotions. The range of theories developed by 
psychologists to explain jealousy are not necessarily absorbed by the evolutionary 
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programme but are instead, combined with, and partly explained by, the general 
evolutionary research programme. 
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Chapter ten 
The role of evolutionary explanations in psychology 
The current status of psychological science 
Over the course of the twentieth century we have witnessed considerable progress in 
many areas of science. The implications for technology, society, and the environment 
have been equally considerable, if not always beneficial. For example, since the 
discovery of the structure of DNA by Watson and Crick in 1953, there have been 
dramatic advances in the field of genetics. In less than fifty years since Watson and 
Crick's discovery, the sequencing of the human genome has not only become a 
theoretical possibility, but is also near to becoming an accomplished fact. The 
implications of this research for humanity in general are profound and far-reaching. 
By contrast, progress in psychology and the other social sciences has been slow, and 
their impact on society, although not negligible, has been comparatively less than that 
of the physical and biological sciences. As I discussed in chapter two, the lack of 
progress demonstrated by psychology can be attributed to a range of methodological, 
conceptual and institutional problems. Psychologists, as Meehl (1967, 1978) has 
repeatedly made clear, use inappropriate and inadequate methods in their 
investigation of their subject matter. These methodological woes are abetted by 
institutional features which promote quantity over quality of research (Lyldcen, 1991). 
Conceptually, psychology remains disunified and is characterised by a proliferation of 
small-scale theories oflimited scope and applicability (Royce, 1985; Staats, 1989). 
Science in general can be reasonably characterised as a cumulative affair. Over time 
we develop better and better models of the world; models that further our 
understanding of nature and of our place in it. In psychology, however, there has been 
little conceptual progress. This point is made clear by Lykken (1991, p. 7): 
275 
In the hard sciences, each generation stands upon the shoulders of its 
predecessors, the bones of the Elder Giants become part of the foundation of 
an ever-growing edifice. The great names of psychology's comparatively 
recent past are respected mainly as intrepid explorers who came back empty-
handed. There is no edifice, just this year's anthill, most of which will be 
abandoned and washed away in another season. 
"The present state of knowledge in psychology" Lykken (1991, p. 7) concludes is 
"very broad but shallow. We know a little bit about a lot of things." 
Evolutionary psychologists in their critiques of contemporary psychology come to a 
similar conclusion to that reached by Lykken and others (e.g., Staats, 1989). For 
example, Tooby and Cosmides (1992, p. 23) suggest that: 
After more than a century, the social sciences are still adrift, with an enormous 
mass of half-digested observations, a not inconsiderable body of empirical 
generalizations, and a contradictory stew of ungrounded, middle-level theories 
expressed in a Babel of incommensurate technical lexicons. 
Evolutionary psychologists argue that progress in psychology has been slow because 
of a failure to realise that psychology is really just a branch of biology (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1989). Evolutionary psychology, it is suggested, offers just the kind of 
conceptual integration that psychology requires to emerge from its chaotic and non-
progressive state. As Buss (1995, p.20) states: "Evolutionary psychology provides the 
conceptual tools for emerging from the fragmented state of current psychological 
science." The key point suggested here is that the evolutionary programme offers to 
unifY psychological science under the umbrella of single paradigm or metatheory. 
This point has been made by many who have offered evolutionary explanations of 
psychological and social phenomena. Wilson (1975), for example, clearly presented 
sociobiology as a unifying scheme for the social sciences. Similarly, Barash (1982) 
and Van de Berghe (1983) claim that sociobiology offers a unifying framework which 
represents a new paradigm for psychology in the Kuhnian sense. Buss (1995, p. 85) 
reaches a similar conclusion in his claim that "evolutionary psychology is a 
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revolutionary new paradigm". The strong implication here is that sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology offer a way of overthrowing or replacing contemporary 
psychological theorising with explanations drawn explicitly from the evolutionary 
research programme. 
Although evolutionary psychology is in its embryonic stages, we hope and 
expect that its growth will eventually replace the welter of conflicting middle-
range psychological theories and the wealth of descriptive information with a 
series of models of the innate mechanisms that comprise the human psyche. 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1989, p. 33). 
What are we to make of these bold claims for conceptual revolution?l Will a future 
psychology be practiced as a branch of biology with a strong commitment to develop 
evolutionary explanations of psychological and social phenomena? And will the 
current proliferation of theory in psychology be replaced by theories drawn explicitly 
from the evolutionary research programme? 
In the remainder of this chapter I will discuss the various claims that the evolutionary 
programme offers a revolutionary conceptual paradigm which could serve to replace 
existing theoretical schemes in psychology. I shall suggest that there are various 
reasons why we should rej ect this strong claim, while maintaining that evolutionary 
explanations will have an important role to play in the future of psychology. The 
precise nature of this role will be outlined and the ways that the evolutionary research 
programme might further progress in psychology will be suggested. My conclusions 
in this chapter will draw on the conceptual resources related to theory appraisal, 
research programmes, explanation, and scientific progress outlined in the first two 
chapters. 
1 Just how evolutionary explanations should figure in psychology and the relationship between 
evolutionary theory and other theories in psychology seems to vary considerably from author to author 
and even in the same work by the same author. The claim for conceptual revolution represents the 
extreme position here and is probably not the one held by the majority of those who claim allegiance to 
the evolutionary research programme in psychology. 
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The explanatory coherence of the evolutionary research programme in 
psychology: past, present, and future 
Firstly, and most importantly, it is worth emphasising that neither sociobiology nor 
evolutionary psychology offers a new paradigm as such. As Ruse (1987) has made 
clear, sociobiology is not a new paradigm, but is merely an expanded branch of the 
Neo-Darwinian theory of evolution. The same is clearly true for evolutionary 
psychology. As I discussed in chapter three, both sociobiology and evolutionary 
psychology draw on the conceptual resources of the general evolutionary research 
programme. It is certainly true that the proliferation of important theories developed 
by Hamilton, Trivers and Maynard-Smith in the 1960's and 1970's afforded a 
considerable degree of conceptual advancement, especially in terms of explaining 
social behaviour. However, these theories are best considered as auxiliary theories 
that augment the hard core of the general evolutionary research programme, rather 
than offering a new paradigm as such. 
It is also worth pointing out that attempts to explain human psychological and social 
phenomena are not by any means new. Ever since Darwin formulated his principle of 
natural selection, there have been diverse and widespread attempts to use evolutionary 
explanations to further our understanding or psychological and social processes. Any 
claims that sociobiology or evolutionary psychology offers a new paradigm for 
psychology, or that psychology is best conceived as a branch of biology, therefore, 
must demonstrate why this should be the case now, when such attempts are more than 
a hundred years old. That is, it needs to be shown that the evolutionary programme is 
the most explanatorily coherent approach to psychology and that judgements of 
explanatory coherence have changed, or need to change, since earlier attempts to 
develop evolutionary approaches to psychology. 
It is clear that evolutionary approaches in psychology do not represent the mainstream 
view held by psychologists. That is, contemporary psychologists, in general, do not 
perceive evolutionary theory to be the best way of explaining psychological and social 
phenomena. This point is demonstrated in Figures ten and eleven. Using Psych lit, an 
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on line reference base, searches under a range of theorists and theoretical approaches 
demonstrate that references to Darwin and Evolutionary theory are substantially less 
than those to behaviorism or psychoanalytic theory or to Freud and Piaget. Clearly 
psychologists are more likely to draw on theorists and theoretical approaches in their 
written pUblications other than Darwin and evolutionary theory. Moreover, as figure 
twelve illustrates, there has be no substantial increase in references to either 
sociobiology or evolutionary psychology since the early 1980's. 
No doubt these psych lit searches offer a rather crude measure of interest in various 
theoretical approaches in psychology and cannot tell us what the best approach is. 
Certainly there is some indication that evolutionary approaches in psychology are 
becoming more prominent, especially in some domains such as social psychology 
(e.g., Simpson & Kenrick, 1996). Moreover, evolutionary approaches have expanded 
to encompass a huge range of different areas in psychology from psychiatry (Stevens 
& Price, 1996) to neuroscience (Gazzaniga, 1992). However, it is clear that if the 
evolutionary programme does offer a revolutionary new approach, it is a revolution 
which shows little sign of widespread acceptance in the near future. 
In chapter three, I presented a brief overview of the history of the evolutionary 
research programme in psychology. I argued in this chapter that we could understand 
the rise and decline in the prevalence of evolutionary explanations in psychology in 
terms of the perceived acceptability of the evolutionary programme in which 
questions of explanatory coherence are prominent. The original interest in 
evolutionary explanations in psychology can be understood in terms of the promise of 
explanatory unification. Darwin's theory of evolution made clear that humans and 
other animals, mind and behaviour, are all subject to the forces of evolution embodied 
in the process of natural selection. 
The subsequent decline of evolutionary explanations in psychology can also be traced 
to a variety of sources. Questions regarding the moral acceptability of the programme, 
the programme's explanatory scope, and questions over the use of analogical 
reasoning all contributed to the evolutionary programme in psychology being 
perceived as less acceptable. The rise of behaviorism as an alternative theoretical 
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approach also played an important role in the decline of evolutionary explanations in 
psychology. 
The return of evolutionary explanations in psychology can also be traced to a variety 
of factors, which overall can be conceptualised as increasing the explanatory 
coherence of the programme relative to competing research programmes. 
Firstly, since the 1950's, a revival of instinct as a potential explanatory source of 
behaviour increased the scope of the evolutionary programme relative to behaviorism. 
If a large number of behaviours could be best explained as species specific 
adaptations rather than reflecting a generalised learning history, then evolutionary 
theory could potentially explain a wider range of phenomena than previously thought. 
Purely operant and respondent learning explanations of behaviour, therefore, became 
less viable accounts of the range of natural behaviours studied by ethologists, and 
comparative psychologists. 
Since the mid 1950's there was also an increase in the number of studies of primate 
behaviour under natural conditions (Wilson, 1994). An increased understanding of 
primate behaviour and the evolutionary significance of animal behaviour more 
generally, strengthened by analogy, the possibility of evolutionary explanations of 
human behaviour. As more detailed accounts of primate and especially chimpanzee 
behaviour and cognition began to emerge, the similarities between humans and other 
animals became more apparent, especially in the social sphere. Like humans, 
chimpanzees were revealed to live in complex social groups, hunt for meat, engage in 
food sharing, and use tools (e.g. Goodall, 1986) 
Another important factor in the re-emergence of evolutionary explanations in 
psychology and the social sciences was the development of a range of auxiliary 
theories in the 1970's by Trivers, Hamilton and Maynard-Smith, which helped to 
provide increasingly satisfactory evolutionary explanations of a broad range of 
phenomena, especially social phenomena. This growing interest in the role of 
evolutionary explanations in the social sciences was reflected in the launching of 
several journals such as Ethology and Sociobiology, Behavioural Ecology and 
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Sociobiology, and Human Nature, all devoted to articles developing evolutionary 
explanations of human and animal behaviour. 
It is unlikely that the reemergence of evolutionary explanations in psychology can be 
attributed in any significant way, to social and political factors. As Degler (1991) 
points out, the resurgence of evolutionary accounts of human behaviour emerged in 
the 1960's and 1970's at a time when liberalism in politics was widespread. Indeed, 
the somewhat negative reception of sociobiology by liberal political groups and like-
minded scientists bears testimony to the unfavorable political climate in which the 
new developments emerged. It would seem then that a variety of a factors linked to 
the explanatory coherence of the evolutionary programme can account for its re-
emergence in psychology. In particular, the breadth of the programme was extended, 
or more specifically, increasingly satisfactory explanations were developed for a 
wider class of phenomena relative to competing explanatory accounts such as 
behaviourism. Empirical and conceptual progress in ethology has also contributed to 
the coherence of the programme by providing a richer source of analogy from which 
to draw upon. However, despite the increase in interest in evolutionary explanations 
in psychology since the 1970's, they have not as yet received widespread acceptance. 
Advances in biology more generally at both an empirical and conceptual level suggest 
that the evolutionary research programme in psychology is more explanatorily 
coherent than ever it has been. The evolutionary programme certainly promises the 
most unifying explanatory scheme available to psychologists. Although questions of 
explanatory breadth are hard to determine on a global scale, the sheer range and 
diversity of phenomena in psychology and the social sciences which have been 
explained from an evolutionary perspective is indicative of the wide scope of the 
programme. Evolutionary explanations have been used to explain phenomena in 
perceptual psychology (e.g., Shepard, 1984, 1987, 1992), cognitive psychology (e.g., 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Pinker, 
1994) social psychology (e.g., Simpson & Kenrick, 1996) neuropsychology (e.g., 
Gazzaniga, 1992), developmental psychology (e.g., Hazen & Shaver, 1987; 
McDonald, 1992), emotion (Plutchik, 1980) and clinical psychology (Marks, 1987, 
Stevens & Price, 1996) among others. Certainly no other theoretical approaches in 
psychology display this kind of explanatory breadth. Moreover, the kinds of 
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explanations that are deployed typically use few special assumptions and invoke the 
same kind of argument patterns which are used to explain biological phenomena in 
general. 
More and more detailed studies of animal mind and behaviour have also increased the 
explanatory coherence of the evolutionary programme by providing richer sources of 
analogy to draw on in the development of increasingly more adequate adaptation 
explanations of human psychological phenomena. The burgeoning research on social 
cognition in group living primates, for example, is drawn upon in the development of 
evolutionary explanations of human social behaviour and in the discussion of specific 
adaptations designed for group living. The evolutionary research programme also 
displays a high degree of internal coherence or consistency in that specific theories in 
the programme are mutually consistent with other theories and ultimately with the 
principle of natural selection at the hard core of the programme. 
Given the high degree of explanatory coherence manifested by the evolutionary 
research programme what reasons can be forwarded for its lack of widespread 
acceptance in psychology? One reason that has been, and to some extent still remains, 
prevalent is related to concerns over the moral implications of the evolutionary 
research programme in psychology. Evolutionary explanations have often been 
associated with right-wing political positions and a deterministic view of human 
nature. However, I see no good reason why this should necessarily be the case. In fact 
I think it is just as easy to use evolutionary theory to support left-wing politics and 
liberal causes. For example, one might stress the important role of sociality, 
cooperation and group cohesiveness in the evolution of social species to support the 
importance of harmonious community life, or perhaps emphasise the continuity 
between humans and other animals in a defense of animal rights, or point out the 
ecological interconnectiveness of all life in the development of an environmental 
ethic. 
The more general problem in the context of perceive moral unacceptability is that 
psychologists and social scientists, typically speaking, have a poor general 
understanding of evolutionary theory and of the nature of evolutionary explanations. 
The evolutionary research programme, therefore, is perceived to be less explanatorily 
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coherent than it otherwise might be. In order to evaluate the epistemic value of an 
evolutionary research programme, as many have noted (e.g., Kuhn, 1962, Thagard, 
1992, Giere, 1988), it is essential to fully get 'inside' the programme and to clearly 
understand it's conceptual structure. The way psychologists are educated typically 
precludes the development of such an understanding of evolutionary theory. Although 
there are courses in evolutionary psychology, comparative psychology and related 
subjects, these are neither compulsory nor widespread.2 It is no wonder that 
psychologists typically emerge with a poor understanding of the nature of 
evolutionary theory. 3 
The lack of understanding of evolutionary theory by psychologists clearly contributes 
to the perceived inadequacy of the evolutionary programme in psychology, but I 
would suggest it is not the only or even primary reason. My discussion of the various 
challenges to the evolutionary programme in psychology in chapters four to nine 
suggest that evolutionary explanations have an important but not exclusive role to 
play in furthering our understanding of psychological phenomena. A clearer 
understanding of the perceived inadequacy of the evolutionary programme can be 
obtained by a focus on the kinds of explanations that it offers us and its relations to 
other kinds of explanations in psychology. The lack of acceptability of the 
evolutionary research programme in psychology can be traced to, among other things, 
questions regarding the programme's external coherence. That is, there is 
considerable confusion among psychologists about the way that evolutionary 
explanations might be related to other sorts of explanations in psychology. 
Levels of analysis and evolutionary explanations in psychology 
In chapter two I outlined a frequently used distinction between the different levels of 
analysis which explanations in psychology can be drawn from. We can 
simultaneously provide functional, physiological, psychological, and social 
explanations for many phenomena of interest to psychologists. Moreover, the 
2 The same could be said for other important areas of psychology such as theoretical and historical 
psychology, with similar results. 
3 I do not mean this, in any sense, as a criticism of psychologists, but more as a general point regarding 
some of the institutional reasons for the lack of acceptability of evolutionary explanations in 
psychology. 
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different kinds of explanations that we employ can be conceptualised as being either 
ultimate or proximate in nature. Similarly, the ethologist Niko Tinbergen (1963) has 
provided an influential distinction between four types of why questions that we can 
direct at biological systems. We can legitimately ask questions of a functional, 
phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and mechanistic nature. In explaining some biological 
entity we can describe its adaptive function, its evolutionary history, its 
developmental trajectory and the proximate physiological and psychological 
mechanisms which produce it. These various distinctions, based on levels of spatial 
and temporal analysis, immediately suggest one way that we might understand the 
role of evolutionary explanations in psychology. Perhaps the evolutionary programme 
can be seen to furnish us with functional and phylogenetic explanations, that is 
ultimate ones, whereas mainstream psychological theory provides us with proximate 
explanations of the relevant developmental, psychological, social and physiological 
processes which underlie the phenomena of interest. Differences of opinion emerge, 
however, in terms of just how these different kinds of explanations are related to one 
another. Roughly speaking, there are four different stances that could be taken on the 
relevance and role of ultimate explanations in psychology. These different positions 
suggest different roles for the evolutionary programme in psychology and indicate 
different beliefs about the relation of evolutionary explanations to other sorts of 
explanations in psychology. 
(1) Proximate explanations of human psychological phenomena screen off ultimate 
explanations. Evolutionary theory, therefore, is explanatorily irrelevant in 
furthering our understanding of psychological and social facts. 
(2) Evolutionary explanations can tell us about ultimate but not proximate causes. The 
evolutionary programme has a limited role to play in explaining psychological 
phenomena. Evolutionary theory, therefore, is simply compatible with mainstream 
psychological theory. 
(3) Ultimate explanations provide explanatory support for proximate explanations of 
psychological phenomena. The evolutionary programme will play an important 
role in our understanding of psychological facts. Evolutionary theory, therefore, 
sublates or reinforces mainstream psychological theory. 
(4) Ultimate explanations explain proximate explanations. The evolutionary 
programme should be accepted by psychologists as the dominant theoretical 
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paradigm. Evolutionary theory, therefore, incorporates mainstream psychological 
theory. 
Which one of these four alternatives best represents the conceptual situation in 
psychology will not be an all or nothing affair. Different phenomena in psychology 
may be best understood in terms of any of these four different positions on the 
relationship between ultimate and proximate explanations. 
Generally speaking, however, position one and two are unlikely to be tenable stances 
to take in psychology. Although I do not reject the possibility that proximate causes 
can screen-off ultimate ones, it is unlikely that this will typically be the case. For 
example, in explaining the ritualised homosexuality (H) found in Melanesian cultures, 
we may want to primarily invoke proximate causes, in terms of the beliefs prevalent 
in the community (C). We could also provide ultimate explanations of just why these 
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beliefs happen to be present in these cultures. We may want to invoke specific social 
learning mechanisms to account for these beliefs and discuss their fit with evolved 
psychological mechanisms (E). The question here is: does C screen off E from X ? 
That is, do socio-cultural explanations make statistically irrelevant evolutionary 
explanations in furthering our understanding of ritualised homosexuality in 
Melanesia? 
I would argue that this cannot be the case. The probability of some pattern of belief 
cannot be independent of how those beliefs came about, unless those beliefs are 
entirely arbitrary and free-floating. However, this is unlikely to be the case, given the 
sorts of reasons outlined in chapters three and eight regarding the importance of 
conceptualising learning as in some sense framed in nature. That is, learning in 
general and social learning in particular must be organised along lines that are 
relevant to the organism. 
In general, it is important to note that the different levels of temporal and spatial 
analysis should not be conceived of in terms of an intellectual division of labour. That 
is, although some specialisation is inevitable, it is clear that explanations drawn at 
different levels are relevant to one another in important ways. The distinction drawn 
288 
in chapter one between explanation as unification and explanation as elucidation of 
mechanisms, I believe, is helpful in this context. The evolutionary programme offers a 
'top-down' approach to explaining psychological phenomena. That is, psychological 
and social facts are viewed as instances of more general regularities. More 
specifically, psychological phenomena are viewed as adaptations or the products of 
adaptations. Mainstream psychological theories, by contrast, typically adopt a bottom-
up approach. Generally speaking, they are concerned with explaining the specific 
mechanisms which underlie individual events. 
In terms of this VIew of explanation, bottom-up explanations can be viewed as 
instantiations of top-down processes. Proximate mechanisms, therefore, are specific 
instances of more general regularities. Of course it is always possible to proceed in an 
elucidation of proximate causal mechanisms without reference to ultimate causes, but 
it is not necessarily desirable. A consideration of ultimate function provides, firstly, 
some clues as to the sorts of mechanisms that might have evolved to solve the 
relevant adaptive problems (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Of course, any given function 
can be realised in multiple ways, so knowing the function of some item will not 
necessarily lay bare its mechanism. However, a consideration of function, coupled 
with knowledge about the phylogenetic history of the organism will provide 
constraints on the sorts of processes that could have evolved to solve specific adaptive 
problems. In evaluating the various theories of proximate mechanisms that 
psychologists develop, therefore, one important criterion will be the theory's fit with 
what is known about our evolutionary history, both in terms of the specific ecological 
conditions under which humans evolved and in terms of the antecedent psychological 
mechanisms that our ancestors were likely to have possessed. 
Given these points, however, ultimate explanations will not always, or perhaps even 
typically explain proximate ones. Firstly, as noted above, proximate explanations are 
underdetermined by ultimate ones. Secondly, there is the possibility that some 
important mechanisms, especially social ones, are emergent. That is, they cannot be 
conceptualized as adaptations, nor do they map onto adaptations in any clear-cut 
manner. 
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The foregoing analysis suggests that the relationship between the evolutionary 
programme and other kinds of explanation in psychology is one of sublation. 
Evolutionary theory provides reinforcement to, or a rationale for, the specific theories 
typically developed by psychologists. This would suggest that the evolutionary 
programme does not offer the promise of conceptual revolution for psychology. 
However, I think it is also clear that in furthering our understanding of many 
psychological phenomena we need to draw on the full resources of the evolutionary 
research programme. To explain, for example, humans' capacity to attribute mental 
states to others, we need to understand the functional significance of the relevant 
underlying mechanisms and the ecological and phylogenetic contexts in which they 
evolved (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Models of the specific psychological mechanisms 
underlying this capacity certainly need to be consistent with the facts about human 
evolution, but are not entirely explained by them. 
Explanatory relevance and explanatory salience 
I would suggest that evolutionary explanations are typically, if not always, 
explanatorily relevant in furthering our understanding of some psychological 
phenomena, but will differ greatly in terms of their explanatory salience. Recalling 
Railton's (1981) distinction drawn in chapter one, we can consider that one central 
goal of science is to provide us with the ideal explanatory text, while specific 
scientific endeavors are often aimed at gleaning explanatory information about the 
world. The ideal explanatory text, as Salmon (1989) notes, determines what counts as 
explanatorily relevant. What is salient, however, will depend on specific features of 
the individual and the kinds of question that they ask of the world. 
Many of the sorts of questions that psychologists ask focus attention on specific 
classes of causes. Typically speaking, requests for information are directed towards 
specific features of the intra-personal, social, and cultural environment. Psychologists 
are often concerned with the causes of individual differences located in particular 
patterns of development or in term of socialization to different cultural contexts. To 
use a simple example, we may ask the question: "Why does Kengo speak Japanese 
whereas Bob speaks English?" Our answer to this question is simple: Kengo was 
raised in an environment of Japanese speakers whereas Bob was exposed to an 
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environment in which English was the main language. This answer makes no 
reference to evolutionary theory at all. Evolutionary theory is not salient in this case. 
It is, however, explanatorily relevant, for it provides the ultimate explanation of how 
it comes to be that Kengo and Bob happen to be capable of learning a language, by 
referring to the selection processes which have led to the evolution of an innate 
universal language acquisition device in humans. 
This evolutionary explanation becomes salient if we ask a slightly different question: 
"Why does Bob, but not Bob's pet frog Frodo, speak English? Our explanation in this 
case will focus on the different evolutionary histories of Bob and Frodo, and how in 
one case this had led to the development of a language acquisition device, and in the 
other it has not. A schematic representation of these different kinds of explanation is 
presented in figure twelve below. 
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Figure twelve Explanation seeking why questions in psychology and the 
salience of different kinds of explanation 
Ultimate explanation Proximate psychological Proximate social Explanation seeking 
explanation 
The ancestors of She possesses a 
modern 
evolved a 
humans language acquisition 
language device. 
acquisition device 
which has the function 
of communication of 
propositional 
knowledge over a serial 
channel. 
explanation why question. 
She was raised in a Why does Kengo speak 
social environment of Japanese? 
Japanese speakers. 
He possesses a He was raised ill a Why does Bob speak 
Language acquisition social environment of English? 
device. English speakers. 
The ancestors of He does not possess a He was raised in an Why does Frodo the 
modern frogs language acquisition environment of English frog not speak English? 
underwent no selection device. 
for the development of 
language acquisition 
devices. 
speakers. 
It is clear, therefore, that evolutionary explanations are relevant in furthering our 
understanding of psychological phenomena, but are they usually salient? Consider 
another example that I have discussed in the previous chapter: the widespread practice 
of infibulation in northeastern African societies. Evolutionary psychologists (e.g., 
Wilson & Daly, 1992) use this example as an instance of the evolved male sexual 
jealousy mechanism in operation. However, the invocation of this mechanism, 
although relevant is not necessarily salient. To explain the practice of infibulation we 
need to primarily advert to the specific beliefs held by men and women in these 
cultures and to the environment that they inhabit. In this context we need to discuss 
the role of Islam, the limited autonomy and status of women generally, the cultural 
necessity of infibulation for marriage, and the importance of marriage as the only way 
of women obtaining any kind of status. To be sure, the kinds of beliefs held by men 
are surely influenced to a considerable degree by their relevant evolved psychological 
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mechanisms. However, reference to male sexual jealousy in this case only furthers our 
understanding of infibulation so far, and fails to fully explain why infibulation is 
practiced in some cultures but not others. 
Buss (1992, p. 2) argues that "all psychological theories, even the most ardently 
environmental ones, imply the existence of psychological mechanisms." Buss argues 
further that such psychological mechanisms are best considered as evolved 
adaptations with distinct evolutionary histories. Buss is surely correct here. At some 
stage our explanations of psychological and social phenomena must invoke 
psychological mechanisms. These mechanisms, moreover, will typically if not 
always, be the product of evolutionary forces. Evolutionary theory, therefore, will be 
relevant in all explanations in psychology. However, the salience of evolutionary 
theory will vary from case to case. I have somewhat laboured this point, but I think it 
is an important one and serves to explain why psychologists are typically reluctant to 
invoke evolutionary theory in explaining the phenomena that they study. Having said 
this, I would suggest that evolutionary theory will often be salient in providing 
adequate explanations for psychological phenomena. As my discussion of jealousy in 
the last chapter suggests, many of the phenomena associated with jealousy, as well as 
the specific mechanisms underlying jealousy, can be explained by the various relevant 
theories of the evolutionary programme. This I think will be the case in many areas of 
psychology. The evolutionary programme becomes less salient, however, in 
explaining sociological or economic phenomena, and is virtually irrelevant in the 
development of theories of literature. 
The evolutionary programme and the future of psychology 
The foregoing discussion suggests that there will be no revolution in psychology. No 
effigies of Skinner, Piaget, or Freud will be burned, and portraits of Darwin will not 
become mandatory on the walls of psychologists' offices. Psychology is not, and will 
never be, an entirely autonomous science. However, it is unlikely that it will be 
subsumed by biology. The evolutionary programme sublates rather than incorporates 
or replaces existing psychological theory. However, in our attempts to unravel the 
ideal explanatory text, psychologists must draw on the full resources of the 
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evolutionary research programme. In this final section I shall discuss some of the 
ways whereby the evolutionary research programme might further progress in 
psychology. 
The evolutionary research programme offers, firstly, a means of furthering conceptual 
progress in psychology. By invoking the concept of proper function, psychologists 
have a potentially powerful tool in improving their categorisation schemes of 
psychological phenomena. By carving the mind at its functional joints, we are likely 
to produce more realistic orderings of phenomena and more clearly demarcate 
information from noise in the way that we address the subject matter of psychology. 
The evolutionary programme also offers psychologists a way of making explanatory 
progress. The use of evolutionary theory helps us to further understand the nature of 
psychological phenomena and provides a means of integrating causal-mechanistic 
explanations with unifying ones. As the evolutionary programme in psychology 
develops it should provide us with more epistemically acceptable adaptation 
explanations of psychological phenomena and extend the scope of such explanations 
to new phenomena. The development of plausible group selection explanations, for 
example, may further our understanding of some social and moral phenomena of 
interest to psychologists (e.g., Wilson, 1997). In general, the evolutionary programme 
offers to bring some kind of conceptual integration to psychology. The phenomena 
that psychologists study and the mechanistic explanations that they develop will be 
typically conceptualised as the product of evolutionary processes, and evaluation of 
alternative proximal theories will be fruitfully undertaken with respect to what we 
know of human evolution. 
Organisational progresses can also be furthered in psychology by acceptance of a 
more prominent role for the evolutionary programme. The relations between different 
areas of psychology and between psychology and the other sciences can be improved 
by a more careful consideration of the role of the evolutionary programme in 
psychology. For example, theories of social learning need to be related to what we 
know about the evolution of our species and the adaptive functions of the mind. The 
realisation that learning is unlikely, in general, to be the result of general purpose 
mechanisms but instead reflects domain-specific processes should further our 
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understanding of how children come to understand the world. Such considerations 
improve the external coherence of both the evolutionary research programme and 
those specific theories of social learning. 
For the acceptance of the evolutionary programme in psychology to become more 
widespread there also needs to be a careful consideration of the institutional features 
of the programme and the way that the programme relates to society. This is also true 
of psychology more generally speaking. It is unlikely that the day to day practices of 
psychologists will change to any considerable degree, even if the evolutionary 
programme plays a more prominent role in psychology then it has in the past. As 
LeCerra and Kurzbin (1995, p. 4) note, " ... all psychologists need not be 
evolutionary psychologists per se, just as all biologists need not be evolutionary 
biologists studying the principles of evolution." However, some institutional features 
of psychology will change if the evolutionary programme becomes more widely 
embraced. Importantly, the education of psychologists would be altered so as to 
include a more prominent discussion of the nature of evolutionary theory and its 
implications for psychology. A more prominent role for comparative and evolutionary 
psychology in the education of psychologists is likely to clarify the role of 
evolutionary explanations in the social sciences for a greater number of psychologists. 
It should also serve to reduce some of the misunderstandings demonstrated by 
psychologists in their evaluation of the evolutionary programme. 
I also believe there needs to be progress made in terms of the relations between he 
evolutionary programme, psychology and society. Evolutionary explanations are often 
tarred with the brush of determinism and are viewed as providing a scientific crutch 
for propping up the status quo in society and justifying extant inequalities. As I have 
discussed in chapter five, these beliefs are neither consistent with evolutionary theory, 
nor are they justifiable ethically speaking. Because our best understanding of human 
nature potentially exerts a profound effect on social policy and human action, more 
attention needs to be paid to interface between the evolutionary programme and 
society. 
Ultimately the evolutionary programme offers to further progress the field of 
psychology by helping to provide richer and more realistic models of the world. By 
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providing a deeper understanding of ourselves, our relations to other species, and the 
world that we live in, we can engage in scientific inquiry in a way commensurate with 
the goal of producing valuable knowledge. 
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